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This dissertation takes Theodor Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory as a point of departure to analyze a 
number of antinomies basic to modern German thought and bourgeois society. The principal 
aim of this dissertation is to interpret Aesthetic Theory’s diagnosis of the nature of aesthetic form 
under the historical conditions of modern bourgeois society since the late eighteenth century 
as a basis for examining the fate of autonomous form as such under capitalism. 
The dissertation opens by exploring Adorno’s late thesis that art in bourgeois society must 
have a double character as “both autonomous and a fait social” if it is to fulfill its condition as 
something made that appears like nature. I analyze the inevitable conflict between two equally 
valid aspects of the work of art: the formal law and its genesis in capitalist production. In order 
to lay bare this antinomy, I employ aesthetic and historical categories from Idealist, Marxist, 
and neo-Kantian traditions that make up the immediate context for Adorno’s aesthetic theory.  
After revisiting Adorno’s proposed resolution to the antinomy, in chapter two I read 
Heinrich von Kleist’s Michael Kohlhaas (1810) in terms of the novella’s effort to reconcile its 
two conflicted tendencies: forensically pursuing its theme, a lawsuit, and moving towards its 
own lawfulness as a literary work. A reconciliation is necessary so that the novella can separate 
itself both from the suggestions of the prevalent juridical discourse and from dominant literary 
habits. While it fails to reconcile them, I argue that by showing the conflict in its formal 
structure it becomes a successful literary work. 
Chapter three examines Hegel’s systematic and historical constitution of the person in his 
Elements of the Philosophy of Rights (1821) and detects a conflict between the self-governing ‘I’ 
and its emergence out of the modern relations of hired labor. As the first major modern 
philosopher to turn to the new discipline of political economy, Hegel was at pains to reconcile 
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the predominantly economic life of bourgeois society with the autonomy of modern 
individuals owing their status as persons to their relationship with hired labor. These 
relationships, by design, make it impossible for all individuals to become persons, however. I 
discuss the difficulties in Hegel’s resolution to this conflict through his theory of the state. 
Chapter four shows how, in Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852), the 
revolutionary act of proclaiming the republic as a political form claiming to represent all people 
comes into conflict with that act as it is conditioned by the rise of capital and the attendant 
rule of one class over all others. Written at a turning point in modern European history when 
the idealist projects of autonomy in philosophy, aesthetics, and politics had reached their 
limits, Marx’s short book reveals, according to my interpretation, the philosophical import and 
the political implications of the conflict between an autonomous form, the French republic, 
and its real conditions of possibility in capitalist society.  
 I conclude the dissertation by discussing the political nature of the aesthetic modality in 
which the modern problem of autonomous form was posed and trace the path to Adorno 
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“NOT TRUTH IN HISTORY, BUT HISTORY IN TRUTH” 
 
In this dissertation, I take Theodor Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory as a point of departure for 
analyzing the philosophical problem of antinomy as an essentially aesthetic problem in modern 
German thought and bourgeois society since the late eighteenth century. Aesthetic Theory, 
according to my interpretation, offers on the one hand a diagnosis of the nature of aesthetic 
form and artistic act, which is entangled in an antinomy under the historically specific 
conditions of capitalist society. It shows, on the other hand, that the problem of antinomy in 
modern philosophy reveals its full import only in modality of the aesthetic. This double aspect 
gives Aesthetic Theory a distinctive place in modern tradition of philosophical aesthetics, making 
it fruitful for grasping the problem of antinomy as it ensnares not only the aesthetic sphere 
but also any other sphere where a self-related structure claims to give itself its own law. In this 
context, I introduce and explore four constitutive problems in aesthetics, literature, right, 
revolutionary politics; namely, the doubled character of art in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, the 
composition of a literary work in Heinrich von Kleist’s Michael Kohlhaas, the constitution of 
the person of rights in Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right, and the making of the republic 
as a modern political form in Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. 
I. ARGUMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE PRESENT DISSERTATION 
I will argue that the autonomous form in bourgeois society faces an antinomic conflict of a 
performative nature between its formal conditions of self-rule and the real conditions of its 
possibility. In modern philosophy, antinomy refers to a conflict between two laws, rules, or 
maxims with the same source of legislation or one between two applications of the same law. 
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In its more general use, antinomy signifies the equivalence of two conflicted views on one and 
the same object. In this dissertation, I work out a performative notion of antinomy as a conflict 
between an act and its conditions of possibility such that both the act and its conditions hold 
valid on independent grounds. This is best shown in the aesthetic sphere, which also offers 
the prospect for a resolution to the antinomy. 
By autonomous form, I mean the act of organizing oneself according to a formal law of 
one’s own. This is a self-related act, the success of which requires an agent, some sort of 
content, and the presence of a specific set of conditions. The act is formal in the sense that it 
is not bound to this or that particular content even though any act does contain something 
specific. The clearest example among the four cases of autonomous form that I will discuss in 
the following chapters is given by the Hegelian structure of the person. As a human individual, 
the person is an embodied subject possessing unique physical and psychological properties; 
for example, skin color, particular mental abilities, a particular language he or she speaks, and 
a certain social or familial background. Despite all these properties that differentiate one 
individual from an other, each person is nonetheless formally equal to another person, because 
both individuals can separate themselves from their particular properties and grasp themselves 
as an abstract, free ‘I.’  
There is a certain similarity to this in the aesthetic realm; however, unlike with a person, 
the agency of the aesthetic act is a source of frustrating controversy. Does the aesthetic object 
form itself of its own accord, in virtue of a metaphysical force, or is this act a mere illusion 
reinforced by the observer of the act and the institutions sponsoring the act? I argue in line 
with Adorno that what is unique about the aesthetic act is not a dogmatic clinging to its 
autonomy, nor a facile transfer to other spheres, but the aesthetic act’s unique awareness of 
its conditions of success as a self-related autonomous act. When we put an act, a text, an event 
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in context, our goal is to improve clarity in order to better grasp the matter at hand. Context 
sheds light on the matter by embracing it like a member within its bond of relations, and thus 
making it explainable or justifiable. Aesthetic form may be defined as a phenomenon whose 
very relation to its own context of genesis becomes an issue for it as well as for the observer.1   
In taking Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory as its point of departure, the dissertation treats the 
aesthetic in two ways. In one sense, it holds the aesthetic on an equal footing with the three 
other spheres––literature, right, politics; in another sense, it examines the aesthetic as a 
distinctive sphere insofar as the constitutive problems of other spheres most decisively 
become visible in it. What distinguishes the aesthetic form from other forms of autonomy, I 
will demonstrate, is the awareness of the aesthetic form of its antinomy, hence its desire to 
resolve it. The aesthetics offers the modality for articulating non-aesthetic problems. Yet, I do 
not intend to employ it merely as an explaining term for other spheres. Rather, it is the aim of 
this dissertation to show that any attempt to resolve the aesthetic antinomy itself requires an 
engagement with literary, legal-philosophical, and political categories, as stated by Aesthetic 
Theory’s maxim, “All aesthetic categories must be defined both in terms of their relation to the 
world and in terms of art's repudiation [lossage] of that world.” (AT: 138/ÄT: 209) The same 
holds true, as I will argue, for literary, philosophical, and political categories. If these 
categories––such as structure, agency, organization, lawfulness, relation, parts––aid us in 
appreciating the constitution of the autonomous work of art, the well-organized poetic text, 
the self-related person, and the self-determining republic, where each structure is regarded in 
its own right, this appreciation will not be adequate if not brought to bear on the context 
                                                     
1 In my insistence with Adorno on the antinomy of the aesthetic, I argue against taking the conflicts between 
aesthetic autonomy and other autonomous formal spheres, theoretical or practical, to be false or none-existence. 
For the latter view, see Andrea Kern and Ruth Sonderegger’s “Intorduction” to their edited volume Falsche 
Gegensa ̈tze: Zeitgenössische Positionen zur philosophischen Ästhetik (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2002), esp. 7–9. 
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against which the specific structure forms itself and on the real conditions that underlie that 
act of self-forming. 
The innovative aspect of Adorno’s late work on aesthetics, which I regard as a response to 
the problem of antinomy as he received it from the German-Idealist and neo-Kantian 
traditions, lies in its unceasing commitment to the two aspects of any formal constitution, 
namely, its validity and its genesis––hence to the conflicts arising from them. In this regard, 
while this dissertation intends primarily to contribute to philosophical aesthetics in general and 
Adorno’s aesthetic theory in particular, the way the dissertation poses its questions contains 
suggestions for tackling problems in literary criticism, the Hegelian political philosophy, and 
the Marxist theory of modern society.  
This dissertation begins in chapter one by exploring Adorno’s late thesis that art in 
bourgeois society must have a double character — as “both autonomous and a fait social” — 
if it is to fulfill its condition as something made that appears like nature. The thesis derives 
from the tension between Adorno’s two commitments. On the one hand, Adorno’s 
understanding of art’s autonomy as imitating natural beauty owes much to certain trends in 
German Idealist aesthetics. On the other hand, he embraces Marx’s view that under a capitalist 
mode of production, the commodity is the universally necessary form of any product as a 
product of labor (see C: 951, 953). I analyze the antinomy between these two equally valid 
aspects of the work of art: the formal law by which it becomes a separate sphere and its own 
genesis that places it back in the context of capitalist production. The latter robs art of its 
autonomy while, at the same time, making this autonomy historically possible by granting art 
the semblance of something self-sufficient: a product of labor that appears to be sui generis. 
Adorno makes this argument by resorting to Marx’s analysis of the commodity form. An 
Idealist account of the autonomy of the artwork is not adequate to describe this antinomy, 
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and must concern itself both with the real conditions of the rise of this autonomy without 
giving up its claim to autonomy. I close this chapter by revisiting Adorno’s proposed 
resolution to the antinomy through the categories of the sublime and the ridiculous.2   
One might ask why I choose to read Adorno’s aesthetic theory in tandem with the other 
texts I chose for this project. The three main works presented here—by Kleist, Hegel, and 
Marx—roughly mark the beginning and the end of the period in modern European history 
between the 1789–1792 French Revolution and the 1848–1852 Revolutions in France, 
Germany, and other countries. As such, this period provides the richest articulations of, in 
Castoriadis’s terms, the project of autonomy in philosophy, politics, aesthetics, and literature.3 
The Idealist aesthetics of autonomy, for my purposes, can be roughly summarized by Karl 
Philip Moritz’s statement on the beautiful as that which is complete in itself, owing nothing to 
the relations, intentions, and purposes of the real world. Moritz developed his aesthetics of 
autonomy towards the end of the eighteenth century along with Schiller, Kant, and the early 
Romantics. As an endpoint of this development, I take Hegel’s follower Friedrich Theodor 
Vischer’s aesthetic work in the wake of the former’s highly generative aesthetics. I refer here 
specifically to the first volume of Vischer’s Ästhetik, oder die Wissenschaft des Schönen (Aesthetics, 
or the Science of the Beautiful, published in 1846), in which he constitutes beauty as the unity of 
two opposed moments, idea and reality.4  
                                                     
2 By making this case, we will be able to bring out the significance of what is called, not without a touch of 
disdain, Adorno’s “shift to aesthetics”; See Rudiger Bubner, Modern Philosophy in German. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981, 179–182. It is important to note that there is not such a late or sudden shift in Adorno’s 
thought: indeed he started with aesthetic problems and remained consistently concerned with these questions 
throughout. Cf. Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the 
Frankfurt Institute (New York: FP, 1977), 43–45. 
3 I borrow the expression “project of autonomy” from Cornelius Castoriadis, World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, 
Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination, trans. David Ames Curtis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 
132, 340. For a discussion of the philosophical presuppositions of Idealist aesthetics, see Leonardo F. Lisi, 
Marginal Modernity: The Aesthetics of Dependency from Kierkegaard to Joyce (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 
23–56. 
4 Friedrich Theodor Vischer, Ästhetik, oder Wissenschaft des Schönen. Erster Theil: Die Metaphysik des Schönen 
(Reutlingen & Leipzig: Carl Mäcken, 1846). See esp. §§ 41–69. Kai Hammermeister in The German Aesthetic 
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The post-March period, following the sobering failures of the 1848 republican and socialist 
revolutions, engendered anti-autonomy projects in German thought: materialist, naturalist, 
psychologist, and sociological programmata were undertaken by a “skeptical generation” that 
radically criticized Idealist understandings of knowledge, beauty, the moral act, and 
revolutionary politics.5 In a gross simplification, one could describe the common goal of these 
efforts as a confrontation between the ideals and the real conditions of life—or a conflict 
between formal structures and their context of genesis, or of speculative knowledge and 
experience.6 The poles of autonomy and sociohistorical genesis need not be apportioned 
exclusively to two separate eras, however. The relation between the two poles had already been 
problematized by the first half of the nineteenth century, both in political philosophy and in 
literature, as can be seen, at least, in Kleist’s Michael Kohlhaas (1810) and Hegel’s Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right (1821).7  
                                                     
Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) seldom mentions Vischer in his account of the 
development of philosophical aesthetics from its idealist and romantic inception in eighteenth century, which for 
him was instigated by Baumgarten, Mendelssohn, and Moritz. On the one hand, Peter Bürger in Zur Kritik der 
idealistischen Ästhetik (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1983), acknowledges the significance of Moritz for the rise of 
the autonomy aesthetics in German tradition, adding that this figure had been underestimated (by 1983) in the 
literature (120, see also 120–124, 145–151). And yet, there is no mention of Vischer in his account. On the other 
hand, in a recent and extensive history of poetics and aesthetics in the German speaking world, Sandra Richer 
places Vischer’s works in the context of a post-Idealist poetics, at the “Turning Point After Hegel and Beyond.” 
See A History of Poetics: German Scholarly Aesthetics and Poetics in International Context, 1770–1960 (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2010), 112–121. For a discussion of Moritz’s place in Idealist aesthetics, see Peter Szondi, Poetik und 
Geschichtsphilosophie I: Antike und Moderne in der Ästhetik der Goethezeit, Hegels Lehre von der Dichtung, ed. Senta Metz 
and Hans-Hagen Hilderbrandt (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1974), 82–98. See also Georg Lukács, “Karl Marx 
und Friedricch Theodor Vischer,” in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Ästhetik (Berlin: Aufbau, 1956), and Willi Oelmüller, 
Friedrich Theodor Vischer und das Problem der nachhegelischen Ästhetik (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1952).  
5 See Klaus Christian Köhnke, The Rise of Neo-Kantianism: German academic philosophy between idealism and positivism, 
trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge, University Press, 1991), 67–148. On the rise of Realpolik or the 
politics of power as a reaction to the liberal-socialist revolutionary politics of the pre-March period, see Gerhard 
Plumpe and Edward Mcinnes, eds, Bürgerlicher Realismus und Gründerzeit 1848–1890, vol. 6, Hansers 
Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur (Munich: Hanser, 1966), 17–83.  
6 In de Vries’s opening statement in his Minimal Theologies, “In the modern age thought increasingly must do 
without a substantial and fundamentally onto-theological determination of philosophical reason and rationality. 
No longer can modern thinkers reconcile the concept of theoretical reasons with the idea of an all-encompassing 
speculation on metaphysical grounds” (3).  
7 For a detailed discussion of the relation between system-building and genesis (in a general historical and 
philosophical sense and not necessarily in relation to the structure of bourgeois society) in the Idealist period see 
Yun Sang Kim, System und Genesis: Zur Theorie des Systematisch-Genetischen in der deutschen Romantik und im deutschen 
Idealismus (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004). 
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Both works, whose only shared interest seems to be the idea of right, were well aware of 
the presuppositions of their respective positions on literature, right, personality, and the state. 
The subject matter of Kleist’s novella—the lawsuit over two horses taken away unlawfully 
from Kohlhaas the sixteenth-century horse dealer—governs the organization of the work with 
as much force as its counter subject matter: the fantastic theme of prophecies by a gypsy 
woman, a popular figure in the Romantic literature of Kleist’s time. The considering of the 
relationship between these two seemingly disparate themes has served as a distinct irritation 
for interpreters of this work. In chapter two I read Michael Kohlhaas in terms of the novella’s 
effort to, if not reconcile, at least arbitrate these two conflicted tendencies: forensically 
pursuing its primary topic, a lawsuit, and moving towards its own lawfulness as a literary work. 
This reconciliation is necessary in order for the novella to separate itself both from the 
suggestions of the prevalent juridical discourse and from the dominant literary conventions.  
In contrast, Hegel took issue with theories of social contract by accusing them of failing to 
give a compelling account of the concrete conditions under which modern free individuals 
claim their natural rights. However, he also criticized the historicist genetic accounts to justify 
positive rights, most notably advocated by the historical school of law. As the first major 
modern philosopher to explore the new discipline of political economy, Hegel was at pains to 
reconcile the dominantly economic life of bourgeois society with the autonomy of the modern 
individual. In chapter three, I turn to Hegel’s systematic and historical constitution of the 
person in his Elements of the Philosophy of Rights (1821) and detect a conflict between the self-
governing ‘I’ and its emergence out of the modern relations of hired labor. I discuss the 
difficulties in Hegel’s resolution to this conflict in terms of his theory of the state. It was Marx’s 
pamphlet, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852), that revealed the full import of the 
conflict between an autonomous structure, the French republic, and its real conditions of 
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possibility — that is, the rule of capital. Chapter four shows how, in Marx’s pamphlet, the 
revolutionary act of proclaiming the republic as a political form claiming to represent all people 
comes into conflict with that act as it is conditioned in the context of the rise of capital and 
the attendant rule of one class over all others. Finally, I conclude this dissertation by discussing 
the political nature of the aesthetic modality and its path in reverse: from Adorno to Marx, 
through Kleist and Hegel. 
II. THE GENERAL PROBLEMATIC: VALIDITY VERSUS GENESIS  
For all the attacks waged against it, from natural sciences and realpolitik, among other 
influences, the development of German thought since the 1848–1852 period has never wholly 
retreated from its Idealist aspirations. Rather, these attacks generated a problematic that 
transformed it into one of the central concerns of the neo-Kantian and phenomenological 
movements during the late nineteenth- and early twentieth century: validity versus genesis. 
Adorno’s thought generally, and his aesthetic theory in particular, inherited the problems of 
this post-1852 world.8   
To locate the problematic in Adorno’s thought, to which he later on offered an aesthetic 
response, I propose looking at his early correspondence with a newly found peer Alfred Sohn-
Rethel. While in Oxford, Adorno received a letter from Sohn-Rethel in which he outlined an 
idea for an article he wanted to submit to the Journal for Social Research edited by Max 
                                                     
8 See Werner Schneiders, Deutsche Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 48–62. On the place 
of philosophical thought in distinction to natural sciences in the Neo-Kantian movement, see the following essay 
in a recent collection of works on Neo-Kantianism: Andrea Staiti, “The New-Kantians on the meaning and status 
of philosophy,” in New Approaches to Neo-Kantianism, ed. Nicolas de Warren and Andrea Staiti (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015): 19–38. Cf. Martin Jay, Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School 
and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), 41–85. Of course, Jay’s 
focus is more on the generation of the Young-Hegelians in the pre-March decade. For a thorough and 
illuminating discussion of the ways in which the Neo-Kantian thought paved the way for the rise of the Frankfurt 
School Critical Theory, see Andrew Arato, “The Neo-Idealist Defense of Subjectivity,” Telos: Critical Theory of the 
Contemporary, no. 21 (Fall 1974): 108–161. 
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Horkheimer in New York. Adorno was so enthused about the intellectual affinity he found 
with Sohn-Rethel that he compared it to the famous encounter between Leibniz and Newton 
regarding their similar yet independent discoveries of differential calculus. He then writes, “I 
believe not to be exaggerating when I tell you that your letter meant to me the greatest shaking 
that I have experienced in philosophy since my first encounter with [Walter] Benjamin’s work 
–– and that occurred in the year 1923!”9 This one occurred in 1936. 
Sohn-Rethel places his central insight in the intersection of Idealist epistemology and 
Marxist view of the relation between theory and praxis, “The historical emergence of theory as 
endowed with logical autonomy and a self-sufficiency vis-à-vis the practical-material being of 
human beings, that is to say, the historical emergence of ‘knowledge’ in any idealist 
understanding, in the last instance can only be accounted for out of a peculiar and very deep-
seated break in the praxis of human [mode of] being.”10 He aims “to give a materialist 
explanation [Erklärung] of Idealist interpretation of rational thinking.”11 To do so, he proposes 
examining the historical process of socialization, aided by the Marxist categories of exchange, 
exploitation, and the commodity form. In sum, his stated goal is to “critically liquidate the 
apriorism.”12 In his response to Sohn-Rethel, Adorno points out their shared problems:  
That is, as you know, first of all the whole complex of history and “historicity” 
of the commodity form; then the problem of mediation between infrastructure 
                                                     
9 Adorno to Sohn-Rethel, November 17, 1936, in Theodor W. Adorno and Alfred Sohrn-Rethel Briefwechsel 1936-
1968, ed. Christoph Gödde (Berlin: edition text + kritik: 1991), 32. Though that letter is lost, Sohn-Rethel sent a 
more detailed exposé of his thesis in a second letter, the first in a series of exposés and ever-developing versions 
over the decades to come. For Sohn-Rethel’s own summary of the development of his thesis, see Alfred Sohn-
Rethel, Geistige und Körperliche Arbeit: Zur Epistemologie der Abendla ̈ndischen Geschichte (Weinheim: VCN, Acta 
Humaniora, 1989), Preface. 
10 Sohn-Rethel to Theodor W. Adorno, November 3, 1936, Briefwechsel, 13. 
11 Alfred, Sohn-Rethel, Geistige und körperliche Arbeit, 153, 154.  
12 Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Warenform und Denkform, mit zwei Anha ̈ngen (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1978), 90–102. 
Sohn-Rethel’s project openly differentiates itself from competing genetic accounts of knowledge, “the bourgeois-
sociological reduction,” which understands genesis in terms of crude facticity (krude Faktizität). Briefwechsel, 15. 
He might have in mind Karl Mannheim’s work published in 1929; Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology 
of Knowledge, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (San Diego: Harvest, 1936). 
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and ideology, to which I myself have a suggestion for a solution 
[Lösungsvorschlag] to offer, and regarding which I am most excited to know 
whether it coincides with yours; and finally the “overcoming of the antinomy 
of genesis and validity” [“Überwindung der Antinomie von Genesis und Geltung”] 
with which my present book essentially deals.13   
 
Two weeks later, after he had received a longer exposé of Sohn-Rethel’s work, Adorno 
again invokes the agreement  
of which you may have realized traces in the concept of false synthesis in the 
jazz work, but which essentially consists in the crossover (= dialectical 
identification) of Idealism in dialectical materialism; in the knowledge that not 
truth in history but history is contained in truth [daß nicht Wahrheit in Geschichte 
sondern Geschichte in der Wahrheit enthalten ist]. 
 
He eventually sums up their shared program on this high note, “I now believe with certainty 
what I since long assumed from my effort: that we can concretely succeed to explode Idealism 
[den Idealismus zu sprengen]: not through the “abstract” antithesis of praxis (like according to 
Marx) but out of Idealism’s own antinomic [die eigene Antinomik des Idealismus].”14 
Although he brings up dialectical materialism as if it were a weapon against Idealism, 
Adorno promptly adds that this is not a matter of discrediting Idealism by contrasting it with 
“‘abstract’ antithesis of praxis (like according to Marx).” Rather, he is interested in “Idealism’s 
own antinomic.” I take this to be a statement on Adorno’s lifelong project, in general, and his 
later aesthetic theory, in particular, which sought to resolve some of the contradictions in 
Idealist philosophy and aesthetics once they are exposed to the Marxian categories but in such 
                                                     
13 Adorno to Sohn-Rethel, Oxford, November 3, 1936, Briefwechsel, 10. The book in question is Adorno’s On the 
Metacritique of Epistemology (Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie) that was published in 1956 and translated into 
English as Against Epistemology: a Metacritique. Studies in Husserl and the Phenomenological Antinomies, trans Willis 
Domingo (London: Polity, 1982). 
14 Adorno to Sohn-Rethel, November 17, 1936, Briefwechsel, 32.  
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a manner as to avoid confronting the abstract antithesis of praxis. Adorno would, of course, 
modify his view of Marx’s own approach, using Marxian categories such as the commodity 
form and the law of exchange in his later works, but not by way of explaining away Idealism. 
He differentiates the use of his categories from Sohn-Rethel’s, perhaps under the influence of 
Horkheimer.15  
Emerging in the framework of the newly constructed discipline of Erkenntnistheorie (theory 
of knowledge), the problematic of validity versus genesis primarily revisits the Kantian 
relationship between a priori knowledge as exclusively claimed by philosophy, and its 
conditions of possibility. The claim is that knowledge “though genetically it cannot be gained 
without experience, can nonetheless be grounded [or justified] in its validity without recourse 
to experience.”16 Or in Husserl’s words, “All knowledge ‘begins with experience,’ but it does 
not therefore ‘arise’ from experience.”17 To take an example from pure logic as the primary 
site of the debate: A, B, C are judgments based on observation, experiment, and induction, 
such that if A is the case, then B is true, and if B is the case, then C is true. Now, if we conclude 
that if A is true, then C must also be true, we have a logical law. This logical law is not of the 
same nature as the natural or factual laws underpinning the three judgments of A, B, and C. 
For Husserl, a natural law is established “by induction from the singular facts of experience.” 
Logical laws, in contrast, have “a priori validity,” because “they are established, not by 
                                                     
15 Max Horkheimer rejected Sohn-Rethel’s proposal for article. His reasons are given in a letter to Adorno where 
he sharply criticizes the former’s crude, ahistorical, and indeed abstract deployment of Marxian categories. In 
Horkheimer’s eyes, Sohn-Rethel used Marx only to exemplify his own conception of “concreteness” “as radically 
as possible,” whereas he could have equally well resorted to biology, psychology for his genetic debunking of 
Idealism. See Horkheimer to Adorno, December, 8, 1936, qtd. in Briefwechsel, 41. For a discussion of the 
ambivalence or the “dual quality” in Adorno’s engagement with Marx and Marxist critique of metaphysics, see 
Hent de Vries, Minimal Theologies: Critiques of Pure Reason in Adorno and Levinas (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005), 261–271. 
16 Gottfried Gabriel, Erkenntnis (Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), 15. Cf. also Míkel Dufrenne, The Notion of the 
A Priori, trans. Edward S. Casey (Evanston, Il: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 4. 
17 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. 1, book 1, trans. J. N. Findlay (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1970), § 24, 109. 
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induction, but by apodeicitic inner evidence.”18 The task of philosophy is then to justify this 
independent validity of the laws of thinking on its own terms.  
Adorno’s position on the problematic can be found sketched in the context of the 1960s 
debate on positivism in German sociology in this passage: “In the realm of so-called 
constitutional problems [Konstitutionsprobleme] they are inseparably united, no matter how much 
this may be repugnant to discursive logic.”19 The problem of constitution inquires under what 
conditions a structure emerges that claims to be self-related and justifiable on its own terms 
alone. In tackling this question, Adorno chose Husserl as his main interlocutor in logic and 
epistemology, while in aesthetics he took issues with Wilhelm Dilthey who undertook a similar 
constitution of aesthetics and poetics, which I will touch on in chapter one.20 
For all the enthusiasm that Adorno shows in his letter, quoted above, for his new friend’s 
project, there is an essential difference between Adorno and Sohn-Rethel when it comes to 
resolving the “antinomy of validity and genesis.” Sohn-Rethel seems certain of a positive way 
to “solve” the tension, if any, between the autonomy of theories and their origin in social 
                                                     
18 Husserl, § 21, 99. On validity and genesis, or validity and existence, which first was introduced by Hermann 
Lotze, see the latter’s work, Logic in three books: Of Thought, of Investigation, and of Knowledge, trans. Bernard Bosanquet 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1884), 437–445. This distinction in other terms is one between the context of discovery and 
the context of justification of the subject matter as proposed by Hans Reichenbach in his book Experience and 
Prediction: An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), 
6-7. See also Gabriel, Erkenntnis, 2–26. 
19 Adorno’s introduction to The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: 
Heinemann, 1976), 22; see also 6; “Einleitung zum ‘Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie,’” GS 8: 304. 
For further discussion on the problematic in Adorno, see Jürgen Haberman, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: 
Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1996), 129–130, 323–324. The recent Anglo-
Saxon scholarship on Adorno has paid attention to the problematic of validity in relation to genesis via his 
Husserl- and Kant-interpretation, though not in the context of his aesthetic theory. See Brian O’Conner, Adorno’s 
Negative Dialectic: Philosophy and the Possibility of Critical Rationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2004), 127–148; Peter 
Gordon, Adorno and Existence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 58-–70; Roger Foster, Adorno: 
the Recovery of Experience (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 89–112. For an earlier account of 
the Neo-Kantians along with a concise note about their influence on Adorno, see Gillian Rose, Hegel contra 
Sociology, (London: Verso, 2009 [1981]), 1–23, 29.  
20 See Wilhelm Dilthey, Poetry and Experience, trans. Rudolf A. Makkreel, and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), esp. the essays, “The Imagination of the Poet: Elements for a Poetics” (1887), 
29–174, and “The Three Epochs of Modern Aesthetics and Its Present Task” (1892), trans. Michael Neville, 
175–221. 
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practice. The key position in Adorno’s letter of response relates to his view that “not truth is 
in history, but history is contained in truth,” which is the result of what he calls “the crossover 
of Idealism in dialectical materialism.”21 The point is not, that is, to deploy the Marxian theory 
of modes of production as, to take Derrida’s term, a “genetic technique,” opposed to the 
“structural techniques” of idealists, in order to tear apart the validity of a philosophical 
problem or a claim to truth as the justification for a self-contained act according to the terms 
set by itself.22 It is rather to answer the question of why certain persistent problems emerge 
and assume forms of autonomy. Instead of dispelling the forms, Adorno asks what the 
historical experience contained in their claim to truth is, apart from their conditions of 
arising.23 This question is fundamentally different from the attempt to relativize truth by 
reducing it to its context. On the contrary, the context produces conflict instead of clarity, but 
this conflict is productive, it tells us something about the truth of the matter, which demands 
patiently taking the narrow path of the antithetic. For Adorno, unlike for Sohn-Rethel, the 
relation of Idealism and Marxism remained antinomic. This becomes the case clearly in 
Adorno’s writings on aesthetics. While in both spheres, logic and aesthetics, the inseparability 
of genesis and validity offers a key to Adorno’s position, there is a shift in emphasis from 
genesis to validity in the aesthetic context. Thus, in Aesthetic Theory he writes:  
                                                     
21 Compare the 1930 and 1936 statements with the largely identical formulations from Adorno’s revisiting of 
Husserl in Against Epistemology, 135; GS 5, 141. Cf. also, “[G]enesis dwells in the heart of validity . . . , the truth is 
not present in history, but history in the truth.” Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1959), trans. Rodney Livingstone 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2001), 166. 
22 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 159. 
Written only a few years after Adorno’s death (September, 11, 1969), this text offer formulations of the relation 
between genesis and structure in Husserl that bear striking resemblances to Adorno’s reading of Husserl, though 
perhaps not in its solutions (Cf., e.g. 154–169, 167). For a detailed discussion of the problematic, see Paola 
Marrati, Genesis and Trace: Derrida Reading Husserl and Heidegger (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). See esp. 
3–8 for the articulation of the problematic of thinking “both the autonomy of sense and truth and their birth in 
time.”  
23 In his 1930 inaugural speech, Adorno had held that “The truth-content of a problem is, principally, different 
from the historical and psychological conditions out of which it grows” (“Die Wahrheitsgehalt eines Problems 
ist von den historischen und psychologischen Bedingungen, aus welchen es erwächst, prinzipiell, verschieden”) 
GS 1: 337.  
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In art the difference between the thing made and its genesis––the making––is 
emphatic: Artworks are something made that has become more than something simply 
made. . . . The confounding of artworks with their genesis, as if genesis provided the 
universal code for what has become, is the source of the alienness of art scholarship 
to art: for artworks obey their law of form by consuming [Verzehren] their genesis. (AT: 
179/ÄT: 267)  
 
The distinguishing mark of the aesthetic act with regard to other autonomous forms when 
it comes to the problematic of genesis and validity relates, in my view, to the former’s capacity 
for becoming aware of a conflict with its own genesis and its attempt to do something about 
it––in Adorno’s figurative expression, to consume its own genesis. A consummation of its 
own genesis, successfully or not, bears testimony to the presence of a tension between the act 
and the historical, genetic conditions of its success. As I will argue at length, the truth of 
autonomous artwork hinges for Adorno on this testimony. In this respect, Aesthetic Theory rests 
on this fundamental premise: “The a priori aspect of the artistic act and the state of history no 
longer are attuned to one another [stimmen nicht mehr zusammen], which is not to say that they 
ever harmonized. This incongruity is not to be eliminated by adaptation: The truth, rather, is 
in enduring their conflict” (translation modified; AT: 59/ÄT: 94).24 To grasp this incongruity, 
which betrays the philosophy of history underlying the Aesthetic Theory, an engagement with 
the Marxist dimensions of Adorno’s thought is essential. Just as we saw in his response to 
Sohn-Rethel, here too the deployment of Marxian categories by Adorno is not to explain away 
the aesthetic act by subsuming it under objective structures and modes of production.25   
                                                     
24 “Das Apriori des künstlerischen Ansatzes schlechthin und der Stand der Geschichte stimmen nicht mehr 
zusammen, wenn anders sie je harmonierten; und diese Inkonzinnität ist nicht durch Anpassung zu beseitigen: 
Wahrheit vielmehr, sie auszutragen.”  
25 For an instance of the Marxist account of the artwork in an non-antinomic way, see Hans Heinz Holz, Vom 
Kunstwerk zur Ware: Studien zur Funktion des ästhetischen Gegenstands im Spätkapitalismus (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1972). 
For a critique of this account, again in an non-antinomic way, see Hannelore Schlaffer, “Kritik eines Klischees: 
‘Das Kunstwerk als Ware,’” in Erweiterung der materialistischen Literaturtheorie durch Bestimmung ihrer Grenzen. 
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A decade before Aesthetic Theory, Adorno had used the same verb “austragen” (endure) as 
in the passage quoted above. In a lecture, he argues that the autonomous artwork has to 
“receive and absorb in itself the contradictions between its own real and formal conditions, to 
endure this contradictoriness,” and thereby “perhaps arbitrating [schlichten] it in its image (Ä58: 
165). The formal, a priori condition of the aesthetic act, as I understand it in this dissertation, 
precisely refers to the capacity of the act for separating itself from the real conditions of its 
emergence in a manner similar to pure logical laws. Unlike these laws, however, the act does 
not lose sight of the claims of that genesis, that is, of its own relationship with that which 
remains external to it, otherwise it would “render empty its a priori” (AT: 128/ÄT: 209). When 
Adorno writes that “The autonomous law of form of works protests against logicality even 
though logicality itself defines form as a principle” (ibid.), what he means to say may be 
understood in terms of the formal sensitivity of the aesthetic act to that which logical laws 
tend to pass in silence: the fact of having come to be.26  
Even though Adorno too promises a “suggestion for a solution” to the antinomy in his 
letter, it is nowhere to be found in his works until the late 1960s. The prospect for a solution, 
                                                     
Literaturwissenschaft und Sozialwissenschaften 4, ed. Heinz Schlaffer (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler. 1974). For an 
important attempt in the context of Marxist thought to think together the genesis of literary works and their 
internal, “significant structure,” see Lucien Goldmann, Essays on Method in the Sociology of Literature, trans. William 
Q. Boelhower (St. Louis, MO: Telos Press, 1980), see esp. 75. 
26 Adorno’s emphasis on the validity of the aesthetic law of form (relative to his stressing on the genesis of logical 
laws) have led some readers of his Aesthetic Theory to ascribe an absolute notion of autonomy to it. Peter Bürger’s 
study of the autonomy of art in bourgeois society in his Theory of the Avant-garde (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1984) contains important methodological insights regarding the validity of art’s formal 
separation and its historical genesis. What I find problematic in his account, however, is that he overlooks the 
antinomic relation of the two aspects of art in Adorno (see10, 35–55), and thus taking Adorno’s view of art’s 
autonomy as absolute. See Bürger, Zur Kritik der idealistischen Ästhetik, 88. A recent collections of essays on Aesthetic 
and Artistic Autonomy, edited by Owen Hulatt (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), which focus on Adorno’s aesthetic 
writings, deals with the antinomy of aesthetics form only in one essay where the whole matrix of “autonomizing 
‘thesis’ . . . heteronomizing ‘antithesis’” is held to be mythical residue of idealist “discussions around mental life 
and moral agency.” Casey Haskins, “The Myth of Autonomy Fault Line in Aesthetics,” in Aesthetic and Artistic 
Autonomy, ed. Owen Hulatt (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 127, 126.  
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in my view, lies in his aesthetic theory, in the perspective that it affords on the formal-structural 
relation between an autonomous act and its real conditions as it was first posed via pure logic. 
I introduce aesthetic antinomy in this dissertation as a means for working out Adorno’s 
notion of art’s double character, and further to orient my reading of the texts by Kleist, Hegel, 
and Marx. This term is not intended to impart an exceptional status to the aesthetic; it purports 
rather to emphasize, firstly, that the antinomy problem most fruitfully manifests itself in the 
modality of the aesthetics, and, secondly, that the aesthetic autonomous form itself faces an 
antinomy that has to be settled. While the first point helps explain, in the framework of 
philosophical aesthetics, the structural problems of form in the three spheres of literature, 
right, and revolutionary politics, the latter point confirms the need for going beyond the 
aesthetic sphere in order to find ways for resolving its antinomy. I conclude this introduction 
by clarifying aesthetic antinomy as the special problematic of the present work. 
III. THE SPECIAL PROBLEMATIC: WHAT IS AN AESTHETIC ANTINOMY? 
Three types of antinomy can be discerned in modern philosophy: transcendental antinomy in 
Kant; strict antinomy, or paradox, in logic; and what is known as performative contradiction. 
I begin with the second type of antinomy.27  
Strict antinomy: A contradiction arises when we have A and non-A. In a strict antinomy or 
paradox, by contrast, we encounter “the equivalence of two statements of which one is the 
negation of the other,” where the two sides of the contradiction are “reciprocally negating and 
at once implicating each other.”28 So, we have A l -A. This means that a proposition and its 
                                                     
27 The origin of the term antinomy, prior to gaining philosophical currency during the late eighteenth century in 
the hands of Kant, is usually taken to reside in jurisprudence since the sixteenth century: “The contradiction of 
a law in itself, the contradiction within one law or between two compellingly valid laws.” Deutsches Fremdwörterbuch, 
vol. 2, s.v. “Antinomie,” ed. Hans Schulz et al (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974ff). 
28 Thomas Kesselring, Die Produktivität der Antinomie: Hegels Dialektik im Lichte der genetischen Erkenntnistheorie und 
der formalen Logik (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1984), 98. 
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negation lead to, rather than simply negate, one another. The famous example of this is the 
Paradox of the Liar simplified thus: “This sentence is not true.” This sentence is true only if it 
is not true, and if the sentence is not true it is true. Knoll proposes the following expression 
for strict antinomy: (A + -A)  (A l -A). This is to indicate that in an antinomy we have the 
conjunction of two relations. On the one hand, there is the relation of simple contradiction 
and, on the other, that of implication between the contradictory terms. While we face a 
contradiction between two terms, we see at the same time a back-and-forth movement 
between the two, such that both the contradiction and the reciprocity coexist. The result is a 
negative self-referentiality.29 Such a view of antinomy applies to art only if it can be 
demonstrated that there is indeed a logical contradiction involved in its formulation. But the 
contradiction between the two aspects of art––autonomy and social facticity––is not as 
immediately clear. Moreover, strict antinomy tells us nothing about the conditions that are 
inherent to the antinomic proposition and thus responsible for generating it.  
Transcendental antinomy: First articulated by Kant, transcendental antinomy regards the extent 
to which the fundamental tendencies or laws of reason come into conflict with one another 
in the act of cognition: on the one hand, everything is conditioned under the a priori forms of 
time and place and categories of pure understanding; on the other hand, there is a 
presupposition that everything is unconditioned. Reason’s architectonic tendency “demands 
the absolute totality of conditions for a given conditioned thing, and this can be reached only 
in things in themselves.”30 The thetic system of all conditions must also include the 
unconditioned, for otherwise it would not be absolute, but itself conditioned by another 
condition not included in the system. There is, however, another tendency in reason that 
                                                     
29 Heiko Knoll, “Dialektik und Widerspruch: Erläuterungen zur strikten Antinomie,” in Stefan Müller, ed., 
Probleme der Dialektik Heute (Wiesbaden: VS, 2009), 24. 
30 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 113. Cf. also Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B449. 
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counters this. In Kant’s language, the “propositions of the antithesis are of a kind that they do 
render the completion of an edifice of cognitions entirely impossible.”31 The antithetical 
statements of reason negate the closure of the thetic system set up by reason; they argue that 
the system is itself part of an ever larger causal relationship in which it is impossible to find an 
ultimate, uncaused point of origin.  
If we translate the thetic tendency of reason into the discourse on art’s autonomy, we can 
assert that the artwork is an closed object with an unprovoked source of causality within it 
organizing all elements according to an internal principle.32 However, the antithetic tendency 
asserts the opposite. Namely, the artwork is the product of preexisting and preformed 
materials, whose principle of organization derives from the intentions of the maker, the norms, 
purposes, and functions of making, and all that within an institutional framework baptizes the 
product as “art.”33 Kant solves the antinomies of pure reason by drawing his distinction 
between the appearance of the thing and the thing in itself. The forms and concepts of our 
two stems of knowledge, sensibility and understanding, help us know how appearing things 
are conditioned. They are however useless for knowing whether or how things are conditioned 
in general and in themselves. However, the problem is that what the artwork is in itself only 
shows itself in how it appears.34 Since the relationship of the autonomous art with its own 
                                                     
31 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A474. For further discussion, see Eckart Förster, The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: 
A Systematic Reconstruction, trans. Brady Bowman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 32–38. 
32 A most eloquent case of this notion of autonomy in artwork can be found in Wellbery’s interpretations of 
Goethe’s poems. See David E. Wellbery, The Specular Moment: Goethe’s Early Lyric and the Beginnings of 
Romanticism (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996). See e.g. 22–24. 
33 There is no shortage of anti-autonomous statements on art in contemporary scholarship, especially since the 
Second War. As Helmut Kuhn succinctly puts it in the middle of the past century with regard to the genetic 
theories of art (institutional, psychological, sociological, anthropological, and recently neuroscientific), “Art has 
become an institution, and it may appear more or less redundant further to ask what it additionally is in truth.” 
“Die Ontogenese der Kunst,” in Theorien der Kunst, ed. Dieter Henrich, 81. Cf. Aesthetic Illusion: Theoretical and 
Historical Approaches, ed. Frederick Burwick and Walter Paper (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990).  
34 Art’s “appearance is that of essence and not an appearance for-another but rather art's immanent 
determination” (AT 109; cf. 99). Its being-in-itself and being-for-us are indiscernibly intertwined Georg Lukács, 
Ästhetik III (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1962), 46. 
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conditions becomes an issue for that art, we must widen our concept of antinomy to include 
this relationship.    
Performative antinomy: To define this type of antinomy, we should first consider a 
performative contradiction. Here, the truth of a proposition or the felicity of a speech act 
disappears once confronted with the real conditions of its possibility, which contradict the 
validity of the utterance. “I am dead,” for example, is a case in point: a dead person cannot 
speak, even though the sentence itself has a valid structure and could have truth-value if it 
were “He is dead.” A performative antinomy offers a more complex situation. A successful 
performative utterance, according to Austin, requires several conditions to be in place: An 
accepted conventional procedure must exist, the appropriate persons must invoke the 
procedure, all participants must perform the procedure correctly and completely, there must 
be the relevant intention to do so, and finally, they “must actually so conduct themselves 
subsequently.” While the absence of any of the first four conditions would result in a “misfire,” 
that is, an unsuccessful or infelicitous performative, the absence of any of the last two would 
lead to an abuse of the act that nonetheless is achieved.35 
On this basis, a performative antinomy arises when an utterance or proclamation comes 
into conflict with the conditions of its possibility; yet it is not clear if it thus becomes a misfire 
or an abuse. The act somehow preserves its validity despite being negated by its conditions. 
Performative antinomy becomes aesthetic when form is not indifferent to its conflict, but it 
strives to resolve itself by reflecting on and participating in those conditions. Because this act 
stands in relation to the context from which it has declared its independence, the aesthetic 
antinomy that arises from it takes on an essentially historical nature. The form’s “other” is the 
                                                     
35 See Austin, How to Do Things with Words, ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1962), 14–15, and 16. I return to these conditions in chapter four.  
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commodity condition of modern bourgeois society, and it is in relation to this hostile condition 
that the aesthetic form appears.  
Pippin believes that the “basic antinomy of Adorno’s aesthetics,” on the one hand, regards 
artworks as “connected to and potentially in a critical relation to the sociohistorical reality of 
the age and, on the other hand . . . [is] something like the formal purity of the modern aesthetic 
as such, autonomous and self-defining” and is no antinomy at all. According to him: 
The antinomy itself is based on a premise about the separability of sensible and 
intellectual faculties that came under severe and sustained attack after Kant, above all 
in Hegel. . . . modernist art has largely (but, of course, not completely) de-aestheticized 
the primary relation to the artwork, . . . diminished the importance of the notion of 
some isolated aesthetic experience as such, heightened the interpretive and so 
philosophical dimension of understanding artworks, and so allowed a distinctly act-
centered sort of intelligibility (the artworks as interpretable act or gesture, not occasion 
for a purely aesthetic response).36 
 
These conditions for a successful aesthetic act, as noted above, go beyond the framework 
of the particular work, the perceptivity of the observer, or even the institutions of art generally, 
though reaction to them finds expression only in the work itself. Granted that, according to 
Pippin, the modern subject is capable of effectively uniting the sensible and intellectual aspects 
of the artwork, they might equally well come up with a false synthesis of those aspects within 
the work precisely by failing to pay attention to, or not reaching a sufficiently abstract level of 
the demands of a successful aesthetic act. After all, Pippin himself shows little interest in 
addressing those demands that stem from the structural aspects of capitalist society. These 
aspects find their way into the objective constitution of works of art, generating conflicts with 
                                                     
36 Robert B. Pippin, After the Beautiful: Hegel and the Philosophy of Pictorial Modernism (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2013), 67–68. 
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the claims of the work that no amount of philosophical reflection can settle if this reflection 
fails to heed the way the work itself tries to resolve them. The only remaining “philosophical” 
way to settle these conflicts would be to deny the aesthetic quality of the artwork by declaring 
it “de-aestheticized.” Even if accept that the primary relation to art has become so, Adorno 
warns that “the deaestheticization of art is immanent to art –– whether it be art that un 
unflinchingly pursues its autonomous order or art that sells itself off cheap” (my emphasis; 
AT: 59/ÄT: 94)37–– and thus facing the same set of thorny problems that emphatically 
aestheticized works and their experience by modern subjects are bound to face  
Pippin seems to suggest that the artwork is not separated from its context, but is entirely 
part of the “sociohistorical world of the age” thanks to the possibility of intelligibility, or of 
“giving accounts,” that the ethical institutions of modernity have provided.38 In this respect, 
Pippin’s position owes much to the aesthetic tradition, from Dilthey all the way through 
Northrop Frye, for which the self-contained structure of the artwork and its cultural context 
stand in a relationship of resemblance, conformity, and mutual understanding, but not one of 
opposition.39 In any case, the dialectical battlefield opened up by antinomies, where, as Kant 
                                                     
37 “Denn wahr ist nur, was nicht in diese Welt paßt. Das Apriori des künstlerischen Ansatzes schlechthin und 
der Stand der Geschichte stimmen nicht mehr zusammen, wenn anders sie je harmonierten; und diese 
Inkonzinnität ist nicht durch Anpassung zu beseitigen: Wahrheit vielmehr, sie auszutragen.” 
38 See Robert B. Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 11, 53, 114, 241–242. 
39 Northrop Frye’s programmatic statement on literary criticism can be found here, “Literary Criticism,” in The 
Aims and Methods of Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures, ed. James Thorpe (Published by Modern 
Language Association of America, 1963): 57–69, 68. In this respect, Jameson’s and Menke’s early efforts in the 
1970s and 1980s to acknowledge and resolve the contradictions of modern autonomous art show a higher degree 
of fidelity to both the idea of art in modern society and to the complexity of modern subjectivity. See Fredric 
Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as Socially Symbolic Act (New York: Cornel University Press, 1982); 
Christoph Menke, Die Souveränität der Kunst: Ästhetische Erfahrung nach Adorno und Derrida (Frankfurt a. M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1991); The Sovereignty of Art: Aesthetic Negativity in Adorno and Derrida (Cambridge, MA: MIT: 1998). For 
a discussion about the relation between formalism and contextualism in literary and historiographical studies, and 
the four modalities of this relation (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony), see Hayden White, “Formalist 
and Contexualist Strategies in Historical Representation,” in Figurative Realism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), in particular, 53-54. We can interpret Adorno’s view of the antinomy of autonomous art 
in ironic modality, that is, a relation of opposition. For White, however, each of the modalities can equally be 
plausible in reading literary works, a view certainly not held by Adorno, perhaps only as a tactical device within 
the general strategy of irony. 
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put it, “each party keeps the upper hand as long as it is allowed to attack,” testifies to the extent 
to which even the disinterested matters of taste presuppose key political positions on how 
things are and should be in the work, not to mention in the world; after all, to have “taste” is 
socially interesting.40 
                                                     
40 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 422; for Kant’s remark on taste in society, see Critique of the Power of Judgment 
trans. Paul Guyer and E. Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5:205 footnote.  
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CHAPTER ONE  




§ 1 Problematic. Art’s Double Character as Antinomy  
§ 2 Analytic of the Autonomous: Form as Separation  
§ 3 Analytic of the Social: Form as Repetition  
§ 4 Dialectic. The Sublime and the Ridiculous: Form as Participation 
 
“Tout est difficile. Comment faire quelque chose 
de complet, de serré et de coulant?” 
Eugène Delacroix, October 1820  
 
 
§ 1 PROBLEMATIC. ART’S DOUBLE CHARACTER AS ANTINOMY 
1.1 The Opus and the Apparatus  
Already in the mid-eighteenth century the idea or consciousness of the double character of 
art, the core thesis in Adorno's Aesthetic Theory and the object of investigation in the present 
chapter, was prefigured, at least in one case. In the opening chapters of The Life & Opinions of 
Tristram Shandy (the first volume of which was published in 1759), as the author speaks of the 
path he would want to take in narrating his life from the very beginning, even before his 
conception, he makes two points about his book, one of them a prediction and the other a 
claim. First, his book will “prove the very thing which Montaigne dreaded his essays should 
turn out, that is, a book for a parlour-window,” and, second, “in writing what I have set about, 
I shall confine myself neither to his [Horace] rules, nor to any man's rules that ever lived.”1  
                                                     
1 Laurence Sterne, The Life & Opinions of Tristram Shandy, ed. Graham Petrie (London: Penguin, 1967), 38. Shandy 
claims to violate the rule recommended by Horace according to which an epic poem or tragedy should begin in 
the middle of things, in res medias, not ab ovo “from the egg,” that is, from the beginning, in this case, from the 
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The novel claims to be free of any literary rule that ever existed by showing awareness of 
the possibility of breaking with rules, striving to present something entirely new that is to 
“make some noise in the world.” The novel knows, on the other hand, that it is destined to 
become a bound pile of papers sitting in the parlor-window of a bookstore or a well-off 
family's living room, turning into a cultural good from the world of literature. So, it is equally 
well aware of the social functions it may be expected to serve. The difficulty that Tristram 
faces here is that he wants both to constitute a novel literary narrative and be free of the 
received literary rules constituting the existing world of literature, yet, to do so, he cannot step 
outside of that world. 
The predicament in Tristram's claim, if taken at his words, is most explicitly voiced in the 
tautological statement by Bertolt Brecht, the German modernist playwright and poet of about 
two centuries later, with respect to his eccentric opera Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny, “An 
opera one can make only for the opera.”2 Opera's double character is revealed in the double 
meaning of the same word in the statement: in the first position, “opera” refers to a particular 
work such as Mahagonny, whereas the second, with its firm definite article, the or die, refers to 
the whole system of opera that consists of works, the army of laborers on and behind the 
stage, from the accessory agents and sound engineers to composers, as well as the 
commissioners, the buildings, the librettos, the reviews, and the audience. Despite all the noise 
                                                     
moment of his birth. (See Graham Petrie's “Notes,” in Tristram Shandy, 616). It can probably be shown what 
possible rules the novel immanently follows in its transition from each station to the other in the course of its 
plot, and why, instead of a central idea organizing all moments, it is the movement of digressions triggered by 
each one moment that bring about the other. After all, he makes it clear that in his narrative about his birth, “I 
find it necessary to consult everyone a little bit in his turn' and therefore must beg pardon for going on a little 
further in the same way.”  
2 “[E]ine Oper kann man nur für die Oper machen.” Bertolt Brecht, “Anmerkungen zur Oper ‘Aufstieg und Fall 
der Stadt Mahagonny,’” in Stücke 3 (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1962), 262–263. Or in the following translation, 
“An opera can only be composed for the opera.” Bertolt Brecht, Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny, trans. Steve 
Giles, (Methuen Drama: 2007), 65.  
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that Brecht's Mahagonny made in the world of German theater, politics, and letters,3 the artist 
himself had no illusion that his work was to become part of what he calls the Apparat of opera-
making. In virtue of its double meaning, the statement could secretly allude to the work's 
autonomous status, too: an opera is to be composed only for the sake of the particular opera 
itself, not for the apparatus of opera-making. 
Once made, Brecht goes on to claim, an opera would become subject to “the universal laws 
of a commodity,”4 for today the apparatus or “the means of production do not belong to the 
producers.” To the extent that opera-making is an apparatus of social production generally, 
the apparatus is “determined by the existing society, absorbing only that which would keep 
the apparatus within this society.”5 Brecht ascribes a social character, not an aesthetic one, to 
the apparatus of opera-making. The products of this apparatus, in Marx’s words, are always-
already conditioned as commodity because under the capitalist mode of production, 
commodity is the universally necessary form of any product as product of wage labor (See C 
951, 953). In virtue of the commodity condition, society, in its turn, “absorbs through the 
apparatus [of art] what it needs in order to reproduce itself. And only the kind of ‘novelty’ can 
assert itself which leads to the renewal, but not the transformation of the existing society – 
whether this form of society is good or bad.” Highly complex are the ways in which the 
products of the opera-making apparatus contribute to the reproduction of existing society, 
including through the ideological formations of the content and the “message” of operas. But, 
even when particular operas are subversive in their content and radically innovative in their 
                                                     
3 See Steve Giles’s detailed report on the immediate reception of the premieres of Brecht's and Kurt Weill's work 
in Leipzig (1930) and Berlin (1931), based on the diverse, conflicting reviews it received. Among them were the 
young Adorno's “Mahagonny” in the journal Der Scheinwerfer (GS 17: 114–122) and an extremely hostile, racist 
review published anonymously in the journal Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte. Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der 
N.S.D.A.P (Adolf Hitler was the publisher and Alfred Rosenberg the editor or, as the term was then coined, 
“Schriftleiter” 'the writing-manager). See Rise and Fall, 101–136.  
4 Brecht, Stücke 3, 262.  
5 Brecht, 261. 
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form, they conform to society in virtue of their belonging to the essentially social apparatus of 
opera-making. In this way, each opera becomes recognizable, to the audience and those 
indifferent to theater and music, as an opera insofar as each particular opera is at the same 
time a commodity.  
On this last note, Brecht concludes in a satirical key with regards to the relation of art and 
society as mediated by the apparatus, “It is not as if you can dream up an opera like a sea-
monster in a Böcklin painting and then put it on show in an aquarium after seizing power; and 
it would be even more ridiculous to try and smuggle it into our good old zoo!”6 However 
unprecedented an opera may be, even after the proletarian revolution, it cannot be put 
anywhere but where it belongs: in the theater house. Yet, the existing apparatus of opera will 
not accept such an unseen animal, for the audience will not recognize it as such. This insight 
did not prevent Brecht, however, from asserting the right of his own operatic work and finding 
solutions to endow his work with innovations (Neuerungen), thereby making it something more 
than a “culinary opera” for mere pleasure. The lesson of Brecht’s reflection on the identity of 
his own artistic work is not simply a disillusioned, wholesale denunciation of art in bourgeois 
society; he is not a cynic who, in Oscar Wilde’s definition, only knows the “price of everything 
and the value of nothing.” The lesson is that art has to look into the eyes of this inevitable 
negativity of its own existence, namely, that though it can and must be autonomous and 
innovative, it is nonetheless a product of that from which it tries to keep its distance.7
 
 
                                                     
6 Brecht, Rise and fall, 65; Stücke 3, 263. 
7 Agamben, in his short programmatic essay, “What is an Apparatus?” addresses an essentially similar question 
by offering a reading of Foucault’s notion of “dispositif” through Hegel. See Giorgio Agamben, What is an 
Apparatus and Other Essays, trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 
1–24. 
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1.2 The Thesis of Art’s Double Character  
The fundamental dissatisfaction of the opus with the apparatus, of the individual work of 
literature with its context of genesis both as production and reception, in Sterne and Brecht 
marks what Adorno decades later calls the double character of art in modern bourgeois society. 
According to his most concise definition, art is “both autonomous and fait social.” (AT: 5/ÄT: 
16; see also AT: 229/ÄT: 340). The two positions on the autonomy and social facticity of the 
work of art give rise to an antinomic conflict to which none of the theretofore offered 
theoretical resolutions gave a satisfactory answer in Adorno’s eyes. The thesis of art’s double 
character underwent some transformations in Adorno's thought over many years. Adorno 
never uses the expression in that particular form in any of his writings before 1960s. Traces 
and prefiguration of the thesis of art's double character are to be found in his prime years’ 
writings, as early as his 1920 short piece on Expressionism;1 it was, however, since the late 
1950s that Adorno took steps towards a concrete articulation of the thesis, pursuing its 
antinomic consequences. So far as its genesis of this core thesis goes, one could consider his 
1958-59 lectures on aesthetics in Frankfurt and his second encounter with Paul Valéry's 
writings on aesthetics in 1960. The very first instance of “the double character of art” appears 
in is 1961 winter-semester lectures on aesthetics.2  
The simplest and most palpable statement of art’s double character runs thus:  
                                                     
1 “Expressionismuss und Künstlerische Wahrheit,” GS: 11; Notes to Literature, vol. 2, trans. Shierry Weber 
Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). 
2 See Vo61, 6382. I surmise that another possible lineage of the double character thesis can be traced down in 
Georg Simmel’s expression “doppelte Stellung” (“the double stance”) of the artwork in a famous essay on the 
“Handel” to which Adorno has referred. See Georg Simmel, “Der Henkel,” in Philosophischer Kultur: Über das 
Abenteuer, die Geschlechter und die Krise der Moderne, Gesammelte Essais, ed. K. Wagenbach, 1986, pp. 111-118. Adorno 
briefly engages with Simmel’s essay in his “Henkel, Krug und frühe Erfahrung,” Noten zur Literatur, GS 11, 556-
566.   
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The double character of art––something that separates itself from the empirical reality 
and thereby from society's nexus of effects and yet falls back at the same time into the 
empirical reality and society's nexus of effects. (Translation modified; AT: 253) 
([D]er Doppelcharakter der Kunst als eines von der empirischen Realität und damit 
dem gesellschaftlichen Wirkungszusammenhang sich Absondernden, das doch 
zugleich in die empirische Realität und die gesellschaftlichen 
Wirkungszusammenhänge hineinfällt.) (ÄT: 374–375) 
 
The thesis gives rise to the following antinomy:  
 
THE THESIS SIDE: The work of art separates itself from the empirical reality and 
thereby from the social nexus of effects. 
 
THE ANTITHESIS SIDE: The work of art falls at the same time into the empirical 
reality and social nexuses of effects. 
 
The merit of this formulation, which makes up the centerpiece of the present chapter, is 
that the contradiction between its sides immediately becomes apparent. We have an antinomy 
here if we can show that both propositions are equally and self-sufficiently true while in 
conflict with each other. If the thesis side of the antinomy offers the formal conditions of the 
artwork as a separately posited sphere, distinct from its surrounding context, the antithesis 
side points to the real, contextual, and determining conditions of this positing. Because for 
Adorno artworks “require a double observation that is no more to be posited as an unalloyed 
whole than aesthetic autonomy and art can be conflated as something strictly social” (ibid.), I 
adopt in this chapter a similar approach to unfold all the main terms of the formulation of the 
antinomy. These are: the work of art, separation, falling back or repetition, the empirical reality, 
and the social nexus of effects. 
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The last two terms, the empirical reality and social nexus of effects, repeat themselves vis-
à-vis the artwork. It is hence that the relation of the artwork to its context of genesis must be 
examined once from within the work, that is, from the perspective of its formal separateness 
from its real conditions of genesis, and then from without, that is, from the perspective of its 
falling back into, or repeating, its real conditions of genesis. Both perspectives impose 
themselves on the observer of the autonomous works of art. While the focus of our inquiry 
will be the autonomy of the work of art throughout, it is studied from two standpoints, the 
bringing together of which constitutes a problematic for art’s dilettantes and savants alike. 
Without this double observation, artworks would be free of one of their most troublesome 
problematics. How art possesses a double character and why it qualifies as an antinomy needs 
to be justified. 3 
The best way to approach the concept of genesis––as the index of all that from which art 
separates itself––goes through Aristotle’s theory of four kinds of cause, material, formal, 
efficient, and final, which serves s a guide to gain knowledge of how a thing comes to be. The 
first two are immanent to the thing: the material cause lies in the stuff out of which the thing 
                                                     
3 More than a decade after the publication of the Aesthetic Theory, Sparshott opens his voluminous tome on arts 
thus:  
“Art is a simple matter. Consider five objects, all familiar at least by proxy: Leonardo's Mona Lisa, Shakespeare's 
Hamlet, Beethoven's Eroica, Dante's Divine Comedy, Michelangelo's David. Each of these is a work of art, if anything 
is; we would be more surprised if a history of the relevant art left them out than if it included them. Suppose now 
that you found the experience of looking at, listening to, or reading one of these neither enjoyable nor interesting. 
You would then feel entitled to say that either you were not up to it (it was beyond you, or was not your kind of 
thing, or you were not in the mood) or it was no good. That is, you would have no doubt as to what standard 
should be applied in deciding if it was any good, although you yourself might be in no position to apply it. And 
the standard in each case would be essentially the same. There is really no doubt about what these things are for. 
. . . There is, then, really no problem about what art is and what art is for.” Francis Sparshott, The Theory of the 
Arts (Princeton: Princeton UP: 1982), 3. 
In a footnote to the same paragraph Sparshott comments on the above points, “T. W. Adorno points out that 
the enigmatic character of art appears only from the outside [see AT 121–122]. What I am saying in these opening 
remarks is essentially that there is no need to look at a human activity from the outside, and if one chooses to do so, 
one can claim no privilege for one's view” Sparshott, 503. He takes a very different, almost opposed path in his 
study of art and various arts, yet his characterization of Adorno's aesthetic theory, I believe, goes to the heart of 
Adorno's project. 
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is made (“The bronze of a statue”), and the formal one in its form or pattern, including the 
class or genus under which the thing falls. The other two kinds of cause tend to be external to 
the thing, thus the efficient cause is that of a maker (“The man who plans . . . the father of the 
child”) while the final cause makes up the end or telos of the thing, answering the question, 
Why has the thing been made?4 The last two causes are external to the thing only in terms of 
the source of causality––a person with a craft or capacity, and the use to which the thing is 
put––but not its expression in the thing, which inheres in it and constitutes a starting point 
from which the thing can be known as a made thing. For Aristotle, “all causes are beginnings.” 
This means that to explain the thing I need to take my point of departure from the thing itself, 
and it is only by looking at the thing itself that I can discern its material, its form or pattern, 
the traces of the craft deployed to make it, and its purpose.  
Artefacts belong to a class of things that are generated neither naturally nor spontaneously, 
but artificially, that is, by the purposeful agency of something.5 Although the four causes are 
supposed to be given for explaining all kinds of things, when it comes to the autonomous 
artwork, the final causality––which according to Aristotle has explanatory priority over all 
others and to which the first three causes are instruments for answering the why of the 
product––becomes problematic, for it is not possible to answer the question as to why a poem, 
say, Brecht’s Die Liebende, has been made. There is no satisfying answer to this question. The 
poem has stuff and materials, form and pattern, a maker, but no purpose that can be pinned 
down. In my view, the peculiarity of the autonomous artwork from an Aristotelian perspective 
                                                     
4 This account is based on the summary that Aristotle offers in Metaphysics, 1030a24–38; translated by W. D. Ross, 
The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 2001). For the Greek text and 
an extensive commentary by Ross, see Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 2 vols (Oxford: Calderon, 1924). See also Andrea 
Falcon, “Aristotle on Causality,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/aristotle-causality/. 
5 Artefacts are makings or poieiseis. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1032a7. By purposeful agency, I mean to rephrase what 
Aristotle refers to as the soul of artist (ψυχῇ) whose product is a making that possesses form (εῖδος). Metaphysics, 
1032b32–33. 
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is that in it, the formal cause cuts its ties to the final cause such that it becomes impossible to 
decide the final cause of the work out of its formal constitution. In the case of a table, its 
pattern of having four legs and a flat surface indicates the purpose of holding objects in a 
stable state and at a height fit for an average person. This makes for its final reason to exist. 
The shapes of the everyday artefacts give us clues as to their purposes, they are more or less 
decipherable in connection to their uses. Deciphering the pattern of a painting like the famous 
Guernica by Picasso only confronts us with something indeterminate that leads us to no finality. 
It poses an enigma.6 
The identity of formal and final causes in the artwork suggests that, if according to Aristotle 
the point of departure in knowing the made thing lies in the thing itself, for the artwork one 
can neither limit oneself to the materials of the work, nor to the intentions and beliefs of its 
maker, nor to the norms and rules of its making. In the absence of a positively given final 
cause, one has only to concern oneself with the form of the work. The formal cause of the 
artwork thus acquires priority over others, especially the final one. The formal cause speaks to 
what the inner composition of the work is in separation from the outside, whereas the final 
cause situates the artwork in the nexus of relations between things, persons, and purposes. In 
this respect, I have organized my argument according to two broad though not apodictically 
distinct notions of genesis as the source of causality for bringing about the artwork: genesis as 
origination (including material and efficient causes) and genesis as organization (combining 
formal and final causes). Art’s autonomy will be examined once in relation to its separation 
                                                     
6 A similar discussion of the Aristotelian and Kantian notions of causality with regard to Adorno’s understanding 
of the artwork and its enigma (to which I will return in the fourth part of this chapter) is offered by Giulles, 
Moutot, Essai sur Adorno (Paris: Payot & Rivages, 2010), 310–314. 
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from genesis in its double sense, and the other time in relation to its falling back into, or the 
repetition of, that genesis.7 
Treating the two characteristics of art, autonomous and social facticity, in distinction from 
one another is only to serve an eased mode of presenting my argument. Abstracting the 
moment of autonomy from that of the social facticity has no counterpart, as Adorno 
repeatedly stresses, in the ontological status of the work of art itself. He states in a 1961 lecture, 
“The moments of this double character are not simply to be separated but that they have 
something essential to do with each other” (Vo61: 6382).8 In another lecture from 1968, he 
notes that “None of those moments of the artwork––the autonomous and the one oriented 
to the outside––are to be understood freely and on their own, but each individual moment is 
both a moment of immanent logic and one of connection with society” (Vo67: 11170).9 
Understanding these two moments freely and on their own is precisely what I have set out 
doing in the first half of the chapter. 
 Even so, my final goal is to consider them together in their concrete unity, but only after 
we have shown that there is a ground, and indeed a need, for such a unity. For Adorno, art’s 
autonomy “exists only in relation to its other; it is the process that transpires with its other” 
                                                     
7 Valéry has a similar view of the two aspects of aesthetic making, spontaneous and conscious. While the two 
aspects are primarily viewed from the standpoint of the artist, they becomes constitutive of the aesthetic object 
itself, too, “In a work of art, in sum, two kinds of constituents are always present: first, those whose origin we 
cannot conceive, which cannot be expressed by means of acts, although they can be modified by acts later on; 
second, those which are articulate, and thus may be the result of thought.” Paul Valéry, “Aesthetic Invention,” 
Aesthetics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Pantheon, 1964), 66. The pair of origin and articulation in the 
artwork correspond to the pair of origination and organization in my argument.  
8 “[D]ie Momente dieses Doppelcharakter nicht einfach getrennt sind, sondern daß sie miteinander etwas 
wesentliches zu tun haben.” 
9 “Keines jener Momente des Kunstwerkes – des autonomen wie des nach außen gerichteten – ist frei aus sich 
zu verstehen, sondern jedes einzelne Element ist sowohl eines von immanenter Logik wie eines des 
Zusammenhanges mit der Gesellschaft.” See Albrecht Wellmer, “Über Negativität und Autonomie der Kunst. 
Die Aktualität von Adornos Ästhetik und blinde Flecken seiner Musikphilosophie,” in Dialektik der Freiheit: 
Frankfurter Adorno-Konferenz 2003, ed. Axel Honneth (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp: 2005), 245. See also Jay 
Bernstein, “The Dead Speaking of Stones and Stars,” in The Semblance of Subjectivity: Essays in Adorno's Aesthetic 
Theory, ed. Tom Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 147. 
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(translation modified; AT: 3/ÄT: 12).10 A positive notion of the autonomy of art, one that 
goes beyond simply stressing its separation from society, or its negativity, can only be achieved 
provided that its relation to that from which it separates itself––its context––is fully taken into 
account. The contribution of Adorno’s aesthetics to the modern discipline of aesthetics is his 
conception of the inseparability of both moments of autonomy and social facticity. His key 
innovation, in my interpretation, lies in the plea that the aesthetic concern itself, not only with 
the formal conditions of the artwork separating itself from its real conditions, that is, the 
empirical reality and the social functions and purposes, but also with the real conditions 
themselves for the possibility of aesthetic separateness. Aesthetic form is bound to confront 
an antinomy thanks to this double relation to its real conditions of genesis. 
I do not intend in this chapter to offer a comprehensive or reconstructive account of all 
themes of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, a 1970 posthumously published volume of chapters that 
are completed but in need of a final reorganization. A growing body of scholarship in recent 
years, especially in English, is carrying out such a task.11 In examining the antinomy of aesthetic 
form in art’s double character in Adorno, my contribution to this reception aims to make one 
central point, namely, that art’s double character is inevitable if we are to follow through the 
claim of art at the onset of modern aesthetics as something made that appears like nature.12 In 
this respect, I take Adorno’s argument to possess a transcendental aspect and a historical 
aspect, in accord with which one could argue that whether or not any autonomous artwork 
                                                     
10 “Sie ist nur im Verhältnis zu ihrem Anderen, ist der Prozeß damit.” 
11 See esp. Espen Hammer, Adorno’s Modernism: Art, Experience, and Catastrophe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015) and Owen Hulatt, Adorno's Theory of Philosophical and Aesthetic Truth (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2016). 
12 For Kant art is the product of the “determinate intention of producing something,” nevertheless we regard it 
as if it were nature, “although of course one is aware of its art.” See Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 
§ 45, 185–186. 
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has ever succeeded in existing, art is bound to have a double character precisely if it must be 
a separated self-legislating sphere. 
The transcendental aspect of Adorno’s claim relates to what he takes as the specificity of 
art: that it separates itself from that out of which it emerges, that is, the entire social context. 
In this respect, separateness is, for Adorno, the trans-historical, formal condition for objects 
to be experienced and recognized as art. If separation is a form of conflict with or opposition 
to that from which the phenomenon separates itself, then there have always been “conflicts 
between art and society,” and even before the rise of bourgeois society “art certainly stood in 
opposition to social domination and its mores” (AT: 225/ÄT: 334) The definition of art as 
generating a separated realm in virtue of lawfully gathering together tactile, optical, acoustic, 
plastic, or poetic elements, and in opposition to the way those elements are organized in reality, 
is in principle indifferent to the variety of specific conditions under which that separation takes 
place. It does not speak to the nature of that against which art separates itself. 
Once it starts asking the question of what it is from which art separates itself, or whether 
it is still possible at all to generate such a set apart realm, the thinking about art assumes a 
historical dimension. Thus, Adorno modifies his transcendental claim about art noted above 
by submitting that it is only in bourgeois society and its commodity condition that art gains 
“awareness of its own independence.” While formal separation specifies art in general, the art 
of modern bourgeois society intensifies its separateness, its separateness becomes a death-and-
life issue for it, because “the bourgeois society integrated art much more completely than any 
previous society had” (AT: 225/ÄT: 334). Art’s awareness of its historically new predicament 
in a highly rationalized, brutally coercive society, of the risk of failing to resist the total 
integration into that from which it strives to keep its distance, commits the aesthetician to a 
set of considerations bearing on what art is and whether it is still possible at all. I take Adorno 
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to mean by integration primarily the commodity form subsuming all products of labor, 
including the works of art. 
While the transcendental aspect of art’s double character gives the formal conditions of 
separation, the historical aspect provides the real conditions of the genesis of the artwork. 
Because, however, the idea of art involves going beyond its conditions of production, to 
acquire a validity of its own as a recognizable aesthetic object in distinction from its path of 
genesis, then giving an account of the genesis of the works of art does not capture its aesthetic 
quality. Thus, I will argue that for Adorno, the true validity of the work, its very right to 
existence, has to do with breaking with its genesis.13 The force of the antinomy asserts itself 
precisely here. I have arranged the steps of my argument so as to demonstrate that the real 
conditions of genesis both make possible and impossible the autonomy of the artwork. That 
is, they serve as the context from which the artwork is bound formally and lawfully to separate 
itself in order to realize its very idea, and simultaneously function as conditions for the 
possibility of a successful aesthetic separation. For this reason, the separation moment needs 
to be discussed once in a transcendental manner and then in relation to its conditions of 
possibility.  
Finally, because art is not “indifferent” (“gleichgültig”) toward its own double character 
(see AT: 310/ÄT: 459), I will show how, for Adorno, every successful artwork responds to its 
own constitutive conflict in order to regain its identity, reclaim its right to an autonomous 
existence, and remake its relation to its context of genesis.  
                                                     
13 Very early on in the Aesthetic Theory, Adorno writes, “Nietzsche’s late insight, honed in opposition to traditional 
philosophy, that even what has become can be true, is axiomatic for reoriented aesthetic. The traditional view, 
which he demolished, is to be turned on its head: Truth exists exclusively as that which has become.” (AT: 3/ÄT 
12). In Bernstein’s words from a different context in Adorno, “Validity is not determinable independently from 
the path through which it arises. If reasoning in transitions is the space of epistemic advance, then both transition 
(genesis) and validity must be phrased as having equal weight.” Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 338. See also Hammer, Adorno’s Modernism.  
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Here is the outline of the main steps that I will take in the rest of this chapter. In part two, I 
lay down the autonomy moment of the artwork in which the work separates itself through 
form from its genesis both as origination and as organization. In part three, I turn to the social 
facticity moment of the artwork in which the work repeats in itself its context of genesis by 
imitating the fetish form and the commodity form. In part four, I take up the question of 
resolution to the conflict between the two characters of art by looking at the two moments of 
separation and repetition together, that is, as a unified but enigmatic whole. With the help of 
Adorno’s categories of the sublime and the ridiculous, I examine the processual character of 
the artwork to be interpreted as a rhythm that oscillates between positing the work as 
something separate and then negating this positing. The effect of this rhythm is the endlessness 
of the work as an enigmatic thing that does not finalize itself in the form of a product with a 
determinate end. The chapter will conclude by showing that the rhythm of the work generates 
what Adorno calls a figure with which the artwork participates in history beyond the duality 
of separation and repetition. 
Insofar as the aesthetic experience of the autonomous artwork by a beholder, listener, or 
reader is concerned, a feeling of the conflict remains as an inevitable moment of the 
experience, however. This is the case because the beholder has no grounds to reconcile the 
internal and external views of the autonomous artwork. And insofar as the artwork is analyzed 
independently from the beholder, the resolution remains possible but not actualized under the 
condition of bourgeois society. 
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§ 2 ANALYTIC OF THE AUTONOMOUS: FORM AS SEPARATION  
The first part of the formulation, defining the artwork as something that “separates itself from 
empirical reality and thereby from the social nexus of effects,” presents the autonomy moment 
at its most abstract as a state of separation. Understood as this separation and as the specific 
way this separation occurs, the specificity of art is defined by Adorno thus: “Art specifies itself 
by that through which it separates itself from that out of which it came to be” (translation 
modified; AT: 3/ÄT: 12).1 The expression “that out of [or with] which” (“dem. . . woran”) 
evokes Aristotle’s term ἐξ οὗ (“that out of which”) designating the material cause of a thing.2 
In this way, the passage declares art’s separation from its material determinants. Yet, we should 
note, the actual specificity of art is not merely its being separated but the manner in which, or 
“that through which” (“dem, wodurch”), it performs this separation. The mode of separating 
itself from its conditions of genesis defines art for Adorno. Another formulation states, “Only 
by virtue of separation [Trennung] from empirical reality, which sanctions [gestattet] art to model 
the relation of the whole and the part according to the work's own need, does the artwork 
achieve a heightened order of existence [Sein zweiter Potenz]” (AT: 4/ÄT: 14). 
If the artwork separates itself through its whole-part relation from its context of genesis, 
then it succeeds in severing its causal ties to that context, if only in the sense that no knowledge 
of that context can capture the specificity of the artwork. The key to this account of separation, 
with its emphasis on the mode of separation, lies with the expression “social nexus of effects” 
(which renders the German term Wirkungszusammenhang) in our primary passage by Adorno. 
The nexus of effects is a term that derives from Dilthey’s construction of the historical world. 
                                                     
1 “Sie spezifiziert sich an dem, wodurch sie von dem sich scheidet, woran sie wurdet.; ihr Bewegungsgesetz ist 
ihr eigenes Formgesetz.” 
2 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1032b16–17. 
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In that context, it “is distinguished from the causal nexus of nature by the fact that, in 
accordance with the structure of mental life [Das geistige Leben], it produces values and realizes 
purposes.”3 It does so by virtue of an immanent and teleological character that is essential to the 
spiritual. A spiritual, or mind-structured world has its center within itself, and, unlike a 
spiritless mechanism, all its elements work together, affecting one another in a shared world. 
Dilthey deploys this notion to account for the autonomy and self-sufficiency of purposes and 
values in the historical world, delimited against the natural world. Significantly, Dilthey’s own 
example for the nexus of effects comes from the sphere of poetical production: “If we read 
one of Shakespeare’s comedies we find the component parts of an event not only temporally 
and causally linked but elevated into unity according to the laws of poetical composition: this 
unity lifts the beginning and the end out of the causal chain and links its parts into a whole.”4 
This means that a comedy by Shakespeare is structurally of the same nature as any other 
historical world, including a religious system, or a legal code. 
The nexus of effects denotes a reciprocal relation of causality between many elements in a 
whole where each element can be both the effect of another element while itself a cause 
effecting that element. In such a nexus, it is impossible to pin down one element as either the 
prime cause or the final effect. All elements in the nexus are effects inasmuch as no element 
can lay claim to be uncaused or the main cause of others, and the whole nexus declares its 
independence from whatever lies outside of it so far as what lies outside of it claims to cause 
the relations of elements inside.5 Thus, it must follow that the work is an effect whose cause 
                                                     
3 See Wilhelm Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften. Wilhelm Diltheys Gesammelte 
Schriften (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1927), 152–162, here 153. For the English translation, slightly modified here, 
see, Selected Writings, ed. H. P. Rickman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 196–197. 
4 Dilethey, Selected Writings, 199. 
5 Speaking of a declaration of independence, the best example may be the way that the republic constitutes itself 
as one and indivisible unity in separation from other political unities outside of it. In chapter four I will take up 
the question of the form of the republic. 
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appears to reside within itself. The Shakespeare comedy in Dilthey’s example does not stand 
in any strikingly causal relation to the rest of the context of which it is a part.6  
Adorno’s notion of the separated aesthetic form both conforms to the structure of a nexus 
of effects, as Dilthey’s own literary example may testify, and negates, it for it claims to be a 
separated sphere, set apart from the social nexus of functions, purposes, and values.7 Adorno 
does not equate the aesthetic quality of the artwork with this nexus: “[T]he nexus of effects 
[is] not the principle to which the autonomous works are subordinated, but it is their 
framework [Gefüge] [in which they are] with themselves” (GS 11: 429).8 Inasmuch as the nexus 
of effects breaks with the causality of natural, empirical objects for Dilthey, it allies itself with 
art’s autonomy in its claim to be a thing that possesses something more. Inasmuch as art’s 
autonomy claims to resist external effects, values, and functions, however, the theory of nexus 
of effects fails to explain what the function or purpose of an autonomous artwork is in 
defiance of purposes imposed on it from the outside. When we speak of causality in the work, 
we need to distinguish between two kinds. The causality that generates the work out of definite 
stuff and the determinate craft of the maker as artist (material and efficient causes) differ from 
the formal causality that organizes the work and sustains this organization in independence 
from material and efficient causes. The artwork separates itself from the outside and yet it 
does so in a certain way, thereby becoming something. What is it that separates itself and how 
does it do so?  
                                                     
6 “Strikingly causally closed” is the expression that Putnam uses to refer to the causal nexus of nature. See Hilary 
Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 75. 
7 Adorno’s own use of the term “nexus of effects” in his aesthetic writings can offer a further evidence of the 
affinity of the structure of the artwork and that of the social context to which the work is to relate. See, for 
instance, ÄT 122, 133, 360, 399.  
8 “[D]er Wirkungszusammengang [ist] nicht das Prinzip, dem die autonomen Werke unterstehen, sondern ihr 
Gefüge bei sich selbst.” “Commitment,” Notes to Literature. The term Gefüge is widely used in Aesthetic Theory as a 
way of referring to the tightly woven frame of the autonomous artworks whose elements are sensible and the 
relations between those elements, however, spiritual. Cf. ÄT: 139, 146, 150, 153, 155, 181, 266, 280, 364, 413, 
424, 430, 432, 488, 515, 528. 
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Immediately after referring to the specificity of art in the above passage, Adorno goes on 
stating: “Its law of movement is its own law of form. It exists only in relation to its other; it is 
the process that transpires with its other” (translation modified; AT: 3/ÄT: 12).9 Movement 
here signifies the changes and displacements in the ways of defining what art is in the absence 
of any invariable artistic characteristics. That which in any given historical moment specifies 
art must be sought in art’s attempt to separate itself from what is not art, constituting its own 
set-off realm. Separation is separation from something. If the historical movement of art obeys 
any law, then this law derives from art’s formal organization of that separated realm. Form 
does so in a lawful manner. Adorno’s terms for this lawfulness of separation through form 
include construction, rationality, and coherence.10 These terms speak to the relation of the 
wholesome unity of the work and what counts as its parts. Form enables the separation of the 
work from the conditions of its coming to be: its sensate materials, the act of making that 
comes with intentions and purposes of the maker, but also the functions expected from the 
product of that making. 
The separation, however, should not be understood in terms of content––it is not that the 
work distances itself from certain images, words, colors, meanings, syntactical constructs, 
tropes. Works of art organize in themselves whatever materials are actually available to them. 
They have a body in virtue of being material objects. They find themselves in optical, acoustic, 
verbal, and tactile fields of any present time. But they offer their own configuration of elements 
within those fields. Separation must be understood as the formal jurisdiction under which 
elements are gathered: “Form works like a magnet that orders elements of the empirical world 
                                                     
9 “[I]hr Bewegungsgesetz ist ihr eigenes Formgesetz. Sie ist nur im Verhältnis zu ihrem Anderen, ist der Prozeß 
damit.” 
10 “Form is the artifacts' coherence, however self-antagonistic and refracted, through which each and every 
successful work separates itself from the merely existing.” AT 142. 
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in such a fashion that estranges them from the nexus [Zusammenhang] of their extra-aesthetic 
existence” (AT: 226/ÄT: 336; See also AT: 7/ÄT: 19). Form is not a creatio ex nihilo, it is a 
“creation out of the created” (AT: 143/ÄT: 216),11 that is, out of what is already formed and 
which belongs to a set of determinations. Adorno stresses that “Aesthetic autonomy 
encompasses what is collectively most advanced,” that is, the artist must have an eye and an 
ear for what seems to be most removed from the demands of the separated, self-legislated 
realm of art. Materials and methods of making art, writes Adorno, “are historically and socially 
preformed” (AT: 42, 89).12 In every other respect a work is caught in the nexus of effects of 
the empirical world except with regard to its own formal nexus of elements. In short, form is 
a separation from the genesis of the work. 
In an illuminating passage on the relation between what the work receives as its stuff and 
what the form of work does to this stuff, Adorno states, “Everything appearing in the artwork 
is virtually content [Inhalt] as much as it is form, whereas form remains that by which the 
appearing determines itself [sich bestimmt] and content remains what is self-determining [das sich 
Bestimmende]” (AT: 145/ÄT: 219).13 It is not insignificant that, precisely in discussing the form 
of the work, which we would equate with its power of self-determination, Adorno in this 
passage reserves the term of activity, self-determining, for the content. In this passage, the key 
stress, I believe, falls on the power and nature of that which the artwork puts together by way 
of forming them. The materials have their own preformed signification and yet once they have 
stepped into the jurisdiction of the artwork, they transform themselves because they are now 
separate from the causality of what is outside of the work. Yet again, they transform 
                                                     
11 “[K]eine freilich aus dem Nichts sondern aus Geschaffenem.”  
12 On the question of aesthetic materials, see Hammer, Adorno’s Modernism, 181–192.  
13 “Alles im Kunstwerk Erscheinende ist virtuell Inhalt so gut wie Form, während diese doch das bleibt, wodurch 
das Erscheinende sich bestimmt, und Inhalt das sich Bestimmende.”  
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themselves not by the coercive force of a principle hammering them into the formal unity of 
the work. On the contrary, the work forms their materials, non-violently, by following their 
own determinations to the extent that what is contained in the form is dubbed self-determining 
by Adorno (cf. AT: 5, 143). 
A piece of poetry, in which no complex formal operation seems to govern the work, still 
creates a set apart realm in close proximity to that from which it sets itself apart. William Carlos 
Williams’s “Poem” makes a case. In it, form shrinks to a minimal act of gathering together 
words and images from the everyday world, and yet, it generates what is a poem:  
As the cat 
climbed over 
the top of 
 
the jamcloset 




then the hind 
stepped down 
 




The poem is elliptic in its grammatical form on account of the position of the verb for the 
motion of the cat’s forefoot, which may be taken to be implied by the general movement in 
“climbed over.” The ellipsis is backed up in the reverse movement of “stepped down” of the 
hind(foot). The intertwinement of the ascent and descent in the motion of the cat, mediated 
in the poem by the slightly awkward position of the adverb “carefully,” introduces a mild 
tension that keeps the reader going to and fro between the two opposite motions. Yet, this 
very opposition, which runs counter to the laws of physical nature demanding motion in one 
                                                     
14 William Carlos Williams, The Collected Earlier Poems (New York: New Directions, 1952), 340. 
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direction at any given moment, makes up the aesthetic law of the poem. It holds the poem 
together and helps it separate itself from any empirical report. It is only in the poem that one 
can go back and forth between the two motions of the cat, whereas in reality the cat takes only 
one position at a time. The poem creates its own unique temporality in which moments do 
not follow each other only successively. 15  
In the aesthetic object, therefore, the chain of causes and effects, the spatial-temporal 
framework, that conditions our perception of the empirical objects and their relations for us, 
is broken once it has arrived at the threshold of a painting, a sculpture, a poem printed on a 
piece of paper, or, in its extreme case for Adorno, of music (in which case severing is driven 
to its extreme or “ins Extreme”; GS 18: 157)16. Music is extreme in its separateness because 
its fundamental mode of organizing notes, namely time, can suspend or reverse the nature of 
experiencing time as a successive flow of moments, which makes for the condition of 
perceiving sounds. Of a “highly organized music” (“hochorganisierte Musik”) Adorno writes 
that one must listen to it “in a multidimensional manner, at the same time forwards and 
backwards. This is what its temporal principle of organization demands: time is to be 
articulated only through the differences between the known and the non-yet-known, between 
what-has-been-there and the new; progression itself has as its condition a retrograde 
                                                     
15 In a one-time reference to the poet, Adorno stresses, “When Brecht or Carlos Williams sabotages the poetic 
and approximates an empirical report, the actual result is by no means such a report: By the polemical rejection 
of the exalted lyrical tone, the empirical sentences translated into the aesthetic monad acquire an altogether 
different quality. The antilyrical tone and the estrangement of the appropriated facts are two sides of the same 
coin. Judgment itself undergoes metamorphosis in the artwork.” (“Wo Brecht oder Carlos Williams im Gedicht 
das Poetische sabotieren und es dem Bericht über bloße Empirie annähern, wird es keineswegs zu einem solchen: 
indem sie polemisch den erhoben lyrischen Ton verschmähen, nehmen die empirischen Sätze bei ihrem 
Transport in die ästhetische Monade durch den Kontrast zu dieser ein Verschiedenes an. Das Gesangsfeindliche 
des Tons und die Verfremdung der erbeuteten Fakten sind zwei Seiten desselben Sachverhalts. Verwandlung 
widerfährt im Kunstwerk auch dem Urteil.”) AT: 123/ÄT: 187.  
16A most clear, phenomenologically accurate account of this separation is offered by Simmel in a short essay on 
the “Frame of the Painting.” See, Georg Simmel, “Der Bildrahmen,” in Die Philosophie der Kunst: Philosophische und 
kunstphilosophische Aufsätze (Potsdam: Gustav Kiepenheuer, 1922), 46–54.  
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consciousness” (GS 5: 367).17 That Adorno says so of a “highly organized music” reveals that 
the statement may not be true of any piece of music, but only of that kind whose organizing 
principle can indeed sever itself from the empirical experience of time. 
Adorno has remarked that form does not or cannot abandon what has thus been made its 
other, that is, the context of its genesis, but remains in relation to this other from which it has 
separated the work. Now if form “is the process that transpires with its other” (“ist der Prozeß 
damit”), then in order to understand how form relates to its other, we need to consider this 
process of lawful separation itself, which is determined in a twofold manner. On the one hand, 
the work separates itself from empirical reality and, on the other hand, from the social nexus 
of effects. Our original passage on art’s double character links the two separations with a 
“thereby” (“damit”), so that it appears as though the work’s separation from empirical reality 
makes possible that from the social nexus of effects. In simpler concepts, the work as aesthetic 
object is not only a functional empirical thing. It is a useless, ideal thing as well. I examine both 
forms of separation as regards two aspects of genesis, originative and organizational, whereby 
it rises above both empirical time and place and social functions.  
 
2.1 Separation from Genesis as Origination  
Adorno’s way of substantiating his notion of form as separation from genesis counts as one 
key point where his position is deeply indebted to the German tradition of Idealist aesthetics, 
in two main ways: in conceiving of the act of separation as an essentially aesthetic capacity of 
                                                     
17 “Auch hochorganisierte Musik muß man mehrdimensional, von vorwärts zugleich und rückwärts hören. Das 
erheischt ihr zeitliches Organisationsprinzip: Zeit ist nur durch Unterschiede des Bekannten und nicht schon 
Bekannten, des Dagewesenen und des Neuen zu artikulieren; Fortgang selber hat zur Bedingung ein rückläufiges 
Bewußtsein.” Three Studies on Hegel, trans. Shierry Weber Nocholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993). 
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the human subject, and in conceiving of the structure of separation as imitating natural beauty. 
I will discuss these ways in relation to the autonomy moment of the artwork. 
The state of being set apart is primarily one that veers toward concealing its own 
emergence, otherwise it would have to reveal the ways by which the object relates to the 
sources of causality outside of its boundaries. Here I would refer to the definition of the 
aesthetic object in Karl Philipp Moritz as he is considered the first modern aesthetician 
specifically to work out a notion of art’s autonomy as separation. For Moritz, the aesthetic 
object is “that which is complete in itself” (“in sich selbst Vollendetes”). The completeness 
thesis rests on the concept of purposiveness or usefulness, which in turn brings into play the 
role of the subject. According to Moritz, the beautiful object is complete in itself inasmuch as 
it is not a useful or purposive object for me. In the case of the useful object, “I make myself, 
so to speak, into a middle point to which all parts of the object relate, that is, I behold the 
object merely as a means of which I am myself the end insofar as through that means my 
completeness is advanced.”18 The useful object has thus its “purpose not in itself, but outside 
of itself in something else through which the completeness of the object is to increase.”19 
Whenever I look at a useful thing, I find it incomplete insofar as it is there to serve not itself 
but my needs, like a watch and a knife. It is wanting for something that it cannot be or find in 
itself as long as it is not put into some use desired by me. Constitutionally, the useful object is 
ready to enter into relations with other objects: the knife meets the meat to cut it. Left to itself, 
the knife sits on the kitchen table for the future uses, not much worthy of beholding for its 
                                                     
18 “Ich mache mich gleichsam zum Mittelpunkte, worauf ich alle Theile des Gegenstandes beziehe, d.h. ich 
betrachte denselben bloß als Mittel, wovon ich selbst, in so fern meine Vollkommenheit dadurch befördert wird, 
der Zweck bin.” Karl Philipp Moritz, Die Signatur des Schönen, und andere Schriften zur Begründung der Autonomieästhetik, 
ed. Stepan Ripplinger (Hamburg: Philo Fine Arts, 2009), 7; “On the Artistic Imitation of the Beautiful” (excerpts), 
in Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, ed. J. M. Bernstein (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003).. 
19 Moritz, Signatur, 8. 
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own sake. By contrast, the beautiful “has its purpose not outside of itself, and does not exist 
because of the completeness of something else, but because of its own inner completeness.” 
A knife that is complete in itself stands in no need to meet the meat or my purposes.  
Moritz’s is therefore not an absolute notion of being-in-itself but one relative to the 
position of the subject vis-à-vis the aesthetic object. He refrains from defining the beautiful 
independently and on its own terms. Yet, he does not stop at the standpoint of use in 
characterizing the beautiful object, either. He writes, “The nature of the beautiful consists 
precisely in the fact that its inner essence lies outside of the limits of the thinking force and 
with its emergence in its own becoming. Precisely because the thinking force in the face of the 
beautiful can no longer ask, Why it is beautiful, it is beautiful.”20 Moritz does not claim that 
the beautiful is thereby independent in an absolute sense, but only to the extent that thinking 
cannot discover the reasons why it is perceived as beautiful, why it elicits, that is, a very peculiar 
form of pleasure in the viewer. The thinking force cannot establish any conclusive relation 
between the fact of the coming-to-be of the beautiful and its quality as beautiful. It remains in 
the dark (“dunkel”).21 Darkness and obscurity of the thinking force in the face of the aesthetic 
object recalls the language of the nascent aesthetics in the eighteenth century.22 Darkness as 
opposed to the clarity when it comes to the ideas that the subject makes of distinct objects 
constituted the point at which aesthetics as a discipline claimed its right alongside the 
traditional disciplines of logic and metaphysics. The modern lineage of the concept of 
separation or Absonderung in Adorno’s aesthetics must also be sought here.  
                                                     
20 “Die Natur des Schönen besteht ja eben darin, daß sein inneres Wesen ausser den Grenzen der Denkkraft, in 
seiner Entstehung in seinem eignen Werden liegt. Eben darum, weil die Denkkraft beim Schönen nicht mehr 
fragen kann, warum es schön sey? ist es schön.” Moritz, 47. 
21 See Moritz, 43. 
22 Moritz, 45. The concept of the dark and the dark forces are rooted in the works of Leibniz and later 
Baumgarten. See, Texte zur Grundlegung der Ästhetik, trans. Hans Rudolf Schweizer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1983). 
For a discussion of obscurity and clarity in Leibniz and Baumgarten, see Christoph Menke, Force: A Fundamental 
Concept of Aesthetic Anthropology, trans. Gerrit Jackson (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 13–19. 
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Baumgarten uses the German term Absonderung as the equivalent of the Latin abstractio and 
employs it for two slightly different purposes in his metaphysics and aesthetics. The 
counterpart to abstraction for him is attention (Aufmerken, attentio). 23 Baumgarten’s innovative 
idea, that aesthetics as the science of sensate or lower cognition can aid and improve the 
science of rational or higher cognition, rests on the close relation that he establishes between 
the art or faculty of attending (ars attendi) and the art or faculty of abstracting (ars abstrahendi). 
Taken together, both faculties help achieve the Cartesian philosophical goal in pursuing truth: 
clear and distinct ideas.24 A basic metaphysical-psychological principle underlies Baumgarten’s 
position: “To that which I represent to myself as clearer than others I pay attention; from that 
which I represent to myself as darker than others I turn my thoughts away [abstract]. I thus 
have the ability to relate [my] attentiveness to something and to leave something out of [my] 
regard.”25 According to Baumgarten, traditional metaphysics, looking down at sense 
perception, tends to pay attention only to those representations that are already clear as they 
are given in our experience. Out of these already clear and available perceptions, logic tries to 
“draw clear concepts, elucidations and determinate intuition-judgments, and out of these 
further general propositions and other conclusions.”26 In his Aesthetica, Baumgarten turns to 
                                                     
23 In Pfütze’s words, “Abstraction, the overlooking of the world and of any surrounding, is a faithful servant of 
sublime perception of that which is essential.” Hermann Pfütze, Form, Ursprung und Gegenwart der Kunst (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999), 93. 
24 Adorno briefly takes up the theme of the “clear and distinct perception” as one of the Cartesian rules for 
reasoning in the context of the form of the essay. See Adorno, “The Essay as Form,” in Notes to Literature, 14–
17. For this concept in Descartes, see The Principles of Philosophy: Selected Philosophical Writings, ed. John Cottingham 
and Robert Stoothoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 160–212, 178–188. 
25 “Was ich mir klarer als anderes vorstelle, darauf gebe ich acht; was ich mir dunkler als anderes vorstelle, davon 
ziehe ich meine Gedanken ab. Also habe ich die Fähigkeit, die Aufmerksamkeit auf etwas zu lenken und etwas 
außer Acht zu lassen.” Baumgarten, Metaphysica, in Texte zur Grundlegung zur Ästhetik, ed. Hans Rudolf Schweizer 
(Hamburg: Felix Mainer, 1983), § 529, 13. 
26 Baumgarten, 70. The traditional metaphysician that is indifferent to aesthetics need only open his eyes and ears 
to undertake the task of coming at clear and distinct ideas. What he fails to overlook according to Baumgarten, 
however, is the very presupposition underlying his act of attention. Namely, paying attention to something is in 
fact to abstract and set aside whatever else that surrounds the object and its representation. He does not ask, 
therefore, of reasons why certain representations are clear but confused or both unclear and confused, and of 
what he can learn from the confused representations something about the knowing subject itself.  
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this concept anew to account for the mechanism of attention to objects.27 Without the art of 
abstracting, the subject will not be able to overcome its distractedness and to behold the object 
on its own terms, free of its relation to other objects and representations.  
The unity of separating and attending goes far beyond the realm of philosophical 
psychology. It conditions the experience of that which has been separated. The essence or the 
why of the beautiful object might remain obscure to me, yet, as both Moritz and Adorno note, 
the fact itself, or the what of the work, namely, that there exists something separated as a whole 
remains certain. The separated whole becomes then the object of attention. It is in virtue of 
being a wholeness integrating whatever it contains that the work can separate itself from its 
genetic context, for if no such whole could form itself, then there would be lingering parts in 
our perception of the work whose relations to the other parts would not follow the logic of 
separation. It is hard to give examples of works with unintegrated parts, for works already 
successful in their separation do no possess any. One case in point can be the relatively recent 
genre of music called “Sleep Music” or “Relaxing Music.” At times running for hours 
(therefore usually available only on the Online platforms such as the Youtube channels), this 
simple, repetitive type of music cannot be framed into one whole. There is hardly any principle 
of organization at work in these pieces gathering together endless arrays of notes. The notes 
remain essentially uncaptured because as loosely organized parts they fall back into the context 
from which the artwork is supposed to separate itself. This occurs especially because, as is 
often the case, the sleep music is accompanied by background natural sounds (birds, waves, 
rain) to boost the mood for falling sleep. 
At a later stage in the history of the concept of separation, Schopenhauer provides an 
account of aesthetic separation that implies the correlation of Baumgarten’s and Moritz’s 
                                                     
27 Baumgarten, § 638. 
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accounts. For him, a wholly attentive subject becomes the truthful mirror of objects.28 It frees 
itself from any willing, intention, and interest, in order that in its purity it can represent to itself 
the pure object. This pure object in turn is nothing but “the complete manifestation of the will 
appearing in the intuited object, which precisely is the (Platonic) Idea of the object.” 29 In 
describing the formal determination of the aesthetic object, he goes on writing: 
The conception of such [a Platonic Idea], however, requires that, when beholding an 
object, I actually abstract from its position, in time and place, and thereby from its 
individuality. For it is this position, which is always determined through the law of 
causality, that posits that object, as individual, in some relation to me: thus, only 
through the setting aside of that position does the object turn into Idea and precisely 
thereby do I into the pure subject of knowing. For this reason, since it fixates the 
fleeting moment forever and thus wrests itself out of time, every painting offers not 
the individual, but the Idea, that which persists during all change.30 
 
The innovative aspect of Schopenhauer’s idealist aesthetics lies with its claim that the aesthetic 
attitude toward its object commits us to take account of the absence of any relations between 
the object and whatever lies outside of it. The subject turns into the mirror of the object. Key 
in realizing this account is the correlation that Schopenhauer creates between what he has 
called a pure, will-free subject and the Ideal object. Purifying the subject of any will, intention, 
purpose vis-à-vis the object coincides with, or makes possible, the abstracting of the object 
from its position in time and space. If I seek to find a use in the aesthetic object, purporting 
                                                     
28 “treuen Spiegel der Objekte.” Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga und Paralipomena II (Zürich: Haffmans, 1988), 364. 
29 “die vollkomenne Manifestation des im angeschauten Objekt erscheinenden Willens, welche eben die 
(Platonische) Idee desselben ist.” Schopenhauer, § 206. 
30 “Die Auffassung einer solchen aber fordert, daß ich, bei Betrachtung eines Objekts, wirklich von seiner Stelle, 
in Zeit und Raum, und dadurch von seiner Individualität, abstrahiere. Denn diese, allemal durch das Gesetz der 
Kausalität bestimmte Stelle ist es, die jenes Objekt zu mir, als Individuo, in irgend ein Verhältniß setzt: daher wird 
nur unter Beseitigung jener Stelle das Objekt zur Idee und eben damit ich zum reinen Subjekt des Erkennens. 
Deshalb giebt jedes Gemälde, schon dadurch, daß es den flüchtigen Augenblick für immer fixiert und so aus der 
Zeit herausreißt, nicht das Individuelle, sondern die Idee, das Dauernde in allem Wechsel.” Schopenhauer, § 206. 
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to do something with it for my own interest, then I will place it back in the nexus of things, 
and along with it myself in the nexus of inclinations, purposes, and interests. It seems thus 
that the purified subject, according to Schopenhauer, is necessary for the aesthetic object to 
appear, or to be experienced, as an uncaused effect.  
The Idea, Schopenhauer claimed, is persistent and unchangeable through all 
transformations of an aesthetic object. But is this not true of any object whatsoever insofar as 
in its many manifestations or modifications something remains constant by which we refer to 
the essence or idea of a thing? A thousand models of a car all include the car-ness as such, just 
as no matter how many years have passed since the making of an armchair, the chair-ness 
persists for all its changes. Schopenhauer is aware of this problem and offers a solution in 
order to differentiate aesthetic objects from all other objects. In arts we do not have, writes 
Schopenhauer, “the intertwinement of This Matter with This Form, which precisely makes for 
the concrete, the actually singular,” but the work of art “shows the Form alone, which already, 
when it is complete and comprehensive, would be the Idea itself.” And further: “This 
abstraction, this separation of the form from the matter, belongs to the character of aesthetic 
artwork [artifact], precisely because its purpose is to bring us to the (Platonic) Idea.”31 To 
establish this characteristic of the aesthetic artefact as opposed to other artefacts, we need to 
clarify two ambiguities in the terms that Schopenhauer uses: form and matter. Each of these 
can have two meanings. 
 On the one hand, form signifies the shape or pattern of a thing, its morphē (μορφή), and 
hence its visibility to us. This recalls the second, formal kind of cause in Aristotle’s four causes, 
and in this respect, it is intertwined, as Schopenhauer remarked, in that out which the thing is 
made, that is, its material cause. The human shape of a statue is carved out of a piece of marble 
                                                     
31 Schopenhauer, § 209. 
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as its matter. This optical sense of the form is indistinguishable from its matter, and it is no 
wonder that Aristotle tends to use the nameless expression “that out of which.”32 On the other 
hand, form signifies the essence or idea (εἶδος) of the made thing, that which remains constant 
through all accidental, not substantial, changes of the thing. Aristotle writes, “By form I mean 
the essence of each thing and its primary substance.”33 Here, the particular forms-as-shapes or 
μορφαι that a thing can assume do not change the form-as-essence of the thing. In this regard, 
the visible form (μορφή) of a thing appears in its being a this and not that, while the ideal form 
of a thing cannot be captured by a this.34 This second notion of form operative in Aristotle and 
in metaphysical thinking in general involves its own notion of matter, this time not as 
something formless and thus unthinkable because imperceptible. Matter here can refer to 
materials, already formed, that become the object of form-giving in any kind of making, 
including art. Using metaphors, tropes, and images in poetry, or colors and shapes in painting, 
or rhythms and accords in music bear testimony to the presence of matter as materials. In this 
sense, for instance, in the Poetics Aristotle refers to plots or stories as the primary materials of 
poetics composition (tragedy) and characters, action, and reasoning as the secondary 
materials.35 Therefore, when Schopenhauer says that the form of the matter in the artwork 
                                                     
32 For a recent take on this issue, see Thomas Ainsworth, “Form vs. Matter,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/form-matter/. 
33 Otherwise, a pure matter without any form is designated by ἥυλη Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1032b2–3. 
34 Poetics, trans. Richard Janko (Indianapolis: Hacket, 1987), 49b25–51a35. For the highly debated question of the 
double meaning of form as εἶδος and μορφ, see Christopher p. Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 183–185. 
35 A brief discussion of the different senses of matter can be found in Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1029a1–5. In his 
lectures on metaphysics, Adorno takes up the double sense of the concept of form in Aristotle and stresses that 
the latter tends to use them interchangeably. Metaphysics, [58]. For him, the mark of the traditional metaphysics in 
the west, following in the footsteps of Aristotle as its founder, is to prioritize the ideal form as what is essential 
above and over the material or empirical form. 60–61.  
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separates itself from the matter, it can be taken to deploy both senses of Mateie that I noted 
above: pure stuff and materials out of which the work organizes itself.36 
A full account of most things requires going beyond their perceptible shape. Unlike a chair, 
the external form of a cell phone says next to nothing about what it is and what it is. It may 
only indicate its relation to human ear and mouth. The final cause or reason for explaining a 
volcanic eruption, cyclone, or animal, cannot take its point of departure from the immediately 
visible form-as-shape of them. How does the artwork stand to other things as to its form? 
One could say that the artwork makes it impossible to decide its final cause based on its formal 
cause. Or, in other terms, it becomes impossible to move from the formal constitution of the 
artwork, its morphological hanging-together of elements, to any purpose or end that can put 
the work in causal relations to other things or persons, and thereby give an account of it based 
on final causality. Moreover, unlike a machine, an organism, or any other complex structure 
whose external form does not capture its essence, the artwork possesses nothing but what 
appears to the observer through its external form, whether it be, like a movie, a novel, a musical 
piece, an unfolding in time such that the perception of the work requires going beyond its 
momentous observation, or, as in a painting or sculpture, the whole work is present at one 
time. In both cases, we deal with a complex form that does not betray any finality.  
                                                     
36 I gave an Aristotelian color to the view of form that Schopenhauer himself dubs as Platonic. When he talks of 
the separation of the Form of the aesthetic object from its matter, Schopenhauer might be referring to the 
Platonic notion of separation (χωρισμὸς). The same term, including its adverbial or prepositional form, appears 
several times in the Aesthetic Theory: “Art, χωρις [separate or separately] from empirical reality, takes up a position 
against it” (“Kunst, χωρίς vom empirisch Daseienden, bezieht dazu Position”). ÄT: 16/AT: 7. See also ÄT: 124, 
151, 185, 198, 297, 520. 
Separation, in the context of Plato’s theory of Ideas, renders the Greek term Chorismos. This is one of the solutions 
that Plato offers in his theory of knowledge as a theory of the relation between particular sensible things and 
their universality. For instance, in Phaedo he deploys this to refer the divorce of soul from body. Phaedo 67d. 
However, it is highly debated how Plato’s chorismos is to be understood, that is, whether he speaks of an 
ontological, object, separation of things from their idea or whether this is merely an epistemological devise to 
clarify the relation between them. Grondin, following Gadamer, argues that the latter holds true and that Aristotle 
wrongly attributes the view of ontological separation to Plato. See Jean Grondin, Introduction to Metaphysics: From 
Parmenides to Levinas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 272, n. 42. For a discussion of this concept 
in Plato, see Martin, Gottfried Martin, Platons Ideenlehre (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), 157–169. 
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The following passage from the 1961 lecture demonstrates a core position in Adorno’s 
aesthetic theory that is both in accord with the Idealist, Schopenhauerian view of form as 
disappearance of genesis or becoming and departs from it:  
On the one hand, it [the artwork] is something that has come to be [a what-has-
become: Gewordenes] and not something natural and is thus to be determined, in 
accordance with its own content, as such a what-has-become. On the other hand, it 
owes its substance to that through which it separates itself as what-has-become from 
that through which it came to be and into which it perhaps dissolves again in the age 
of technical mass production. And this moment, through which it now separates itself 
as what-has-become from that through which it has come to be, is precisely nothing 
other than the formal law [Formgesetz], and that is the ground of justification 
[Rechtsgrund] for why the analysis of the concept of form indeed belongs as the central 
moment in any aesthetics. (Vo61: 6404)37 
 
Adorno agrees with Schopenhauer that the aesthetic object must suspend its unique 
position in time and place and the conditions of its coming to be through the independence 
that its form enjoys from its matter, that is, an independence from the causally determined 
facticity of empirical things. He departs from him, however, so far as Schopenhauer holds on 
to a transcendent sphere such as the ontologically realistic realm of the Platonic Ideas to secure 
the presence of a force in the object that holds its material, sensate manifold together in 
separation from its matter and renders it knowable or intelligible.38 In this sense, Adorno is 
                                                     
37 “Einerseits ist er nämlich ein Gewordenes und nicht ein Natürliches und seinem eigenen Gehalt nach nur als 
ein solches Gewordenes zu bestimmen. Andererseits hat er seine Substanz an dem. wodurch er als Gewordenes 
von dem sich abhebt, wodurch er wurde und worin er vielleicht im Zeitalter des technischen Massenproduktion 
wieder übergeht. Und diese Moment, wodurch es nun als Gewordenes von dem sich abhebt, woraus er geworden 
ist, das ist nichts anderes eben als das Formgesetz und das ist der Rechtsgrund dafür, warum in eine Ästhetik die 
Analyse des Begriffs der Form eigentlich als das Zentrales hineingehört.” 
38 Cf. the following passage: “If the Platonic ideas were existence-in-itself, art would not be needed; the 
ontologists of antiquity mistrusted art and sought pragmatic control over it because in their innermost being they 
knew that the hypostatized universal concept is not what beauty promises. Plato's critique of art is indeed not 
compelling, because art negates the literal reality of its thematic content, which Plato had indicted as a lie. The 
exaltation of the concept as idea is allied with the philistine blindness for the central element of art, its form” 
(AT: 83). 
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more of an Aristotelian. The form of the work, as the central moment of aesthetic analysis, is 
tightly connected to the material composition of the work. For him, “[A]rtworks surpass the 
world of things by what is thing-like in them, their artificial objectivation. . . . They are things 
whose power it is to appear. Their immanent process is externalized as their own act, not as 
what humans have done to them and not merely for humans” (AT: 80, 81/ÄT: 125).39 We 
cannot, of course, pose the question as if it were the answer. 
This takes us back to the key question of the aesthetics of autonomy: How does the object 
separate itself in virtue of its form in a lawful manner from its genesis? For a growing number 
of literary and aesthetic theoreticians, the question is not one of how but rather whether this 
is possible at all. For them, the artwork does not separate itself from its genesis, and if it is 
held to be able to do so, then one is caught up in an ideological framework.40 Viewed in 
isolation from the other, social facticity moment, the separation moment would by necessity 
appear in an idealistic perspective without any remainder. And we should, perhaps, not be too 
quick to deny this tendency towards idealism at the very heart of Adorno’s aesthetic theory as 
well. But without entertaining some relation to idealism thus conceived, the separateness of 
the artwork would be out of question. 
                                                     
39 “Sie ueberfluegeln die Dingwelt durch ihr eigenes Dinghaftes, ihre artifizielle Objektivation. . . . Sie sind Dinge, 
in denen es liegt zu erscheinen. Ihr immanenter Prozess tritt nach aussen als ihr eigenes Tun, nicht als das, was 
Menschen an ihnen getan haben und nicht bloß für die Menschen.”  
40 For Hinz, autonomy is understood only as a “historically emerged phenomenon of artistic praxis and reflective 
philosophy of art,” whereas, “in terms of the epistemological necessity to banish it to the realm of metaphysics,” 
as a concept without any social empirical reality, autonomy is put in quotation marks. Berthold Hinz, “Zur 
Dialektik des bürgerlichen Autonomie-Begriff,” in Autonomie der Kunst: Zur Genese und Kritik einer bürgerlichen 
Kategorie, ed. Michael Müller et al (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972), 173, n. 1. For Moi, “The doctrine of 
autonomy is culture-phobic.” An aesthetic theory needs, according to her, to adopt a culturalist position of sorts. 
“By culturalism, I mean all the various approaches to literature and other cultural objects that reject the autonomy 
of art in its modernist formulation and stress the cultural, historical, social, and political aspects of aesthetic 
phenomena, such as Marxism, feminism, new historicism, and cultural, postcolonial, and queer studies, as they 
have developed over the past twenty-five years. All these trends share an insistence on the cultural situatedness 
of all human forms of expression, which is entirely alien to the formalist veneration of art as sacred and 
transcendental, or as the purest form of negativity.” Toril Moi, Henrik Ibsen and the Birth of Modernism: Art, Theater, 
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 21–22. I believe the concept of cultural situatedness should 
be understood as a break with any notion of separateness of the artwork from its context of emergence.  
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To unpack this potential ambiguity, if not unclarity, in Adorno’s work, I propose resorting 
once more to Moritz and the key point on which, in my view, the former agrees with him and 
reveals a deep Idealistic aesthetic commitment, at least insofar as the isolated moment of 
autonomy as separation through form is concerned. As the very title of Moritz’s article, “The 
formative imitation of the beautiful” (“Die bildende Nachahmung des Schönen”), clearly 
suggests, aesthetic separation is made possible by imitating natural beauty. The act of making 
or forming the beautiful work of art is to create the same unbridgeable relation between 
emergence and effect of the beautiful as one finds in natural beauty. What testifies to the 
success of this making is the feeling of the pleasure that is specific to the completeness of the 
beautiful in nature. (And the facilitator of this peculiar act of nature-imitating making or this 
crafted imitation of nature is the figure of the genius.) For Moritz, to imitate nature is not to 
imitate its particular constructs or images; it is to imitate in the “existing totality” or the 
“relations of the big totality of nature” that we find mysteriously and unthinkably at work in 
the things complete-in-themselves, that is, the beautiful things. To summarize this relation 
between emergence and the completeness of the beautiful in art imitating nature, Moritz 
writes: 
Since, however, those big relations, within the full scope of which precisely lies the 
beautiful, no longer fall within the reach of the thinking force, so also can the living 
concept of the artistic imitating of the beautiful take place only in the feeling of the 
active force that brings it about in the first moment of emergence, where the work, as 
already completed, all of a sudden appears, through all grades of its gradual becoming, 
in a dark apprehension before the soul, and in this moment of first generation, so to 
speak, before its real existence, it is already there; through which arises at once that 
unnamable allure that drives the creative genius to permanent making. 41 
                                                     
41 “Da man aber jene grossen Verhältnisse, in deren völligen Umfange eben das Schöne liegt, nicht mehr unter das 
Gebiet der Denkkraft fallen; so kann auch der lebendige Begriff von der bildenden Nachahmung des Schönen, 
nur im Gefühl der thätigen Kraft, die es hervorbring, im ersten Augenblick der Entstehung stattfinden, wo das 
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Moritz takes pains to outline a structural, not representational, affinity between art and 
nature in which the generating act falls short of fully accounting for the generated work. The 
product remains obscure even to the creator, just as the beautiful products of nature are dark 
for the thinking force of the subject though they excite the feeling soul. But while obscurity in 
the case of nature relates both to generation and organization of the beautiful, in art we do 
know that the work is made by certain means and a maker. The Moritzian imitation of natural 
beauty must then refer only to the mode of organizing the work art. It does so in a set of terms 
that are useful not only to understand the Idealist aesthetic project but also the critique of this 
project in Adorno’s aesthetic theory. 
Moritz’s view on imitation of nature finds an echo in Adorno’s words, “Art does not imitate 
nature, not even individual instances of natural beauty, but natural beauty as such” (AT: 
72/ÄT: 111). In the same vein, “Natural beauty is perceived both as authoritatively binding 
and as something incomprehensible that questioningly awaits its solution. Above all else it is 
this double character of natural beauty that has been conferred on art. Under its optic, art is 
not the imitation of nature but the imitation of natural beauty” (AT: 70–71/ÄT: 111–112).42 
The double character of what is beautiful in nature, being binding yet incomprehensible, 
corresponds to the Moritzian distinction between feeling and thinking power, and both refer 
                                                     
Werk, als schon vollendet, durch alle Grade seines allmähligen Werdens, in dunkler Ahndung, auf einmal vor die 
Seele tritt, und in diesem Moment der ersten Erzeugung gleichsam vor seinem wirklichen Daseyn, da ist; wodurch 
alsdann auch jener unnennbare Reiz entsteht, welcher das schaffende Genie zur immerwährenden Bildung 
treibt.” Moritz, Die Signatur des Schönen, 47. 
42 On the mechanism of imitating natural beauty in art, Iser notes that “the imagination creates appearances 
which, in turn, feature the presence of something nonexistent. It is the hallmark of the work of art that it provides 
appearance for something inconceivable, thereby endowing a figment with illusion.” On the other hand, however, 
the imagination vanishes and therefore decomposes the illusion: “The outcome of this inherent interaction 
between producing and negating operations is semblance.” Wolfgang Iser, “The Aesthetic and the Imaginary,” 
in The States of 'Theory': History, Art, and Critical Discourse, ed. David Carroll (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1990), 212. 
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back to the ability of the aesthetic object, having successfully imitated natural beauty, to 
surpass its own genesis or making. This makes up the fundamental position on art in Idealist 
aesthetics whose most lucid expression is to be found in Kant’s idea of art in Critique of the 
Power of Judgment. For Kant, art is a made thing that appears like nature. This can be the case 
provided that, first, we are aware that the thing is art, namely the product of the “determinate 
intention of producing something,” and, second, we nonetheless regard the thing as if it were 
nature, “although of course one is aware of its art.”43 How is the beholder supposed to unify 
these two perspectives, one falling for the natural appearance of the work and the other 
awakening to its being a made thing? The organization of the work offers the key. 
 
2.2 Separation from Genesis as Organization  
In our primarily phenomenological description of the work’s separateness thus far one 
question has remained open: What is it in the artwork that enforces the separation and sustains 
it in the state of being separate? Note the grammar of the first part of the original passage at 
issue in this chapter where the artwork is defined “als eines von der empirischen Realität und 
damit dem gesellschaftlichen Wirkungszusammenhang sich Absondernden,” which, rendered 
literally, amounts to: “as one self-separating from empirical reality and the social nexus of 
effects.” Separation indicates an activity in the work devoted to organizing itself in a certain 
way. This “itself” is not just an empty space in which the work is recognized by a viewer and 
by which the viewer––even at a few feet away from the painting or the theater room––realizes 
that he or she is going to face an artwork. That is certainly one phenomenological sense of 
aesthetic separation. The “itself” is at once a bundle of sensate elements organized in the set 
apart frame of the work into a unity or synthesis. Synthesis is the result of the relation between 
                                                     
43 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 45, 185–186. 
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the moments of the work with each other (see Ä58: 330). The lineage of the term Synthesis 
used by Adorno sheds light on the self-activity of the artwork in its separateness. As it lists the 
aims of a treatise on poetics, Aristotle’s Poetics opens with a reference to the importance of 
synthesizing in a successful poem, “To discuss the art of poetry in general, as well as the 
potential of each of its types; to explain the unity of plot required for successful poetic 
composition.”44 Two points deserve to be made here, one grammatical and the other 
theoretical. 
The treatise starts by pointing to unity as the first and foremost feature of poetic 
composition (ποιητικός). This signifies the identity of the product as one singular thing 
organized after a plot or narrative or story (μῦθος). The word that Aristotle uses to refer to 
this unity is the infinitive of the verb συνίστημι in the middle/passive voice, συνίστασθαι, 
meaning to put together, to organize, or to frame. That is the source of the English “synthesis.” 
The middle/passive voice used by Aristotle is of importance for us here as it signifies that the 
poetic composition organizes itself in its own interest or for itself. Of course, because of the 
ambiguity of this voice, it can also be rendered as “being organized” by the poet. Wilson’s 
remark on the use of this verb in Aristotle’s meteorological writings stresses the middle voice 
rather than the passive voice, “As with συνίστασθαι, it implies a self-gathering into one place 
of stuff that had been diffused throughout some mixture or that was potentially present in it. 
So in air, which has potentialities of wet and dry exhalation, whichever exhalation 
predominates will gather together in a mass.”45  
A good sense of the middle/passive voice can be given by recalling constructs in English 
such as “This book reads well” or “This wine tastes good.” The real subject of reading the 
                                                     
44 Aristotle, The Poetics [1–6], trans. Richard A. Macksey, manuscript.  
45 Malcolm Wilson, Structure and Method in Aristotle’s Meteorologica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 66. 
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book and tasting the wine is the human individual, yet grammatically it is the objects 
themselves that appear to be doing something, that is, reading and tasting. This grammatical 
reversion of the agency of the act tells us something about the quality of the objects as if they 
were self-active. In the same sense, we can say of an artwork as an object that what it does is 
organize, organizing is what fundamentally characterizes it, so that we can say of it: It organizes 
well or It organizes poorly.46 On such an account, a more literal translation of Aristotle’s words 
in the first paragraphs of the Poetics runs thus: “[To analyze] how it demands [δεῖ] to self-
organize the plots if the poetic making is going to hold fast beautifully.” The rest of the Poetics 
is an effort to demonstrate what that demand for self-organization entails.47  
Along Aristotle’s account of synthesizing of plots as the self-activity of the poetic 
composition according to the demand of poetic success, we can get a better sense of synthesis 
in Adorno. Separation, he has argued, abides by the law of the form of the work in which 
disparate elements step into relation with each other. But which comes first? Is the synthesis 
the result of gathering the “plots” or is it the synthesis that gives the law according to which 
these are to be organized? This circular view suggests both that the relation between the 
individual elements comprises the wholeness of the work and that it is the whole that 
determines the individual elements. In order to get out of this circular view of the work, 
Adorno proposes the following heuristic way of looking at the formal law of the work: “In a 
good novel, somehow in the first sentence, I don’t want to say every other word, but anyways 
                                                     
46 Valéry takes as the necessary, though not sufficient, condition of any art its ability “To organize a system of 
perceptible things.” Paul Valéry, “The Idea of Art,” Aesthetics, 73. 
47 “. . . καὶ πῶς δεῖ συνίστθαι τοὺς μύθους ει μέλλει καλῶς ἕξειν ἡ ποίησις.” “The Poetics,” Aristotle: The Poetics, 
“Longinus” on the Sublime, Demetrius on Style, Loeb, ed. T. E. Page (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1927), 
47a8. On the importance of the verb δεῖ, Pepe notes that we can “recognize two overall guidelines for Aristotle’s 
inquiry, i.e. a normative and a descriptive intent. The normative intention is perceptible behind his use of δεῖ: it 
is not a question merely of analyzing the stories but of indicating the way in which plots must be constructed if 
the poem is to be a success. . . He frequently has recourse to δεῖ in the treatise, denoting his intention of 
prescribing, almost didactically, the rules of creating poetry.” The Genres of Rhetorical Speeches in Greek and Roman 
Antiquity, Cristina Pepe (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 129. 
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the direction of the development [Tendenz], the construction of the whole [Konstruktion des 
Ganzen] must more or less be laid down” (Ä58: 330). 
The first sentence––like that of Kafka’s Metamorphosis on how one morning Gregor Samsa 
woke up from unrestful dreams and found himself in his bed metamorphosed into a giant bug, 
or what Mrs. Ramsay says in response to her son in the opening paragraph of Woolf’s To the 
Lighthouse, “Yes, of course, if it’s fine tomorrow”––posits a direction towards which all other 
sentences to follow must orient themselves if they are to form themselves into a lawful 
synthesis of words. There is, however, no law determining what this opening sentence must 
be. The opening can be contingent, and indeed it does appear fully random to the novice 
reader, and it is only after he or she has read the entire book or listened to the entire musical 
piece that the necessity of the opening line will reveal itself. This, again, recalls the Aristotelian 
view of poetic composition (specifically, tragedy) having a beginning, a middle, and a 
conclusion, of which, however, the beginning, contrary to the other two parts, “does not of 
necessity follow something else, but after which there naturally is, or comes into being, 
something else.” The middle and conclusion always have to follow what precedes them if the 
poetic composition must be the “representation of a complete action.”48 
Though in slightly different terms, a similar view of the wholeness of the work and its 
logical progression is advocated by Hegel. Although he does not speak of the beginning of a 
work, Hegel refers to the theme (Thema) of a work, that is, the simple, abstract foundation for 
the execution (Ausführung), which gives the concrete shape of the work as a synthesis.49 This 
abstract theme makes for the content (Inhalt) of the work. The theme as such is universal and 
can thus be given, as in the example of a book, “in a few words or sentences,” and “nothing 
                                                     
48 Aristotle, Poetics, 50b26–28. 
49 Aristotle uses the term sunolos (σύνολος, of the same root as the verb συντίθημι mentioned above) to refer to a 
thing as a concrete whole, such as the bronze statue. Metaphysics, 1029a3–4.  
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else ought to occur in the book other than that of which the universal has already been given 
in the content.”50 The simple, abstract, and in fact subjective theme of a work then puts 
forward, according to Hegel, an “ought” (“Sollen”) on the basis of which the work sets out 
developing itself into something concrete. The ought in the abstract form of a theme gives the 
work its direction, and the reason why the work proceeds in that direction, writes Hegel, is 
that “[W]e are not content with this abstract form and demand something further. At first, it 
is only an unsatisfied need and something inadequate in the subject, which strives to supersede 
itself and to proceed to satisfaction.”51 On this path of objectivation, the subjective force in 
the work encounters obstacles or limits (Schranke) that it has to overcome in order to find 
satisfaction in realizing itself. Why Hegel speaks of satisfaction lies in his notion of the free 
subject as that which is the total (das Totale) in the sense that the subject “is not this inner self 
alone,” that is, the universal theme or idea of the work, “but equally the realization of this 
inner through the outer and in it.”52 The theme, in other words, demands to become a finished 
work.  
The chief difference between Adorno’s view of the separating and self-organizing force in 
the artwork and Hegel’s view of the objecting force in it relates to the presence of a 
commanding universal theme in the latter and the absence thereof in the former. It is no 
accident that Adorno illustrates his view by speaking of the opening, fully contingent sentence 
of the work. In this way, pace Aristotle, the work has to build itself out of what it posits at its 
first step and then specifies itself further and further on that basis. Whether and how the 
                                                     
50 G. W. F. Hegel, Ästhetik I/II, ed. Rüdiger Bubner (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1971), 159; Translated by T. M. Knox, 
Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 95–96.  
51 “[S]o sind wir doch mit dieser abstrakten Form nicht zufrieden und verlangen nach Weiterem. Zunächst ist 
dies nur ein unbefriedigtes Bedürfnis und im Subjekt als etwas Ungenügendes, das sich aufzuheben und zur 
Befriedung fortzuschreiten strebt.” Hegel, Ästhetik I–II, 160. 
52 “[I]st das Subjekt das Totale, nicht das Innere allein, sondern ebenso auch die Realisation dieses Innern am 
Äußeren und in demselben.” Hegel, 161. 
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subjective force in the work succeeds in solving its problems, overcoming its obstacles, 
demands knowing the nature of those obstacles in concrete terms.  
 
In Aesthetic Theory, a hypothetical scene of modern public life is conjured up that must have 
been an experience from his exile years in America. The scene best brings up art’s double 
character from the standpoint of its social character. I cite the passage in full length: 
Music, whether it is played in a café or, as is often the case in America, piped into 
restaurants for the guests, can be transformed into something completely different, of 
whose expression [Ausdruck] the hum of conversation and the rattle of dishes and 
whatever else becomes a part. To fulfill its function, this music expects the 
inattentiveness of its listeners no less than in its autonomous state it expects their 
attentiveness. A medley [Potpourri] is sometimes made up of parts of artworks, but 
through this montage the parts are fundamentally transformed. Functions such as 
warming people up and drowning out silence recasts music as something defined as 
mood, the commodified negation of the boredom produced by the grey-on-grey 
commodity world. The sphere of entertainment, which has long been integrated into 
production, amounts to the domination of this element of art over all the rest of its 
phenomena. These elements are antagonistic. The subordination of autonomous 
artworks to the element of social function buried within each work and from which 
art originated in the course of a protracted struggle, wounds art at its most vulnerable 
point. Yet someone in the café who is suddenly struck by the earnestness of the music 
and listens intensely may feel odd to himself [alien to reality, realitätsfremd] and find 
himself foolish to others. In that antagonism the fundamental relation of art and 
society appears in art. (Translation modified; AT: 253/ÄT: 375)53 
                                                     
53 “Musik kann, im Caféhaus gespielt oder, wie vielfach in Amerika, durch telefonische Anlagen für die Gäste 
von Restaurants übertragen, zu einem gänzlich Anderen werden, zu dessen Ausdruck das Gesumm Redender, 
das Geklapper von Tellern und alles Mögliche hinzugehört. Sie erwartet die Unaufmerksamkeit der Hörer, um 
ihre Funktion zu erfüllen, kaum weniger als im Stand ihrer Autonomie deren Aufmerksamkeit. Ein Potpourri 
addiert sich zuweilen aus Bestandteilen von Kunstwerken, aber durch die Montage verwandeln sie sich bis ins 
Innerste. Zwecke wie der des Anwärmens, der Übertäubung des Schweigens formen sie um, das, was man mit 
Stimmung bezeichnet, die zur Ware gewordene Negation der vom Grau der Warenwelt bereiteten Langeweile. 
Die Sphäre der Unterhaltung, längst in die Produktion eingeplant, ist die Herrschaft dieses Moments der Kunst 
über ihre Phänomene insgesamt. Beide Momente sind antagonistisch. Die Unterordnung autonomer Kunstwerke 
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The passage offers a notion of the social character of the artwork that manifests itself as a 
force resisting against the work’s attempt to realize its aesthetic separateness. The friction 
between the external force and the work’s own force takes the form of a conflict felt by 
listening to the musical piece. That is the place of the appearing of the conflict between what 
is expected of the musical pieces and what the piece itself expects if it is earnest and thus 
resilient. Aesthetic separation as the musical piece’s autonomous state as much depends on 
the attentiveness of a subject, the café-dweller, as its external function invites distraction. If 
the café-dweller that is struck by the piece feels an antagonism––to the point of 
embarrassment, say, before his or her friends around the table ––between the demand of 
sustained attention on the side of the work and the demands of socialization, of having fun, 
on the side of the café, then chances are that the work has a quality that goes beyond its 
function. If so, then the site of that conflict must be, not only the individual person that is 
struck by the music, but also the musical piece itself as the final line of the passage states, “In 
that antagonism the fundamental relation of art and society appears in art.” 
The key point as regards the social character of art in the passage is that this character, 
manifested in the form of the distracting function of the piece, is nothing external to the piece, 
it is no quality imposed on it from without. Rather, it is “buried within every work.” If this 
functional moment devoted to distraction and mood-providing is realized through 
inattentiveness, then two conclusions can be drawn. First, the social character of the work 
tends to rule over the work once the work was experienced not in its wholeness but partially, 
                                                     
unter das gesellschaftliche Zweckmoment, das in jedem vergraben ist und aus dem in langwierigem Prozeß die 
Kunst aufstand, verletzt sie an der empfindlichsten Stelle Wer jedoch etwa, vom Ernst einer Musik plötzlich 
betroffen, im Café sehr intensiv zuhört, mag virtuell sich realitätsfremd, für die anderen lächerlich benehmen. In 
jenem Antagonismus erscheint in Kunst das Grundverhältnis von ihr und der Gesellschaft.”  
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that is, as a medley or potpourri of elements. The work succeeds in separating itself from the 
context only in virtue of the experience of its wholeness. Second, the wholeness of the work, 
required for its aesthetic separation and its overcoming of the imposed social functions, needs 
an attentive subject to actualize the work by discerning the parts of the work from the medley 
of noises and turning them into a whole.54 Adorno is clear on the role of the subject in realizing 
the synthesis that the work needs in order to claim its aesthetic separation. In a late 1950s 
lecture, he says:  
This synthesis, I may remind you, is a spiritual synthesis. In the artwork the moments 
as such remain always separated, and you can only so much perceive of the artwork as 
a spiritual unity, as a nexus of meaning, as a structure as you in your own turn bring 
along a synthetic force vis-à-vis the artwork, that is, if I may say that in such an 
exaggerated manner, in so far as you are ready to once again actualize in yourself as 
the observer the same process that is present in the artwork as a potentiality in a 
congealed form. (Ä58: 295) 55  
 
It is the work itself that provides the ground for its being performed along or anew by the 
listener or reader or viewer. Rather than just arguing for a reception theory of the artwork, the 
alleged lack of which in Adorno’s aesthetic thought has been criticized,56 Adorno’s recourse 
                                                     
54 As Paul Valéry says of the concept of attention, “Attention, link between the whole and the part.” 
Cahiers/Notebooks 3, trans. Norma Rinsler, Paul Ryan, Brian Stimpson (New York: Peter Lang: 2007), 294, the 
1927 entry. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty puts it, “a piece of music comes very close to being no more than a medley 
of sound sensations: from among these sounds we discern the appearance of a phrase and, as phrase follows 
phrase, a whole and, finally, as Proust put it, a world. . . . All I have to do here is listen without soul-searching, 
ignoring my memories and feelings and indeed the composer of the work, to listen just as perception looks at 
the things themselves without bringing my dreams into the picture.” The World of Perception, trans. Oliver Davis 
(London: Routledge, 2004), 99–100. 
55 “Die Momente bleiben als solche im Kunstwerk stets doch getrennt, und nur soviel können Sie von dem 
Kunstwerk als einer geistigen Einheit, als einem Sinnzusammenhang, als einer Struktur wahrnehmen, wie Sie 
Ihrerseits dem Kunstwerk gegenüber an synthetisierender Kraft mitbringen, wie weit Sie also bereit sind, wenn 
ich es so übertrieben sagen darf, in sich selbst als Betrachter den Prozess noch einmal zu aktualisieren, der als 
Potential in geronnener Gestalt in dem Kunstwerk eben gegenwärtig ist.” 
56 The most consistent figure in this respect is Jauss: “My criticism of Adorno’s aesthetic was meant to introduce 
the attempt to justify aesthetic experience vis-à-vis a theoretical claim that neglects or suppresses the primary 
modes of this experience, especially its communicative efficacy, in favor of the highest level of aesthetic 
reflection.” Hans Robert Jauss, Aesthetic Modernity and Literary Hermeneutics, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: 
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to the role of the subject serves to show that the autonomous artwork is not always-already 
fully objectified. If it were fully objectified, then the relations between the elements of the 
work would have obeyed the causality, as well as spatial-temporal structure, ruling over any 
other empirical object. This would have the work fall back into the causal nexus of other 
things, and thereby make impossible its claim to separation. But, on the other hand, the subject 
here is not to be viewed as an external force that is added to the work to make it wholesome, 
which would involve denying the work its claim to completeness. On par with Schopenhauer’s 
pure subject, the listener’s attentiveness simply enacts the non-material relations that already 
exist between the material parts of the work. 
To avoid both pitfalls, the artwork must be a spiritual and not merely a material synthesis. 
In other words, the work is not materially completed; it is rather in need of being completed 
by its experience. It is spiritually completed insofar as it includes in itself the capacity to be 
experienced as a whole. This is in accord with the formal lawfulness of the work’s synthetic 
unity. What enables the artwork to separate itself autonomously is neither perfection nor 
completeness.57 To give substance to this conclusion, that is, the need for the subject to 
perform the whole-part relation in the artwork, I draw on a separately discussed example in 
Aesthetic Theory and bring it to bear on our café scene and its problematic.  
 Let us suppose that what is being played in the café is Beethoven’s Piano Sonata in D- 
Minor, Opus 31, No. 2 (“The Tempest”), and that that is the object of the cafe-dweller's intense 
                                                     
University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 21. 
57 Hans-Georg Gadamer offers an illuminating formulation on this issue. In a discussion of music and the 
circularity involved in understanding a musical product, he defines a construction or Gebilde as that which is not 
to be understood by appeal to its pre-planned completeness ‘vorgeplantes Fertigsein.’ A Gebilde shapes itself from 
within itself into its own form through a process of being built up. So, it is both constructed and yet to be 
constructed: “The task is to build up in oneself what is already a construction, to construe what is not ‘construed.’ 
. . Without the readiness of the receiver to become all ear, no poetical text would speak” (“Die Aufgabe ist, das, 
was ein Gebilde ist, in sich aufzubauen, etwas, was nicht ‘konstruiert’ ist, zu konstruieren – Ohne die Bereitschaft 
des Aufnehmenden, ganz Ohr zu sein, spricht kein dichterischer Text.” Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” 
in Gesammelte Werke. vol. 2. (Tu ̈bingen: Mohr, 1985), 358. 
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attention. The performance of the Sonata takes about twenty-five minutes, divided, according 
to the form of sonata, into three more or less equally long movements, Largo-Allegro, Adagio, 
and Allegretto. With regard to the second, Adagio movement Adorno writes: 
The first thematic complex of that movement, which is of extraordinary, eloquent 
beauty, is a masterfully wrought mosaic of contrasting shapes that are motivically 
coherent even when they are registrally distant. The atmosphere of this thematic 
complex, which earlier would have been called mood, awaits -- as indeed all mood 
probably does -- an event that only becomes an event against the foil of this mood. 
The F-major [i.e. the second theme of the second movement] follows with a rising 
thirty-second note gesture. (AT: 285/ÄT: 424)  
 
Now with regard to this second, F-major theme as well as the entire second movement of 
the Sonata, which can be taken as a part of the whole Sonata, Adorno suggests, in a passage 
written later in the course of the composition of the book, the following experiment:  
It only requires playing the passage first in context and then alone to be able to 
recognize how much its incommensurableness, radiating over the passage, owes to the 
work as a whole. The passage becomes extraordinary because its expression is raised 
above what precedes it by the concentration of lyrical, humanized melody. It is 
individuated in relation to, and by way, of the totality; it is its product as well as its 
suspension (AT: 188). 
 
Taken alone, the Adagio movement offers just a beautiful melody in its second theme. This 
not very extraordinary melodic passage may fit very well into the atmosphere of a café. The 
passage may stand out for any number of reasons amid the medley of the hum of 
conversations and the rattle of dishes. Someone sitting in the café may catch the melody as he 
or she goes on eating or talking. This means concretely that the passage in itself can be 
beautiful, pleasing. Taken as a part of a configuration of notes the realization of which would 
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require attention to the Sonata in its entirety, however, the passage will become more than, or 
different from, what it immediately offers to the café dweller: it steps into a peculiar relation 
to what came before, that is, in the first movement, which was a complex exposition of Largo-
Allegro and Adagio themes to be developed in the remaining two movements. The second 
movement, with its delightful melody, responds to the first, as if showing awareness of what 
precedes it. To grasp this response we need to adopt an “external vantage point” towards this 
thematic passage, seeing it, so to speak, from the perspective of the entire unfolding of the 
music thus far.  
In the combined examples of the café and the Beethoven sonata, the musical piece comes 
into conflict with the context of its reception when the piece’s claim to autonomy resists being 
subordinated to its embedded functionality on account of the beauty of its Adagio movement. 
So far, we have concluded that the artwork betrays its social character only in its disintegrated 
status thanks to defective reception. This implies that in its lawfully synthesized, wholesome 
unity the artwork will be able to shake off all its social character and fully separate itself from 
social nexus of effects. If it is thanks to the unity of attending and separating, in a manner 
reminiscent of Baumgarten’s thesis, that the artwork realizes its autonomy in competition with 
the social function buried within its own structure, then a further question emerges: Wherein 
does the source of the lawfulness lie with which the form severs the whole work from 
empirical reality and thereby from social nexus of effects within which it is situated? A deeper 
conception of the social holds it to nest in the very formal separation of the artwork. The 
social constitutes a character of the work.  
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§ 3 ANALYTIC OF THE SOCIAL: FORM AS REPETITION  
The second part of Adorno’s formulation on art’s double character determines autonomous 
art as something that “falls at the same time into the empirical reality and the social nexuses 
of effects.” This second character of art brings up its belonging to a context, rather than its 
separation from it. Adorno holds art to be a social fact. He tends to use the French expression 
fait social (AT: 5/ÄT: 16; AT: 229/ÄT: 340), thereby betraying the lineage of this concept in 
the work of Émile Durkheim. The latter’s definition runs thus: “A social fact is any way of 
acting, whether fixed or not, capable of exerting over the individual an external constraint; or: 
which is general over the whole of a given society whilst having an existence of its own, 
independent of its individual manifestations.”58 To rephrase Durkheim’s own examples of 
social fact, when I speak English or use the currency of the dollar in the U.S., individual 
instances of my uttering a sentence or my buying an item are made possible by the relations 
of that language and this currency. I cannot change the syntax or coin idiosyncratic words or 
come up with a banknote of my own choice without disrupting the communication or making 
impossible the exchange. There is no self-rule with a social fact, for “it asserts itself as soon as 
I try to resist it.”59  
If the artwork is a social fact, then as a product of making and of labor it cannot be 
autonomous in the sense of being able to separate itself from ways of acting, making, and 
existing in society. The claim of the social facticity moment precisely consists in denying the 
aesthetic form any separateness from its genesis. According to the antithetical determination 
of art as a social fact, the work of art falls back into both the empirical reality and the social 
nexus of effects. The former states that the work is a thing among other things, hence bound 
                                                     
58 Émile Durkheim, “What is a social fact?” in Rules for Sociological Method, ed. W. D. Halls (New York: FP, 1982), 
59. 
59 Durkheim, 51. 
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up with time and place and in causal relation with other things. The latter, following Dilthey’s 
definition quoted earlier, states that the artwork is a member of the circular, self-centered 
historical world of values, purposes, and functions, thus nothing essentially separate from it.  
The trouble with the way we laid down the separation of the artwork through form as its 
moment of autonomy is that it might appear as an unchangeable definition a priori of the 
autonomous artwork, independent and before its appearance on the scene. Indeed, the 
transcendental aspect of Adorno’s idea of art as formal separation hands us such a definition. 
What this definition fails to deliver on its own is, firstly, to show whether art can do so always 
and under all historical circumstances, and, secondly, the nature of that from which the work 
separates itself. In the preceding part of this chapter, separation was considered in a fashion 
principally tangential to history such that our discussion presupposed the possibility of 
separation under all conditions, from Aristotle to Kafka. All the same, such a definition fails 
to address the coming-to-be of autonomy. The real conditions of the formal separation of the 
aesthetic object find no treatment in the tradition of Idealist aesthetics from Moritz to 
Schopenhauer. This is the point where Adorno departs from that tradition. We need to 
demonstrate why the aesthetic needs to concern itself with the real conditions of aesthetic 
separateness. 
My contention is that the real conditions both serve as the context from which the artwork 
formally and lawfully separates itself, as argued earlier, and simultaneously function as 
conditions that make possible a successful aesthetic separation. I do not intend here to offer 
an archival, sociological, psychological, or historical account of the rise of art’s autonomy, 
which surpasses the scope of this dissertation. My aim is to incorporate the determining force 
of those real, that is, extra-aesthetic conditions into the constitution of the artwork only 
through the extra-aesthetic forms of the fetish and the commodity, both being specifically 
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modern phenomena. My discussion of real conditions in relation to formal conditions 
proceeds on its own part in a formal, or shall we say ideal, manner. Commodity is to be treated 
as a structure within which the artistic production, as a social production, occurs. In Marx’s 
terms, commodity is the universal form that all products assume in the capitalist mode of 
production. Modern autonomous artwork cannot help but mimic the form of commodity, 
behave and be treated like a fetish, if it must reclaim its autonomy, “[C]ommodity production 
not only migrates into artworks in the form of a heterogeneous life but indeed also as their 
own law” (AT: 223/ÄT: 335); they have a “latent commodity form” (AT: 237/ÄT: 352), for 
“[T]he emancipation of art was possible only through the appropriation of the commodity 
character, through which art gained the semblance of its being-in-itself” (AT: 239/ÄT: 355). 
The semblance of being-in-itself, effected by the act of formal separation, is shared by the 
artwork with the commodity and the fetish. 
Both fetish and commodity are historically determined forms that at the same time appear 
to be not made, tending to conceal their fact of being products of human labor. It was Karl 
Marx who grasped the structural and historical unity of the fetish and the commodity. In a 
1938 essay, Adorno summarizes Marx’s famous, extensively discussed definition of the fetish 
character of commodities as “veneration of the self-made” (GS: 14, 24).60 He uses the same 
terms in the early introduction to Aesthetic Theory to relate the fetish character and aesthetic 
separation, “The quality of artworks depends essentially on the degree of their fetishism, on 
the veneration that the process of production pays to what lays claim to being self-produced” 
(AT: 341/ÄT: 507). As this passage points out, fetishism resembles in its structure that of 
aesthetic separation in that it lays claim to the causal independence of the product from the 
                                                     
60 “Veneration des Selbstgemachten.” For recent discussions of Marx’s understanding of fetishism, in his prime 
years and in Capital I, see Kohl, 91–98, Iacono 103–131, and Hartmut Böhme, Fetishism and Culture: a Different 
Theory of Modernity., trans. Anna Galt (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014), 223-256. 
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act of production. It is in virtue of this separation that the product can appear as self-made or 
self-produced. The theoretical claim behind Adorno’s turn to the fetish object is that a 
separation that does not show awareness of its own conditions of genesis would fall back into 
the domain of fetishism, even though the fetish character is an inevitable condition for the rise 
of the autonomous artwork.  
In the following pages, I proceed to examine the ways that the work of art fails to separate 
itself from its genesis by showing how it is bound to repeat both the fetish form and the 
commodity form. In these two forms, what is decisively wanting is an internal organizational 
principle to bring together all elements of the object in a manner that would secure its aesthetic 
separation from its context, even though the effect of both forms nonetheless approximates 
that of aesthetic separation: uncaused effect. Examining the moment of autonomy from the 
perspective of its social facticity invites an external view of the artwork, just as in the previous 
moment we adopted an internal one.  
 
3.1 Repetition of Genesis: The Fetish Form 
In the Draft Introduction to Aesthetic Theory, omitted from the final version, Adorno writes, 
“Only through fetishism, the blinding of the work vis-a-vis the reality of which it is part, does 
the work transcend the spell of the reality principle as something spiritual” (AT: 341/ÄT: 
506).61 Spiritual here is defined as the result of the artwork separating itself from its context, 
appearing as an uncaused effect. The metaphor of blindness helps work out the indifference 
of the artwork as something spiritual toward its surroundings, a blindness nevertheless that 
does not debilitate the work. On the contrary, the work acquires liveliness, becomes spirited, 
                                                     
61 “Allein durch den Fetischismus, die Verblendung des Kunstwerks gegenüber der Realität, deren Stück es selber 
ist, transzendiert das Werk den Bann des Realitätsprinzips als eine Geistiges.”  
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in virtue of its ability to persevere in freedom from the causal, functional, purposive demands 
of the external world. If in Hegel’s memorable description, the artwork is an Argus with a 
thousand eyes “with which the inner soul and spiritedness are seen at all points,” for Adorno 
it has no eye for what is outside of it.62  
Elsewhere in the Aesthetic Theory, spirit in the works of art is brought to bear upon their 
fetish character thus:  
Spirit in artworks is posited by their structure, it is not something added from outside. 
This is responsible in no small way for the fetish character of artworks: Because their 
spirit emerges from their constitution, spirit necessarily appears as something-in-itself, 
and they are artworks only insofar as spirit appears to be such. Nevertheless artworks 
are, along with the objectivity of their spirit, something made. Reflection must equally 
comprehend the fetish character, effectively sanction it an expression of its objectivity, 
and critically dissolve it. To this extent an art-alien element, which art senses, is 
admixed to aesthetics. (AT: 183–184/ÄT: 274) 63  
  
The optical strategy adopted by Adorno in this passage generates a double view of the 
artwork. In one view, the work appears as an uncaused effect, something spiritual that appears 
to rest in itself because its spiritual effect arises from the organization of elements of the work 
alone. It is an effect of the work’s constitution. In another view, which looks at the work from 
a certain distance, this very spiritual resting-in-itself of the work emerges as its fetishistic 
character, that is, as something obviously made that nevertheless appears not to be made. 
From an external view, a work of art is bound to appear as a fetish. Adorno’s theory of fetish 
                                                     
62 Hegel, Ästhetik I/II, 232; Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, vol. 1, 153–154. 
63 “Geist in den Kunstwerken ist kein Hinzutretendes, sondern von ihrer Struktur gesetzt. Das ist zu nicht 
geringem Grad für den Fetischcharakter der Kunstwerke verantwortlich: indem ihr Geist aus ihrer Beschaffenheit 
folgt, erscheint er notwendig als Ansichseiendes, und sie sind Kunstwerke nur, wofern er so erscheint. Dennoch 
sind sie, samt der Objektivität ihres Geistes, ein Gemachtes. Reflexion muß den Fetischcharakter ebenso 
begreifen, als Ausdruck ihrer Objektivität gleichsam sanktionieren, wie kritisch auflösen. Insofern ist der Ästhetik 
ein kunstfeindliches Element beigemischt, das die Kunst wittert.” 
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is not novel unless viewed from the standpoint of the constitutive role that he takes it to play 
for autonomous form in bourgeois society. To examine the structure of the fetish, I draw on 
the work of William Pietz and his thesis on the fetish as a “radically historical object.”64 
The merit of Pietz’s thesis for our topic here lies with its success in showing how the rise 
of the fetish in modern Europe was intertwined with the rise of commercial culture and 
commodity production, especially at its borders with non-European regions. In formulating 
his main argument on the rise of the fetish he writes:  
The fetish, as an idea and a problem, and as a novel object not proper to any prior 
discrete society, originated in the cross-cultural spaces of the cost of West Africa 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. While I argue that the fetish originated 
within a novel social formation during this period through the development of the 
pidgin word Fetisso this word in turn has a linguistic and accompanying conceptual 
lineage that may be traced. Fetisso derives from the Portuguese word feitiço, which in 
the late Middle Ages meant ‘magical practice’ or ‘witchcraft’ performed, often 
innocently, by the simple, ignorant classes. Feitiço in turn derives from the Latin 
adjective facticius, which originally meant ‘manufactured.’”65  
 
In its simple structure, the fetish is a manufactured, material object that is taken to possess 
transcendent or non-material qualities. In this respect, fetishes belong with the class of sacred, 
magical things, even though they constitute their own peculiar species of sacred artifacts.66 The 
                                                     
64 William Pietz, “The Problem of the Fetish, I.” RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics, no. 9 (1985): 5–17, 
www.jstor.org/stable/20166719], 7. 
65 Pietz, 5. 
66 Following Charles de Brosse, the first modern theoretician of fetishes and fetishism, Iacono notes that one 
major point of distinction between a fetish and an idol for worshiping is that “fetishes do not possess any 
symbolic or representative power, and if they do, it is only at a primordial level.” Fetishes predate idols in the 
development of religions. Alfonso M. Iacono, The History and Theory of Fetishism, trans. Viktoria Tchernichova and 
Monica Boria (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 16. For the place of fetishes in sacred 
objects, See Karl-Heinz Kohl, Die Macht der Dinge: Geschichte und Theorie sakraler Objekte (Mu ̈nchen: Beck, 2003), 
13–18. For a thorough essay on Charles de Brosse’ account of the fetish, see Rosalind C. Morris, “Fetishism 
[Supposing that It Existed]: A Preface to the Translation to Charles Brosse’s Transgression,” The Returns of 
Fetishism: Charles de Brosse and the Afterlives of an Idea, trans. Rosanild C. Morris and Daniel H. Leonard (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2017), vii-xvi. 
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conceptions of fetishes emerged out of “concrete problems faced by merchants on the African 
coast. They were shaped and articulated with each other as much out of the practical 
experiences and presuppositions of these merchants as by these men’s objective observations 
of the alien practices of African societies.”67 Pietz also notes the presence of a double problem 
or double perversion faced by the merchants of African “fetishes”: commercial exchangeable 
objects, and sacred, social, personal objects for the locals.68 Therefore, “the fetish could 
originate only in conjunction with the emergent articulation of the ideology of the commodity 
form that defined itself within and against the social values and religious ideologies of two 
radically different types of noncapitalist society, as they encountered each other in an ongoing 
cross-cultural situation.”69 It is not entirely accurate to call both societies noncapitalist. While 
capital was yet to settle in Europe as a result of the rise of wage labor and changes in ownership 
of landed property, the presuppositions for a capitalist mode of production were already 
appearing on the scene (as I will discuss in chapter four). In any case, the double constitution 
of the fetish on account of the placement in two different domains, as an African supernatural 
object and as a European manufactured commodity, makes it hard to grasp it in a unifying 
concept. Duality is inherent in its emergence and in its existence. It is a made thing that claims 
not to be made, a cultural object that claims to be natural or divine. 
The fetish object does not seem to care much about this dual aspect of its own; it 
stubbornly clings to its transcendence, which it does not owe to its own constitution, for any 
object can turn into a fetish. Randomness is a defining feature of fetish objects.70 The 
worshiper of the fetish objects knows of no reasons to reflect on the fact that those objects 
                                                     
67 William Pietz, “The Problem of the Fetish, II: The Origin of the Fetish.” RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics, no. 
13, 1987: 23–45 [www.jstor.org/stable/20166762], 44. 
68 Pietz, “The Problem of the Fetish II,” 45. 
69 Pietz, “The Problem of the Fetish I,” 7. 
70 Peitz, “The Problem of the Fetish II,” 23, 40, 43, 45. 
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are manufactured by fellow human beings. For the fetish worshiper there is no conflict 
between the two aspects of the fetish. Such a conflict may be the case when it comes to 
religious relics, with the key difference that here the figure of a prophet, a saint, or Jesus Christ 
for that matter, serves as the mediator to help unify the utterly trivial aspect of a lock of hairs 
as a sacred object and its wholly transcendent value. As the endless theological debates among 
the Early Fathers bear testimony, a similar tension between the two aspects of the fetish object 
reiterates itself here between the two dimension of the person of Christ as both wholly divine 
and wholly human.71 
In spite of the structural affinity of the fetish and the artwork, the dual constitution of the 
separated object does become a problem in the case of the artwork. If according to its idea, in 
Kant and Idealist aestheticians, art is something intentionally manufactured that nevertheless 
appears as naturally emerged, then awareness of its being a made thing is essential to its 
reception. Unlike the worshiper of the fetish, the viewer of the artwork must come to terms 
with two aspects of its object of contemplation, a trial all the more daunting for the observer 
of modern art where, in the famous opening line of Aesthetic Theory, “[N]othing concerning art 
is self-evident anymore, not its inner life, not its relation to the world, not even its right to 
exist” (AT: 1/ÄT: 9).72 Self-evident here means that there are conventional ways by which the 
dual aspects of the work, its fact of being made and its separation from its context of making, 
                                                     
71 For an examination of this problem, see Oliver D. Crisp, Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1-34. Since the problem arises against the foil of the event of 
incarnation, or the divine becoming flesh, the relation to the artwork as having a material body that is at once 
non-material become clear. Galleries and museums usually put up a sign with the imperative “Please Do Not 
Touch!” This is a meaningful injunction, for there is nothing to be found by touching the body of art and yet the 
“philistine” desire (AT 10) to touch the body of the artwork signals the observer seeking to find the answer to 
the question, What is this thing? in the thing itself. This effort is both justified though futile. This also refers back 
to theology. Giselle de Nie brings the concept of touching to bear upon the relation of the believer to the person 
of Christ, “Tangere autem corde, hoc est credere: Augustine on ‘Touching’ the Numinous,” in How the West Was 
Won: Essays in Literary Imagination, the Canon, and Christian Middle Ages for Burcht Pranger, ed. Willemien Otten, Arjo 
Vanderjagt, and Hent de Vries (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 283–300. 
72 “Zur Selbstverständlichkeit wurde, daß nichts, was die Kunst betrift, mehr selbstverständlich ist, weder in ihr 
noch in ihrem Verhältnis zum Ganzen, nicht einmal ihr Existenzrecht.” 
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find reconciliation in the experience of the viewer. Adorno finds a paradox here, “Fetishization 
expresses the paradox of all art that is no longer self-evident to itself: the paradox that 
something made exists for its own sake; precisely this paradox is the vital nerve of new art” 
(AT: 22/ÄT: 41).73 
The paradox of a made thing appearing as not made finds its expression in fetishism, which 
signifies that if the aesthetically made thing does not solve its paradox, if it fails to find a way 
to arbitrate its dual aspects, it would fall back into a fetish object. In this respect, Adorno 
elsewhere refers to the pathology of an absolutized separation, “During the nineteenth century 
aesthetic semblance was heightened to the point of phantasmagoria. Artworks effaced the 
traces of their production, probably because the victorious positivistic spirit penetrated art to 
the degree that art aspired to be a fact and was ashamed of whatever revealed its compact 
immediateness as mediated” (AT: 102/ÄT: 157).74 If being mediated indicates the condition 
of being made, the immediateness effects the liberation from any trace of that condition. 
Adorno speaks of a heightened aesthetic semblance in the sense that the appearance of being 
not made assumes a full illusory character paid for by deceitfully concealing the fact of being 
produced.75 
The reason why the ways of making something into an apparently non-made, namely 
artistic creation, have lost their self-evident character as art and contributed to fetishization of 
works of art, cannot be accounted for by the form of the fetish alone. We need to consider 
                                                     
73 “Fetischisierung drückt die Paradoxie aller Kunst aus, die nicht mehr sich selbstverständlich ist: daß ein 
Gemachtes um seiner selbst willen sein soll; und gerade jene Paradoxie ist der Lebensnerv neuer Kunst.” 
74 “Der ästhetische Schein hatte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert zur Phantasmagorie sich gesteigert. Die 
Kunstwerke verwischten die Spuren ihrer Produktion; vermutlich weil der vordringende positivistische Geist der 
Kunst insofern sich mitteilte, als sie Tatsache sein sollte und dessen sich schämte, wodurch ihre dichte 
Unmittelbarkeit als vermittelt sich decouvriert hätte.”  
75 This phenomenon was documented by Richard Wagner in the concept of Effekt as the outcome of a 
mechanistic device in such a manner as to fully conceal the contribution of that device. It is an effect without a 
cause (“Wirkung ohne Ursache”). See Richard Wagner, Oper und Drama. In Dichtungen und Schriften, vol 8, ed. 
Dieter Borchmeyer (Frankfurt: Insel Verlag, 1983), 98. 
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historical means by which the structure of the fetish as a religious object has found its way 
into the ways of making and producing as broadly as possible. Otherwise, the fetishization of 
the artwork would be reduced to an anthropological or psychological phenomenon on the side 
of art’s audience. The fetish character requires a vehicle to arise as an actually present force 
coercing the works of art, to become a necessary objective determination of them insofar as 
they are products of labor. 
The commodities, in Marx’s words, tend to make it appear as though “the relationships 
between the producers, within which the social characteristics of their labor are manifested, 
take on the form of a social relation between the products of labor” (C: 164). The commodity 
behaves like the fetish object insofar as it lays claim to its being self-made and not the product 
of labor. In the same way, writes Adorno, “The semblance character of the artworks, the 
illusion of their being-in-itself, refers back to the fact that . . . , in Marxian terms, they 
necessarily reflect a relation of living labor as if it were objectified” (Translation modified; AT: 
169/ÄT: 252).76 If the absence of awareness of its real conditions of genesis marks the fetish 
and the commodity, then the artwork must turn against its fetish character if it is to follow 
through its claim to aesthetic separation. If not, it would not successfully separate itself from 
society’s nexus of effects. Adorno then adds that “in its most unguarded manifestations art 
has always revolted against this, and today this revolt has become art’s own law of 
movement.”77 This statement remains true to what Adorno previously defined as the 
                                                     
76 “Der Scheincharakter der Kunstwerke, die Illusion ihres Ansichseins weist darauf zurück, daß sie . . ., marxisch 
gesprochen, ein Verhältnis lebendiger Arbeit notwendig so zurückspiegeln, als wäre es gegenständlich.”  
77 It cannot be denied that from a perspective external to the cultural domain of western Europe, the 
phenomenon of the autonomy of art might be seen as essentially fetishistic. In a manner non unsimilar to Pietz’s 
theory of the fetish, Jusdanis offers an example of the ‘emergence’ or becoming of the autonomous art to 
undermine its imperialistic political and cultural function in modern Greece with regard to western Europe. See 
Gregory Jusdanis, Belated Modernity and Aesthetic Culture: Inventing National Literature (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991), 88–21. By contrast, Lisi offers an immanent counterpoint to the cross-cultural function 
of autonomy in Scandinavian literature and shows how the very relation of “dependence” to the birthplace of 
autonomous art becomes an internal moment of a new regime of the aesthetic. See Leonardo F. Lisi, Marginal 
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specificity of art, namely its separation from what brings it about. Art has always separated 
itself from its context, so goes Adorno’s claim about what art is. Yet, in a historical amendment 
to that statement, it is specifically the art under the condition of universal commodification 
that turns its revolt against its own fetish character into its main tactic for securing aesthetic 
separation in distinction both from the fetish object and from commodity.  
 
3.2 Repetition of Genesis: The Commodity Form  
Let us return once again to the café scene where a musical piece, the Beethoven Sonata, was 
being played. What helped the Beethoven Sonata separate itself from the context of the café 
and the functions of entertaining or mood-making that it demanded from the piece was its 
formal organization of elements according to an internal lawfulness. In a 1956 fragment for 
an unfinished book on Beethoven, still removed from the positions characteristic of Aesthetic 
Theory, we read: 
Music, before the bourgeoisie’s emancipation, had an essentially disciplinary function. 
Afterwards, it became autonomous, centered on its own formal laws, heedless of 
effect––a synthetic unity. But these two destinies mediate each other. For the formal 
law of freedom, which determines all moments and thus entirely circumscribes 
aesthetic immanence––is nothing other than the disciplinary function turned inwards, 
reflected, wrenched from its immediate social purpose. It might be said that the 
autonomy of the art-work has its source in heteronomy, much as the freedom of the 
subject arose from lordly sovereignty. The force enabling the work of art to constitute 
itself and dispense with a direct outward effect, is the force of this same effect in 
altered form; and the laws to which it relates is no other than that which it imposes on 
others. . . . Autonomous music is not absolutely cut off from the context of effects: it 
mediates this context through its formal law. 78 
                                                     
Modernity: The Aesthetics of Dependency from Kierkegaard to Joyce (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013). 
78 Th. W. Adorno, Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2007), 42. 
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The crux of the claim in this passage is that the autonomous form is indebted to the social 
context of its emergence at a level far deeper and more abstract than the immediate particular 
social purposes and functions with which the synthetic unity of the form breaks away. On one 
level, the work succeeds in divorcing itself from any immediate functions, whereas on another, 
it fails to do so. If in the café example, the social character manifested itself in isolated parts 
of an otherwise wholesome work, imposing itself on the work once it was experienced 
partially, the claim here is that the work in its very wholesome, autonomous, separated status 
follows society. The social is present in the form of the work, the same form whose function 
it was, in Aesthetic Theory, to separate the work from society’s nexus of effects. What the passage 
calls “the formal law of freedom” makes up the aesthetic rationality of the work, which has a 
determinatory power subordinating all elements to itself.79 It is by force of this power that the 
work can “constitute itself and dispense with a direct outward effect,” and it is the same power 
that enabled Beethoven’s Piano Sonata in its rational construction to guard itself against being 
reduced to the isolated humane melody of its second movement. Yet, there is another, reverse 
move in the passage as well. This runs from the sealed-off unity of the work back to that 
against which the work composes itself: the formal law of the work repeats the social law of 
producing and organizing objects.  
If the autonomous work dispenses with any “immediate social purpose” or “direct outward 
effect” and still preserves its social character in its form, then we deal here with a technically 
abstract notion of the social. Abstract because the social here is not equated with this or that 
purpose, this or that effect, but with having an effect as such, or having a purpose as such. In 
                                                     
79 On the rationality of construction in the sense of determinatory power, see Günter Figal, Theodor W. Adorno: 
Das Naturschone als spekulative Gedankenfigur, zur Interpretation der Ästhetischen Theorie im Kontext philosophischen 
Ästhetik (Bonn: Bouvier, 1977), 55–56. 
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order for the social to achieve this level of abstractness it must negate its identity with any 
particular function. A musical piece, in this way, is not there for the sake of a mass ritual in 
the church, nor for providing mood in a café, nor to warm up a dinner party or to boost a 
political rally, nor to recreate the joy of previous, familiar artistic forms. It is neither committed 
to society nor to its own history. The musical piece does not take any specific functional form 
as far as any existing functional form is external to the structuring principle of the artwork. 
On Adorno’s account such a retreat or freedom from functional forms has not always been 
possible. It has an historical essence that can be traced in the trajectory of modern art. The 
transition from Expressionism to the New Objectivity (die Neue Sachlichkeit) in the early-
twentieth-century Germany is a case in point that he first outlines in his 1958/59 lectures on 
aesthetics.  
The two movements represent for Adorno principles constituting poles that presuppose 
one another: expression and construction. The subject’s free expression in the work of art is 
the guiding principle in Expressionism.80 This purified the aesthetic materials from all 
conventional conditions, having moved beyond all traditional, inherited forms and formal 
determinations, “The material has now become directly at the disposal of the subject” (Ä58: 
103). The artist thus became the sovereign in his or her domination over the materials. By 
turning the material into pure nature, purified supposedly of unoriginal formal determinations, 
the subject as artist turned it at once into a pure matter (Stoff) which it now could treat at 
pleasure. Therefore, the principle of expression produces an object that is ready for 
construction based on the formal properties of the materials without the meddling of 
                                                     
80 For a selection of key statements of some of the leading Expressionists in early-twentieth-century German art, 
specially those of the group Der Blaue Reiter ("The Blue Rider”) founded by Wassily Kandinsky and Franz Marc 
in Munich in 1911, see Voices of German Expressionism ed. Victor H. Miesel (Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1970), 43–88. 
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traditional forms. Adorno defines construction as the outcome of Expressionism thus, “[T]he 
set-free form that is stamped on the material by a free and, if you want, sovereign subject” 
(Ä58: 108).  
On the other hand, construction itself, not subjective expression, is the principle of the 
New Objectivity. Here, it is the object itself that has priority over and beyond the intentions, 
purposes, and expressions of the subject. But the material for an Objective construction could 
only be furnished by the Expressionistic breaking away with the traditional notion of form in 
which the artists were supposed to fulfill rules of composition. The New Objectivity needed 
the kind of form in relation to which the artistic subject could have full freedom. The 
significance of the New Objectivity for Adorno has to do with the freedom with which the 
artist entrusts himself or herself to “what the matter demands purely out of itself, without 
arrogance, without vanity and with the utmost concentration” (Ä58: 108).81 This makes for a 
higher instance of art’s autonomy, for the artist’s relation to materials enjoys a double freedom, 
namely, freedom from traditional forms of the artistic object, which is made possible in the 
Expressionism, and freedom from the whims of the artistic subject. To describe this double 
freedom, Adorno in a different context borrows from Hegel the expression “freedom toward 
the object” (“Freiheit zum Objekt”), “The freedom of thought in forgetting itself in the matter 
at hand and in changing itself” (GS 10.2: 579).82 In a seemingly paradoxical manner, therefore, 
the artist is free to bind himself or herself to the demands of the materials themselves. As 
Hulatt puts it, “The artwork’s constitutive principle is nothing other than the treatment of 
                                                     
81 “die Freiheit, dem, was die Sache rein von sich aus will, ohne Hochmut, ohne Eitelkeit und mit der äußersten 
Konzentration sich zu überlassen.” For a similar discussion of the relation between Expressionism and the New 
Objectivity, see AT: 44–45, 114–115, 155, 229, 539. 
82 “[D]ie des Gedankens dazu, in der Sache sich selbst zu vergessen und sich zu verändern.” “Meinung Wahn 
Gesellschaft,” For other instances of the usage of the expression, see Negative Dialektik, GS 6: 38, 58; ÄT 33, 410; 
GS 8: 259; GS 11: 162, 395, 524; GS 14: 377. 
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authentic materials without reference to anything but their formal properties. As such, the 
artwork is entirely autonomous considered from the perspective of its constitutive processes.”83  
We should bear in mind that on account of its claim to autonomy, the technically well-
constructed artwork is all along busy organizing itself in opposition to external functions and 
effects. The product must by definition be purposeless. Purposeless in the sense that the 
means-end relations between the elements of its rational nexus of effects does not posit any 
determinate effect or function that could give the work an operative place in society’s nexuses 
of effects. The reverse move of the polar relation between expressionism and constructivism 
occurs precisely in relation to this claim. The rational construction of the work, which is 
supposed to be free of any expression, becomes itself expressive: it expresses the form of 
functionality per se, “The purely constructed, strictly objective artwork, which ever since Adolf 
Loos has been the sworn enemy of everything artisanal, reverses into the artisanal by virtue of 
its mimesis of functional forms: Purposelessness without purpose becomes irony” (AT: 58). 
Irony ensues here because the constructivist artist meant to break with any purposiveness as 
a result of imposing subjective intentions on the work, and yet the product at hand expresses 
the purposiveness of functional forms. It is not clear what examples of works Adorno has in 
mind. It seems, however, that architecture offers the most tangible cases of that 
transformation. One could think of the Kundmanngasse House, Vienna (1928) designed by 
the architect Paul Engelmann and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Another example could be the highly 
mathematically or phonometrically composed piano pieces by Erik Satie. “Rational logic of 
composition” and the presence of “universally understandable concepts” are represented in 
the aesthetic vocabulary of constructivists.84  
                                                     
83 Owen Hulatt, Adorno’s Theory of Philosophical and Aesthetic Truth, 152. 
84 Stanislaus von Moos, Le Corbusier: Elements of a Synthesis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 39. For statements 
by leading constructivists, see Stephen Bann, ed, The Tradition of Constructivism (New York: Viking, 1974). 
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The imitation of functional forms in full retreat from any direct particular social function, 
I believe, is the deepest manifestation of the social character in the autonomous artwork. This 
imitation is unintentional. All the artwork does is remain faithful to the formal properties of 
its own materials and follow its own rational principle of construction. For Le Corbusier, the 
new spirit of art is that of “construction and synthesis guided by a clear concept.”85 What 
makes it, however, imitate that from which it tries to keep its distance, is its own aesthetic 
rationality. Adorno puts this process in these terms: 
In the process of becoming increasingly technical, which irrevocably binds them to 
functional forms [Zweckformen], artworks come into contradiction with their 
purposelessness. . . . It is not that rationality kills the unconscious, the substance of 
art, or whatever; technique alone made art capable of admitting the unconscious into 
itself. But precisely by virtue of its absolute autonomy the rational, purely elaborated 
artwork would annul its difference from empirical existence; without imitating it, the 
artwork would assimilate itself to its opposite, the commodity. It would be 
indistinguishable from completely functional works [Zweckwerke] except that it would 
have no purpose, and this, admittedly, would speak against it. The totality of inner-
aesthetic purposefulness develops into the problem of art's purposefulness beyond its 
own sphere, a problem for which it has no answer. (AT: 217–218/ÄT: 323) 
 
Adorno reserves the verb “assimilate” for what I have referred to under “repeat” and 
“imitate,” whereas he also speaks of “mimesis of functional forms” (“Mimesis an die 
Zweckformen”; ÄT: 92) in the preceding quoted passage. Imitation is indeed a form of 
assimilation of what is other to the imitator. Elsewhere, he points to the subordinating 
(unterwerfen) of the anti-functional art to a principle “that could be grounded only through 
functionality” (AT: 179/ÄT: 179).86 The terminology in Aesthetic Theory should not be taken à 
                                                     
85 Qtd. in von Moos, 279. 
86 “das einzig durch Funktionalität sich begründen könnte.” 
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la lettre. While the artwork does not imitate particular direct, immediately present functions, it 
nonetheless imitates, assimilates in itself, and partakes in functionality as such.87 Adorno’s way 
of referring to this functionality as such, that is, having the form of a function beyond any 
particular, immediate function, is commodity, which lies at the heart of the passage quoted. 
Through commodity, I believe, a highly satisfying notion of the social and social character will 
be available to us with regard to works of art as products of socialized labor.  
The contribution of the commodity production to the rise of a very peculiar social structure 
is offered in Marx’s analysis of capital. Even though Marx makes it explicit neither that labor 
as such is dependent on any particular society, nor that it is the sole source of value (nature is 
the other source; see C: 133), his claim is that it is only in modern society that human labor 
has become thoroughly socialized. As a central Marxian position in his thought, Adorno 
extends the social substance of exchange to a principle governing whatever falls within 
society’s nexus of effects. He writes in Negative Dialectics: 
The exchange principle, the reduction of human labor to the abstract universal concept 
of average labor-time, is primordially akin with the identification principle. This has its 
social model in exchange, and would not be without it. It is through exchange that 
non-identical individual beings and functions [Leistungen] become commensurable, 
identical. The extending of the principle restrains the world to what is identical, to 
totality. (GS 6: 149–150)88  
                                                     
87 Werckmeister writes, “The works of art become emancipated from the art-alien purposes, yet their aesthetic 
autonomy does not free them from the functional nexus with society, but becomes their new social functions.” 
O. K. Werckmeister, Ende der Ästhetik. Essays über Adorno, Bloch, das gelbe Unterseeboot und der eindimensionale Mensch 
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1971), 8. Even though it is fair to speak of new functions inflicted externally on 
autonomous arts, the culmination of which is culture industry, the notion of a higher social functionality that I 
hold Adorno to offer cannot be captured by new functions alone. Adorno does point to a second-grade function 
to which anti-functional autonomous works are subordinated in a society functionalized through and through. 
As “cultural goods” (“Kulturgüte”), the functionless is forced to acquires function. See Dissonanzen, GS 14: 221–
222. 
88 “Das Tauschprinzip, die Reduktion menschlicher Arbeit auf den abstrakten Allgemeinbegriff der 
durchschnittlichen Arbeitszeit, ist urverwandt mit dem Identifikationsprinzip. Am Tausch hat es sein 
gesellschaftliches Modell, und er wäre nicht ohne es; durch ihn werden nichtidentische Einzelwesen und 




Exchange becomes in Adorno’s works a quasi-metaphysical principle not only of modern 
bourgeois society but of history considered far more broadly. It is an inherently relational 
category, which he seems to be positing both as a category a priori and as a historically specific 
category. A priori, for exchange has always been around; historically specific, for it is only in 
modern bourgeois society that it has elevated itself to a totalizing principle.89  
The notion of the social at work in the form of the commodity appears in the opening 
pages of Marx’s first volume of Capital in order to help analyze the form of the value congealed 
in a commodity in the process of exchange. Value counts as a highly abstract category in 
Marx’s analysis of commodities as apparently elementary units of “the wealth of societies in 
which the capitalist mode of production prevails” (C 105). To grasp the value, we must look 
at the way the value appears, namely, in a twofold manner. First, it takes the qualitative form 
of the use of commodity as “an external thing, a thing which through its qualities satisfies 
human needs of whatever kind.” The use of the commodity is bound up with its material 
features. Hammers are of no use for keeping one warm, only certain fabrics, fuel for fire, and 
shelter are. Second, value can take a quantitative form, too, which realizes itself in the act of 
exchange. Because the use value is realized only in consumption, and since different use-values 
address different needs, exchange comes into play. A useful commodity that can be exchanged 
for another useful commodity, therefore, must possess an exchange-value.  
                                                     
89 If the exchange principle constitutes such a sweeping, inevitable fact in human society, then it cannot be just 
poison but must contain the antidote in itself, too. For Adorno, there is the promise of truly equal rationality, the 
ideal of free and just exchange, hidden in the principle of exchange. See GS 6, 159. For a discussion of the 
importance of the exchange principle in Adorno and the Critical Theory more generally, see Helmut Reichelt, 
“Die Marxsche Kritik ökonomischer Kategories. Überlegungen zum Problem der Geltung in der dialektischen 
Darstellungsmethode im ‘Kapital,’” in Iring Fetscher, Alfred Schmidt, and Hans-Georg Backhaus, 
editors Emanzipation Als Versöhnung: Zu Adornos Kritik der “warentausch”-Gesellschaft und Perspektiven der Transformation 
(Frankfurt a. M.: Neue Kritik, 2002), 142–189.  
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This second manifestation of the value of the commodity can readily be mistaken for the 
exchange value. If, in the simplest form of an act of exchange, x quantity of commodity A is 
traded for y quantity of commodity B, then we have a value relation between two valuable 
because useful items in which two qualitatively different things, A and B, a hammer and a 
jacket, are held to be equal. It yields the equation xA = yB. This is the expression of the value-
relation. But we know that considered from the perspective of their uses, which are bound up 
with their own physical properties, two different things cannot be equal to one another. It is 
not their use-values that make them equal. Rather, “[W]ithin an exchange relation, one use 
value is worth just as much as another, provided only that it is present in the appropriate 
quantity” (C: 127). A hammer is not equal to a jacket, but, say, 10 hammers can be equated 
with 3 jackets. It is in virtue of a quantitative moment that the useful commodities can step 
into an exchange relation. “This relation changes constantly with time and place. Hence 
exchange-value appears to be something accidental and purely relative” (C: 126). 10 hammers 
(as a single mass of value) is then equal to 3 jackets but only 15 hammers can get us 1 table, 
just as 2 tables is exchanged for 5 yards of linen, and so on. The value of a commodity in the 
exchange relation can appear in numerous quantities. It is absurd to speak of the inherent 
exchange value of an object. Because not inherent in the commodity, the exchange value thus 
abstracts itself from the use value and thereby the physical properties of the commodity.90  
If neither the qualitative use of the commodity nor its quantitative exchange in the relation 
of exchange can offer the sufficient ground to grasp the value of the useful object, then we 
                                                     
90 Marx acknowledges that since Aristotle, “the great investigator who was the first to analyze the value-form,” 
the fact of exchanging unequal things has caused grave troubles for philosophical and economic thought. 
Aristotle saw that the value-relation between two commodities involved making equal two qualitatively unequal 
things, “There can be no exchange without equality, and no equality without commensurability” and concludes 
that exchange in reality is impossible and merely serves practical purposes. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, 
Ch. 5 (London: Loeb edition, 1926, 287–9), qtd. in Marx, 151. Marx’s theory of value sets about solving precisely 
this Aristotelian riddle through the concept of social labor. 
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need to seek a different ground for the principle of exchange in the equation of xA=yB. 
Viewed from a perspective that has let go the physical qualities of the commodities, what 
remains is one common property of them all, “that of being the products of labor.” Because 
the physical use-values are products of labor, then insofar as they have physical properties they 
must be products of physical, concrete labor. A higher level of abstraction thus requires that 
we let go all material constituents of the useful object, including the concrete act of making it. 
Therefore, “[A]ll its sensuous characteristics are extinguished. Nor is it any longer the product 
of the labor of the joiner, the mason or the spinner, or of any other particular kind of 
productive labour,” but that of “human labour in abstract” (C: 128). Considered only as 
products of labor and to the extent that these products step into the value-relation of 
exchange, the commodity has value because human labor as such, not a particular shape or 
mode of labor, has been expended on them and become congealed in them precisely as value. 
The concept of abstract labor helps us understand the source of the value of the commodities 
beyond the randomness of the quantitative exchange value, but what is still wanting is an 
account of why and how this value expresses itself in the quantities. The concept of quantity 
does not vanish from the analysis of the value-form. The question arises, “How, then, is the 
magnitude of this value [the objectified labor] to be measured? By means of the quantity of 
the ‘value-forming substance,’ the labour, contained in the article. This quantity is measured 
by its duration, and the labour-time is itself measured on the particular scale of hours, days 
etc.” (C: 129). It is precisely this answer that introduces the appropriate place for the concept 
of the social to come on the stage. 
The move from the concept of abstract labor to what Marx calls the social substance of 
value counts as one of the trickiest in Capital. All particular units of human labor manifested 
in all sorts of work, from packaging and carpeting to tailoring and painting cars in a factory, 
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partake in “the total-labour power of society . . . one homogenous mass of human labour-
power” (ibid.). The sole way in which this homogenous mass allows any internal differentiation 
goes through the concept of time. Time is the most abstract category to refer to the mode of 
expending labor, of any kind, to produce a commodity capable of participating in exchange 
with others. Again, the time that a smith takes to forge a hammer remains accidental and 
irrelevant. The labor-time of a particular work needs to be hammered into a necessary relation 
with that of other units of labor. What counts is the average labor-time “socially necessary” to 
produce useful articles “under the conditions of production normal for a given society and 
with the average degree for skill and intensity of labour prevalent in that society,” including 
the physical strength of the workers and the technological stance of the machines. 
Like commodity, the artwork in its aesthetic separation tends to hide its being a product of 
labor, for it is to imitate natural beauty. Moritz’s statement on the beautiful as that which is 
complete in itself has as its historical essence the form of commodity in the growing art and 
book market of the eighteenth century Europe.91 The artwork, too, presents its worth, which 
is a relation of labor, as if it were objectified with no trace of labor (see ÄT: 252). Unlike 
commodity, the aesthetic separation does not exist to satisfy any needs, it is wanting for any 
use value, which does not mean that it cannot be socially interesting, promoting distinction 
between classes, adding to symbolic capital.92 This means that the work of art is essentially 
                                                     
91 For a discussion of this market in relation to Mortitz’s conception of autonomous art, see Martha 
Woodmansee, “The Interests of Disinterestedness,” in The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of 
Aesthetics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 11–35. The most thorough account of the bourgeois, 
and class-conflictual character of the autonomy is offered by Bredekamp. For him, the The early modern cultural-
social rift between the descending feudal-ascetic society and the ascending bourgeois culture is essential to see 
the class character of the rise of the autonomy of art out of the struggles of both groups with the catholic church. 
See Horst Bredekamp. “Autonomie und Askese,” in Autonomie der Kunst: Zur Genese und Kritik einer Bürgerlichen 
Kategorie, ed. Michael Müller (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972), 88–172. For a critique of Bredekamp’s 
account of the genesis of the autonomy of art, see Bürger, Theory of the Avant-garde, 35–41. 
92 See Pierre Bourdieu, Distinctions: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987). To grasp the relevance of the commodity form for the social character of art, 
we can resort to one term of not frequent use in Aesthetic Theory: the absolute commodity. Adorno writes, “If 
artworks are in fact absolute commodities in that they are a social product that has rejected every semblance of 
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exposed to being assimilated into the world of universal functionality, and thereby losing its 
claim to formal separation. To use Aristotelian terms, the formal cause of the work became its 
final cause in that functionality turned into its ultimate finality, which is a failure for art insofar 
as it loses its claim to formal separation from any finality.  
 
§ 4 DIALECTIC. THE SUBLIME AND THE RIDICULOUS: FORM AS 
PARTICIPATION 
If art is not “indifferent” (“gleichgültig”) toward its own double character (AT: 310/ÄT: 459) 
we should consider how it sustains its own conflict and how it responds to it in order to regain 
its identity, reclaim its right to an autonomous existence, and remake its relation to its context 
of emergence.  
The preceding two moments of our analysis present the form of the artwork in two 
opposed determinations. In the autonomy moment viewed internally, form separates itself 
from its genesis. In the social facticity moment, held as the external view on art’s autonomy, 
form repeats its genesis. The moments were considered separately, an approach that Adorno 
does not advise. The concrete existence of the artwork resists such a division of its moments, 
but the attentive experience of the work imposes it on the beholder, listener, and reader. If 
separation corresponds to the rational construction of the work or its formal conditions, and 
repetition to the imitative impulse of the work or its real conditions, then when it comes to a 
unified, integral account of the work’s concrete existence Adorno reserves a third concept for 
                                                     
existing for society, a semblance to which commodities otherwise urgently cling, the determining relation of 
production, the commodity form, enters the artwork equally with the social force of production and the 
antagonism between the two. The absolute commodity would be free of the ideology inherent in the commodity 
form, which pretends to exist for-another, whereas ironically it is something merely for-itself: It exists for those 
who hold power.” AT: 236/ÄT: 351. 
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it, participation. In referring to this concept he frequently uses it’s the Greek, Platonic word 
throughout the Aesthetic Theory: methexis (μέθεξις). A philological survey of Adorno’s works 
yields that the appearance of the term methexis more or less coincides with the appearance of 
the expression art’s double character.93 If this coincidence can serve as a firm enough ground, 
then it will be safe to claim that with the help of the concept of methexis Adorno points out 
the direction that any possible resolution to art’s double character should take. It is thus that 
the autonomous artwork becomes relevant, assuming a critical stance vis-à-vis its context of 
emergence. 
Methexis belongs with the constellation of concepts in Plato’s theory of Ideas as a theory 
of knowledge. This theory asks: How can we know the ever changing things in the sensible 
world in all their various appearances? How is the definition of a thing possible? In Aristotle’s’ 
words, Plato 
held that the problem [of definition] applied not to sensible thing but to entities of 
another kind––for this reason, that the common definition could not be a definition 
of any sensible things, as they are always changing. Things of this sort, then, he called 
Ideas, sensible things, he said, were all named after these, and in virtue of a relation to 
these; for the many existed by participation in the Ideas that have the same name as 
they.94 
 
                                                     
93 While throughout his corpus Adorno mentions Plato and at times uses Platonic terms, affirmatively or critically, 
and while the concept of participation (Teilnahme) in its general meanings frequently appears in his works, 
instances of the term methexis with respect to art are infrequent and almost entirely limited to his Aesthetic Theory 
(and his 1960s lectures on aesthetics): “methexis in enlightenment” (AT: 86/ ÄT: 134); “methexis in truth” (AT: 
108/ÄT: 166); “methexis . . . in reconciliation” (AT: 118/ÄT: 181); “methexis in history” and “methexis in the 
tenebrous” (AT: 133/ÄT: 201); “methexis in enlightenment” (AT: 151/ÄT: 227); “methexis . . . in language” 
(AT: 171/ÄT: 256); “[the subject’s] methexis in the universal” (AT: 202/ÄT: 300). There are also a couple 
appearances in Negative Dialectics: GS 6: 65, 237. A philosophical discussion of Plato’s theory of Ideas appears in 
his lectures on Metaphysics: Concept and Problems, 13–19. For a recent discussion on Plato’s significance for Adorno’s 
thought, see Wolfram Ette, “Adorno und Platon,” Zeitschrift für kritische Theorie 38/39 (2017): 68–96. ProQuest 
Ebook Central.  
94 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 987b4–10. Aristotle himself does not see much difference between Plato’s methexis and 
the Pythagoreans’ mimesis or imitation in the relation of the things and their forms. For him, they mean more or 
less the same. See, Metaphysics, 987b10–13. 
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Plato offered various, even conflicting answers to the question of the relation between the 
sensible things and the Ideas: from the idea that the Ideas are present in the things in early 
dialogues, to the notion that things fall short of the Ideas and are only examples of them, thus 
imitating them, in middle dialogues, to the later dialogues in which the Ideas are wholly 
separate from the things. Methexis appears in his middle-to-late dialogues, and it is doubtful 
that the problem has ever found a full and satisfying answer.95 In Adorno’s words, the doctrine 
of methexis is  
that of the participation of the scattered things in the Idea to which they are 
subordinate. This also presupposes something different from the Idea; if there were 
nothing which was different from the Idea, such a ‘participation’ in the Idea, such a 
μέθεξις, would not be possible. And in fact, the late Plato did extensively revised the 
strict version of the doctrine of Ideas, as it appears in what are called the classical, 
middle dialogues.96  
 
The way that Adorno interprets the concept of methexis in the context of Plato’s theory 
of Ideas is peculiar. Instead of stressing the separation of the Ideas from the sensible, 
appearing things, which the late Platonic notion of participation seems to suggest,97 he turns 
the concept around so as to stress the importance or priority of the things themselves. He 
even goes further to claim, against the prevalent scholarly view of his time in Germany, that 
“[T]here is no doubt that in Plato’s late period the existent asserts itself increasingly against 
                                                     
95 According to Martin, “The substantive methexis seems to occur only in Parmenides (132 D) and in Sophists (256 
B). . . . By contrast the verb metechein, as well as the synonymous verb metalambanein, are very common, 
generally indeed in broader meaning . . . in Phaedo (100 C).” Martin, Platons Ideenlehre, 170. For a thoroughgoing 
discussion of the development of Plato’s theory of Ideas, see David Ross, Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1951). For the concepts of presence, sharing, imitating, and participation see 21, 35, 88, 231, 
respectively.  
96 Adorno, Metaphysics, 17. 
97 As Peters writes, “Describing the relationship of sensibles to the eide in terms of participation (methexis) suggests 
the subordination of things to the eide, a subordination at the heart of the Platonic metaphysic.” Francis E. Peters, 
Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon (New York: New York University Press, 1967), 35. 
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the Idea, although, in the chronology of Plato’s works which is now generally accepted, one 
of the dialogues in which the doctrine of Ideas is presented most bluntly and developed most 
ingeniously, the Phaedrus, is dated extremely late.”98 The accuracy of Adorno’s view is less 
important here than its philosophical intention and import for his aesthetic theory.99 His 
reading of Plato, I believe, clearly shows to what extent metaphysics plays a key role in aesthetic 
theory viewed, as I did in this chapter, from the perspective of the double character of art. For 
Adorno, metaphysics comes into being when the “tension between the sphere of 
transcendence and the sphere of that which is merely the case, between τό ὄν, τά ὄντα . . . , is 
itself the subject of philosophy.”100 While this tension is thematized in Plato’s thought, 
according to Adorno, it was only in Aristotle that it fully asserted itself, hence, for him, 
metaphysics per se started with Aristotle. Coupled with Adorno’s view that in the late Plato 
there is an increasing attention to the world of non-being, that is the world of the sensible, 
Adorno’s idea of metaphysics becomes directly relevant to his aesthetic theory.  
We saw that the artwork separates itself through its form from empirical reality and thereby 
from society’s nexus of effects in order to realize its autonomy as something that is both 
manufactured, and thus material, and for-itself because similar to natural beauty in its structural 
indeterminacy. This was in accordance with the idea of art. The aesthetic separation, under the 
condition of bourgeois society, proved to imitate the form of the commodity. This meant a 
failure for the claim of aesthetic separation, which manifested itself in its full antinomy in the 
constructivist art movement of the New Objectivity where the work’s rational construction 
following the formal determinations of the matter itself turned the work into the expression 
                                                     
98 Adorno, Metaphysics, 17.  
99 An earlier, Platonic account of aesthetic can be found in 1958/1959 lectures on aesthetics through a reading 
of Plato’s Phaedrus. See Ä58, 170–185. 
100 Adorno, Metaphysics, 18. 
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of functionality as such. In that particular manifestation, art’s claim to transcendence failed at 
the heart of its most truthful operation.  
 If this is the ultimate case for the autonomous artwork, then speaking of its double 
character will be pointless. If any idea of art participating in truth––that is, the claim of being 
a made thing that appears to be unmade for a justifiable reason––is to have relevance, if the 
thesis of art’s double character holds true, Adorno has to show that the work does not merely 
imitate or repeat or assimilate in itself the form of the fetish-commodity as the universal 
condition for socially produced, modern objects; that the work is not an effect of an operative 
system, but that it is capable of asserting its formal separation from that system while being 
part of it;101 finally, and all boils down to this in Aesthetic Theory, that the very reality of an 
artwork having the two characters of autonomy and social facticity tells something, itself has 
a language. The language of methexis becomes relevant here, and it is hence that the Platonic 
core of the otherwise largely Aristotelian strategy of Adorno’s aesthetic theory comes to light. 
Though it is not of this world, the artwork partakes in this world to prove a point about it: 
“Through form art participates in the civilization that it criticizes by its very existence. Form 
is the law of the transfiguration of the existing, counter to which it represents freedom” (AT: 
143). 
On my interpretation, Adorno manages to sustain the two moments of separation and 
repetition, formal self-activity and imposed finality, of art’s double character with the aid of 
two pairs of concepts: the sublime and the ridiculous on the one hand and, on the other, the 
enigma and the figure as the answer to the enigma of the artwork.  
 
                                                     
101 This is the view advocated by Luhmann, Die Kunst der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), 217–
208. See also Hans van Maanen, How to Study Art Worlds: On the Societal Functioning of Aesthetic Values (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2009). 
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4.1 The Rhythm of the Enigma  
Adorno starts pointing to a solution after having outlined the antinomy of the New Objectivity 
by making two contrasting statements. The following two statements revolve around the place 
of the subjective in the work, which the New Objectivity had banished: 
To date the only alternative to this has been the polemical intervention of the subject 
in subjective reason by a surplus of the subject’s own manifestation beyond that in 
which it wants to negate itself. Only by carrying through this contradiction, and not 
by its false resolution, can art somehow still survive. (AT: 58/ÄT: 92)102 
 
What becomes obvious is the disparity between the functionally thoroughly formed 
artwork and its actual functionlessness. Still, aesthetic mimesis of functionality cannot 
be revoked through recourse to the subjectively unmediated: This would only mask 
how much the individual and his psychology have become ideological with regard to 
the supremacy of social objectivity, a supremacy of which Sachlichkeit is correctly 
conscious. The crisis of Sachlichkeit is not a signal to replace it with something humane, 
which would immediately degenerate into consolation, the correlative of the actual rise 
of in-humanity. (AT: 61/ÄT: 97)103  
 
The first passage views the subject as a solution, the second shows distrust against it. It is 
a solution insofar as its intervention in the work disrupts the full imitation of social 
functionality by bringing in a moment of arbitrariness. One could imagine incorporating extra 
large windows into the front main wall of the Wittgenstein House which is otherwise wholly 
functional. Or, as an artist friend once observed to me, the door handles of the building, 
                                                     
102 “Dagegen hat bislang nur eines geholfen: der polemische Eingriff des Subjekts in die subjektive Vernunft; ein 
Überschuß seiner Manifestation über das, worin es sich negieren möchte. Nur im Austrag dieses Widerspruchs, 
nicht in seiner Glättung kann Kunst irgend noch sich erhalten.”  
103 “In all dem manifestiert sich die Inadäquanz zwischen dem in sich funktional durchgestalteten Kunstwerk 
und seiner Funktionslosigkeit. Dennoch ist die ästhetische Mimesis an Funktionalität durch keinen Rekurs aufs 
subjektiv Unmittelbare widerruflich: er würde nur verhüllen, wie sehr der Einzelne und seine Psychologie 
gegenüber der Vormacht der gesellschaftlichen Objektivität zur Ideologie geworden ist: davon hat Sachlichkeit 
das richtige Bewußtsein. Die Krisis der Sachlichkeit ist kein Signal, diese durch ein Menschliches zu ersetzen, das 
sogleich in Zuspruch degenerierte, Korrelat der real ansteigenden Unmenschlichkeit.” 
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designed by Wittgenstein himself, are expressive in a non-functional, non-Sachlich, slightly 
ornamental, manner. In this sense, Wittgenstein’s style does not entirely conform to Loos’s 
idea of ornament as crime. Yet, the introduction of the subjective cannot be in the service of 
consolation, for it would remain uncertain in which way that consolation would fit into the 
form of the artwork.104  
Adorno’s final position on the role of the subject in offering a solution to art’s antinomy 
should be sought in his reinterpretation of the traditional aesthetic category of the sublime, 
“the only aesthetic idea left to modernism” (AT: 197).105 The reason for this decision resides 
in what characterizes the sublime as a feeling. Traditionally defined solely in relation to nature, 
the feeling of the sublime for Adorno includes two moments: feeling weak but safe before all-
powerful nature and feeling free and elevated before it. The two moments are on display in a 
passage by Kant that Adorno cites. After describing scenes of natural greatness and power, 
from the roaring oceans, threatening huge rocks, erupting volcanos to high waterfalls, in a 
manner that Adorno takes to be along the lines of Sturm und Drang sensibility, Kant states that 
the sight of these scenes will be the more appealing, the more they are dreadful, when we find 
ourselves in a safe situation.106 What makes for the feeling of the sublime are both safety and 
resistance with regards to nature. Adorno comments on the passage, “The feeling of the 
                                                     
104 An illuminating example of what the subjective moment can achieve in the autonomous work can be found 
in Adorno’s reading on the final scene of Goethe’s Iphigenie auf Taurus in a 1967 speech. He refers to the last scene 
of the drama where the conversation between Iphigenie and Thoas the barbarian king takes place and in which 
Thoas’ forgivingness toward her is brought in an unstable, non-identical balance with Iphigenie’s humanity. 
Goethe, so argues Adorno, sets up a scene that does not feel quite natural because Thoas bids them goodbye 
twice: “Geht sie!” and then again “Lebt wohl,” so that it should be clear for the audience that Iphigenie feels as 
much gratitude towards Thoas as Thoas is unsure of Iphigenie’s humanness. Thoas gives more to the Greeks, 
Iphigenie, Pylades, Orest, than they do to him. For Adorno, this scene deviates from the organic unity of the 
play and reveals the making hand of the artistic at work. See, Adorno, Noten zur Literatur, in GS 11: 495–514. 
 
106 “Aber ihr Anblick wird nur um desto anziehender, je furchtbarer er ist, wenn wir uns nur in Sicherheit 
befinden.” He goes on writing, “Also heißt die Natur hier erhaben, bloß weil sie die Einbildungskraft zur 
Darstellung derjenigen Fälle erhebt, in welchen das Gemüt die eigene Erhabenheit seiner Bestimmung selbst 
über die Natur, sich fühlbar machen kann.” Kant, Kritik des Urteilskraft (Critique of the Power of Judgment), qtd in 
Ä58: 51, 53. 
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sublime . . . indeed consists in that what is by its natural determination weaker––the human 
being, precisely as nature ––is nonetheless able to resist what is stronger by way of becoming 
aware of itself as spirit . . . aware, as it were, of affinity between the infinity of [its own] spirit 
and the infinity of nature.”107 
 The feeling of the sublime in this sense does not offer an unchanging property a priori of 
the human being’s relation to nature. It has a historical substance. We can feel safe in nature 
and resist mere natural determination once we have managed to dominate nature. The 
condition for the rise of the feeling of the sublime is then the success in dominating nature, at 
an unprecedented and qualitatively different level in modern bourgeois society (cf. Ä58: 48).108 
The basic move in this reinterpretation is the sublime’s “transplantation into art,” that is, the 
claim that “The sublime, which Kant reserved exclusively for nature, later became the 
historical constituent of art itself” (AT: 197, 196/ÄT: 293). To do so, Adorno puts forward 
an interpretation through which the very composition of the concept of the sublime is to 
change: rather than merely take the sublime as the subject’s elevation over naturalness, he 
interprets it as the “return of nature”: “The sublime was supposedly the grandeur of human 
beings who are spiritual and dominate nature. If, however, the experience of the sublime 
reveals itself as the self-consciousness of human beings' naturalness, then the composition of 
the concept changes” (AT: 198). The feeling of the sublime testifies both to the force of the 
                                                     
107 “Das Gefühl des Erhabenen [. . .] eigentlich besteht darin, daß das in seiner natürlichen Bestimmung 
Schwächere – der Mensch, eben als Natur – trotzdem dem Stärkeren dadurch zu widerstehen vermag, daß es als 
Geist seiner selbst inne wird, . . . gewissermaßen der Ähnlichkeit des Unendlichen des Geistes inne wird mit der 
Unendlichkeit der Natur.” Ä58: 51–52. 
108 A similar argument is made by Ritter in respect of the relation of historical progression in dominating nature 
and the liberation of subjectivity. Ritter also discusses the rise of landscape as a secular, aesthetic concept once 
again thanks to a changed relation to nature. See “Landschaft: Zur Funktion der Ästhetischen in der modernen 
Gesellschaft,” Metaphysik und Politik: Studien zu Aristoteles und Hegel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), 407–
434. 
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human subject to go beyond what is natural and to its intertwinement with nature, for nature 
appears as a force to the subject itself as a piece of nature.  
Transplanted into the artwork, this double sense of the sublime generates an operation that 
marks the work’s awareness both of its capacity for separation and its subordination to what 
is empirical and social in its body. It is in this sense that the artwork is not indifferent to its 
double character, just as the human being struck by a sublime natural scene ought, according 
to Adorno, to recall both his or her being a piece of nature and being capable of rising above 
it. A revisited concept of the sublime as both rising above and subordination to nature, that 
is, a view of the sublime capable of addressing art’s double character, cannot be limited to its 
original meaning, being elevated (Erhabene). In this respect, that which is clownish, ridiculous, 
goes hand with hand with a notion of the sublime defined as remembering one’s own natural 
character. “The divergence of the constructive and the mimetic, which no artwork can resolve 
and which is virtually the original sin of aesthetic spirit, has its correlative in that element of 
the ridiculous and clownish that even the most significant works bear and that, unconcealed, 
is inextricable from their significance” (AT: 118–119). And it is not pure accident that the 
aesthetic theoretician who stands at the close of the tradition of Idealist aesthetics, Friedrich 
Vischer, organizes his “science of aesthetics” based on the relation of the pair of the sublime 
and the ridiculous (or the comic, “das Komische”) as two constitutive moments of the 
beautiful, aesthetic object.109  
It has been reported that his friends used to laugh out loud at passages from the 
Metamorphosis that Kafka would read to them. Amid the narrative of the tragic transformation 
of Gregor Samsa in the long story, we come across passages that run counter to the supposedly 
                                                     
109 See Friedrich Theodor Vischer, Ästhetik, oder Wissenschaft des Schönen. Erster Theil: Die Metaphysik des Schönen 
(Reutlingen & Leipzig: Carl Mäcken, 1846), where he makes explicit the relation of the sublime and the comic as 
moments of the beautiful in §§ 228, 82, 147.  
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solemn tone and content of the narrative. A case in point is the following account of the 
encounter between the charwoman of the household and Gregor:  
[S]he never failed to open the door a crack for a moment every morning and evening 
to look in on him. At the beginning she would call him over to her, saying things that 
were probably intended to sound friendly, like “Hey, over here, you old dung beetle!” 
or “Just look at the old dung beetle!” Thus addressed, Gregor gave no reply but instead 
remained where he was, immobile, as if the door had never been opened. If only this 
charwoman, instead of being allowed to disturb him uselessly at whim, had been given 
instructions to clean his room daily!110 
 
The old widow’s utter indifference to the horrifying, if wholly absurd and impossible, 
predicament of Gregor is a moment in the story that functions as a needle bursting the balloon 
of its all too sachlich, objective seriousness. The word “Mistkäfer” (“dung beetle”), that the 
charwoman uses, is so banal and so inaccurate (as opposed to Kafka’s description of Samsa’s 
condition in the opening paragraph as an “ungeheueren Ungeziefer”)111 that it leaves Gregor 
himself speechless. There may be ways to read the passage in some symbolic or allegorical 
relation to the structural whole of the story. All the same, it is hard not to burst into laughter 
at its ridiculous effect in the flow of the narrative. On account of her indifference to Gregor’s 
condition, especially in contrast to the care that Grete his sister and at times his parents offer 
him, the position of the charwoman remains external to the pain of the protagonist. If we 
venture to take this position as an allegory of an indifferent beholder toward the separated 
artwork as metamorphosed Gregor, then we would be in a better position to understand 
Adorno’s note on the ridiculous in art, “which philistines recognize better than do those who 
are naïvely at home in art” (AT: 119). The feeling of the ridiculous is not far removed from 
                                                     
110 Franz Kafka, The Metamorphosis, trans. Susan Bernofsky (New York: Norton, 2014), 94.  
111 Bernofsky has rendered it as “some sort of monstrous insect.” The Metamorphosis, 21. For more on translating 
this expression, see Bernofsky, “The Afterword.” 
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the feeling of conflict that our café-dweller experiences once struck by the earnest music. 
Those who would not pay attention to the musical piece and would prefer to go on talking or 
eating, would find the individual’s intensive attention ridiculous. As for art itself, the ridiculous 
“is the price of its self-enclosure.” Thus, an artwork that incorporates the ridiculous, the 
clownish, in itself alongside its sublime operation, is an artwork that is fully aware, and barely 
indifferent, to the problematic character of its own self-enclosure or separation. The ridiculous 
view of the artwork imposes itself even on the work viewed as a whole, not just experienced 
partially and thus wrongly. As a wholeness, from outside, the work becomes one thing among 
others, and thereby resembles a fetish object with no display of its virtuosity in organizing 
disparate elements. The ridiculous––as is often overlooked by the interpreters of Adorno’s 
theory of the sublime––rightly presents the work as a piece of reality, be it natural or social.  
The rhythm of the sublime and the ridiculous in the autonomous artwork, which is exposed 
to the risk of imitating what it claims to negate, that is, bourgeois society’s principle of 
exchange, produces an effect that needs to be concretely shown in particular works. In abstract 
terms, it is a rhythm that oscillates between positing the work as something separate and then 
negating this positing. This vacillation does not free the viewer from his or her double vision. 
We see the artwork simultaneously as something separate from its surroundings and as a part of 
its surroundings, that is, as a social fact. The work, however, is one and the same thing that in 
virtue of the above rhythm allows and sustains that double vision. The concept of methexis 
or participation should be understood from the perspective of this rhythm. What I name 
rhythm here appears in Aesthetic Theory under the expression of “the processual character” of 
the artworks, as opposed to anything static in them, “The enactment of antagonisms that each 
work necessarily has in itself” (AT: 176). 
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The rhythm of positing and negating generates an effect whereby the autonomous artwork 
becomes inexhaustible, representing, remarks Adorno in a lecture, a “positive infinity” 
(“positive Unendlichkeit”), “For it is on the one side something finite in itself, outlined 
[Umrissen], given in time and place, but on the other side an infinite scale of implications, which 
does not readily reveal itself [sich erschließt]and which requires analysis.”112 The verb sich 
erschließen, rendered here as revealing itself or opening itself up, suggests closure, too. The work 
does not become an enclosed object. In Valéry’s comment, “We recognize a work of art by 
the fact that no ‘idea’ it can arouse in us, no act it suggests to us, can exhaust or put an end to 
it.”113 Though generated, art becomes itself generative of a boundless reservoir of significations 
and implications that cannot be captured in a concept, purpose, message. 
 We can read this notion of endlessness or positive infinity of the work in relation to the 
absence in it of the Aristotelian final causality. The following two passages from Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics provide us with the terms of what is at stake in the view of the work as an endless 
thing:  
[E]verything that comes to be moves towards a principle [ἀρχὴν], i.e. an end [τέλος] 
(for that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and the becoming [γένεσις] is 
for the sake of the end), and the actuality [ἐνέργεια] is the end, and it is for the sake of 
this that the potency [δύναμις] is required. 
  
[T]he action [ἔργον]is the end and the actuality is the action. And so even the word 
‘actuality’ [ἐνέργεια: in-work or in-action] is derived from ‘action’, and points to the 
complete reality [ἐντελέχεια].114  
 
                                                     
112 Adorno, Vorlesung über Negative Dialektik: Fragmente zur Vorlesung 1965/66, ed. Rolf Teidemann (Frankfurt a. 
M: Suhrkamp, 2003), 125. 
113 Valéry, “The Idea of Art,” 76. For his brief sketch on the infinite in aesthetics, see “The ‘Aesthetic Infinite,’” 
Aesthetics, 80–82.  
114 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1050a7–10, 20–21. 
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The complete reality as the end product of an activity based on some potency or skill (house 
as the result of the act of skillful building or poem as the result of the act of poetic composing) 
is linked here to the existence of a principle or telos. The principle, which lies at the outset of 
the act, is equated by Aristotle with that which lies at the end, that is, the telos. These two are 
mediated by the acting itself as a movement that departs from a principle and proceeds towards 
becoming complete by reaching its goal. It is then that the act rests because the telos is realized. 
From this entelechy, which is, in Randall’s terms, “a complete, self-enclosed functioning,” “has 
vanished all the temporal sense of motion, change, or process. There has vanished also all 
sense of relatedness to a further objective.”115 Both the acting and its goal now rest in the 
complete reality of the object. The work is over and done.  
Even so, this is not true of all acts and things, as is the case here for artworks. For some 
classes of acts and their products, such as closing the door or making bread, the actualized 
goal in the form of a thing or a state of things does terminate at a point. For others, according 
to Randall, “both goal and activity are in the actor: seeing is in the seer, thinking in the thinker, 
living and living well in the psyche.”116 In the first kind of activity, the product is separate from 
the producer, just as house is from the builder and the painting from the painter. However, 
the difference between a house as a functional product and the painting as a non-functional 
one is that, just as the activity and the goal reside in the seeing subject, so too, I contend, do 
both the activity and its goal in the painting, even though, of course, the painter as the efficient 
cause of the paining remains external to the finished product. As a material thing, every 
painting, sculpture, poem must at some point sever itself from the process of being made and 
be declared finished. Yet, the work does not stop its being-at-work (energeia) once the artist 
                                                     
115 John Herman Randall, Jr., Aristotle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 131. 
116 Randall, 131–132; Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1048b4–9, 1050b2.  
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finished his or her work, for the goal that it wants to reach is indiscernible from its acting, 
namely, self-organizing. Something keeps going on in the work. The artwork thus behaves like 
a substance-as-subject in which both activity and goal reside. It self-organizes once brought 
into existence. It is without telos or without end. Since there is no finality or purposefulness at 
which the work can stop, its essence as its reason to be (or to have come to be) always eludes 
the observer or the philosopher. While it is in this world, it does not, like the Kingdom of 
God, have any closing, thus it is not a finished thing like any other thing in the world.117 
Precisely because there is both force or dunamis and actuality or energeina in the work, it can be 
considered to be endless, otherwise, the separation of force and actuality would yield the 
separation of the act of making and the made product. 
Adorno calls this aesthetic phenomenon a force field, a “dynamic configuration of its [that 
is, the artwork’s] elements,” and links it back to the traditional metaphysical concept of 
entelechy or, its synonym in Leibniz, “monad.”118 The defining characteristic of the concept 
of monad, and hence its metaphysical use, resides in the primacy of matter over form and the 
objectivity of the form, according to Kant. Monad was to solve the difficulty of explaining 
how it is that things exist in time and place and stand in causal relations to each other as distinct 
unities. There are two ways to go about solving this. One way, which constitutes Kant’s 
innovative move, asserts that time and space are forms of human intuition, and the 
substantiality, causality, and community of things are informed by the categories of human 
understanding. Things are manifolds of sensate data that are then synthesized by the subject 
in order to become objects of experience. Form, therefore, is original and precedes the matter. 
                                                     
117 The Greek New Testament at least on one occasion speaks of “without telos” in speaking of the Kingdom of 
God. Among other examples, “. . . and for this kingdom there will be no end” (καὶ τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται 
τέλος). Luke 1:33. The Student’s New Testament, ed. Edgar J. Goodspeed (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1954).  
118 “Kraftfeld,” ÄT: 446/ AT 30; See also ÄT: 264, 307, 434. On monad, see AT: 180. 
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In another way, we can say that time and space are determinations of things themselves, to 
which also belong the capacity of relating to one another as grounds and consequences. In 
Kant’s words, “Leibniz first assumed things (monads) and an internal power of representation 
in them, in order subsequently to ground on that their outer relation and the community of 
their states (namely of representations) on that.”119 In virtue of this inner capacity of things-
as-monads to form themselves and relations between themselves, the form of a thing or 
community of things is given independently of the subject.  
Adorno’s notion of the work of art as a force field sides with traditional metaphysics insofar 
as it interprets the form of the work as its potency of separation primarily as a property of the 
work itself and not the mere imprint of the human subject. However, unlike traditional 
metaphysics and its aesthetic revivals in German Idealism,120 Adorno does not hold that the 
monadological character of the autonomous works of art is the last word about them, “The 
thesis of the monadological character of artworks is as true as it is problematic.” Further, with 
an eye on the contemporaneous trends in literary theory and criticism, he writes: 
There is no denying the progress made even in academic art scholarship through the 
demand for immanent analysis and the renunciation of methods concerned with 
everything but the artwork. At the same time, however, immanent analysis bears an 
                                                     
119 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A267, B323.  
120 Translating the primacy of form or that of matter in metaphysics into aesthetic terms brings in Kant anew. 
Adorno’s relation to Kant’s aesthetics, which during the late 1950s he calls an aesthetic of subjectivity as opposed 
to the objective aesthetics of a Hegel (Ä58: 12–14) would not remain the same. In the Aesthetic Theory, his 
relation to Kant becomes more complex. In Peter Uwe Hohendahl’s words: “The explicit emphasis on the 
objective side suggests a greater proximity to Hegel than Kant. This was certainly the case in the lectures. In 
Aesthetic Theory the constellation has become considerably more complex insofar as Hegel’s theory comes under 
severe criticism, a polemic that, at least in part, uses Kant.” The Fleeting Promise of Art: Adorno's Aesthetic Theory 
Revisited (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 52. Moreover, the problematic of the subject-objective 
distinction in Kant’s aesthetics itself is not as clear-cut as it may appear to be. Peter Bürger, for instance, on 
account of Kant’s idea of art as looking like nature, demonstrates that there is a decisive moment hidden in Kant’s 
analytic of the judgment of taste when the theoretical attempt to derive a specific conduct of the subject vis-à-
vis an object, that is the judgment on the beautiful, turns into a demand to determine the characteristics of a 
specific object: “The determining characteristics of the judgment of taste become those of the work of art” (“Die 
Bestimmungsmerkmale des Geschmacksurteils werden zu solchen des Kunstwerks”). Zur Kritik der idealistischen 
Ästhetik, 82–83. 
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aspect of self-deception. There is no determination of the particularity of an artwork 
that does not, as a universal, according to its form, go beyond the monad. It is delusive 
to claim the concept, which must be introduced externally to the monad in order to 
open it up from within and thus to shatter it, has its source exclusively in the object. 
The monadological constitution of artworks in themselves points beyond itself. (AT: 
180/ÄT: 268–269)121  
  
 What needs justification here is the claim that the form of the artwork goes beyond its 
monad-like enclosure in virtue of––we can add here on account of the earlier discussion of 
the moment of social facticity––the form’s essential relation to its other. This relation Adorno 
calls universal. Thus, the view of the artwork as an endless, self-active thing poses a problem 
that confronts us once again with the antinomy without having handed us any solution to it. 
The work as a result of a rhythmic process inexhaustible in its implications emerges at the 
same time as a framed thing at a standstill. The energy of the work, its force, is a semblance. 
The work does not really act like a living organism, it only appears to be doing so. It is “at 
once a force field and a thing” at rest. Stressing one-sidedly the force side or the dynamic 
aspect of the artwork tends to conceal the historical nature of modern art as a made thing that 
is well aware of its own making.122 As a nature-like, subject-like synthesis, the artwork runs the 
risk of relapsing into the form of the fetish all over again. It can become irrelevant as an 
occasion of mere pleasure. To avoid this, we need to think of the notion of the endlessness of 
the artwork in close relation to its genesis. In other words, the question to be raised would be: 
                                                     
121 As a prominent figure of academic immanent analysis during 1950s in Germany, Adorno might have in mind 
the conservative literary critic Emil Steiger and his collection of essays, Die Kunst der Intepretation: Studien zur 
Deutschen Literaturgeschichte (Zürich: Atlantis, 1955). For a discussion of Adorno’s relation to Steiger and academic 
literary criticism, see Peter Uwe Hohendahl, The Fleeting Promise of Art, chap. 4.  
122 Two relatively recent works exemplify the tendency to accentuate the concept of art’s force field in Adorno 
without fully locating it in relation to historical conditions of art’s genesis. Krzysztof Ziarerk, The Force of Art 
(Stanford: Stanford UP. 2004), ch.1; Ayon Maharaj, The Dialectics of Aesthetic Agency: Revaluating German Aesthetics 
from Kant to Adorno (Bloomsbury: London, 2003), chap. 6.  
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How does the end result of an endlessly processual enigmatic object relate to the specific 
conditions of its coming to be, or, in Adorno’s own terms, how and why does the separated 
form go beyond itself? The truth of autonomous art is indebted not only to the act of 
separation but equally to the justifying of this very act.  
 
4.2 Figuring the Answer  
I propose to interpret Adorno’s concept of the truth-content of the artwork in tight relation 
to the work’s participation in history in the following passage:  
The truth content of artworks, as the negation of their existence, is mediated by them 
though they do not in any way communicate it. That by which truth content is more 
than what is posited by artworks is their methexis in history and the determinate 
critique that they exercise through their form. History in artworks is not something 
made, and history alone frees the work from being merely something posited or 
manufactured: Truth content is not external to history but rather its crystallization in 
the works. Their unposited truth content is their name. (ÄT: 201/AT: 133)123  
 
The key to the passage is in the adjective “unposited” (“nicht gesetzter”). We have arrived 
at a point in our analysis of art’s double character where neither the moment of separation 
through form nor the moment of imitation or repetition through form can tell us the truth 
about the existence of the artwork. Individually, each moment turns into its other, or each 
moment demands the presence of the other. We saw earlier in the chapter that the concept of 
history came into play in the constituting of the autonomous work to differentiate it from the 
                                                     
123 “Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Kunstwerke, als Negation ihres Daseins, ist durch sie vermittelt, aber sie teilen ihn 
nicht wie immer auch mit. Wodurch er mehr ist als von ihnen gesetzt, ist ihre Methexis an der Geschichte und 
die bestimmte Kritik, die sie durch ihre Gestalt daran üben. Was Geschichte ist an den Werken, ist nicht gemacht, 
und Geschichte erst befreit es von bloßer Setzung oder Herstellung: der Wahrheitsgehalt ist nicht außer der 
Geschichte sondern deren Kristallisation in den Werken. Ihr nicht gesetzter Wahrheitsgehalt darf ihr Name 
heißen.” 
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structure of the fetish objects and all magical-cultic functions that might be associated with 
the work. In this respect, when it comes to the artwork, unlike the fetish object, the answer to 
the question, What is this?, is always: This is a made object. There must not be anything in the 
work that rejects this answer, otherwise the work would be lying. Even a poet of the caliber 
of Paul Valéry has no illusion about a poem being the product of a skillful way of doing 
things.124  
All the same, the artwork retains its character as an enigma or riddle in virtue of its specific 
configuration through form. Now, the answers to the questions, Why is this? and How is this? 
can be given without remainder by saying this is a made thing, for making has generated 
something that appears to be not made, something that goes beyond the intentions of the 
making, the rules of the making, and the materials of the making. The more in the aesthetic 
artifact could not have been intentionally produced or posited as a result of the efficient causes 
in the act of making.  
What if these enigma-laced objects are indeed fetishes that have deceived us into thinking 
they are works of art, aesthetic objects, namely, that they owe their more to their own 
configuration or elements and not to any convention, system of dogmatic believes, or false 
consciousness? Artworks are not mysterious, only fetish objects are, so claims Adorno, “If 
transcendence were present in them, they would be mysteries, not enigmas,” whereas “The 
actual arena of transcendence in artworks is the nexus of their elements” (AT: 78/ÄT: 122). 
If I do believe that the red drops on the cheek of the statue are indeed the blood tears of a 
saint, or of Christ for that matter, I will be confronted with a mystery whose answer may or 
may not be available to me. If I, along with a community of believers, am convinced that this 
is a miracle, then I will commit myself to the account that the divinity is at work here. Divinity 
                                                     
124 See Valéry, “The Idea of Art,” 70–71.  
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as the answer to the miracle, however, counts as a source of causality outside of the miracle to 
the extent that no matter how deeply in awe we all are at the sight of the miracle, the statue 
remains a contingent sign signifying something beyond itself. This is different from an enigma 
or “dark saying.”125  
The enigma and the answer to the enigma cannot be separated from each other in the same 
way that the mystery and its solution can be. When the mystery of a heinous crime is finally 
solved, the horror of the crime, which we experienced even before the solution was found, 
continues to linger with us. We know for certain that there is a heinous crime. This does not 
hold true for an enigma. Without the answer, we cannot even make sure there is an enigma in 
the first place. The very organization of elements of the enigma as a linguistic product follows 
the principle that is given by the word, name, concept that is to be the answer to the enigma. 
In the absence of the answer it is hard to verify the authenticity of the enigma. The principle 
given by the answer can organize the articulation of the enigma so as to make it possible for 
us to discern a logic in the way the enigma is phrased, but this logic widely differs from one 
enigma to another. To take a most famous riddle in the Western tradition, the Sphinx asks, 
“Which creature has one voice and yet becomes four-footed and two-footed and three-
footed?” It is only in light of Oedipus’s answer, “Man,” that the apparently arbitrary phrasing 
of the riddle assumes necessity: because man as a baby crawls on all fours, as an adult walks 
on two feet, and in old age uses a walking stick.  
 If the artwork according to Adorno poses an enigma, it is thanks to the possible existence 
of an answer that the elements of the work-enigma configure themselves. The work can fail 
to be an enigma or deceptively pass itself off as a false enigma, just as the Sphinx could pose 
its enigma thus, “What creature has one voice and yet becomes one-footed and three-footed 
                                                     
125 This is according to LSJ’s definition of αἴνιγμα (ατος, τό), the Greek for enigma or riddle.  
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and five-footed?” to which there is no answer, even though the question still feels like a riddle. 
A true riddle promises an answer; in the artwork, “as in enigmas, the answer is both muted 
and demanded by the structure” (“verschwiegen und durch die Struktur erzwungen”; 
Translation modified; AT: 124/ÄT: 188). In order for the structure of the work to be capable 
of demanding a muted answer, it must obey a purposefulness and yet, just as in enigmas, this 
purposefulness is of an indeterminate nature or else there would be no enigma.126 But what if 
the artwork poses a false enigma? Adorno takes this potentially deceptive, illusory quality of 
the artwork that has captured our attention to be part of its enigmatic character, “Whether the 
promise is a deception––that is the enigma” (AT: 127/ÄT: 193).127 It is not the case that we 
first assure ourselves that the object in front of us is an artwork and then, like a detective, go 
after its solution. If we do not see the object as a unity aesthetically separated from its context, 
rightly or not, if we view it as a social fact like any other facts produced in a system or 
apparatus, there will be no enigma to begin with. The relation between this enigma and the 
answer that is demanded but not given positively by the work takes us to the new concept of 
history at work in the longer passage quoted above on truth-content. 
Here the concept of history performs a different role, it no longer is merely the real 
condition of the artworks of which the works are supposed to be aware in order to avoid 
becoming fetishistic or phantasmagorical. If history as external condition of the works is to 
betray the social fact of the posited-ness of the artwork, stripping it of the semblance of being-
in-themselves, here history does the opposite: “History alone frees the work from being merely 
                                                     
126 The German term Rätsel or in its older form Rätzel, is defined in a sixteenth-century document in a similar 
manner, that is, as a Sinnbild or sensible/sensate image that appears irrational and yet contains something 
intelligible and rational. A Rätzel is “an image that through similarity with an irrational thing brings forth the life 
and customs of a rational one in a concept” (“iſt ein Bild welches durch Gleichheit eines unvernu ͤnfftigen Dinges 
das Leben uñ die Sitten eines vernu ͤnfftigen in einem Conceptu vorſtellet”). Daniel Georg Morhof, Unterricht von 
der Teutschen Sprache und Poesie (Kiel, 1682), 773–774, https://deutschestextarchiv.de/ 
book/show/morhof_unterricht_1682. 
127 “Ob die Verheißung Täuchung ist, das ist das Rätsel.” 
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something posited or manufactured.” Viewed from the standpoint of being merely posited, 
the work gets caught up in the predicament of separation/repetition that we laid bare before. 
Participation in history is to free the work from that predicament, that is, both from its activity 
in separating itself through form and from its passivity in imitating the nexus of effects from 
which it separates itself. 
These two moments taken together as one concrete mode of existence produce an image. 
It has its own look or face. It generates a content. The work becomes something that appears 
in a certain way. We no longer deal with isolated characters of the work. The working of the 
artwork really stops here, it can do no more than posit itself in virtue of its specific 
configuration of sensuous elements. When Adorno says that the artwork does not 
“communicate” its truth-content, and that its truth-content is “unposited,” he means that the 
truth of this content is not anything positively given in the work. The way that the end result 
of the work’s operation in its two characters manifests itself acquires its own eloquence 
without signifying anything positive, any determinate meaning. Even though artworks do not 
produce any effect that is to interact, as it were, with society’s nexus of effects, they do produce 
an image or shape (Gestalt) (ÄT: 359). To refer to this quality of the artwork, Adorno uses 
terms such as the language-character, eloquence, of the image-character.128 On par with the 
sublime-ridiculous rhythm noted above, autonomous works participate in the total context of 
their genesis, that is, history, by letting go both of their own aesthetic separateness and their 
imitating society by resorting to meanings and functions. 
The participation in history grants a temporal nucleus to artworks. It binds them to a 
specific historical moment and context from which the work receives its elements, its law of 
                                                     
128 See, “Schrift” (ÄT: 122, 126, 135, 189, 264, 304); “Sprachcharakter” (ÄT: 172, 249, 250, 308, 413), “Beredt” 
(ÄT: 39, 55, 67, 125, 140, 306, 314, 353); “Bildcharakter” (ÄT: 130, 133, 142, 200. 
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form, even its force enabling it to separate itself, “If artworks are alive in history by virtue of 
their own processual character, they are also able to perish in it” (AT: 178/ÄT: 255).129 Works 
use notes, words, tropes, colors, blocks of marble, and images that are available to them. They 
have body in virtue of being material objects. They find themselves in optical, acoustic, verbal, 
and tactile fields of the time and form their own synthesis of elements. The fittest term to refer 
to this end result of the work’s immanent process of configuration and its entrusting itself to 
its context is figure. 
On account of its early appearance in his works, the concept of Figur testifies to the 
presence of a unifying theme in Adorno thought. This is the case in “The Actuality of 
Philosophy.”130 In the philosophical context of that inaugural speech, figure is held to be the 
shape of a question or a problem that the philosopher configures and it consists of the 
elements of reality, but is itself not directly present in reality as something objective. The way 
the elements of the figure or of the question are put together follows a logic that is not actually 
given to the philosopher, “Philosophy has to bring its elements, which it receives from the 
sciences, so long in changing constellation . . . as for them to get into figure, a figure that can 
be legible as an answer while at the same time the question itself disappears.”131 The 
                                                     
129 For a discussion of art’s temporal nucleus and its relation to historical moment, see Günter Figal, For a 
Philosophy of Freedom and Strife: Politics, Aesthetics, Metaphysics (Albany: State University of New York Press 1998), 
109–124. 
130 Erich Auerbach composed his famous essay on the philological and semantic history of “figura” in ancient 
and medieval literature around the same time as Adorno first turned to the term in his inaugural speech. See 
Erich Auerbach, “Figura,” in Figura: Dynamiken der Zeiten und Zeichen im Mittelalter, ed. Christian Kiening, Katharina 
Mertens Fleury (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2013), 263–300. For an English translation, see “Figura,” 
trans. Ralph Manheim, in Scenes from the Drama of European Literature (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1984), 11– 78. 
131 “Philosophie [hat] ihre Elemente, die sie von den Wissenschaft empfängt, so lange in wechselnde 
Konstellationen [. . .] zu bringen, bis sie zur Figur geraten, die als Antwort lesbar wird, während zugleich die 
Frage verschwindet” (“Die Aktualität der Philosophie.” GS 1, 335). In Foster’s words, “Adorno is arguing that 
the illumination of a concept through its context allows the concept say something, even though it is not being 
used to produce statement. What concepts 'say' is not a piece of information about the world, it is something 
about themselves, and their own relation to the world.” Roger Foster, Adorno: the Recovery of Experience (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2007), 50. 
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configuration of a figure out of the elements of reality resembles the separation of the artwork 
through forming disparate elements. 
Figura, Auerbach remarks, as the product of “Hellenization of the Roman education in the 
last century BC,” originally as well as in later uses of the term meant plastic form, that is, the 
external shape of an object.132 As to its proper Greek lineage, he links it to one of the two 
senses of “form” in Aristotle that I indicated earlier, namely, μορφή as opposed to εἶδος. To 
complicate matters further, Auerbach refers to other candidates in Plato and Aristotle, both 
recalling even more emphatically the perceptible character of form, “morphē . . . schema, typos, 
plasis.” Yet, the point that he wants to make relates to the birth of the double sense of the term 
form (forma in Latin) in the spirit of Aristotle’s definition of μορφή or shape, “schema tēs ideas 
[the pattern of its idea or form], the ideal form; thus Aristotle employs schema in a purely 
perceptual sense to designate one of the qualitative categories.” Aristotle gives this definition 
in the context of defining the multiple sense of matter in his thought. Once, it is  
“of the nature of substratum,” meaning the formless, unthinkable stuff out of which 
something comes to be, then, it is shape (σχῆμα), and finally, it is the “combination of 
these.”133 Auerbach then adds that figura was usually used to render the Greek shape. What we 
can take away from this philological excursus is the presence both of the sensible and the ideal 
in the concept of figure.  
 The term that transports the philosophical notion of the figure into the aesthetic in Adorno 
turns out to be that of enigma. In Aesthetic Theory we read, “Artworks share with enigmas the 
duality of being determinate and indeterminate. They are question marks, not univocal even 
through synthesis. Nevertheless their figure [Figur] is so precise that it determines the point 
                                                     
132 Auerbach, “Figura,” 11, 10.  
133 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1029a2–4. Auerbach, 14.  
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where the work breaks off.” The breaking off of the work should be understood as the limits 
of aesthetic separation or aesthetic positedness. At this point, once the figure was fully formed, 
the work has to let go; it cannot control the trajectory of its meanings, of its interpretations, 
of its functions, the conditions of its receptions, the passing of time. In any case, it does suggest 
how it is to be read, but “As in enigmas, the answer is both hidden and demanded by the 
structure. This is the function of the work's immanent logic, of the lawfulness that transpires 
in it” (ÄT: 188/AT: 124).134  
The figure of the autonomous artwork contains the answer to its enigma; the work figures 
the answer. In fact, it can be taken as an answer to the following question that Adorno 
formulates as the paradox of art, “How can making bring into appearance what is not the 
result of making; how can what according to its own concept is not true nevertheless be true?” 
(AT: 107/ÄT: 164).135 Finding the answer for Adorno involves the act of interpretation. Even 
though he believes the interpretation can solve the enigma, the antinomy of the artwork 
remains unresolved as “The antagonisms of society are nevertheless preserved in it” and 
“Giving form [Gestaltung] to antagonisms does not reconcile or eliminate them” (AT: 168/ÄT: 
252, and AT: 199/ÄT: 283). Insofar as the aesthetic experience of the artwork is concerned, 
for Adorno, “[C]onsciousness of the antagonism between interior and exterior is requisite to 
the experience of art” (“Draft Introduction,” AT: 349/ÄT: 520). Listening to Beethoven or 
reading Beckett cannot help but be accompanied by a sense of conflict and unease, such a 
feeling is indeed a sign of a genuine aesthetic experience.  
                                                     
134 “Mit den Rätseln teilen die Kunstwerke die Zwieschlächtigkeit des Bestimmten und Unbestimmten. Sie sind 
Fragezeichen, eindeutig nicht einmal durch Synthesis. Dennoch ist ihre Figur so genau, daß sie den Übergang 
dorthin vorschreibt, wo das Kunstwerk abbricht. Wie in Rätseln wird die Antwort verschwiegen und durch die 
Struktur erzwungen. Dazu dient die immanente Logik, das Gesetzhafte im Werk.” 
135 “Wie kann Machen ein nicht Gemachtes erscheinen lassen; wie kann, was dem eigenen Begriff nach nicht 
wahr ist, doch wahr sein?” 
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Aesthetic Theory leaves behind a metaphysical vestige in its treatment of art’s double 
character. On its manifest appearance, metaphysical for Adorno is the fact that a made thing, 
something posited, can appear as something not made, that it can be true (see AT: 131/ÄT: 
198; cf. also AT: 179/ÄT: 267). On its latent appearance, the antinomy of the double character 
is resolved through the endless implications of the work that stand in need of interpretation. 
Here we face the very conception of the force of the subject––that spiritual thread weaving 
together the otherwise disparate members of the work’s body––that is supposed to rescue the 
work from subscribing to the modes of bourgeois society in virtue of a sublime yet ridiculous 
intervention in it. Where is the source of this force? Whence comes the power of this 
subjective intervention? The three remaining chapters of this dissertation make efforts to 








THE LITERARY ANTINOMY AND ITS RESOLUTION IN 
HEINRICH VON KLEIST’S MICHAEL KOHLHAAS 
 
Chapter Overview:  
§ 1 Michael Kohlhaas's Problem 
§ 2 Michael Kohlhaas's Sache: The Tronkenburg Case  
§ 3 Michael Kohlhaas's Anti-Sache: The Jüterbog Prophecy 
§ 4 Michael Kohlhaas's Solution: The Wittenberg Argument 
 
§ 1 MICHAEL KOHLHAAS'S PROBLEM  
At issue in Heinrich von Kleist’s 1810 Michael Kohlhaas is a legal case over a pair of black horses 
belonging to the sixteenth-century horse dealer Michael Kohlhaas from the state of 
Brandenburg. One day, as he is crossing the border into Tronkenburg in the state of Saxony 
for trade purposes, his two horses are taken away from him under false pretenses (unnecessary 
transit papers). Two weeks later, he finds his horses in a ruinous state; they have been 
overworked and mistreated by the local nobleman Junker Wenzel von Tronka. The main plot 
of the novella revolves around Kohlhaas’s attempt to seek justice for himself by demanding 
that his horses are restored to their original healthy and well-fed condition. This constitutes 
Kohlhaas’s Sache (matter, case) throughout and it is in this context that the novella’s narrative 
unfolds. 1  
The story of the litigation, vengeance, victory, and death of Kohlhaas is narrated in roughly 
three parts. The first part begins in Tronkenburg, the primary scene of the conflict. To resolve 
                                                     
1 The term Sache (matter, case, cause) appears with significant frequency, used by various figures, throughout the 
story (23, 27, 35, 37, 41, 47: Streitsache ‘the dispute case or matter,’ 49, 56, 60, 62, 91, 105). Likewise, in one of the 
two or three historical sources that Kleist must have consulted while composing Michael Kohlhaas, namely the 
story of Hans Kohlhase in die Märckische Chronik by Peter Haffttiz (ca. 1520–1602, published in 1731), the term 
Sache comes up: “. . . seine Sache befodern zu behelffen . . . .” Bernd Hamacher, Heinrich von Kleist: Michael Kohlhaas, 
Erläuterungen und Dokumente, (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2003), 64. 
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his case, Kohlhaas first takes the legal path in Dresden by filing a legal complaint. After days 
pass with no response, Kohlhaas learns that his complaint was ignored because of nepotistic 
influences. He then takes up arms and attacks a number of other Saxon cities to avenge 
himself, riding after the fleeing Junker. The second part of the novella begins with Kohlhaas’s 
visit to Martin Luther in Wittenberg following the latter’s enraged open letter condemning his 
revolt. Although Luther does not bless his cause, he does intervene to guarantee Kohlhaas 
safe passage to Dresden, in order to bring his case against the Junker to the Dresden court 
again. After becoming snared in a trap laid by the Saxon officials to dismiss his nearly 
successful case, he is arrested and sentenced to death. At this point, however, the Elector of 
Brandenburg intervenes and Kohlhaas is transported to Berlin for a new trial. According to 
the classical rhetoric, the novella’s subject-matter, Kohlhaas’s lawsuit, demands forensic 
statements regarding the the who, what, when, why, and where of the incident in question.2 
This motivates the sequential development that governs the narrative format of Michael 
Kohlhaas during its first two parts. However, the last part of the novella takes a radically 
different turn through flashbacks to an earlier encounter in the marketplace of the city of 
Jüterbog between Kohlhaas and a gypsy woman who claims to know the future, and who 
eventually helps with his cause.3 
Traditionally, the key difficulty in interpreting Michael Kohlhaas pertains to the role of this 
                                                     
2 On the forensic or judicial, as one of the three main types of rhetoric, Aristotle writes that “The party in a case 
at law is concerned with the past.” Rhetoric, I, 1358b, qtd in Richard Lanham, A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, 2nd ed. 
(Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1991), 165. For the classical definition of the rhetorical and juridical 
concept of issue, see ibid., s.v. “Issue,” 93–94.   
3 Müller-Salget refers to a five-act tragedy embedded in the tripartite division of the novella. Act I in the first part 
recounts the emergence of the conflict and the legal path Kohlhaas takes until the death of his wife Lisbeth. Acts 
II and III in the second part deal with Kohlhaas's violent acts and the legal-political debates around the conflict. 
his Act IV would then cover the events from the Elector of Brandenburg rescuing Kohlhaas from death penalty 
in Saxony to the latter’s meeting with the gypsy woman in the Berlin prison cell. And the conclusion of the 
novella with its resolution would constitute the last act in the last part. “Kommentar,” in Heinrich von Kleist, 
Sämtliche Erzählungen, Anekdoten, Gedichte, Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2013), 719–20. 
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“enigmatic figure of the gypsy woman” for the novella as a whole,4 or, rather, to the way that 
the juridical, forensic order of the first parts of the novella relates to the prophetic order of 
the last part. The novella divides itself into two opposing centers; unifying them into one rule-
governed whole poses a distinct structural problem. While the narrative of the novel concerns 
a simple legal case that grows into a massive conflict for Michael Kohlhaas the protagonist, I 
will show how this structural problem ripens into a strict antinomy for Michael Kohlhaas the 
novella.  
I will argue that what appears to be the drawback of Michael Kohlhaas’s—that is, the 
introduction of the gypsy figure, proves, in fact, to be its key to solving a deeper problem:5 
how to constitute itself as an autonomous work of literature in freedom from other social 
spheres of practice in the context of a nascent bourgeois society. Buried within the novella is 
a formal structure subsuming its two centers, or focal points—juridical and prophetic, forensic 
and fantastic—with no debilitating conflict. Figure 1 below illustrates this formal structure: an 







                                                     
4 See Theodor Pelster, Heinrich von Kleist. Michael Kohlhaas. Lektüreschlüssel (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2004), 18. 
Hamacher refers to this figure as one of the “greatest uncertainties or indeed mysteries in Kleist's story” (264).  
5 Of the figure of the gypsy woman in the last pages of the novella and all that comes with it, Ludwig Tieck 
dismissively writes that Kleist leads the audience through “a fantastic dreamworld which we cannot unify with 
the preceding events which we have so precisely learnt from him.” Hamacher, Michael Kohlhaas, 95–96. 
6 I owe this insight to Földényi's concise interpretation of the novella F. László Földényi, Heinrich von Kleist. Im 
Netz der Wörter (Munich: Matthes & Seitz, 1999), 530. 
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Figure 1  
 
The middle focus of the novella, the Luther scene in Wittenberg serving as its turning point, 
and provides the framework for the novella to cultivate the relationship between its two 
centers, holding them together. It functions as a bridge to elevate the novella from one order 
of discourse to the other, mediating the settlement of the conflicting juridical and prophetic, 
real and fantastic, poles of the story. My interpretation of Michael Kohlhaas rests on two 
premises that I will substantiate in the course of this chapter. First, the forensic development 
of the events forming the subject matter of the first parts of the novella, or its Sachlichkeit, is 
not sufficient to qualify Michael Kohlhaas as a literary work, nor does it do justice to Kohlhaas’s 
case or Sache. Second, there is indeed a form of lawfulness at work in the novella that cannot 
be reduced to the sequential unfolding of events and the juridical settlement of the matter at 
hand, especially because the lawsuit does not find a satisfying resolution in the forensic part. 
This lawfulness is enabled by, though not identical with, the anti-sachlich, prophetic order of 
the last part of the story. It is only because of the prophetic order at the end that the novella 
begins to claim its own aesthetic, autonomous essence. The fantastic order on its own, 
however, does not guarantee the autonomy; only the novella’s attempt to justify the lawful 
relation between the two orders can secure its claim to be autonomous. 
 
§ 2 MICHAEL KOHLHAAS'S SACHE: THE TRONKENBURG CASE 
The legal conflict over the pair of horses taken away from Kohlhaas by the Junker’s men is 
Kohlhaas’s Sache. To his wife Lisbeth, who tries to talk him out of resorting to any extreme 
measures to provide himself justice, Kohlhaas replies, “What shall I do? Shall I give up my 
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suit?”(MK. 108: 32) 7 Earlier in the story, after seeing his miserable horses, “the very image of 
misery in the animal kingdom!” (MK: 92/14), he declares before the Junker and his men, “I 
want my well fed and healthy horses back!” (MK: 94/16). This remains the core of his claim. 
Put in juridical language, Kohlhaas’s Rechtssache (legal case / matter of right) as he originally 
filed to the court of Dresden is equally straightforward, “to restore . . . horses to . . . their 
original condition” (MK: 100/23). Towards the end of the novella even the Emperor, in his 
letter to the Elector of Saxony, complains that “the Kohlhaas case” has been made by the 
Elector “a matter for the entire Holy Roman Empire” (MK: 168/105). 
All the same, Kohlhaas himself was absent from Tronkenburg for the two weeks during 
which the Junker’s men ruined his two horses. It was his groom Herse that stayed at the 
Junker’s castle. Kohlhaas now has to find out if the whole matter was really the Junker’s fault 
or if Herse, who told him the story, may have also been at fault. His absence therefore made 
Herse’s forensic interrogation scene necessary early on (MK: 94–100/18–22). Once he comes 
to believe Herse’s story, Kohlhaas is now capable of two things: telling his wife “the whole 
course and inner coherence of the story” (“den ganzen Verlauf und inneren Zusammenhang 
der Geschichte,” MK/23) as discovered through Herse, and, based on that sachliche story, 
setting out to demand “public justice.” The Sache is clearly associated with the inner coherence 
of the account of the Tronkenburg incident. We the readers, however, have yet to see whether 
the Sachlichkeit of its narrative will guarantee the inner coherence of the novella itself. 
As a legal term, the Sache is defined by the 1794 General State Laws for the Prussian States thus: 
“The matter as such [Sache als solche] signifies from the perspective of the law all that which can 
be the object of a right or a bindingness.” 8 In this sense, as the document’s §2 makes explicit, 
                                                     
7 “Was soll ich tun? soll ich meine Sache aufgeben?”  
8 Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischer Staaten von 1794, ed. Hattenhauer, Hans (Frankfurt am Main: A. Metzner, 
1970), II. §1.  
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even the actions of human beings, as well as their rights, can be considered under the concept 
of the Sache. In a narrower sense, according to II. §3, the Sache is only that which, either by 
nature or through human beings, has a self-standing or independent character. It is this 
independent substance that makes the thing into the object of a permanent right, otherwise 
the thing could not be recognized over time as the same thing claimed by a person. The Sache, 
whether as a human action or a right or a thing, is that which one can claim, regulate, alienate, 
or sanction, so that the authority protecting that claim can punish those violating it.  
A thing can be the object of right, however, only thanks to the existence of a legal definition 
determining what substantiates the Sache, what qualifies as ownership of it, and what 
constitutes the damaging of it. If something in the capacity of a Sache can be the object of 
right, bindingness, and thus law, it means that its particular quality as a thing or deed or even 
thought is essentially capable of being claimed as the object of universal validity. So, a pair of 
horses are associated with an abstract concept—or right—initiating a whole complex process 
of rectifying what went wrong with them.9 Even so, claiming animals as one’s legal things is 
not an unproblematic claim. The Prussian Law is at pains to define what makes up the 
substance of, say, a pair of horses. It does not reserve any specific definition for the substance 
of an animal as Sache, presumably because the force of nature in the case of organic life inflicts 
a kind of inevitable and rapid decay that differs from inorganic things losing their quality and 
thereby perhaps substance over time (cf. §101). The concept by which Prussian Law regulates 
the ownership of an animal is the same as that which Kohlhaas keeps demanding for his 
                                                     
9 As Graham notes, in so far as Kohlhaas's sense of right is concerned, it “is one of universalium in re [the universal 
in a thing]. That is to say, it is a strictly private and personal conception, wholly governed by, and geared to, that 
actual configuration of facts which his untoward experience presents to him. . . . Everything in the total chance-
conglomerate offered to his perception to him seems relevant and goes into the making of the conception of 
justice he frames.” Ilse Graham, Heinrich von Kleist: Word into Flesh: A Poet's Quest for the Symbol. Walter de Gruyter, 
1977, 214. 
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horses: restoration (Wiederherstellung). An ill animal, abandoned by its hitherto owner, once 
taken into care and restored to its original condition is legally considered the property of the 
caregiver (see I. § 18). 
In this way, restoration in the language of the novella qualifies as a legal term bearing on 
its protagonist’s Sache. This is a key concept insofar as what the horse owner demands are not 
just his horses (‘who cared nothing about the horses themselves’ “dem es nicht um die Pferde 
zu tun war”; MK: 104/12), but his right to his well-fed, healthy, properly fattened horses. After 
all, at any time, he could have returned to Tronkenburg to retrieve them as he was constantly 
advised by others to do (e.g. MK: 101/24; see also the Luther scene, MK: 127/54).10 
This Sache is also the novella’s Sache: it is the matter around which everything should revolve 
and be organized, down to the very syntax of the work. A typical sentence in Kleist’s narrative 
includes two or three aspects of the matter at hand in tensely woven structure. The frequency 
of clauses in sentences stresses the conditions and quality of an event by referring to what has 
happened in the past, or in the meantime, or during the formation of that event: 
Meanwhile, the Junker had been released from his prison in Wittenberg and, after 
getting over a dangerous attack of erysipelas that had inflamed his foot, he had been 
peremptorily summoned to appear before the Dresden court to answer the charges 
made against him by the horse dealer Kohlhaas concerning a pair of black horses that 
had been unlawfully taken from him and ruined by overwork (MK: 136/65).  
 
                                                     
10 It is remarkable that, during the post-Tronkenburg course of the novella, apart from the initial encounter with 
the miserable animals that initiated the conflict, Kohlhaas happens to see his horses at two different occasions at 
which he shows no enthusiasm nor willingness to have them. The first time is when he invades the Tronka castle 
with his men (see MK: 121/47) and the second time when the knacker brings the horses to the Dresden square. 
Here Kohlhaas is invited to identify the horses, “the horses tied to this cart are mine” (“die Pferde, die an seinen 
Karren gebunden sinc, gehören mir”) (MK: 139–140). He does not want to have them in their miserable 
condition. So, though he recognizes his horses, he does not see, to use the above legal term, the substance of 
them.     
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The Junker’s infected foot is brought up in the same breath as the main matter of the 
novella, namely Kohlhaas’s complaint in regard of his horses.11 Another case, mentioned by a 
late nineteenth-century commentator as an example of Kleist’s Sachlichkeit, is the following 
passage (the first quote is from the 1810 final version of the novella and the second from the 
shorter, 1808 version in the journal Phöbus): 
Kohlhaas called her his brave wife, spent that day and the next very happily 
with her and the children and, as soon as his business permitted, set out for 
Dresden to lay his complaint before the court. 
 
Kohlhaas kissed her, called her his brave wife, rested no longer than a single 
night by her, and set out the next morning to begin his work.12 
 
What is striking in these variations, in their apparent brevity and insignificance, is the 
predominance of Kohlhaas’s main concern over everything else. In both versions, haste is 
emphatic, whether in the familial matters or in those of his trade. The narrative does not linger 
over Kohlhaas kissing her wife and children, despite the likely weight of such moments for 
Kohlhaas’s inner life. He is rather eager to turn to the actual matter of the story, to his “Werk” 
(work) that must be started: going to the court in Dresden and filing his complaint against the 
Junker. A similar syntactical rhythm repeats itself when Kohlhaas says farewell to her deceased 
wife. In the Phöbus fragment we read:  
Kohlhaas thought: –––; kissed her as tears streamed down his face, pressed 
                                                     
11 Michael-Klaus Bogdal holds the main achievement of Kleist's complex syntax to be a kind of “flexible 
synchronization or separation of temporal courses in a way that is not to be found in the prose of the nineteenth 
century.” Heinrich von Kleist. Michael Kohlhaas. (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1981), 25.  
12“Kohlhaas nannte sie sein wackeres Weib, erfreute sich diesen und den folgenden Tag in ihrer und seiner Kinder 
Mitte, und brach, sobald es seine Geschäfte irgend zuliessen, nach Dresden auf . . . .”  
“Kohlhaas küsste sie, nannte sie sein wackeres Weib, ruhrte auch nicht länger, als eine einzige Nacht, bei ihr aus, 
und brach schon am nächsten Morgen auf, um sein werk zu beginnen.”  
Qtd. in Georg Minde-Pouet, Heinrich von Kleist: Seine Sprache und Sein Stil (Weimaer: Emil Felber, 1897), 68. 
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her eyes, and dismissed the spiritual.13 
 
And in the 1810 version: 
Kohlhaas thought: “May God never forgive me the way I forgive the Junker!” 
kissed her with the tears streaming down his cheeks, closed her eyes, and left 
the room (MK: 110/35).14 
 
Two points on this passage are in order. First, the dotted, blank space in the early version, 
between Kohlhaas thinking and kissing, is filled in the final version by one more reference to 
his matter at hand through the name of the Junker.15 That Kohlhaas does not intend to forgive 
him, as the dying Lisbeth begged him to do by putting her finger on biblical verse, only means 
that his Sache is not to be given up (the exact same refusal holds later on in the Luther scene). 
Once again, his most intimate familial conduct is punctuated by his preoccupation with his 
lawsuit. 
Second, in the narrative it takes the author about half a page to describe the preparation of 
a relatively resplendent funeral for Lisbeth in an equally hasty tempo, and once the guests were 
dismissed, Kohlhaas undertook the “business of revenge” (Geschäft der Rache), which was to be 
the next major step in pursuing his Sache after the initial, legal one. Just before that moment, 
during the funeral he had received a letter of resolution from the Elector of Brandenburg in 
                                                     
13 “Kohlhaas dachte: -- -- --; küßte sie, indem ihm häufig die Tränen flossen, drückte ihr die Augen zu, und entließ 
den Geistlichen.” The Phöbus fragment published in pararell to the book version, “Michael Kohlhaas,” in 
Sämtliche Erzählungen: Text und Kommentar, ed.Klaus Müller-Salget (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2013), 60. 
14 “Kohlhaas dachte: 'so möge mir Gott nie vergeben, wie ich dem Junker vergebe!' küßte sie . . . und verliess das 
Gemach.”  
15 In a very negative review of the 1808 version of the novella, a contemporary reviewer, Böttiger, writes, “Was 
wir Seite 33 aus dem Gedankenstrichen, als Kohlhaasens Weib gestorben war: 'Kohlhaas dachte -- -- -- küßte sie 
usw.' machen sollen, können wir auch nicht einsehn" "It is also not clear what we are supposed to make of the 
dash when Kohlhaas's wife was dead: 'Kohlhaas thought – – –; kissed her and so on.’” Heinrich von Kleist's 
Lebensspuren: Dokumente und Berichte der Zeitgenossen, ed. Helmut Sembdner (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 197), no. 
296a. The matter-of-factual quality of Kleist's sentences must have played a role in this particular reception, 
notwithstanding even the otherwise most probably bad taste of the reviewer. 
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response to the petition that Lisbeth had fatally handed to him, “he was commanded to fetch 
the horses home from Tronka Castle and let the matter drop, on pain of imprisonment” (“er 
solle die Pferde von der Tronkenburg abholden, und bei Strafe, in das Gefängnis geworfen zu 
werden, nicht weiter in dieser Sache einkommen”) (MK: 111/35). The command to “drop the 
matter” is of course ignored by Kohlhaas; he does take up the matter all over again, and this 
time violently. 
Beyond the prose style, there is still a more fundamental notion of Sachlichkeit at play in his 
work The story’s matter at hand with its dual side (a particular case and a universal claim) 
involves a significant formal consequence: the matter grants the novella an inner lawfulness 
and factualness in the unfolding of its plot. Kohlhaas’s legal case, or issue of right, by its nature 
secures the lawful, rational, and transparent course of the story,16 since the steps of developing 
the plot are governed by the logical demands of the legal case. When the horse dealer decides 
to take the matter in his own hands, he sends a notice to the Junker, giving him a three day 
ultimatum, which Kleist refers to as Kohlhaas’s Rechtsschluß (decree) (MK: 111/35). A word by 
word rendering would give us “right deduction” or rightful conclusion enforced by virtue of 
his “angeborenen Macht” (inborn authority). 
In this sense, “the portrayal of the first part still obeys nothing less than mathematical laws. 
. . . The legal case of Kohlhaas is exposed in the mode of presentation of the legal science.” 17 
The sequential progression and sustained focus on the matter define the sachlich, juridical style 
of the novella. The juridical statement is a determining statement that subsumes all particular 
cases, events, feelings under a concept.18 Insofar as the governing concept in the narrative of 
                                                     
16 See Klaus-Michael Bogdal, “Mit einem Blick, kalt und leblos, wie aus marmornen Augen. Text und 
Leidenschaft des Michael Kohlhaas,” in Heinrich von Kleist. Studien zu Werk und Wirkung, ed. G. Dirk and K. M. 
Bogdal (Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1988), 192 
17 Franz M. Eybl, Kleist-Lektüren (Stuttgart: WUV, 2007), 189, 187. 
18 Cf. Bernhard Greiner, Kleists Dramen und Erzählungen: Experimente zum 'fall' Der Kunst (Marburg: Francke, 2000), 
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Michael Kohlhaas continues to be Kohlhaas’s matter of right, it continues to render describable 
whatever comes along its way.  
A document from the period, Wilhelm Grimm’s 1810 review of Heinrich von Kleist’s 
newly published stories makes the following remark on Kleist’s prose style: 
The presentation [Darstellung] relentlessly speaks through itself alone, in a clear 
and comprehensible manner, and it does not thus need the miserable aids of 
remarks and rebukes with which the common narrators try to help up their 
lifeless products. The presentation also tends, often permeating the smallest 
details, to the eloquent individuality, without losing itself in any of them.19 
 
If by the “common narrators” of the time here are meant the Romantic writers with their 
emphasis on poeticization, feelings, subjectivity, then a sachlich, self-evident prose would be 
free of anything irrelevant to the life and movement of the Sache or matter in discussion. 
Nothing external or contingent seems then to be guiding this presentation other than its own 
proper object. It is the Sache itself that speaks. In light of the legal nature of Kohlhaas’s Sache, 
we can then define the order of jurisprudence as an order of evidence or self-evidence.20 Even 
though he was not really present at the original scene of the conflict in Tronkenburg—since 
he had gone to gone to fetch the transit document, he learned of it only by interrogating his 
servant Herse––Kohlhaas’s certainty is the certainty of having evidence of a past event, or 
rather, of having a matter at hand that is by its nature self-evident: his two horses should not 
                                                     
336. 
19 “Die Darstellung spricht stets durch sich selbst, klar und verständlich, und so bedarf sie der kümmerlichen 
Aushülfe von Betrachtungen und Zurechtweisungen nicht, womit die gemeinen Erzähler ihren leblosen 
Produkten aufzuhelfen suchen. Auch geht die Darstellung geht auf sprechende Individualität, oft in kleinsten 
Details eindringend, ohne sich in diese zu verlieren.” 
20 As another evidence for the juridical relevance of the German term Sache, one could point to the Latin legal 
doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur” or “the thing speaks for itself.” According to this doctrine, dating as far back as 
Cicero, certain things do not need a proof in the process of trial. The wrong can be inferred from the nature of 
the matter or incident itself. See Lateinische Rechtsregeln und Rechtssprichwörter, trans. Detlef Liebs, 1982 (Munic: C. 
H. Beck, 1998), 210. The German translation of the expression is “die Sache spricht für selbst.” Kleines deutsch-
lateinisches Handwörterbuch, vol. 2, ed. Karl Ernst Georges (Leipzig: Hofenberg, 1969 [1910]), 238. 
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have been taken from him and worked nearly to death.21 Even where the legal conflict is a 
complex one, there must always be a self-evident point of departure, that is, that there is a 
perceived conflict between at least two parties. What Grimm calls the “eloquent individuality” 
in Kleist’s stories defines the path the juridical discourse is to take in our novella, organizing 
its elements around the presence of a single event, the Tronkenburg incident, and what follows 
from it. That the eloquent individuality of the smallest details does not devour the entire 
narrative owes, again, to the guidance and guardianship of the Sache over the process of holding 
together and ordering all the particular parts, mobilizing them for the sake of the case. 
Kohlhaas’s to and fro movement between cities in northwest Prussia in the states of 
Brandenburg and Saxony thus can be mapped out as trips guided by objectives related to his 
case, at least up to just before the Jüterbog incident: 
 From Tronkenburg, the original scene of the main conflict about the horses, Kohlhaas 
rides to Dresden to provide the transit document (Passchein) improperly required by the 
Junker’s castellan (MK: 90/14), and returns to Tronkenburg after a couple of weeks to fetch 
his horses, which he then found in miserable condition. As Kohlhaas heads to Dresden to file 
a complaint, he suddenly turns his horse around and heads for his hometown 
Kohlhaasenbrück for the sole reason of listening to his groom’s side of story (MK: 94/17). 
Kohlhaas then rides to Dresden to file his complaint in the court (MK: 101/23). However, 
after the near year comes around with no meaningful progress, and Kohlhaas realizes that the 
legal path is blocked due to a blood relation between the Junker and the Saxon officials, his 
frustration reaches a climax point when his wife Lisbeth dies (the most unfortunate of “all the 
unsuccessful steps that he had taken,” MK: 109/33), and, at her funeral, he receives a 
                                                     
21 There is no counterargument offered in the novella as against Kohlhaas’s case itself. It is as if all the characters, 
and the narrator as well, firmly believe what happened in Tronkenburg was wrong. Luther clearly confirms that 
what Kohlhaas demands “is just” ‘ist gerecht’ (translation modified; MK: 127/54).  
 126 
disappointing resolution from the state of Saxony in response to the petition that she, as a last 
resort, had fatefully, and, as it turns out, fatally, submitted on her husband’s behalf. This spurs 
Kohlhaas to take up arms, first invading the castle of the Junker in Tronkenburg and then the 
major cities of the state. His battles near and inside Leipzig, Wittenberg, Mühlenberg are 
governed by his desire to pursue the fleeing Junker (MK: 111–121/36–49), and what puts an 
end to these battles is Martin Luther’s open letter condemning his action (MK: 122/50).  
What comes after Luther’s intervention in the case (see § 3 below) has its own inner 
lawfulness in so far as it contains a number of legal and political arguments at various levels 
regarding Kohlhaas’s case: Will he be granted amnesty or safe conduct (freie Geleit) to the 
Dresden court to renew his case filing? Will he be considered a rebel subject or a foreign 
enemy? (for the debates in the castle of Saxony between the Elector, Prince von Meißen, Graf 
Wrede, Graf Kahlheim, Hinz, Kunz, see MK: 129–133/56– 61). The debates eventually lead 
to the Elector of Saxony giving Kohlhaas amnesty so that he is able pursue his case in the 
court of Dresden. From this point to the narration of incident in the Jüterbog marketplace, 
two turning points occur: one is the appearance of the knacker that brings Kohlhaas’s 
miserable horses to the marketplace of Dresden (MK: 139–144/67–75), and the other is the 
Johann Nagelschmidt affair (MK: 148f/76f), one of Kohlhaas’s militant men during his 
uprising who offers Kohlhaas unwanted support. Kohlhaas’s case was approaching settlement 
when the Nagelschmidt affair, in tandem with a trap the Saxony statesmen had laid down for 
him, landed in the arrest of Kohlhaas, his trial, and ultimately his death sentence in the state 
of Saxony (MK: 157/91). 
Were it not for the intervention of the Elector of Brandenburg, who claimed Kohlhaas as 
a dual subject of the two states of Saxony and Brandenburg, he would have been executed in 
Saxony and the story would have probably ended right there. After his encounter with Luther, 
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Kohlhaas the rebellious plaintiff falls into a passive role through the entire second part of the 
novella. His passivity reaches its climax when he is arrested. With his transfer to Berlin to 
appear before the high court, during the last twenty or so pages of the novella, however, a 
final, decisive turn of events comes along and the hitherto sachlich nature of the novella 
collapses.22 Towards the end of the novella, there is an encounter, as part of a core motive, 
between two sovereigns and a gypsy woman (the Zigeunerin) in Jüterbog. 
 
§ 3 MICHAEL KOHLHAAS'S ANTI-SACHE: THE JÜTERBOG PROPHECY  
Though, chronologically, the gypsy woman makes her first appearance early in the first part 
of the story, the time of her entrance arrives only late in the third part. This occurs in the 
marketplace of the city of Jüterbog, where the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg are also 
present along with the person of Kohlhaas in some distance from the other two. Her 
immediate role is to make two prophecies at the request of the Electors, which I will refer to 
as the “major” prophecy and “minor” prophecy. The major, famous prophecy addresses the 
fate of the Elector of Saxony’s person and throne. The readers never know the content of the 
prophecy, which the gypsy writes down on a piece of paper and hands to Kohlhaas who 
happens to be there. For the rest of the story the Elector desperately seeks it in vain. The 
minor prophecy, addressed to the Elector of Brandenburg, revolves around an animal, a 
roebuck. My goal here is to unfold the structure of the minor prophecy in the context of the 
                                                     
22 The movement of Kohlhaas in the two states can be broken down into his individuals travels among the 
following cities, all governed by the demands of the case and all are sequentially narrated except for the trip to 
Jüterbog which though takes place early on is narrated later on: . . .Æ Tronkenburg Æ Dresden Æ Tronkenburg 
Æ halfway to Dresden Æ Kohlhaasenbrück Æ Dresden –– after a year –– Kessel Æ Kohlhaasenbrück 
ÆTronkenburg Æ the Women’s Monastery Erlabrunn on the river Mulde Æ Wittenberg Æ Mühlberg Æ 
Leibzig Æ Wittenberg Æ Pirna Æ Kohlhaasenbürg Æ Dresden Æ Dahme Æ –– Flashback to Æ Jüterbog Å . 
. . Æ  Berlin. 
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Jüterbog incident so that I can situate it in the context of the novella as a whole.  
The Elector of Brandenburg asks the gypsy woman to foretell the fate of his throne, but 
since he does not have any faith in her prophetic practices, he derisively challenges her to show 
a sign verifying her power. The gypsy offers this sign, “the big horned roebuck that the 
gardener’s son was raising in the park would come to meet us in the marketplace where we 
were standing, before we should have gone away” (MK: 170/107). She adds that the ainimal 
is well-hidden and locked up in the kitchen in the back of the garden. The Elector of 
Brandenburg, in turn, sends some of his men to the castle, and tasks them with killing the 
roebuck and having the animal prepared for the next day’s meal. This is meant as a joke on 
her to shame the gypsy’s ‘scheme,’ thereby rendering her prophecy null and void. 
The story is left there; the gypsy simply moves to foretelling pleasant things about the 
sovereign’s future, receives some money, and turns to her conversation with the Elector of 
Saxony to make her second, major, prophecy. But soon after she suddenly vanishes in the 
crowd, the roebuck case is taken up again. As the Elector of Brandenburg’s guards show up 
with the news of the animal being killed, and while the Elector is euphorically boasting about 
his success in disclosing the gypsy’s swindle, the prophecy runs its course. The butcher’s hound 
runs out of the kitchen carrying the dead roebuck by the neck and lets it fall to the ground in 
front of the sovereign and his escorts. The Elector of Saxony the narrator puts it thus, “and 
so in fact the woman’s prophecy, which had been her pledge for the truth of everything she 
said, was fulfilled, and the roebuck, dead though it was, to be sure, had come to meet us in the 
marketplace” (MK: 172–173/110). The prophecy is fulfilled, for the roebuck does indeed 
come to the marketplace, “dead though it was, to be sure” (obschon allerdings tot), and a living 
roebuck had also not been specified in the woman’s prophecy. The sign that the sovereign 
asked for as the pledge of the gypsy’s true words proved genuine, after all. This verification 
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may very well be taken as the literary function of the minor prophecy of the gypsy woman. 
The minor prophecy does far more than that, however. The incident, according to my 
interpretation, is important in the following three fundamental ways: 
First, the roebuck scene opens and concludes, and therefore precisely includes, the complex 
incident as a whole in the Jüterbog marketplace.  
The temporality of the prophecy is to the extent precise that the narrative is in full, indeed 
beautiful, accord with the very claim of prophecy to knowledge of time to come: the little story 
is co-temporal with the time of the prophecy without any lapse. We witness the fulfillment of 
the prophecy as we read along until we indeed arrive at that point. In other words, the time 
that it takes for the butcher’s hound to bring the dead roebuck to the marketplace, hence the 
prophecy to its fulfillment, more or less corresponds to the time that it takes for the narrative 
to be told, that is to say, about three pages: between the Elector's order to kill the roebuck 
(MK: 170/108) and the appearance of the roebuck in the marketplace (MK: 172/110). The 
operative time of the prophecy is filled with the gypsy woman's other deeds and words as 
recounted by the Elector of Saxony. The actual time of the narrative is the same as the lived 
time of the act. Meanwhile other conversations take place and, most important of all, the 
central, enigmatic act of the last part of the novella is recounted: the gypsy woman hands the 
piece of paper in a locket, presumably containing the answers to the three questions with 
regard to the fate of the Elector of Saxony, to Kohlhaas who happened to be passing by as we 
find out later from Kohlhaas. 
Second, narratologically, since it is a flashback from the early days of the Kohlhaas case, 
the Jüterbog episode, of which the roebuck prophecy forms a part, is recounted three times 
in the novella from the standpoints of three characters. First by Kohlhaas in Dahme: on his 
escorted trip to Berlin to be tried in the state of Brandenburg, he happens to meet the Elector 
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of Saxony and Heloise (the wife of his chamberlain Kunz) and in answer to his inquiry about 
the locket around his neck, offers the first version. This lacks any reference to the roebuck 
case and simply relays how the locket was given to him by the gypsy woman. According to 
Kohlhaas, months ago on the day of Lisbeth’s funeral––who was accidentally killed by the 
Elector of Brandenburg’s guards as she was trying to submit her husband’s petition–– he 
comes across the gypsy in the marketplace of Jüterbog (MK: 162/97). 23  
Later on, and for the second time, the scene is recounted in the single longest narrative 
monologue in the novella from the standpoint of the Elector of Saxony; it is at this point when 
the roebuck case appears for the first and only time. We thus know of the minor prophecy of 
the gypsy woman through the Elector alone. The third and briefest version of the scene is told 
from the perspective of an “old woman” (Weib) with an “uncanny likeness” to Kohlhaas’s 
wife, Lisbeth, inside the Berlin prison cell where Kohlhaas awaits his death sentence. She only 
mentions the act of handing the piece of paper in an indirect narrative, “She said . . . it would 
be wise, in her opinion, to use the paper for the purpose she had given him at the Jüterbog 
fair” (MK: 176/115). In this way, the Jüterbog incident enjoys a threefold inscription in the 
narrative, yet the roebuck scene appears only once. The importance of the minor prophecy 
reaches still further.24 
Third, in terms of the structure of the act itself, the Elector of Brandenburg helps the gypsy 
woman fulfill her prophecy precisely by willing and acting to nullify it. According to the 
narrator of the motive, the prophecy was “indeed” (in der Tat) fulfilled, and this deed was, in 
                                                     
23 Of course, there is a contradiction in narrative here: as we know from the earlier pages of the novella, Kohlhaas 
passed through Jüterbog three days after Lisbeth's funeral as already notified to Wenzel von Tronka in Kohlhaas's 
letter to him. See 14. 
24 According to Földényi (Heinrich von Kleist: Im Netz der Wörter, 528), the scene is narrated twice, by Kohlhaas and 
by the Elector of Saxony. He does not take into account the brief reference to the scene by the gypsy woman in 
the cell. For him, the duplication of the narrated scene, with differences in versions, attests to the unsearchability 
of the incident in its truth, thereby of fate (529). There is no third, objective standpoint from which to verify the 
Jüterbog incident. 
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fact, the Elector’s own intervention itself. Through his will, the Elector becomes part of the 
very context of prophecy, the validity of which he sets out to refute. The gypsy’s prophecy 
creates a context that entangles the Elector’s act within it. The prophecy opens up what could 
be called call a circle of spell. The Elector thinks that he is in control of this circle, he proudly 
and confidently goes about nullifying its effect and thereby thwarting the prophecy. Yet, the 
very act of his will has him tangled up in the working and realization of the circle. He falls into 
the space of that spell.  
Such a structure is heir to an ancient predicament originating, to name one major source, 
in the Greek tragic tradition. The most obvious case that comes to mind is the trajectory of 
Oedipus in Sophocles’ Oedipus the King. The tragedy performs the structure of the spellbound 
will in its perfect form—that is, in the form of a complete circle of reciprocity between the 
former Laius the king of Thebes, the present king, and his son Oedipus, raised in the city of 
Corinth. With regard to two different prophecies, a spell besets both characters. 
The tragedy opens with Oedipus the king, in a post festum state of affairs. In the course of 
the tragedy he learns step by step what he has, in fact done, to lead up to his position on the 
throne; namely, murdering the king of Thebes as well as his real father, Laius, and marrying 
his mother Jocasta. The reason why he ended up in Thebes instead of remaining in Corinth, 
which had been his home, was to evade the prophecy according to which he would kill his 
father and marry his mother. So, fleeing from Corinth lest he should kill the king Polybius, 
whom he believed to be his father, he indeed participated in the realization of the prophecy 
by killing his real father Laius and marrying his real mother Jocasta. In conversation with the 
prophet Tiresias who first informs him about his past, the outraged Oedipus asks, “Is this a 
plot of Creon, or thine own?” to which the former answers, “Not Creon, thou thyself art thine 
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own bane.”25 The bane or trouble in which he is entangled is the outcome of his own will. The 
same pattern is at work in the case of Laius, the murdered king. Laius, too, unwittingly 
participated in the realization of his fate precisely by choosing to dodge it. In reaction to an 
oracle foretelling that his own son would slay him, he had his wife Jocasta leave their infant 
Oedipus on Mount Corinth to perish. The choice of that place was to put Oedipus in the 
hands of the king of Corinth. 26   
The trajectory of Oedipus poses a number of questions, some of which are still unresolved 
today, and nearly all of which are still relevant. What is the relationship between the two 
elements of this trajectory—the will and the mythical context of its realization? Why did 
Oedipus have to suffer such grave consequences that were in no way equal to his acts? What 
notion of justice could account for his fate? Among the answers offered to these questions, 
one stresses the notion of a curse running through a family, affecting the lives of the 
offspring.27 Another claims that the tragic fate demonstrates that the gods ruling over the 
human beings are not to really just in any meaningful sense.28 In any case, in tragedy the 
individual experiences a certain freedom and independence by allying him- or herself with a 
                                                     
25 Sophocles, Oedipus the King, Oedipus at Colonus, Antigone, trans. F. Storr (London: Macmillan, 1913), 37. The Loeb 
translation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986) has it as “Creon is not your trouble, but rather you 
yourself.” The original Greek verse is “Κρέων δέ σοι πῆμ᾽ οὐδέν, άλλ᾽ αὐτός σὺ σοί.” 
26 The Appointment in Samar is a 1934 novel by John O'Hara rests on a similar notion of fate. Also, Somerset 
Maugham has written a version of it, based on the old Babylonian-Talmudic story of the encounter with death, 
“There was a merchant in Bagdad who sent his servant to market to buy provisions and in a little while the 
servant came back, white and trembling, and said, Master, just now when I was in the marketplace I was jostled 
by a woman in the crowd and when I turned I saw it was Death that jostled me. She looked at me and made a 
threatening gesture, now, lend me your horse, and I will ride away from this city and avoid my fate. I will go to 
Samarra and there Death will not find me. The merchant lent him his horse, and the servant mounted it, and he 
dug his spurs in its flanks and as fast as the horse could gallop he went. Then the merchant went down to the 
marketplace and he saw me standing in the crowd and he came to me and said, Why did you make a threating 
gesture to my servant when you saw him this morning? That was not a threatening gesture, I said, it was only a 
start of surprise. I was astonished to see him in Bagdad, for I had an appointment with him tonight in Samarra.” 
http://www.k-state.edu/english/baker/english320/Maugham-AS.htm. 
27 See Hugh Lloyd-Jones's argument in The Justice of Zeus. Berkley: University of California Press, 1971, 104–128.   
28 This is the view held by the Ancient Greece scholar Dodds who thought the undeserved sufferings of Oedipus 
confirmed Sophocles’ lack of belief the justice of the gods. See Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus, 108. 
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certain lawful order, as in the case of Antigone; yet, the spellbound will, as we saw in the case 
of Oedipus, of Laius, of the Elector of Brandenburg, signifies the mythical presence of a 
mysterious, arbitrary, brutal force beyond the individual will.29 
But is the person of Kohlhaas not himself caught in a similar structure of the spellbound 
will from the very first page of Michael Kohlhaas? The famous opening paragraph of the novella, 
which introduces him as an exemplary, God-fearing, diligent, honest, righteous, thus virtuous 
married citizen or burgher in his thirties with well-bred children, anchors the cause of his 
upcoming troubles and notoriety in Kohlhaas’s character. The paragraph concludes in this 
way, “The world, in short, would have had every reason to bless his memory, if he had not 
carried one virtue to excess. But his sense of justice [feeling of right or Rechtsgefühl] turned him 
into a brigand and a murderer” (MK: 87).30 It is because of this excess in virtue that Kohlhaas 
becomes one of the “most upright [righteous] and at the same time one of the most terrifying 
men of his day” (“einer der rechtschaffensten zugleich und entsetzlichsten Menschen seiner 
Zeit”), two conflicting qualities that make him an “extraordinary man” (“außerordentliche[r] 
Mann.”) The picturesque, idyllic world of the village of Kohlhaasenbrürck as described in the 
                                                     
29 With a thesis that has bearing on the logic of the spellbound will in Michael Kohlhaas, Jean-Pierre Vernant in 
Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece (with Pierre Vidal-Naquet, trans. Janet LLoyd, NY: Zone Books, 1990) argues 
that what sociologically constitutes the form of Greek tragedy is the consciousness of a conflict between two 
elements in the Greek city state: legality and heroic, mythical tradition: “The tragic turning point thus occurs 
when a gap develops at the heart of the social experience. It is wide enough for the oppositions between legal 
and political thought on the one hand and the mythical and heroic traditions on the other to stand out quite 
clearly. Yet it is narrow enough for the conflict in values still to be a painful one and for the clash to continue to 
take place” (27). Corresponding to these two elements are the two aspects of the tragic action according to 
Vernant, ēthos and daimōn, or heroic character, temperament on the one hand and on the other the presence of a 
religious power: “Each action appears to be in keeping with the logic of a particular character or ēthos even at the 
very moment when it is revealed to be the manifestation of a power from the beyond, or a daimōn” (37). 
30 The entire paragraph in the original runs thus: “An den Ufern der Havel lebte, um die Mitte des sechzehnten 
Jahrhunderts, ein Roßhändler, Namens Michael Kohlhaas, Sohn eines Schulmeisters, einer der rechtschaffensten 
zugleich und entsetzlichsten Menschen seiner Zeit. Dieser außerordentliche Mann würde, bis in sein dreißigstes 
Jahr für das Muster eines guten Staatsbürgers haben gelten können. Er besaß in einem Dorfe, das noch von ihm 
den Namen führt, einen Meierhof, auf welchem er sich durch Gewerbe ruhig ernährte; die Kinder, die ihm sein 
Weib schenkte, erzog er, in der Furcht Gottes, zur Arbeitsamkeit und Treue; nicht Einer war unter seinen 
Nachbarn, der sich nicht seiner Wohltätigkeit, oder seiner Gerechtigkeit erfreut hätte; kurz, die Welt würde sein 
Andenken haben segnen müssen, wenn er in einer Tugend nicht ausgeschweift hätte. Das Rechtgefühl aber 
machte ihn zum Räuber und Mörder” (9).  
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opening paragraph, an ethical world in need of righteousness and virtue to sustain itself,31 did 
not benefit from Kohlhaas’s virtue. On the contrary, through being excessively upright or 
righteous, by obsessively stressing his sense of right (Rechtsgefühl), Kohlhaas bought himself 
both infamy and death at the same time that he brought about the collapse of the ethical world 
itself.  
Regarding the significance of the gypsy episode, Földényi writes that it is “a keyhole in the 
text to which is precisely that key missing that could open the lock and solve the riddle.”32 
However, with this Földényi leaves the elliptic structure of the novella unresolved, in the sense 
that he does not reconcile its two centers. Michael Kohlhaas’s formal structure remains for him 
a testimony to, as he quotes, “die gebrechtliche Einrichtung der Welt” (“the fragile 
arrangement of the world”). In the same vein, “the ‘world’ altogether as erected in Kohlhaas 
through ‘text’ can no longer appear as a meaningful whole conceived of teleologically, but as 
a tangle of contingencies, non-transparencies, and paradoxes.”33 Such a reading proves 
problematic for it does not give any account of the relation between the contingency and 
necessity, or accident and the Sachlichkeit, in the construction of the story as a literary work. 
The necessity derived from the logic of Kohlhaas’s legal case, manifested in the first two parts 
of the story, must be reconciled in some way with the “tangle of contingencies” of the third 
                                                     
31 The recurrent word in Michael Kohlhaas, Rechtschaffen (upright or righteous), characterizes the mode of the 
individual character in the pre-modern, pre-bourgeois world of ethical life or Sittlichkeit, according to Hegel. Being 
virtuous and upright mediates the relation between the individuals and the community by fulfilling the duties that 
are self-evident and universally known among the members of the community. In this world, there is no gap yet 
between private rights and general virtues of interpersonal relations such as honesty, compassion, helpfulness, 
trustfulness. Hegel defines the relation between the ethical, virtue, and uprightness in this way, “Das Sittliche, 
insofern es sich an dem individuellen durch die Natur bestimmten Charakter als solchem reflektiert, ist die Tugend, 
die, insofern sie nichts zeigt als die einfache Angemessenheit des Individuums an die Pflichten der Verhältnisse, 
denen es angehört, Rechtschaffenheit ist” ‘The ethical, in so far as it is reflected in the naturally determined character 
of the individual as such, is virtue, and in so far as virtue represents nothing more than the simple adequacy of the 
individual to the duties of the circumstances to which it belongs, it is rectitude’ (PR: § 150, 193). 
32 Földényi, Heinrich von Kleist, 530. 
33 Alex Schmitt, “Kommentar” to Michael Kohlhaas (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2013), 179. 
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part of the novella.34 If there is a keyhole in the novella, as Földényi maintains, then what if 
the key is in fact to be found in the novella itself, in, as I will propose, the roebuck motive? 
The answer is nowhere to be found but in the formal structure of the work. In the following 
section, I read the roebuck scene as a structure that encircles the novella itself. The last part 
of the novella is Kleist’s reaction to the circle of spell in which Michael Kohlhaas would have 
been caught were it merely a legal case history.  
 
§ 4 MICHAEL KOHLHAAS'S SOLUTION: THE WITTENBERG ARGUMENT 
In this section, which bears the main burden of this chapter’s argument, I will take two 
correlative steps. First I unpack the function of the minor prophecy relative to the novella and 
its antinomy. Then I turn to the Luther scene and read it as a crucial device both for 
understanding the function of the roebuck motive and for unpacking the novella’s resolution 
to the antinomy. 
Through the Jüterbog incident in the last part of Michael Kohlhaas, a counterpart to the 
Sachlichkeit of the first part of the work appears. Through the Jüterbog incident, Kohlhaas 
invokes an agency that he had lost in the second part of the story, where the main actors 
controlling the matters of Kohlhaas’s Sache were the authorities of Saxony and Brandenburg. 
At this point, Kohlhaas finally becomes a self-determining subject.35 At this point, Kohlhaas 
                                                     
34 Various attempts have been made in the literature on Michael Kohlhaas to grant a function to the gypsy woman 
figure, reconciling her with the rest of the work. Hamacher notes that since these attempts tend to rely on more 
or less contingent choices of supporting legal, moral, and philosophical theories, the results become no more 
unifiable than the theories themselves are. Michael Kohlhaas, 257. For some interpretive suggestions, see Timothy 
J. Mehigan, “Michael Kohlhaas: Death and the Contract,” in Heinrich von Kleist: Writing after Kant (Camden House, 
2011), 166; Klaus Müller-Salget, Heinrich von Kleist (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2002), 206; Jochen Schmidt, Heinrich von 
Kleist. Studien zu seiner Poetischen Verfahrensweise (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974), 188, 190; David, Giuriato, “‘Wolf 
der Wüste.’ Michael Kohlhaas und die Rettung des Lebens,” Ausnahmezustand der Literatur. Neue Lektüren zu Heinrich 
von Kleist, ed. Nicolas Pethes (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2011. 293); Peter Horn, Heinrich von Kleists Erzählungen: Eine 
Einführung (Königstein: Scriptor, 1978), 71–72. 
35 See Müller-Salget, “Kommentar,” 721. 
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wills again. He decides not to give the gypsy’s piece of paper to the Elector and it is this act of 
defiance that likely grants him his freedom. The agency of Kohlhaas in this third part of the 
novella starkly runs counter to the failed agency of the first part, one that through violence 
ended up in the labyrinth of court politics. The difference between the two parts of the novella 
indicates two modes of the relationship between the character and fate, or between the will 
and the context in which the will is realized, or between the act and its consequences. But what 
are the consequences of the third part for the novella itself, in terms of the fate of the 
autonomous artwork itself? In this third part, the main issue, if not the main outcome, is not 
related to the horses. The novella ceases to be governed by a legal case history. Following its 
initial sachlich determination, the novella now starts to self-determine itself. This development 
in the novel is due to the incorporation of the Jüterbog incident and the figure of the gypsy 
woman. 
Let us review the core act in the roebuck scene. If, faced with the gypsy’s prophecy about 
the roebuck, the sovereign does not kill the animal, it will seem like he believes in the gypsy’s 
prognostication. This would undermine his initial rational claim, namely his disbelief in the 
business of fortune telling. However, by killing the animal to affirm his rational principles, he 
ends up entangled in the very context of spell cast by the gypsy from which he sought to 
distance himself. A similar predicament besets Michael Kohlhaas with its double determination: 
through its legal subject matter, Kohlhaas’s Sache, contrasted with its own fantastic self-
determination or anti-Sache: the prophetic final part. To use the roebuck scene as an analogy, 
in reacting to its predicament, the novella takes a path radically different from the Elector’s: 
instead of killing the roebuck, that is, instead of carrying out the pursuit of its protagonist’s 
Sache to its end by fully satisfying the juridical order of things, the novella introduces another 
center, the Jüterbog prophecy, to diverge from the Sachlichkeit of the fields of legality, 
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philosophy, historiography.36  
If the novella stops being sachlich, that is, if it stops objectively following its matter at hand, 
then it ceases to be autonomous as an artwork, as it would not be able to follow its own 
lawfulness. The source of lawfulness in the novella is the lawsuit regarding the two horses, and 
it is this case that dictates a certain ‘law’ to the movement of the novella. On the other hand, 
if the novella remains strictly sachlich throughout, that is, following only the movement of its 
legal case, it will lose its status as literary work for it would end up being a mere fact, either as 
a legal document, a juridical treatise, or as a chronicle report.37  
It will be helpful to spell out the claim here through Adorno’s formulation from the Aesthetic 
Theory on the early twentieth-century movement of the New Objectivity already discussed in 
chapter one. He writes, “Totally objectified [versachlicht], by virtue of its rigorous legality, the 
artwork becomes a mere fact [Faktum] and is annulled as art. The alternative that opens up in 
this crisis is: Either to leave art behind or to transform its very concept” (AT: 61/ ÄT: 98). 
By a “totally objectified” artwork Adorno means one whose relations among the elements 
are so fully developed that there is no room for anything indeterminate in the work. This work 
is fully versachlicht inasmuch as all its elements are organized according to, and subsumed under, 
a central concept as the source that determines the place of each element for the sake of 
purposiveness. I noted above how the Sachlichkeit works in Kleist’s prose style in Michael 
Kohlhaas. In this case, the Sache is the notion of right attached to the pair of two horses as 
                                                     
36 Dirk Grathoff makes a similar point with regard to the legal theories discussed by the participants. His helpful 
point on the novella runs: “Kleist does not simply offer a position similar to Garve's [or any other moral or legal 
philosophers of his time], but makes his own contribution, even though no philosophy, to a philosophical context 
of discussion. Why did he change the field? Initially, he wanted to write a popular philosophy. What remains to 
find out is why Kleist is in a position to offer his contribution [to the question or right and morality] in in the 
field of the aesthetic.” Kleist-Jahrbuch 1988/1989, 434. 
37 For a summary of main trends in legal, philosophical, historical, and literary readings of the novella, see Bernd 
Hamacher, "Schrift, Recht und Moral. Kontroversen um Kleists Erzählen anhand der neueren Forschung zu 
'Michael Kohlhaas,'" in Heinrich von Kleist. Neue Wege der Forschung, ed. Anton Knittel and Inka Kording (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003). 
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property, and the wrong done unto this property. When Adorno states that such a work 
becomes a fact, he must refer to the work becoming a case of existing social context of 
purposes and functions in which it gets caught. Elsewhere, Adorno speaks of Zweckformen 
(functional or purposive forms) to refer to totally objectified works whose sachlich quality 
serves particular purposes imposed on them from outside.38 Thus, a computer is a functional 
form, so too is a house in that its elements are all held together in such a way as to serve the 
purpose of sheltering people. This contradicts the purposelessness of the artwork (cf. ÄT: 
323). Introducing the gypsy figure into Michael Kohlhaas liberates the novella from its 
functionality as a text, the elements of which are subsumable under legal norms. Were the 
novella a pure case of Sachlichkeit, following only and to the end the “pure legality” inherent in 
the process of a Rechtssache (MK: 102/23), it would have ceased to be literary. I consider this 
claim more closely.  
In juridical or forensic narrative, what is at issue, namely the conflict that is brought to the 
judge, must be stated as it happened, that is, account must be given of what was done, how it 
was done, why it was done, and whether it was legal or illegal. The last question purports to 
subsume the precisely established deed under a notion of right or wrong that already exists in 
a well-defined manner. If, however, a literary work can be subsumed under a preexisting 
universal rule, concept, or norm, as the principle of organizing its parts and rendering 
meaningful the result, it ceases to enjoy an aesthetic quality as a work of literature. The work 
is aesthetic or poetic inasmuch as it freely determines itself in freedom from the things narrated 
and their lawfulness. While the poetic narrative must also follow its case at issue, it has no 
external point of reference, no well-defined norms, under which to subsume its rigorously laid 
down case. It has only itself to appeal to. And because there is no such ultimate determining 
                                                     
38 See esp. ÄT: 55, 73, 76, 92, 210, 272.   
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point of reference, the law according to which the literary work organizes its elements must 
be one invented by the work itself. It is for this reason that the literary “act belongs to the 
family of reflective judgments.”39 
The act of reflecting in the narrative on the things narrated can make the system or 
institution of literature into its own object. The literary narrative can and must be cautious, if 
it is to be autonomous and avoid following the inherited, accustomed rules and practices of 
self-organization, relying instead on its own ever-new initiatives to define what literature is. 
This is how I suggest we should read the last part of Adorno’s formulation of the predicament 
of the Sachlichkeit: “The alternative that opens up in this crisis is: Either to leave art behind or 
to transform its very concept.” The work can forget all about being an artwork and can choose 
to deliberately serve only functions beyond the sphere of art. Michael Kohlhaas could have been 
intended to be a purely pedagogical, reformist, didactic text for school children, for the 
Prussian statesmen in the post-imperial period after 1806, or for judges and legal scholars.40 
The other option would be to change the very concept of art so that non-art is rendered a 
                                                     
39 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 2, trans. Kathleen McLaughin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984), 61. The singular property of poetic narrative, notes Ricoeur, is its inner distinction between 
the utterance [énonciacion] and the statement [énoncé], or between the saying and what is being said, the narrative 
and its production: “For this reason, the narrative ‘grasping together’ carries with it capacity for distancing itself 
from its own production and in this way dividing itself in two.” This distancing is possible only if the utterance 
or poetic narrative is capable of configuring itself according to a rule not imposed by the statement. Ricoeur’s 
partial goal is to investigate in terms of temporality the “several versions of this interplay” between the narrative 
and the things narrated.  
A similar point can be made with regard to the aesthetic appearance or act. An appearance which we call aesthetic 
is not perceived to be bound by anything other than itself, neither interests or purposes, be they moral or prudent, 
nor inclinations or desires, no matter how pleasant they are. In Schiller's definition of beauty, as the object of the 
aesthetic, self-determination of the thing is the great idea ‘große Idee’ which we should bear in mind. For him, 
“Freedom in the appearance is therefore nothing other than the self-determination in a thing in so far as it reveals 
itself in intuition.” Theoretische Werke ed. Rolf-Peter Janz (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2008), 288. This means, a 
thing appears to us aesthetically, as beautiful, only when we intuit it as something that has no other ground, no 
other cause, than itself. The account that we set about giving of such a thing, therefore, cannot rely on anything 
that is not always already related to the thing itself, emerging from inside of it. Therefore, for Schiller, “beautiful, 
one could say, is a form that does not demand any explanation [keine Erklärung]” (290). 
40 Studies have been devoted to Kleist's reformist aspirations in Prussia, e.g., Christiane Schreiber Christiane, Was 
Sind dies für Zeiten! Heinrich von Kleist und die Preussischen Reformen (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 1991). See esp. 172–
177 on Michael Kohlhaas and the military techniques of resistance. 
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purely objectified product. This situates us at the heart of the matter in interpreting our novella. 
Is Michael Kohlhaas proposing its own concept of art in order to be sachlich but not non-art, or is 
it trying to be an autonomous literary work but not within the confines of the existing system 
of art or the inherited concepts of art? 41 
Michael Kohlhaas indeed drops its central subject matter, or deviates from it, and takes up a 
new one, the prophecies of the gypsy woman, which, as Tieck reminds us, does not solve the 
problem entirely; rather, it produces another. By appealing to an anti-sachlich quality, the novella 
stops being a case of legality; instead it begins being a literary work proper, and thus within 
the field or context of literature. Revolting against all other spheres or fields of practice only 
to claim one’s belonging to the allegedly autonomous field of literature does not put an end to 
the problem, because literature is itself yet another social field or a social system, as discussed 
in the first chapter of this dissertation. Now if the novella is to become an autonomous work, 
it must find a way to reconcile its sachlich, legal center with its poetic, “imaginary,” anti-sachlich 
center in a manner that is equally lawful or sachlich. It must think up a higher notion of autonomy 
than is found in the mere positive legality of a lawsuit. In short, the novella has to be both 
sachlich and anti-sachlich. An antinomy thus arises in Michael Kohlhaas, which we can formulate 
in this way: 
 
THESIS: It is sachlich because it strictly follows its central Sache, the lawsuit by which 
it has its lawfulness fully dictated to it. Since the lawfulness of a legal case differs from 
                                                     
41 Greiner makes an important case for the idea that the novella is not just concerned with legality and right. 
Apart from the particulars of his argument, what is important in his reading is his insistence on the immanent, 
formally constructed attempt of the novella to be autonomous in the sphere of art. Greiner argues, “The story 
[of Michael Kohlhaas] clearly is not a juridical treatise about the tension between the universality of law and the 
facticity, or on the right to resistance. or on the question of the manifestation of the idea of ‘right’ in the concrete 
act of legislation. Rather, a story is offered that answers the fundamental question of the 'Kunstperiode [art 
period: from the late eighteenth century to the death of Goethe in 1832] based on the possibility of bridging 
between the empirical reality and idea in the medium of art through the reversal of the Kantian achievement of 
the symbolization of the beautiful.’” Kleists Dramen und Erzählungen, 340.  
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that of literature, the work ceases to be autonomous as a work of literature and 
becomes a case of the social practice of law.  
 
ANTITHESIS: It is anti-sachlich because it stops strictly following its central Sache by 
introducing a fantastic center. It becomes a work of literature, but, since it fails to 
justify itself in inclusion of its fantastic center, it has its lawfulness dictated to it by the 
habits of the existing world of literature. The work thus ceases to be autonomous. 
 
The real trial of the novella is to reach the delicate balance between a wholly lawfully 
determined work as encouraged by its subject matter, the lawsuit, and a subjectively organized 
body of elements in which the relation between the lawsuit and the prophecy remains 
indeterminate. Sketched abstractly, the novella has an antinomian constitution as follows: it is 
determined in a sachlich way, yet this Sachlichkeit puts it at risk of losing its determination as an 
autonomous literary work. It negates this sachliche determination through self-determining itself 
as a product of phantasy. By negating the sachlich determination, however, the novella runs the 
risk of losing its autonomous status for it would lose its source of immanent lawfulness, its 
Sachlichkeit. To resolve this antinomy, it needs to retain a form of lawfulness that is neither 
sachlich nor customarily literary. In my view, it is the Luther episode, in tandem with the 
structure of the roebuck prophecy, that can offer a means with which to begin to answer the 
question: How does the novella self-determine itself?  
The middle focus of the novella serving as its turning point provides the framework for 
the novella to cultivate its two centers in relation to one another, holding them together. In 
other words, it functions as a bridge to elevate the novella from one order of discourse to the 
other, mediating the settlement between the conflicting juridical and prophetic and real and 
fantastic orders of the story. Luther is the only historical figure in the story who appears under 
his real name and title. His letter to Kohlhaas in the story relies on the historical Luther’s letter 
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to the historical Hans Kohlhase, as does the very fact of the encounter.42 Their conversation 
contains the most comprehensive attempt on the part of Kohlhaas to justify his act, as well as 
the fullest form of objection on the part of his enraged interlocutor. The severe difficulty that 
plagues the interpretations of the Luther scene pertains to the poetic relevance relation of the 
historical figure.43 But how does this historical figure enter the novella with its tentative claim 
to autonomy? To answer, and to grasp the place of the Luther scene in the novella I limit 
myself to three points. 
First, what Kohlhaas demands of Luther is, “refut[e] your opinion of me that I am an unjust 
man” (translation modified; 125: 52). His plea for reconciliation with the figure of Luther 
consists of a double request with both theoretical and practical sides, or rather, in more 
relevant terms, with theological and political aspects. Theologically, Kohlhaas demands that 
Luther not regard him as unjust and damned, which follows from his argumentation with 
Luther to “refute his opinion” and his desire to receive the Holy Sacrament through 
confession. Politically, he wants safe conduct so that he can reach Dresden and lay his case 
before the sovereign. Though the latter demand is satisfied, he is denied his former request. 
At the end of the scene, Kohlhaas asks, “And so, your Reverence, I cannot have the comfort 
of the reconciliation I asked you for?” to which Luther retorts in unequivocal terms, “With 
your Savior, no; with the sovereign––that depends on the effort I promised to make for you” 
(MK: 128).44 The reason why the religious reconciliation failed in this scene is Kohlhaas’s 
persistence in his Sache. He refuses to accept Luther’s call, based on the biblical command, to 
                                                     
42 Cf. Hammacher, Henirich von Kleist: Michael Kohlhaas, 72–74. 
43 For further discussion of this difficulty, see Osthövener’s illuminating essay, “’Die Kraft beschwichtigender 
Worte.’ Luther, Kohlhaas und Kleist,” in Risiko, Experiment, Selbstentwurf: Kleists Radikale Poetik, ed. Hans Richard 
Brittnacher and Irmela von der Lu ̈he (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2013), esp. 113.  
44 This conforms to the historical Luther’s notion of two kingdoms and their separate orders of lawfulness. Martin 
Luther, “The Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed,” in Martin Luther: Selections from His 
Writings, ed. John Dillenberger (New York: Anchor Books, 1962). See esp. 371–372.  
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forgive the Junker, go back to Tronkenburg, and fatten his pair of horses by himself. He argues 
in the same theological register that “even the lord did not forgive all his enemies” (MK: 
128/56).  
Second, the issue of authority, with which Kohlhaas yearns to reconcile, his autonomous 
pursuit of his right notwithstanding, also presents itself in the context of his debate with 
Luther. This issue of authority is implied as a theme in their conversation. Kohlhaas’s 
argument for why he does not want to drop his matter is straightforward. Earlier in the story 
he says to his wife, “Because, dearest Lisbeth, I will not go on living in a country where they 
won’t protect me in my rights. I’d rather be a dog, if people are going to kick me, than a man 
[human being]” (MK: 107/31). If he is supposed to run his trade, he goes on, he needs to 
enjoy his rights, and to enjoy rights he needs to have the freedom to demand them (MK: 
107/32). Rights here signify the space of individual freedom to pursue one’s own way of living 
as a human being. This argument is incomplete, however, as it does not add anything to the 
question of how that protection works. Kohlhaas takes the next step necessary to complete 
his argument, and thereby grant coherence and force to his Sache, in his conversation with 
Luther. When asked why he had recourse to use his sword on the Junker and others “on the 
authority of your own decree” (“in Verfolg eigenmächtiger Rechtsschlüsse,” or more literally, 
“following your self-empowered deduction of rights”; MK: 111/35), he replies, “The war I 
am waging against the community of human beings [Gemeinheit der Menschen] is a misdeed only 
as long as I have not been cast out of it, as you now assure me I have not been” (translations 
modified; MK: 125/53). Luther’s prompt and infuriated answer followed by Kohlhaas’s 
riposte runs thus: 
Cast out? . . . How could anyone cast you out of the community of the state in which 
you live? Where, indeed, as long as states have existed has there ever been a case of 
anybody, no matter who, being cast out of society?––“I call that man an outcast,” 
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Kohlhaas said, clenching his fist, “who is denied the protection of the laws! For I need 
this protection if my peaceful calling is to prosper . . . , and whoever denies me it 
thrusts me out among the beasts of the wilderness. (ibid.) 
 
Luther and Kohlhaas employ two different expressions to speak of the same notion—namely, 
society: die Gemeinheit der Menschen (the community of human beings) and die Gemeinschaft des 
Staates (the community of the state). They do not correct each other, nor do they engage in 
any semantic dispute over the two sets of terms. Even so, it is important to stress the 
terminological and no less political divergence in their discourses.45 For Luther all human 
beings are always already within the community that is structured by the state in such a manner 
that being outcast from society has no meaning to him. Authority continuously claims its 
validity. For Kohlhaas, once the lawful protection of the rights, and thereby freedom, of 
human beings disappears, he or she will return to the sphere of animal necessity where crime 
has no meaning because there is no freedom to act in a rightful or wrongful manner. Kohlhaas 
here seems to be reminding the poetic Luther of the historical Luther’s own views, namely, 
that without laws we “would loose the bands and chains of the wild and savage beasts.”46 In 
both views, the key point falls on the constitutive power of the authorial framework that goes 
beyond the individual claim to autonomy. According to Osthhövener, in Kleist’s novella, the 
figure of Luther “is depicted as an in itself clear figure, without any explicit or implicate 
                                                     
45 The 1794 laws of the Prussian states makes explicit the relation between the validity of rights and the protection 
by the law: “Rechte, welche durch die Gesetze nicht unterschützt werden, heissen unvollkommen, und begründen 
keine gerichtliche Klage oder Einrede” (“Rights which are not upheld by laws are called incomplete and ground 
no judicial complaint or petition”) (Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischer Staaten von 1794, §86). In a useful note 
on the relation between right and the juridical system of laws, Bogdal maintains, “In the natural-rights ideas of 
the eighteenth century, having ‘right’ does not belong to the natural rights, but rather is the nature of human 
being thought within the juristic ideology. The human being becomes subject only as the subject of right” (“Mit 
einem Blick” 37). Also, Kohlhaas’s shifting emphasis from rights and freedom, in the Lisbeth scene, to laws and 
society, in the Luther scene, indicates a shift from civil process to penal process: “In civil process it is always 
about my right, in penal process about the law.” Clemens Lugowski, Wirklichkeit und Dichtung (Frankfurt a M.: 
Moritz Diesterweg, 1936), 193.  
46 Luther, “The Secular Authority,” 370. 
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criticism, the only figure in the text, next to Lisbeth, which stands for an unfalsified rectitude 
and for a piety directed towards everyday life.” 47 In other words, Luther emerges as a positive 
figure confirming the force of authority in the novella.  
Luther does not endow Kohlhaas with the full assurance or reconciliation he sought, but 
only a safe pass through Dresden. Just as in the first part, when blocking the legal path by the 
judicial intervention led to Kohlhaas’s insurrection, here also blocking the extralegal, violent 
path in the wake of Luther’s intervention paves the way for the narration of the Jüterbog 
incident. This is how the Luther scene facilitates the novella’s progression. It is remarkable 
how the authorial mediation turns Kohlhaas into a passive subject during the second part of 
the novella. It is only with the rise of the gypsy woman and the whole Jüterbog incident that 
Kohlhaas once again becomes an active subject.    
Third, what does the Luther scene do for Michael Kohlhaas? It liberates the novella from its 
entanglement, both in Kohlhaas’s purely legal engagement and in terms of the extralegal revolt. 
In this way, the novella creates for itself a path for generating its other, fantastic center in order 
both to solve Kohlhaas’s case and to claim its own autonomy. Of course, as noted before, 
opening up the fantastic, imaginary, literary space runs the risk of subjecting the work to the 
rules –– or rather the authority –– of the world of literature. Here I resort to the device of 
analogy to account for the relevance of the Luther scene for the last point. Through the 
historical figure of Martin Luther and by showing the necessity of the concept of theological 
and political authority, the novella, according to my interpretation, alludes to its own real 
conditions as a work of literature that wants its own lawfulness. By virtue of this scene, the 
problem of Michael Kohlhaas’s autonomy becomes the problem of Michael Kohlhaas’s 
autonomy: a reckoning with the historical forces of authority that coerce the individual as soon 
                                                     
47 Osthövener, “‘Die Kraft beschwichtigender Worte,’” 129. 
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as it asserts itself as autonomous.  
In Michael Kohlhaas we witness the work’s transition from a case of other social fields, namely 
legality or historiography, to a case of the field of literature, or simply, the work of literature. 
Through poeticizing its sachlich quality, the novella leaves heteronomous fields to which it 
initially belonged, but falls into the field of literature.48 It is thanks to its belonging to this field 
that the novella possesses any chance of granting itself its own lawfulness, and it nonetheless 
must concretely enact this lawfulness in its configuration of elements. This operation, 
however, involves running two major risks. Out of fear of losing its own lawfulness, the 
novella might abandon the heteronomous social fields to the extent that it will become a case 
of art for art’s sake by organizing its elements according to a purely formal, even mathematical, 
principle. On the other hand, again out of a similar fear, the work might resort to the ready-
made, inherited, fashionable devices of the literary world to claim its membership in that 
world. In this sense, one might argue that Michael Kohlhaas introduces the gypsy woman episode 
as a means of imitating the Romantic demands of his times. To avoid these two risks and to 
become an autonomous literary work in relation to the real sociohistorical practices, fields, 
and discourses, Michael Kohlhaas must revolt at two levels. It thus performs two negations.  
First, it negates the content of its own Sache, the matter of right, by showing that justice 
cannot be achieved through formal right. There seems to be an agreement among 
commentators of various stripes that the gypsy figure appears because, as Hotho, Hegel’s 
disciple, put it, “the universality and objectivity [Sachlichkeit] of the formal right” cannot gratify 
the grievances done to Kohlhaas’s self-absorbed, retreated subjectivity (37–38).49 Second, the 
                                                     
48 On the peculiarity of the social system of art in contrast to other systems such as religion, law, science, see e.g. 
Niklas Luhmann, Art as a Social System, trans. Eva M. Knodt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). See esp. 
306. 
49 Cf. Müller-Salget, Heinrich von Kleist, 207, 208. 
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novella has to negate the contingent, arbitrary, or forced inclusion of its fantastic part and 
show that such an inclusion grew out of an inner necessity. It is this second way of negating 
that would help the work self-determine itself. Yet, the novella cannot fully carry through with 
any of these negations, because it is both bound to its subject matter as its organizing idea and 
to its status as a work of literature. Each of the thetic and antithetical determinations of the 
novella confronts it with a problem: while both are equally necessary for it to be a literary 
work, at the same time that they come into conflict with one another. To change the concept 
of art itself, as Adorno suggests the sachlich work could do in order to solve its crisis, Michael 
Kohlhaas would have to change the way an artwork is recognized as an artwork. It has no other 
means to do so but its own way of configuring the immanent elements, which would have it 
entangled in the same vicious circle mentioned above. As a whole, Michael Kohlhaas proves its 
autonomy at the same time that—again as a whole—it points to its entanglement in society as 
the context of functions and purposes. This is the persistent antinomy of the autonomous 
Michael Kohlhaas. Even so, as I showed above, the novella shows full awareness of its own 
antinomy by the mediation of the gypsy woman’s minor prophecy. The structure of the 
roebuck prophecy suggests that the will that self-determines is forced to be ensnared in the 
broad context of the realization of the will. The roebuck prophecy mirrors the act of the 
novella as such. At the level of the novella as a whole, Michael Kohlhaas performs this structure 
of the spellbound will. 
So far as Michael Kohlhaas the protagonist is concerned, a form of reconciliation takes 
place in the last paragraphs of the story after all, even though it costs him his life. In Berlin, in 
front of the Elector of Brandenburg, a double retribution (Genugtuung) occurs and the two 
sides of the conflict receive their just dues: Kohlhaas receives his horses, apparently in hale 
and hearty condition, and the two states injured by Kohlhaas’s violence, as well as the Empire 
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itself, receive the dead body of Kohlhaas.50 Kohlhaas is given Holy Communion by a Lutheran 
priest; the Junker is sentenced to two years’ imprisonment (MK: 181/120); the Elector of 
Saxony never puts his hands on the piece of paper that Kohlhaas devours right before his 
death (MK: 182/121); and Kohlhaas’s children are blessed by the Elector who promises them 
a future at his court. It would be wrong, however, if we interpret this as Michael Kohlhaas’s 
resolution. As a literary work, the novella cannot preach the unity of the citizen and the 
enlightened sovereign before it has first preached the unity of its own conflicting forces.  
The novella’s solution to its antinomian constitution does not fully reconcile its conflicting 
determining forces, the juridical and the prophetic, but it manages to arbitrate or settle them.51 
As Adorno puts it in his lectures on aesthetics, the criterion for “important works of art” is 
the extent to which a work can “receive and absorb in itself the contradictions of its own real 
and formal conditions, to endure [austragen] the contradictoriness, and, by perhaps arbitrating 
[schlichten] it in its image, refer both to its own irreconciblity in the reality and finally its 
potentiality for reconciliation [versöhnen]” (Ä58: 165).52 In Michael Kohlhaas, the real condition 
of being a work of literature is nothing but being recognizable as a work belonging to the 
world of literature. In conflict with this condition comes the formal condition of self-
determining itself as a literary work that claims its own lawfulness in the face of the external 
pressure. No matter how hard it tries, the work of literature cannot stop being one by passing 
                                                     
50 In the Elector’s address to him: “Kohlhaas the horse dealer, now that satisfaction has been given you in this 
wise, you on your side prepare to satisfy His Majesty the Emperor, whose attorney stands right here, for breach 
of the public peace!” (MK: 182/121). 
51 Müller-Salget complains in a programmatic essay on the Kleist scholarship that while refering to “the equivocal, 
the paradoxical, contradiction [which] permeates Kleits’s works, is quite common in the scholarship, attempts 
have nonetheless been made to supersede this polysemy [Mehrdeutigkeit], harmonizing the contradictions and 
‘redeeming’ the unequivocality.” Klaus Müller-Salget, “Das Prinzip der Doppeldeutigkeit in Kleists 
Erzählungen,” in Kleists Aktualita ̈t: Neue Aufsätze und Essays 1966–1978, ed. Walter Müller-Seidel (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981), 74. 
52 This distinction between versöhnen and schlichten in the 1958/59 lectures on aesthetics, so far as I could tell, 
ceases to hold in the late 1960s Aesthetic Theory in which, however, Adorno still believes that the artwork is capable 
of enduring its own conflicts between its form and its real conditions of genesis, as I argued in chapter one.   
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itself off as something more than it. I conclude this chapter with a note on the meaning of the 
novella’s reaction to its problem from an Adornian perspective. 
 
“Kleist” appears only once in Adorno’s Ästhetische Theorie, in a passage from the section on 
“society” (“Gesellschaft”), as a noun made out of the adjective form of his name: das Kleistische 
(“the Kleistian quality”— Hellut-Kentor’s translation). Kleist’s name is brought up within a 
discussion of the literary form and society in the works of Kafka, “The thesis that form is the 
locus of social content [Gehalt] can be concretely shown in Kafka’s language. Its objectivity 
[Sachlichkeit], its Kleistian quality has often been remarked upon . . .” (AT: 230/ÄT: 343).53 
Adorno does not develop his notion of the Kleistian quality of Sachlichkeit any further than 
pointing to the objective, matter-of-factual presentation (“so sober a presentation”). Rather, 
he claims that while it is a defining feature of his language, something becomes obvious in 
Kafka that was not yet the case in Kleist himself. So, his thesis on the form is a historical thesis 
on the fate of the Kleistian Sachlichkeit or factualness, whatever it meant to Adorno, over the 
course of a century. He goes on, “His [Kafka’s] language is the instrument of that 
configuration of positivism and myth that has only now become obvious socially.”54 
If we treat positivism as synonymous here with an objective or sachlich language that, 
beyond the meddling of feelings and interests, only follows what is the case or the matter 
(Sache), as in the language of natural sciences or jurisprudence, what remains vague in Adorno’s 
statement is the concept of myth and, as he goes on to indicate, “social spell”: “The linguistic 
                                                     
53 “Daß Form der Ort des gesellschaftlichen Gehaltes sei, ist bei Kafka zu konkretisieren an der Sprache. Auf 
deren Sachlichkeit, das Kleistische ist häufig aufmerksam gemacht worden.” Elsewhere, Adorno refers to the 
Kleistian quality of Kafla’s prose as epic-objective prose (“episch-gegenständliche Prosa”). Mahler: eine musikalische 
Physiognomik. GS 13: 185.  
54 “Seine Sprache ist das Organon jener Konfiguration von Positivismus und Mythos, die gesellschaftlich jetzt 
erst ganz durchschaubar wird.” 
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habitus of ‘the world is as it is’ is the medium through which the social spell [gesellschaftliche 
Bann] becomes [aesthetic] appearance.”55 Further in the passage he refers to myth or spell as 
the presupposition and confirmation, in consciousness, of “the inevitability and 
immutableness of what exists –– as the heritage of the ancient spell –– the new form of the 
myth of the ever-same.”56 The language recounting the factually impossible yet fatefully 
accepted condition of the spellbound Gregor Samsa in Kafka’s Die Verwandlung (Metamorphosis) 
offers an example.57   
Bann or spell, according to the Grimm Brothers’ dictionary, is a circle or domain within 
which the master of the spell (bannherr), a judge, sovereign, exercises his or her power or 
judgment.58 It constitutes a field of jurisdiction where the law has validity and all caught in it 
are subject to that law. As a recurrent term in Adorno’s work,59 if spell is a kind of closure, 
                                                     
55 “Der sprachliche Habitus des So-und-nicht-anders-Seins ist das Medium, kraft dessen der gesellschaftliche 
Bann Erscheinung wird.”  
56 “die Unausweichlichkeit und Unabänderlichkeit des Seienden . . . als Erbe des alten Banns die neue Gestalt des 
Mythos des Immergleichen.” 
57 A case in point would be the opening lines of Die Verwandlung, where the matter at hand is a Gregor Samsa 
just turned into a huge vermin: “Er lag auf seinem panzerartig harten Rücken und sah, wenn er den Kopf ein 
wenig hob, seinen gewölbten, braunen, von bogenförmigen Versteifungen geteilten Bauch, auf dessen Höhe sich 
die Bettdecke, zum gänzlichen Niedergleiten bereit, kaum noch erhalten konnte. Seine vielen, im Vergleich zu 
seinem sonstigen Umfang kläglich dünnen Beine flimmerten ihm hilflos vor den Augen.” “Verwandlung,” in 
Sämtliche Erzählungen. Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer: 1953, 64. These words come only after the narrator makes it clear 
that Samsa had woken up from his uneasy dreams, so this cannot but be real world. The emphsasis on the 
proportions in Samsa's new body only stresses the sobriety of an observation that borders on positivistic language 
of modern biology. 
58 See Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, s.v. “Bann,” accessed September 4, 2018, http://dwb.uni-
trier.de/de/die-digitale-version/online-version/. 
59 If we can refer to anything like Adorno's vocabulary, then Bannkreis would be one of its key terms. In Minima 
Moralia, Adorno speaks of aesthetic circle of spell (“ästhetische Bannkreis”) (GS 4: 254), in “Auf die Frage: Was ist 
Deutsch,” he writes, “the idealist philosophy and works of art tolerate nothing that does not fall within the 
imperative circle of spell of their identity” (GS 10.2: 695). In “Standord des Erzählers im Zeitgenössischen 
Roman” he speaks of the circle of spell of form ‘Bannkreis der Form’ (GS 11: 44). “The circle of spell of culture 
industry” appears in “Über das gegenwärtige Verhältnis von Philosophie und Musik” (GS 18: 149). Also, in 
“Reflexionen zur Klassentheorie,” he refers to (“the circle of spell of system” (“Bannkreis des Systems” (GS 8: 
376), and in a review of Paul Valéry's newly translated writings on aesthetics and art in German, “Valérys 
Abweichungen,” he refers to the “Bannkreis der Gesellschaft” (“the circle of spell of society”) (GS 11: 196). In 
Dialektik der Aufklärung the term refers to the sphere of the dominion of myth as well as the sphere of mere 
naturalness (GS 3: 43, 49, 87, 287), again in Minima Moralia it refers to the sphere of sinfulness with its mechanism 
of deed, guilt, punishment (GS 4: 17) as well as the circle of existence (283). In Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie 
the sphere of immanence is a circle of spell in which the subject is caught (GS 5: 32, 97; cf. also Negative Dialektik, 
GS 6: 174, 185, 240). 
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unfreedom, for those falling within it, as in the tale of the prince, enchanted into the shape of 
a frog awaiting his princess to break the spell, how can it then enjoy an aesthetic appearance, 
which by definition is free, that is, not tied up to senses or purposes and interests? A spell 
socially signifies a situation in which the social context with the individuals and relations within 
it exert a spellbinding, coercive effect. How is aesthetic appearance, as in an artwork, possible 
within the unfreedom caused by a spell? In the case of Kafka, and as regards Adorno’s thesis, 
how can his work, caught in the circle of its subject matter, that is, the world as it is, acquire a 
literary character, becoming something more than a positivistic report of its case? For if it fails 
to do so, it ceases to be a work of literature. 
According to Adorno, Kafka’s solution for this problem—that is, seeking freedom through 
a technique –– we call it Sachlichkeit –– that seems to negate it, is the following: “Whereas his 
work must renounce any claim to transcending myth, it makes the social web of delusion 
knowable in myth through the how, through language” (AT: 231/ÄT: 343).60 Myth or spell or 
the web of delusion –– metaphorical terms Adorno uses to refer to the immediately 
unrepresentable social coercion –– cannot be transcended because forms of expressions are 
already caught within it. Kafka’s work is itself a part of the social field of literature. No vantage 
point can be assigned to any set of meanings, expressions, formulations. Yet, Adorno claims, 
Kafka’s work asserts its freedom of aesthetic appearance by its peculiar way of using language. 
The claim, then, is that although Kafka’s work cannot go beyond the spell or break it, it 
nevertheless can make it knowable, showing its own belonging to the spell as a form of myth. 
So, the above formulation points to a certain double character about Kafka’s work: it is a part 
of the mythical context, yet it is capable of showing how the context works.  
                                                     
60 “Während sein Werk den Mythos zu transzendieren sich versagen muß, macht es in ihm den 
Verblendungszusammenhang der Gesellschaft kenntlich durch das Wie, die Sprache.” 
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If Kafka’s linguistic form tells us the how of the coercion of the social spell, this form 
remains mute since there is no positive meaning to spell it out or signify it through a higher 
system of signification or through a meta-language, as it were: “Kafka wisely guards against 
naming it [the myth or social spell], as if otherwise the spell would be broken whose 
insurmountable omnipresence defines the arena of Kafka’s work and which, as its a priori, 
cannot become thematic” (AT: 230).61 The spell is not given the name of monopole capitalism 
or totalitarian state of a prison or modern European society. The very fact of Kafka’s work, 
as I understand Adorno’s thesis, is to testify to the presence of the spell binding the genesis 
of his work. What Adorno says of Kafka’s work’s language and its Kleistian quality equally 
emerges in Kleist’s novella in the nascent bourgeois society’s context of fragmented spheres, 
though not yet in the language of the novella. By introducing the gypsy woman figure and the 
suspended roebuck scene in its last part, Michael Kohlhaas administers its own problem and, to 
use Adorno’s language, shows the how of its status in its precise configuration of subject matter 
and mode of presentation.  
 
 
                                                     
61 “Ihn zu nennen hütet Kafka sich weislich, als würde sonst der Bann gebrochen, dessen unüberwindliche 
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The destiny of individuals, declares Hegel when discussing the idea of the state deep into his 
Philosophy of Right, “is to lead a universal life” (PR: § 258, 276).1 This life promises freedom as 
“self-determining action in accordance with laws and principles based on thought and hence 
universal” for all individuals. Everyone, not just those of a certain status as in Roman society, 
must be able to participate in this life. On this basis, all forms of slavery must disappear if such 
a life is to be a reality and the unconditional right of all. Bestimmung, Hegel’s term for “destiny,” 
means determination and constitution, so that the destiny of having a universal life to lead 
should not indicate a blind force alien to the way the individual is constituted. Rather, not only 
is it essential to the determination of the individual, to its aptitude for being autonomous, it is 
also in the interest of the individual to participate in the realization of this destiny.2 
Hegel’s system of right sets itself the task of demonstrating, firstly, that the universal life is 
destined for the human individual in virtue of its capacity to grasp itself as a free, self-
                                                     
1 “[D]ie Bestimmung der Individuen ist, ein allgemeines Leben zu führen.” The additions to the paragraphs by 
Hegel’s students and by Hegel himself are marked by A and R, respectively, after the paragraph number. For 
certain passages, the original German appears in the footnote. Unless otherwise noted, translations from other 
works by Hegel, especially his lectures, and works by his interpreters, are mine. 
2 See Hegel, “Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1827–1831),” in Political Writings, ed. Laurence Dickey and 
H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 215. For a thorough account of the history of this 
term, see Laura Anna Macor, Die Bestimmung des Menschen (1748–1800): Eine Begriffsgeschichte (Stuttgart: Frommann-
Holzboog, 2013). 
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determining subject, and, secondly, that the historical moment for the full realization of this 
destiny for all human beings had come. His project thus includes and aims to unify systematic 
and historical ambitions. On this premise, I discern three formal transformations or 
realizations that Hegel invokes in his Philosophy of Right to fulfil the conditions for universal life 
in modern bourgeois society: (1) of the human subject into the person; (2) of the activity for 
satisfying needs into free labor; (3) of the people or the community of human beings into the 
state. If the individual is to lead a universal life, then he or she must become a person by having 
a productive profession and living in a state.3 
These realizations generate conditions of freedom by liberating the person from the crudity 
of blind impulses, the activity from uncompensated exploitation of one’s entire capacity by 
others in slavery, as well as from being concerned only with satisfying one’s own needs, and 
the community from the yoke of cruel customary laws. Hegel writes, “For form in its most 
concrete significance is reason as conceptual cognition, and content is reason as the substantial 
essence of both ethical and natural actuality” (PR: Preface, 22). Thus, in each case, that which 
is alien to the matter at hand is set aside and the concept of the matter––humanity, activity, 
community––comes into itself by regaining its consistency.4  
                                                     
3 It is only in the case of the people or nation becoming the state that Hegel uses the expression “formal 
realization” (“formelle Realizierung”), and he takes it to be the realization of the Idea in general (“Idee 
überhaupt”): “If the nation, as ethical substance––and this is what it is in itself––does not have this form, it lacks 
the objectivity of possessing a universal and universally valid existence.” (PR: § 349, 375). For our purpose in this 
chapter, I take the Idea to signify freedom in general in the sphere of objective spirit without venturing into any 
discussion of the absolute spirit. For Hegel’s notion of the Idea in the Philosophy of Right, see PR, Preface, 20–22. 
For an illuminating recent account on the relation between the idea and the realization of freedom in Hegel, see 
Christian Schmidt, “Autonomie und Freiheit. Politische Aspekte des Selbstbewußtseins bei Hegel.” Hegel-Studien 
47 (2013): 75–92.  
4 Three main sources of Hegel’s philosophy of right can also be located in these three formal realizations: the 
natural-right theories of the person (Rousseau and Kant), the political-economy theories of the labor (Smith and 
Ricardo), and the classical politics of ethical state (Plato and Aristotle). The unrivaled originality of Hegel’s 
thought, as some of his later interpreters noted, lies in his productive effort to reconcile all traditions into his 
system of right in the modern society. See Manfred Riedel, Between Tradition and Revolution: the Hegelian 
Transformation of Political Philosophy, trans. Walter Wright (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 107–
108. 
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By detecting a set of antinomies and examining Hegel’s solutions to them in his Philosophy 
of Right, I take up in this chapter Hegel’s claim to substantiate the unity of systematic and 
historical dimensions of the rise of personality as the primary shape of human freedom and 
the fundamental unit of the universal life. My argument is that the formal structure of the 
person as a self-related ‘I’ in separation from any physical, psychological, and social condition 
comes into conflict with the conditions for the possibility of such an unconditional self-
relation. These conditions, according to Hegel, are the relations of free or hired labor in 
bourgeois society. Because of the predominantly economic––thus self-interest-centered ––
organization of bourgeois society, the persons cannot resolve the conflict between their 
independence as free subjects and their dependence on the entire context of political-
economic relations in bourgeois society. This problem particularly arises when it comes to the 
phenomenon of the rabble or the urban poor as a class without property, labor, and rights. 
Labor formally educates the individual into the person, but it does not secure the personality 
of all individuals. The conflict turns into an antinomy for the person insofar as it is required 
by Hegel both to be an autonomous ‘I’ and to acknowledge its dependence on all others. 
The person for Hegel is at once “the supreme and the wholly ordinary” (translation 
modified; PR: § 35A, 68). Supreme because it elevates itself above everything, every condition, 
in order to declare, “I am myself.” Wholly ordinary because, just like any other living being, it 
has a body embedded in a time and place, entangled in a specific context. The person thus 
“contains this unity of the infinite and the utterly finite, of the determinate boundary and the 
completely unbounded.” This contradiction, notes Hegel in a lecture, “may be borne or 
endured, but not resolved, by me, the harmony, the identity, of the two is only present in the 
rational” (GW 26, 3: 1113–14). This means that from the standpoint of the person the 
contradiction remains.  
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 Hegel’s solution to this conflict is his theory of the state as a universal ethical sphere. In 
order for the state to serve as a resolution by securing the universality of the ethical life of 
many persons, it must be separated from and superior to the bourgeois society’s particular 
needs and ends. The problem that I have found in Hegel’s system comes into focus here, and 
my contribution to the study of Hegel’s philosophy of right is limited to showing where we 
should seek its solution. My argument is that the state as the resolution to the antinomy of the 
person in Hegel––itself the formal realization of the free human individual––is entangled in 
its own antinomy between its autonomy from the bourgeois society and its intertwinement 
with the realm of historical facticity. As Hegel proceeds to claim in the last section of the 
Philosophy of Right (§§ 341–360, 372-380), the state, which was held to be separate from 
empirical reality, becomes at once a product of the world history’s realm of contingencies and 
inter-state relations. Even though Hegel fails to offer a way out of the conflicts of universal 
life for modern individuals, his very failure paves the way for a real resolution. Here I draw on 
the Left-Hegelian and Marxist interpretations of Hegel on the one hand and, on the other, the 
Hegel readings of some of the representatives of the post-War German practical philosophy, 
and propose to think of the universal life of the persons not merely within the boundaries of 
the state, as Hegel seems to suggest, but beyond it and into the turmoil of world history as a 
realm in which only states, not persons, are supposed to participate  
The four parts of the chapter proceed as follows. I first show that Hegel’s concept of the 
person of right emerges as a resolution to the antinomy, identified by Hegel himself, that the 
concept of the human being involves in the historical transition from the Roman world to the 
modern bourgeois society. Further, I examine the structure of free will in a systematic way. 
These two steps are to justify Hegel’s regard of the person as the primary real form that free 
will takes (§ 1). The person, in its own right, will encounter an antinomy on account of the 
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conflict between its formal structure as an unconditionally free, independent ‘I’ (§ 2) and the 
genesis of this structure in the bourgeois relations of hired labor (§ 3). I finally examine Hegel’s 
theory of the state as his solution to the problematic of the person and show why the state 
also proceeds in an antinomian manner. The chapter concludes with reflections on Hegel’s 
speculative resolution to the antinomy, its difficulties, and the prospect of a real, that is, 
political resolution: the participating of persons in history to make possible the universal life 
beyond the mediation of the state (§ 4).  
 
§ 1 THE HUMAN ANTINOMY AND ITS PERSONAL RESOLUTION 
The sixth-century Justinian’s Institutes, an essential part of the body of Roman law known as 
Corpus Juris Civilis, submits that “the main classification in the law of persons is this: all men 
are either free or slaves,” where “They are either born slaves or enslaved afterwards.” Yet, 
“under the law of nature all men were born free,” and the law of nature “is the law instilled by 
nature to all creatures.” The author is well aware that by making a man the property of another, 
“slavery is contrary to the law of nature.”5 Alan Watson claims, “This is the only instance in 
Roman law in which a rule of the law of nations . . . is said to be contrary to nature. No 
important practical consequences flow from the conflict––an indication of the lack of interest 
in, and unimportance of, an ideal law for the Romans.”6 This shows that one could abstractly 
hold onto the freedom of all and concretely, that is in society, believe in the freedom of some. 
We have an abstract notion of freedom here for it is absolved from the real commitments that 
this notion carries with it. Right is the concept with which Hegel recapitulates those 
                                                     
5 Justinian, Justinian's Institutes. ed. Peter Birks and Grant McLeod (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), J.1.2, 
1.3, 1.5, 1.2, 1.3.2. 
6 Alan Watson, Roman Slave Law (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 7. 
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commitments, because right is the realm of “actualized freedom.” Right is the commitment to 
conceiving of a free human being also as actually free, that is, as a person with rights. Slaves 
could be manumitted and thus become free persons under certain conditions. But this means 
that freedom in Roman society was a status granted to people conditionally (status libertatis), 
and since the status of being free was the precondition for assuming citizenship of Roman 
state (status civitatis), not all human beings enjoyed being persons of rights.7 
Doing away with any condition for translating the freedom of all into the personality of all 
constitutes Hegel’s point of departure in his system of right. In person at its most abstract, 
“every status and rank is still excluded, the person is still not to be further determinable” (GW 
26, 3: 1114).8 whereas in “Roman law even personality itself, as opposed to slavery, is merely 
an estate [Stand] or condition [Zustand] . . . , it regards a human being as a person only if he 
enjoys a certain status” (PR: § 40, 71). If there is to be no condition mediating the freedom of 
a human being and the personality of a human being as the bearer of rights, then Hegel must 
deduce the person out of the human being in such a manner that the following infinite 
judgment can be valid: All human beings are persons of rights. This states that a human being 
is free only when he or she is actually free and not merely free in spirit or in concept. Jean-
Jacque Rousseau’s famous statement in the opening chapters of his Social Contract shows a full 
awareness of the conflict that Roman law ignored, “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in 
                                                     
7 See Rudolph Sohm, Institutionen. Ein Lehrbuch der Geschichte und des Systems des Römischen Privatrechts 
(Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1901), 161–167. See also Manfred Riedel, Between Tradition and Revolution: the 
Hegelian Transformation of Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 115. 
8 “jeder Stand, Rang ist noch ausgeschlossen, er ist noch nicht weiter bestimmbar.”  
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chains.”9 Hegel would add that if man is everywhere in chains, then his having born free is an 
irrelevant abstraction. Man is concretely free only when conditions are in place where he is 
not everywhere in chains. If Rousseau’s statement presents us with an antinomy––man is free 
yet man is unfree––then Hegel’s resolution to it would regard the human being always-already 
as a person. The transition from human being to person, or rather, the equating of being 
human with personality, is a move that, I believe, responds to a philosophical and political 
difficulty in defining human freedom in western tradition.  
 
1.1 The Human Antinomy  
Hegel’s take on the concept of the generic human being in the modern world is occasioned, 
in a negative manner, by his way of refuting the different ways of justifying slavery. In one 
way, which includes the historical views on the right of slavery, the justifications “depend on 
regarding the human being simply as a natural being whose existence (of which the arbitrary will 
is also a part) is not in conformity with its concept” (PR: § 57, 87). This recalls the ancient, 
Aristotelian view that looks at the slave as muscle for work, reducing it to a purely natural 
mode of existence.10 The other way, that is, “the claim that slavery is absolutely contrary to 
right is firmly tied to the concept of the human being as spirit, as something free in itself, and is 
one-sided inasmuch as it regards the human being as by nature free, or (and this amounts to the 
                                                     
9 “L’homme eśt né libre, et par-tout il eśt dans les fers.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Œuvre Complètes III: Du Contrat 
social, Ecrits Politiques (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 351. In the first version of the book, Chapter III, Book I, the 
sentence appears with a minor difference: “L’homme eśt né libre, et cependant par-tout il eśt dans les fers” ‘The 
human being is born free, however everywhere he is in chains’ (289; emphasis added). A pedantic reading would 
take the elimination of the “however” in the last version to recall that the relation between natural freedom and 
social enslavement is much more immediate and established than one would imagine. Being born free is therefore 
no guarantee for living freely. The relation between the two parts of the sentence is conjunctive. I wonder if this 
means that Rousseau started accepting this situation of being in chains as normal.  
10 Aristotle’s discussion of natural slavery appears early in the Politics, Book I, II-III. See Nicholas D. Smith 
“Aristotle's Theory of Natural Slavery.” Phoenix 37, no. 2 (1983): 109–122. 
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same thing) takes the concept as such in its immediacy, not the Idea, as the truth.”11 The 
second view, though it possesses a concept of freedom of all, one could further stress the 
point, remains blind to the actual reality of slavery, and where it comes across slaves it regards 
them as essentially free persons whose bodies happen to be in chains. The two ways lead to 
what Hegel designates as an antinomy “which fixes upon and asserts the two moments of an 
Idea [i.e. the concept and its realization] in separation from each other” (PR: § 57, 87). It runs 
thus:  
THESIS: The human being exists as a natural, concept-less being. 
ANTITHESIS: The human being exists as a mere concept or a free spirit in itself.  
 
To resolve the antinomy, Hegel notes, we need to overcome the one-sidedness of both 
assertions by realizing that if there is to be any free spirit, it must give itself “an existence which 
is purely its own and free,” or rather freedom must actually exist (ibid.). To rephrase 
Rousseau’s above statement, Hegel would then maintain that “the human being everywhere is 
born in chains, and he or she becomes free only through overcoming those chains.” That is, 
                                                     
11 The idea for Hegel is the unity of the concept and its existence. We can have a concept of slavery, such as the 
total exploitation of a human being by another, but the idea of slavery is richer in that it incorporates the historical 
specific realization of the concept in, say, Roman or South-American society. In PR: § 1, 25, Hegel remarks:  
“Philosophy has to do with Ideas and therefore not with what are commonly described as mere concepts. 
On the contrary, it shows that the latter are one-sided and lacking in truth, and that it is the concept alone 
(not what is so often called by that name, but which is merely an abstract determination of the 
understanding) which has actuality, and in such a way that it gives actuality to itself.” 
 
And in the Addition to the section he goes on thus: 
“The concept and its existence are two aspects [of the same thing], separate and united, like soul and 
body. The body is the same life as the soul, and yet the two can be said to lie outside one another. A 
soul without a body would not be a living thing, and vice versa. Thus the existence of the concept is its 
body, just as the latter obeys the soul which produced it.” 
 
 The metaphor of soul-body is especially relevant to the Idea of human being in the main-text discussion for 
Hegel is arguing for their unity as the true side of freedom beyond their one-sided emphases. For Hegel’s early 
critique of the separation of the pure formal concept of right on the one hand and, on the other, its reality in the 
works of his contemporaries, see his 1892 review, “Gerstäckers Deduktion des Rechtsbegriffs.” Werke 2, 157–
163, see esp. 158.  
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not only must the human being be considered as free in itself, this freedom must be actual and 
real so that the human freedom can realize itself in society, or, as Pippin puts it, in “specific 
ethical institutions.”12 In slightly different terms, Charles Taylor writes: 
The subject is both identical with and opposed to his embodiment. This can be 
because the subject is not defined by Hegel in one dimension, as it were, as a being 
with certain properties, but in two. He has certain conditions of existence, those of 
embodiment, but at the same time the subject is characterized teleologically, as tending 
towards a certain perfection, that of reason and freedom. 13 
 
Taylor does not bring up the issue of personality in the context of this remark, but it is hard 
to conceive of such a doubly qualified subject, a citizen of two worlds, without regarding it at 
once as the person that has “the capacity for right” (PR: § 36, 69). Right is this very existence 
of freedom (see PR: § 29, 58). The person of right, therefore, arises as the resolution that Hegel 
offers to the human antinomy in which the human being can be considered both as a natural 
subject and as a free, spiritual one, or as both finite and infinite. A human subject that is free 
in its embodiment, infinite in its finitude, must endure this double character in virtue of what 
is external to it. The validity and consistency of the true concept of the human being is 
guaranteed through its determination by personality. In an original way, Hegel thus brings 
right to bear upon the idea of human being on the one hand and the concept of validity on 
the other.14 In this regard, the following passage from his lecture course on philosophy of right 
                                                     
12 Robert Pippin, “Hegel, Freedom, The Will: The Philosophy of Right: §§ 1-33,” in G. W. F Hegel: Grundlinien der 
Philosophie des Rechts, ed. Ludwig Siep (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 33. 
13 Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 21.  
14 For this point Hegel refers to Heineccius, Elementa iuris civilis (1728), where it states, “In law, man and person 
are quite distinct. A man is a being who possesses a human body and a mind endowed with reason; a person is a 
man regarded as having a certain status” (qtd in PR 405, ed. fn. 3 to § 40 ). Even though modern philosophers 
with their theories of natural right of all human beings must not have encountered much political problem with 
identifying the person with the human being, yet, philosophically, it was really only with Hegel that the person 
and the abstract human being became identical, at least as a possibility that could and should be realized. This is 
a thesis that Siep develops in his essay on the concept of the person in Locke, Kant, and Hegel, Praktische 
Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1992), esp. 82, 90, 98–99.  
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is highly illuminating:  
It is the education that makes us conceive of the individual as person, according to its 
universality. The immediate empirical intuition [perception] regards the others not as 
person. This occurs only through thought. The individuals now know themselves 
according to their personality. It is a great, important step that human beings have 
come to regard themselves through a great universal determination. . . . Because it is 
thus the particular will that thinks the universal, that wills the universal, right thereby 
sustains its existence. What is right in itself is thereby realized.––Insofar as collisions 
now emerge, right is to be provided and claimed, and that is administration of justice 
as such. Right then ought to / is supposed to come to its own / acquire validity. This 
knowledge of right’s being valid is in turn something determining that right holds valid. 
(Forward slashes in the original)15  
 
The existence of right, its actual validity for all human beings qua human beings, is 
correlated with the individual’s capacity of knowing itself as something universal, that is, as 
person. Right as resolution to the antinomy of human being mediates the unity of the 
individual’s natural existence and its free spirit. Moreover, right holds valid precisely because 
there is a will that knows itself as deserving of recognition and wants the universal. This is an 
essential move beyond the one-sided, abstract, merely in-itself concept of human being that 
led to the antinomy. Becoming a person through a valid, existing sphere of right shows that 
the human being becomes conscious of his or her substantial universality through something 
external, that is, as Hegel put it, through recognizing others as possessing such a substance as 
                                                     
15 “Die Bildung macht, daß das Individuum als Person aufgefaßt wird, nach seiner Allgemeinheit. Die 
unmittelbare empirische Anschauung betrachtet den andern nicht als Person. Dies geschieht erst durch das 
Danken. Die Individuen wissen sich jetzt nach ihrer Persönlichkeit. Es ist dies ein großer, wichtiger Schritt, daß 
die Menschen dahin kommen, sich in einer großen allgemeinen Bestimmung zu betrachten. . . . Indem also der 
besondere Wille es ist, der das Allgemeine denkt, das Allgemeine will, so erhält hiermit das Recht sein Dasein. 
Was Recht an sich ist, wird hiermit verwirklicht.––Insofern nun Kollisionen entstehen, so ist das Recht 
herzustellen und zu behaupten, und das ist die Rechtspflege überhaupt. Das Recht soll jetzt zum Gelten kommen, eine 
Macht happen als Wirklichkeit. Dieses Wissen vom Gelten des Rechts ist dann wieder ein Bestimmendes, daß es gilt.” Philosophie 
des Rechts: Die Vorlesung von 1819/20 in einer Nachschrift, ed. Dieter Henrich (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1983), 
169. 
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well. In the transition from the human being to the person, in the pedagogical making of the 
personality, the idea of the free yet embodied subject is not augmented by yet another 
qualification, namely being a person; what is thereby added to this idea is the entire context of 
real relations of freedom that Hegel calls right. The case here is analogous to the way that 
Hegel, following Kant, argued against the ontological proof of the existence of God from 
Anselm to Descartes, where existence is shown to be, not one among many properties of the 
concept, but the total context of the very reality of the concept.16 Personality, too, far from 
being an additional property, makes for the real shape that the free human being takes in which 
the latter’s two apparently contradictory aspects of freedom and embodiment find their unity. 
The person is the human being, as both natural and spiritual, sustaining its duality only in 
virtue of the reality of right. Hence the commandment of right: be a person, and regard others 
as persons (see PR: § 36, 69). This is a commandment to guarantee the awareness of an 
indebtedness, of a guilt, of a debt to be paid.17 
If personality is the first shape that free will takes in its existence, then the structure of the 
free will of the abstract ‘I’ can offer a key to that of the personality. The deduction and 
structure of the free will as the threshold to the world of the objective spirit in Hegel’s system 
will next be examined, and on that basis I will then proceed to examine the constitution of the 
person as the primary shape of free will.  
 
1.2 The Form and Content of Free Will  
                                                     
16 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol 3, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, (Berkley: University of California Press, 
1998), 351–359, “The Ontological Proof According to the Lectures of 1831.”  
17 For the significance of the structure of guilt in Hegel’s idea of right, see Britta Caspers, ‘Schuld’ im Kontext der 
Handlungslehre Hegels (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2012). 
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Free will, from a systematic perspective, emerges by overcoming a self-contradictory 
conception of freedom, that is, arbitrariness. The will must leave behind the sphere of drives 
and inclinations that characterizes a crude human being. The figure belongs to what Hegel 
calls the practical spirit as a moment of the subjective spirit.18 Spirit or mind here is practical 
because on the one hand it appears in the form of one individual subject that has existence for 
itself and is real, finding itself in its inner, determined nature as one living entity (EG: § 471). 
On the other, it is intent on fulfilling itself; because it has inclinations and passions, it goes out 
and sets about satisfying them (EG: § 469). Subject, for Hegel, is “the activity of satisfying the 
drives,” and drives are nothing “but the liveliness of the subject.”19 The main moments of the 
practical spirit are feeling, drives, happiness. 
The living subject, in virtue of finding itself in one unity that possesses drives, and which 
wills whatever it happens to will, is capable of being self-conscious, namely in the form of the 
certainty of “‘I’ = ‘I’” (PR: § 25, 55). This unity or identity constitutes the pure form of the 
subject for the subject is not concerned just yet with the content of what it wills. In this respect, 
the subject is certain of itself, but this certainty has little to do with truth precisely because it 
                                                     
18 A schematic glance at this figure from a systematic point of view helps grasp its function in Hegel’s philosophy 
of right. In the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), remarks on drives and active, driven subject appear 
in the following arrangement:  
First Part: The Science of Logic 
Second Part: The Philosophy of Nature 
Third Part: The Philosophy of Spirit,  
First Subdivision: The Subjective Spirit,  
C. Section: Psychology,  
b. The Practical Spirit,  
β. The Drives and the Arbitrariness. 
γ. Happiness 
   c. The Free Spirit  
 Second Subdivision: The Objective Spirit 
  A. Right 
  B. Morality 
  C. Ethical Life 
 Third Subdivision: The Absolute Spirit 
19 “Subjekt ist die Thätigkeit der Befriedigung der Triebe,” “Lebendigkeit des Subjekts” EG: § 475, 384–385. 
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is formal certainty, aside from any concern with the content of that certainty. Hegel’s pun on 
what is mine and my opinion (Mein, Meinung) refers to the formal, abstract nature of the identity 
of the living subject (GPR: § 25R, 76). 
The indifference of the content of drives is what Hegel calls arbitrariness (Willkür) or 
“contingency in the shape of the will” (PR: § 15, 48). It does not matter what I will as long as 
I will something. The subject does not yet ponder over the object of its will. This, however, 
does not make the will of the crude subject any less real. Even so, the free will as this 
arbitrariness, this indifference of the content of the will, is only futile because contradictory 
and not really free yet: the arbitrary will wants to realize itself but since it is caught in the 
particularity of its randomly emerging drives, always presenting the will with new contents, it 
only succeeds in realizing an infinite series of substitutes for the objects of its will (EG: § 
478).20 The subject is enslaved to its drives, that is, to the unknown, alien, unresolved, content 
of that at which it is driven (in PR: § 17A, 50, Hegel explicitly states that at this point the drives 
are primarily the contents of the will). The purely formal freedom of the crude human being 
is therefore self-defeating and in conflict with its own concept, freedom. The task before a 
philosophy of right is to find a way out of the vicious circle of arbitrariness. 
In Hegel’s system, the first step towards the real, that is, non-contradictory freedom is taken 
through the third moment of the practical spirit: happiness. What follows this moment is the 
“free spirit,” with which the transition to the objective spirit, that is, the realm of the Philosophy 
of Right, occurs. Happiness is a representation (Vorstellung) of a harmony between the 
multiplicity of one’s drives, the image of a universal satisfaction whereby the drives no longer 
stand in conflict with one another (EG: § 479). Happiness introduces the moment of 
                                                     
20 I cannot think of a better, more actual, example today than the phenomenon of infinitely scrolling down on 
the so-called social networks in pursue of yet another interesting post. The urge to view a post or click on a link 
is by design to be surpassed by another to view another post ad infinitum.  
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purposiveness to the pursuit of drives, denoting in this respect a more thoughtful relation to 
them. The contribution of the purpose to the business of satisfying one’s drives institutes the 
dimension of thinking in willing. The purpose or the subjective “life plan”21 signifies a step 
beyond the brute power of the naturalness of drives. Hegel writes, “The way of willing to 
make itself objective spirit is to elevate itself into a thinking willing––that is, to give itself the 
content that it can have solely as something capable of thinking” (EG: § 469; cf. § 482, PR: § 
19, 51). 
Happiness remains a private plan, however, and there is eventually no truly universal 
standard other than “tedious platitudes” for how to arrange and manage one’s drives so that 
one could reach a happy harmony between them (PR: § 17A, 50). The content of my will in a 
life plan is much more freely mine, thus more in accord with the concept of free will, than in 
the business of blind satisfaction of whatever drive presents itself to me; I have willed what to 
will, and determined by myself what sort of satisfaction to pursue. All the same, the unity of 
content and form in my will does not yet present itself in the subjective, sentimental concepts 
of happiness. Happiness still falls short of a complete self-determination of the will, that is, 
freedom for Hegel (EG: § 480).  
As the last, psychological, moment of the subjective spirit, happiness as life plan paves the 
way for the transition to the existing, objective spiritual world. The transition to such a world 
is now possible because the concept of the really free will has successfully been established 
and completed for Hegel: there is now a lively self-conscious subject capable of willing in a 
thoughtful manner. The concept of this intelligent will remains both abstract and formal, 
however. Abstract because severed from all other things and wills in such a way that the subject 
                                                     
21 “Lebensplan.” Ludwig Siep, “Leiblichkeit, Selbstgefühl und Personalität in Hegels Philosophie des Geistes,” 
In Hegels Theorie des subjektiven Geistes, ed. L. Eley (Stuttgart: Bad Cannstatt, 1990), 210. 
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is solely concerned with its own particular aspects, and formal because its relation to the 
content of its willing is not yet fully thoughtful.22 To mend these two shortcomings and to be 
able to realize itself, the subject needs to come to terms with its world. Hegel thus lays out the 
terms of the relation with the world that the freely willing subject finds before it and where it 
enters into  
an external objectivity that splits itself up into the anthropological aspect of particular 
needs, into the external things of nature which are for consciousness, and into the 
relationship of individual wills to individual wills, which are a self-consciousness of 
themselves in their diversity and particularity; this aspect makes up the external 
material for the existence of the will” (translation modified; EG: § 483).23  
 
This is an entirely new register in the development of the concept of the crude human 
being confronted now with other aspects of his or her project of freedom that go out beyond 
the private management of drives: needs, things, other wills. The language of drives hardly 
appears henceforth. It belonged to the abstract, set-off realm of the subjective sphere. Every 
and each moment of the life of the crude human being in the realm of the objective spirit is 
to be developed anew in relation to needs, things, and wills, which are the materials of the 
“existence of the will.” Would not such a world impose limitation on the will instead of 
granting existence to it? Hegel is well aware of the ambiguity, “Freedom, shaped into the 
actuality of a world, acquires the form of necessity, whose substantial interconnexion is the system 
of the determinations of freedom, and its apparent interconnexion is power, recognition, i.e. its 
                                                     
22 For a brief take on the word abstract in Hegel, as “abziehen [abstraho, – traxi, – traetus], wegziehen, [i.e.] to 
detach from the richness of determinations of thought,” see Herbert Schna ̈delbach, Hegels Praktische Philosophie: 
Ein Kommentar der Texte in der Reihenfolge ihrer Entstehung (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 202. 
23 “. . . sich eine äußerliche vorgefundene Objektivität bezieht, welche sich selbst spaltet in das Anthropologische 
der partikulären Bedürfnisse, in die äußerlichen Naturdinge, die für das Bewußtsein sind, und in das Verhältnis 
von einzelnen zu einzelnen Willen, welche ein Selbstbewußtsein ihrer als verschiedener und partikulärer sind; 
diese Seite macht das äußerliche Material für das Dasein des Willens aus.”  
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validity in consciousness” (EG: § 484).24 The form of appearance of freedom for the subject 
are the relations of power, laws, duties, and the urgency of mutual recognition between the 
subjects. When freedom steps into the real world and tries to overcome the contradictory 
nature of willfulness and arbitrary satisfaction of drives, it first takes the form of, one could 
say, unfreedom, limitation, frustrating coercion, for what are laws if not means of limiting 
one’s life plan? The dual aspect of freedom remains with the reader of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right throughout. Figuring out the Janus face of freedom, as Rosenzweig put it, in actual reality, 
that is, offering insight into the unity of the substance and the appearance of freedom, is the 
task of the book.25 
 As laid down in the famous formulations of PR: §§ 5–7 (37–42), free will possesses two 
main moments. First is the “freedom of a void,” that is, the willing ‘I’s capacity to sever itself 
from every limitation, from this or that content, refusing to settle for any choice and 
determination, thereby preserving a pure negative force. This moment Hegel calls universality 
or pure indeterminacy (PR: § 5, 37).26 It sets the original, empty scene of freedom, opening up 
the space of pure potentiality, yet retreating from filling that space with any specific object. 
Second, since the state of pure indeterminacy is unstable and void, and ultimately running 
counter to the will’s urge to fulfill itself in actuality, an act of differentiation, a sort of settlement 
in terms of content, is called for: the will posits something, it goes for such and such content 
to fill the void and to realize the indeterminate capacity of the ‘I.’ This is the moment of 
                                                     
24 “Die Freiheit, zur Wirklichkeit einer Welt gestaltet, erhält die Form von Notwendigkeit, deren substantieller 
Zusammenhang das System der Freiheits-Bestimmungen und der erscheinende Zusammenhang als die Macht, 
das Anerkanntsein. i.e. ihr Gelten im Bewußtsein ist.” 
25 Franz Rosenzweig, Hegel und der Staat, ed. Frank Lachmann, 1st ed. 1941 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2010), 
23–24. 
26 Such a pure indeterminacy, pure negativity, is a puzzling force. Even though Hegel takes the example of the 
Terror in the French Revolution as its exemplary manifestation, there is really no definite shape for it, no stage 
of its own, in Hegel’s thought, a point that Axel Honneth draws attention to: The I In We: Studies in the Theory of 
Recognition, trans. Joseph Ganahl, (London: Polity Press, 2012), 26. 
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determinacy (PR: § 6, 39). The will now emerges as a chooser, with its willing finding 
expression in particular objects to the point of losing itself in the world of things. If there is a 
shape for this second moment, then it must be the everyday life world of bourgeois consumers 
walking in warehouses and grocery shops. Finally, it comes for Hegel to the “unity of both 
these moments” that makes for the actual free will (PR: § 7, 41). 
The result of the coming-together of the two moments of universality and determinacy is 
a singular, individual will, a will is both “reflected into itself and thereby restored to 
universality.” In this unity, the will returns to itself through the content of what it wills instead 
of immersing itself in the alien world of random objects of choice. The individual is with him- 
or herself in the world of the others. It is only then truly free and not arbitrary and self-
defeating, when it has both the form of being reflected into itself as an abstracting, detaching, 
empty will, as well as a content that would not negate or limit or reverse the first moment. Such 
a content must be in agreement with the nature of the willing ‘I’ itself. Hegel’s conclusion runs 
thus: The will must will itself, not in the sense of refusing to step out of itself, but in the sense 
of finding itself in whatever the will encounters outside of it: “The will which is sure of itself 
does not therefore lose itself in what it determines” (PR: § 13A, 47). This is the structure of 
the free will in the real world. 
Why do we need such a concept as personality in the first place when we already see a 
similar dual structure in the formation of the self-conscious ‘I’? For Hegel the abstract ‘I’ has 
a structural affinity with the pure concept, that is, the concept of the concept in general. The 
affinity indicates that, as in the case of the formation of free will, so too there arise in the 
formation of an individual concept the two moments of universality and determinacy or 
particularity. The unity of the two moments gives singularity/individuality, according to 
Hegel’s Logic. Now, significantly enough, in the Logic Hegel names this third, final moment 
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personality––which made for a complete concept of freedom in PR: §§ 5–7 (37–42).27 This 
operation gives us a better sense of the relation as well as the difference between the concept 
of the personality and the figure of the person in the Philosophy of Right. If personality is already 
a well-determined term in virtue of its logically singular nature––as the concept that detaches 
itself from everything particular and yet determines itself in a particular way without thereby 
losing itself but becoming only real –– then why does it need to undergo yet another form of 
singularization, or become, in Hegel’s definition of the singular, a “determinate 
determinate’?”28 In my view, and in agreement with Quante, this marks the exact transition 
from, on the one hand, the final sections of the Subjective Spirit part of the system 
(corresponding roughly to Hegel’s introduction to the Philosophy of Right), offering us the 
concept of free will, as well as the doctrine of the concept in Logic, and, on the other, the 
Objective Spirit part of the system, corresponding to the philosophy of right.29  
                                                     
27 In The Science of Logic, Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), The Doctrine 
of Concept, Hegel remarks on the analogous structures of the concept as such and the self-conscious ‘I’ thus:  
“the ‘I’ is the pure concept itself, the concept that has come into determinate existence. It is fair to suppose, 
therefore, when we think of the fundamental determinations which constitute the nature of the ‘I,’ that 
we are referring to something familiar, that is, a commonplace of ordinary thinking. But the ‘I’ is in the 
first place purely self-referring unity, and is this not immediately but by abstracting from all 
determinateness and content and withdrawing into the freedom of unrestricted equality with itself. As 
such it is universality, a unity that is unity with itself only by virtue of its negative relating, which appears 
as abstraction, and because of it contains all determinateness within itself as dissolved. In the second place, 
the ‘I’ is just as immediately self-referring negativity, singularity [Einzelnheit], absolute determinateness that 
stands opposed to anything other and excludes it––individual personality. This absolute universality which 
is just as immediately absolute singularization . . . constitutes the nature of the ‘I’ and of the concept; neither 
the one nor the other can be comprehended unless these two just given moments are grasped at the 
same time, both in their abstraction and in their perfect unity” (514, 12.16–17). 
For the structural similarity of the concept and the free will, see Vittorio Hösle, “Das abstrake Recht,” in Anspruch 
und Leistung von Hegels Rechtsphilosophie, ed. Christoph Jermann (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1987), 5.  
28 Hegel, The Science of Logic, 546: 12.49.  
29 As for the problem of moving from the logical notion of personality to the real figure of the person, Quante 
writes:  
“Hegel combines two logical moments of the ego, abstract self-consciousness (universality) and 
singularity as ‘absolute determinacy,’ in the determination of ‘individual personality.’ In the context of 
abstract right, on the other hand, Hegel distinguishes these two moments in terms of personality and 
person, respectively. He thereby attempts to derive a speculative argument for the necessity of a spatio-
temporal, that is, corporeal individualization of the person, precisely from the abstractness of the 
conceptual moment of pure universality (personality) at the level of abstract right. . . . In the Philosophy of 
Right it is the will that is free in and for itself that possesses the structure of universality, particularity, 
and singularity.” 
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The actual point of departure in Hegel’s philosophy of right is therefore the figure of the 
person. This figure is the same as the generic human being but freed of the contradiction that 
the latter involved. So, the moments of freedom and embodiment return in any treatment of 
the person, but this time around in relation to the really existing context of relations, the 
specific ethical institutions, the system of right, which are external to the person. Any inquiry 
into the person of right is a concrete version of inquiry into the human being and its free will.  
 
§ 2 THE FORM OF THE PERSON: INFINITE SELF-RELATION  
The concept of personality and the figure of the person first appear in PR § 35 (67–69), in the 
opening part of the work, Abstract Right. The fundamental, grey-on-grey structure of the 
person being laid down there, the figure then reappears in more colorful or concrete shapes 
throughout the rest of the book.30 If not always visible, there exists a subtle difference between 
the personality as a concept and the person as a singular individual. Put simply, the person is 
the embodiment of the personality in a singular individual.31 
On the basis of the structure of free will, we are now in a better position to turn to that of 
the person. Becoming a person for Hegel is a possibility present in the subject in the sense of 
“any living thing whatever” (PR: §35A, 68). Personality is a capacity that the subject has to the 
extent that it is a living, moving, desiring entity. But it is not absolutely necessary for the subject 
to realize its personality, to become a person. Hegel would not deny that a cat in virtue of 
                                                     
Michael Quante, “The Personality of the Will” as the Principle of Abstract Right: An Analysis of §§34–40 of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in Terms of the Logical Structure of the Concept,” in Hegel on Ethics and Politics, trans. 
Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 87.  
30 Cf. Klaus Vieweg, Das Denken der Freiheit: Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Munich: Wilhelm 
Fink, 2012), 99. 
31 As Hegel writes in Logic, “Abstraction keeps singularity away from its products, and singularity is the principle 
of individuality and personality. And so it comes to nothing but lifeless universalities, void of spirit, color, and 
content.” The Science of Logic, 546, 12.49. 
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being a living animal may be said to enjoy such a capacity, yet its coming true is a different 
issue, and he would certainly deny it.  
For Hegel, “Personality begins only at that point where the subject has not merely a 
consciousness of itself in general as concrete and in some way determined, but a consciousness 
of itself as a completely abstract ‘I’ in which all concrete limitations are negated and 
invalidated” (PR: § 35, 68).32 Personality then forms itself by a dual consciousness. On the one 
hand, the person is aware of itself as one subject, that is, as a particular unity of parts that moves 
at the subject’s will. This accounts for the subject as the living being it already is. In virtue of 
this consciousness, “I know that I am something wholly determinate: I am of such an age, of 
such a height, in this room, and whatever other particular things I happen to be.” These 
particularities mostly refer to the subject’s body as an object caught up in space and time, 
having weight and skin color, so that it constitutes a “knowledge of the self as an object” (ibid.). 
Filling out the Personal Info section in the Visa application form exemplarily makes one aware 
of this aspect of being a person seeking to cross a nation-state’s border.33 
This knowledge of oneself as something with various contingent properties that stands out 
opposite and external (as an object or Gegenstand) to the subject does not remain at the level 
of mere self-representation. I am not one with, nor exhausted by, my weight, height, skin color, 
but, and this leads to the second consciousness of the personality, I am a “completely abstract 
‘I’” negating all concrete aspects. The self as object, according to Hegel, is “raised by thought 
                                                     
32 “Die Persönlichkeit fängt erst da an, insofern das Subjekt nicht bloß ein Selbstbewußtsein überhaupt von sich 
hat als konkretem, auf irgendeine Weise bestimmtem, sondern vielmehr ein Selbstbewußtsein von sich als 
vollkommen abstraktem Ich, in welchem alle konkrete Beschränktheit und Gültigkeit negiert und ungültig ist.” 
33 It is interesting to note that Hegel scolds Fichte for having concerned himself even with “passport regulations to 
the point of ‘constructing,’ as the expression ran, the requirement that the passports of suspect persons should 
carry not only their personal description but also their painted likeness.” Hegel makes this point to show why it 
is ridiculous for philosophy to “interfere in things” instead of dealing only with actuality of matters insofar as 
they relate to the Idea, that is, as long as they deal with what is essential in the actual (PR: Preface, 21). The 
modern developments, however, showed that Fichte’s preoccupations were not all too vain given the excessive 
operation of the states today in surveilling persons and non-persons.  
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to simple infinity and hence purely identical with itself.” This makes for the essential aspect of 
the capacity for personality and at once for its grave complexity. The subject does not simply 
find its many external features in a mirror, as it were, but, to extend the visual example, the 
subject is capable of looking at itself in the mirror realizing that it is that image or that mirror 
image is its own self, so it turns from its represented particularities away and back to an identity 
severed or abstracted from those particularities. As Hegel notes in a lecture a couple of years 
before, “I am dependent on all sides, but I am equally my own, I am thus infinite and universal 
in that I grasp myself as the I.”34 The transition from being a living subject to the standpoint 
of the person wholly rests on this elevation of the representation of one’s self in its external 
traits, on an act of self-identification, or, simply put, on the ability to utter the words “I am 
myself.” To doubly stress the significance of such a capacity, Hegel goes on declaring, “In so 
far as they have not yet arrived at this pure thought and knowledge of themselves, individuals 
and peoples do not yet have a personality.”35  
The representation posits the self as something external and looks at it through intuition, 
                                                     
34 “Ich bin nach allen Seiten abhängig, aber ebenso bin ich mein eigen, ich bin daher unendlich und allgemein, 
indem ich mich erfaße als Ich.” Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft: Heidelberg 1817/18 mit Nachtra ̈gen 
aus der Vorlesung 1818/19, ed. P. Wannenmann, and C. Becker (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1983), 15; cf. PR: §12, 
46. 
35 There exists an etymological as well as historical-practical relation between, emptiness, voice and “person” in 
the antiquity. Persōna means through-voice. It was originally a full-face mask with a pipe-like hole for the mouth 
through which the actor talked. According to An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, persona by Walter 
W. Skeat (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929), the “large-mouthed masks worn by the actors were so called from 
the resonance of the voice sounding through them. . . . per, through; sonare, to sound, from sonus, sound” (s.v. 
“Person,” 436). The same history holds true for the German word ‘Person.’ See Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und 
Wilhelm Grimm, s.v. “Person,” accessed Septermber 4, 2018, http://dwb.uni-trier.de/de/die-digitale-
version/online-version/. One could speculate, then, that the mask or persona would conceal all the particularities 
of the actor and reduce him or her to a voice impersonating a role indifferent to the constitution of the actor. (I 
owe the etymological idea of “sounding through” in “person” to Professor Richard A Macksey.) Boethius, relying 
on a similar etymology of the word, notes that “the hollow mask necessarily produces a larger sound.” Theological 
Tractates. The Consolation of Philosophy, ed. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester (Cambrige, MA: Harvad 
University Press, 1973), 84. We cannot rely too much on etymology, however. There are other theories about the 
origin of the word person (such as peri sona [around the body], per se una [one in or of itself]), and, as Adolf 
Trendelenburg argues, “In this wealth of doubtful and uncertain conjectures, we may see that the family 
relationship of persona has not been discovered.” Adolf Trendelenburg, “A Contribution to the History of the 
Word Person.” The Monist 20, no. 3 (July 1910): 336–363, 341. 
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it presents the self as a determinate thing to the self, helping the subject imagine itself as 
possessing such and such properties. 36 What this act of presentation fails to do on its own is 
to relate this self-as-object back to the self-as-self. This means, beyond the act of imagining 
oneself as being of such an age, such a height, and other specific characteristics or 
idiosyncrasies, the person needs to take yet another step and sever itself, its ‘I,’ from all these 
particularities, asserting itself as an empty, universal substance, and this is a step that 
representation, because of its entanglement in images and externality of intuitions, fails to carry 
through.37  
                                                     
36 The distinction between the dual consciousness of the person can also be worked out through the distinction 
between representation and thought. The identity of the self, the I=I, cannot be achieved through representation 
alone but through thought. Though the distinction is essential for Hegel, the mechanics that he offers of the 
working of representation may or may not strike one as compelling. Yet its outcome is highly fruitful for an 
understanding of the structure of personality. Systematically, intuition, representation, and thinking are the three 
moments of Theoretical Spirit in the Psychology subdivision of the section on Subjective Spirit. As Hegel outlines 
it, a step just before thinking, representation operates through three moments of recollection, imagination, and 
memory. Through intuiting, recollection offers a content just as it is given to the mind and posits it as mine in 
the form of an image. Then comes imagination into play fashioning the content in an active and subjective way, 
very much similar to what thinking does. Imagination reacts to “the intuited object thinkingly, by bringing out 
what is universal in it, and giving it determinations that pertain to the I” (EG: § 451). Hegel states that “the space 
and the time of intelligence are universal space and universal time. Consequently, in placing the content of feeling 
in the inwardness of intelligence and thereby making it a representation, I lift the content out of the particularity 
of space and time” (EG: § 452A). The outcome of this operation is a sign that captures the represented content 
in its universality. And finally, through memory the sign is again recollected, “taken up into the intelligence.”  
For a recent discussion of Hegel’s psychology in relation to the formation of the free will, see Dirk Stenderoth, 
“Practical Mind and Free Will: Hegel’s Gradual Development of Will,” in, Hegel's Philosophical Psychology, 
ed. Susanne Herrmann-Sinai (New York: Routledge, 2016), 156–162. What I would argue against in Stenderoth’s 
take, is his “gradual” notion of the transition form the lower to higher, freer manifestations of freedom. From 
both a deductive and genetic perspective, such graduation fails to account for the moment of pure indeterminacy, 
pure negativity, that is already at work in human subjectivity from its earlier stages. Graduality is meaningful only 
as in the sense of the process of conceptualizing the free will. 
37 To understand the difference and relation between these two aspects of the person, I suggest looking at 
Descartes’s operation in his Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes explicitly works with the distinction between 
an empty cogito, “I am a thinking thing,’ and the ideas or representation that occur or are contained in that thing. 
The fundamental certainty that Descartes establishes in his Mediations is that “I am something.” Through his 
methodical putting-into-question of all he knows, he concludes that there is one thing that is immune to doubt:  
“I will now shut my eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses. I will eliminate from my thoughts all images 
of bodily things, or rather, since this is hardly possible, I will regard all such images as vacuous, false and 
worthless. I will converse with myself and scrutinize myself more deeply; and in this way I will attempt to achieve, 
little by little, a more intimate knowledge of myself. I am a thing that doubts, affirms, denies, understands a few 
things, is ignorant of many things.” René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, with Selections from Objections and 
Replies, trans. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 24. 
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The individual not only finds him- or herself to be such and such a thing, to have such and 
such properties, but also knows those properties to belong to him- or herself as something 
that is more than the sum total of his or her external properties. The person can relate to his or 
her bodily determinations in such a manner as to enable him or her, as Hegel notes in a 
handwritten addition, to idealize those determinations (“Idealität der Bestimmungen,” GPR: 
§ 35R, 54). The bodily determinations are spatial-temporal, so idealizing them would amount 
to placing them in universal space and time (see EG: § 452A). If one aspect of the person’s 
consciousness presents the particularities existing in space and time, or its body, then the other 
aspect, the abstract empty ‘I,’ does equally exist. But where? Hegel does not subscribe to the 
Cartesian solution to the problem of the embodied ‘I.’ For him, the I Think is not a substance 
demonstrable in isolation from its thoughts and surrounding world which requires God to 
secure its relation to them.38  
                                                     
The I Think is the substance that persists through. By establishing the I Think, the work of a first philosophy is 
not done. Descartes is yet to establish the relation between the I and the external world. “The chief question at 
this point concerns the ideas which I take to be derived from things existing outside me: what is my reason for 
thinking that they resemble these things?” 26. The second step requires a different method than the first, namely 
the substantiation of the I. Descartes’s causal theory of ideas and his underlying argument for the existence of a 
God that is not a deceiver is to secure the success of the second step. 
38 In Hegel’s view, Descartes falls short of offer a real solution to the relation between the soul and the body. For 
one thing, soul and body are two separate substances, respectively of thought and extension, with no capacity for 
directly influencing one another. While both have essential relation to one another for they need one another, 
nevertheless, in virtue of each being a totality in itself, they do not have real relation. So, the middle thing that is 
to mediate and bind them together for Descartes is God. In Descartes, God is, in Hegel’s words, “the complete 
identity of both opposites [soul and body]; this is the unity of the Idea, that is, of the concept and the real.” 
Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3 (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 156. Now the problem for 
Hegel arises when we consider that this Cartesian God is a transcendent one that, as a third thing, mediates and 
renders possible ,the relation between the two things, thinking or soul and body, from outside (“außerhalb 
beider),” so that the unity is not created out of the two opposite terms themselves as concepts. To establish a 
relation between the two terms and the third, Descartes, as Hegel bids us not to forget, “says that those two first 
terms [soul and body] are created substances [erschaffene Substanzen]. This belongs to representation [Vorstellung]; 
creation is no thought [Gedanke]” (157). Creation is supposed to secure the internal relation of both substances 
to the third, mediating term in their unity. Since it is not a determinate concept, or at least Descartes fails to 
conceptualize it determinately, it fails to demonstrate the immanence of the third in the first two terms. Creation 
does not have the status and force of a concept, hence lacking the structure and movement of the concept. (Hegel 
then goes on claiming that it was Spinoza who managed to refer the function of the third term back to thought.) 
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So far as the infinity in the subject goes, I propose to understand it in this way: to the extent 
that the particular properties that the person encounters, in its body and in its surroundings, 
can be infinite in number (from limbs to cells to neurons to psychological traits), the act of 
separating oneself from them must have an infinite character. It is as if the person were saying: 
I am not one with my hand, not one with my face, not one with my heart, cells . . . and so on 
ad infinitum. This infinity should not be taken as a spatial or temporal progress without end, 
but as a capacity already fully present in the subject, otherwise not a single act of abstraction 
would be imaginable. For Hegel, the infinity activity of the subject is already at work when it 
says ‘I.’39 
On the double aspect of personality, the Addition to PR: § 35 (68–69) states: 
Personality is thus at the same time the supreme and the wholly ordinary [or low]; it 
contains this unity of the infinite and the utterly finite, of the determinate boundary 
and the completely unbounded. It is the supreme achievement of the person that it 
can bear this contradiction, which nothing in the natural realm contains or could 
endure (Translation modified).40 
 
                                                     
39 See EG § 96 A. Rinaldi offers a similar, quite expedient argument on the necessity of the presence of the 
infinity in the Hegelian subject through. In a bid to criticize the Fichtean theory of the activity of the I in relation 
to what resists this activity as the Non-I, Rinaldi writes:  
“For such an activity presupposes as a condition for its possibility a sensuously given or material thing-
in-itself, that, as such, is alien and transcendent to it. But, to the extent that as such a presupposition of 
the expression of the activity of the finite subject is unconditionally required, then it is immanent to its 
[subject] concept, is a condition of its consciousness (more precisely: a sensuous datum of external 
intuition), and at least in this respect identical with it, so that it ceases eo ipso to be alien and transcendent 
to it. The act of thinking, the I=I, the pure self-consciousness, which renders possible the unity of 
experience by organizing the heterogeneous manifold of its contents in an organic system of synthetic 
a priori knowledge, is therefore necessarily actually infinite.” 
Giacomo Rinaldi, “Hegel und das philosophische Verständnis der Person,” in Autonomie und Normativität: Zu 
Hegels Rechtsphilosophie, ed. Kurt Seelmann and Benno Zabel (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 22. 
40 “Die Person ist also in einem das Hohe und das ganz Niedrige; es liegt in ihr diese Einheit des Unendlichen 
und schlechthin Endliches, der bestimmten Grenze und des durchaus Grenzenlosen. Die Hoheit der Person ist 
es, welche diesen Widerspruch aushalten kann, den [in another version, W.,: der] nichts Natürliches in sich hat 
oder tragen könnte.” 
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The contradiction in the passage has two terms: high and low, infinite and finite, limited 
and unlimited, a concrete living being and an abstract I, a bundle of representations or images 
and a thinking substance. The fundamental characteristic of the person is that it can suffer 
through the state of being two contradictory things without collapsing under the contradiction. 
This requires a power, the power of a colossal spirit appearing insane to common sense for its 
bearer is at one stroke as weak as a stone because of its bodily properties, its biological and 
physiological uncertainties.41  
A simple, analytical notion of contradiction here would consist in conceiving of the infinite 
as the negation of the finite just as the prefix “in-” suggests. The finite is something that has 
boundaries, limits, is doomed to perish. It is what has an end. On the other hand, that which 
has no boundary and does not end would then be infinite. Such an analysis does not clarify 
much for us.42 While Hegel develops his notion of bad and true infinity in Logic, rather than 
draw on that, I would develop the distinction and the contradiction out of the present case 
itself in a manner not directly deployed by Hegel himself.43 
The above passage on the finite and the infinite presents us with a double path leading to 
the person. One path, the finite one, offers what should be called an additive principle to reach 
the level of the personality. According to this principle, the person would be made up of a 
series of particular determinations or corporeal, hence spatial-temporal, properties the 
aggregation of which will constitute the person. This path fails, however, for no matter how 
                                                     
41 See GW 26, 3: 1113.  
42 Rolf-Peter Horstmann argues against a merely contradictory view of the infinite, and for the possibility of what 
Hegel calls a true infinity, thus, “the possibility of grasping anything finite at all (the red there, the roundness 
here), presupposes the capacity for distinguishing it from any number of other things, or, as he [Hegel] puts it, 
from the infinite. But it also presupposes that the qualitative self-presence of something can only be grasped 
through a concept of finitude and infinitude that does not interpret them as mutually exclusive terms. If no such 
conception were available, we would merely be left with a contradictory concept of infinity.” R. P. Horstmann, 
“Substance, subject and infinity: A case study of the role of logic in Hegel’s system,” in Hegel: New Directions, ed. 
K. Deligiorgi (Acumen, 2006), 77; see also 78.  
43 Hegel, The Science of Logic, 111: 21.217; cf. the very brief take in PR: § 22, 53–54. 
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many parts we add up, from limbs down to, say, the millions of neurons––and we can do so 
ad infinitum––the aggregated outcome would fall short of constituting anything more than 
the generic body of a human being. Such a body may look like a human subject capable of 
referring to itself as ‘I,’ but being a person requires more than that. Now if we look closer, we 
realize that this additive principle may not even reach a human body at all. Starting with a part, 
there is no way for us to construct a whole if we do not have a consistent idea of the whole. 
And if we have such an idea, then we are actually starting with the parts but have already made 
up our mind as to what we will reach. The paradox here, in my view, is identical to the old 
Zenonian paradox of movement or distance, that is, traversing the additively infinite series of 
a given distance in a finite period of time. 44  
To pose the problem more concretely and provide an answer, I draw on Spinoza. In a 
famous letter on the concept of infinity to his friend, Lodowijk Meyer, to take an example 
Spinoza distinguishes between two ways of arriving at the definition of time and space. One 
is, in our preferred language here, an additive, the other a constructive way. He writes:  
If someone conceives Duration in this abstracted way and, confusing it with Time, 
begins dividing it into parts, he can never understand how an hour, for instance, can 
pass by. For in order that an hour should pass by, a half-hour must first pass by, and 
                                                     
44 I have borrowed the idea and the expression of additive principle, as opposed to constructive principle, from 
Walter Benjamin’s view of the distinction between historicism and materialist historiography, especially when it 
comes to the concept of a universal history. In the Thesis XVII of his On the Concept of History, he writes, 
“Universal history has no theoretical armature. Its method is additive; it musters a mass of data to full the 
homogeneous, empty time. Materialistic historiography, on the other hand, is based on a constructive principle.” 
Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: 
Schocken, 1969), 261. The additive principle here is easier to grasp than its alternative for Benjamin, which differs 
from any speculative notion of substantive totality as in Hegel and Spinoza. This much, however, can be teased 
out here that for Benjamin, historical time is not the sum total of isolated moments in the past to be filled with 
historical events in separation from the present. A notion of temporality presupposes the act of looking at the 
past events. This notion for Benjamin is of a messianic nature. Correlative with this notion is another that is 
helpful in understanding the constructive principle is monad. Instead of piling up the particular occurrences to 
form the identity of the historical subject, notes Benjamin, “A historical materialist approaches his subject only 
where he encounters it as a monad. In this structure he recognizes the sign for a Messianic cessation of happening, 
or, revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past” (262). The idea of a “monadic structure” in which 
all parts hang together in relation to a whole that is more than their sum total puts Benjamin in the vicinity of 
Hegel.   
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then half of the remainder, and the half of what is left; and if you go on thus subtracting 
half of the remainder to infinity, you can never reach the end of the hour.45 
 
The failure of this effort lies in our representation of the space or time or measure as 
composed of self-standing parts, just as we tend, representatively, to think of a line as 
composed of individual points. The same failure asserts itself in the additive, finite 
construction of the person based on dividing it into a series of parts supposedly to constitute 
the whole of the personality. To solve the contradiction of the additive principle, Spinoza 
suggests, “[C]ertain things are infinite by their own nature and cannot in any way be conceived 
as finite, while other things are infinite by virtue of the cause in which they inhere; and when 
the latter are conceived in abstraction, they can be divided into parts and be regarded as 
finite.”46 Without intending to get into the specifics of Spinoza’s metaphysics, what is of 
importance for our topic here is the assertion that not everything can be understood or 
thought through its division into its components or parts.47 
The logic of internal self-differentiation of the whole, instead of aggregation of the parts to 
reach the whole, is the fundamental method in Hegel’s thought through and through.48 This 
is especially the case in the third part of the Philosophy of Right. If in the first two parts, we have 
                                                     
45 Spinoza, The Letters, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1990), letter 12, 104. 
46 Spinoza, The Letters, 106. 
47 Famously, Hegel calls the above conception of the infinite bad or spurious infinity, that is, a mathematical 
infinity that relies on the substitution of one finite thing with another, or of adding one property to another. In 
agreement with the Spinozist position, Hegel writes in the Logic:  
“[T]he infinitude . . . is not the empty abstraction from the finite, is not a universality which is void of 
content and determination, but is the fulfilled universality, the concept which is determined and is truly in 
possession of its determinateness, namely, in that it differentiates itself internally and is the unity of its 
thus intelligible and determined differences. Only in this way does reason rise above the finite, the 
conditioned, the sensuous, or however one might define it, and is in this negativity essentially replete with 
content, for as unity it is the unity of determinate extremes. And so the rational is nothing but the syllogism. 
The Science of Logic, 589, 12.91. 
48 In an important remark to his account of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit,, Förster lays down in precise terms the 
two models of constructing the whole in Hegel: Eckart Förster, Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 2012), 315–318. 
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the moments of the abstract right and morality leading up to the third moment of the ethical 
life as the unity of the previous moments, then the path in the second part makes for a descent: 
it is the whole that divides itself into the moments of family, civil society and the state.49 The 
first two parts follow, then, we could say, an additive principle, whereas the last part follows a 
constructive or syllogistic one. Moreover, this logic shows the extent to which the Objective-
Spirit part of the system, the realm of the actualized freedom in right, rests on foundations 
that are not laid down in the Philosophy of Right itself but which appear in the Absolute-Spirit 
section of the system in order for the syllogism to work. 50  
To elucidate this point further, I reproduce here an illuminating schema that Hegel drew 







Figure 2 51 
The identity side corresponds to the act of positing an autonomous, self-related form, while 
the nonidentity side represents the counter-position, namely, that which resists that act and 
                                                     
49 For a similar view on the abstract-concrete-abstract movement of the PR, see Henning Ottman, “Hegelsche 
Logic und Rechtsphilosophie. Unzulängliche Bemerkungen zu einem ungelösten Problem,” in: Hegels Philosophie 
des Rechts: Die Theorie der Rechtsformen und Ihre Logik, ed. Dieter Henrich and Rolf-Peter Horstmann (Stuttgart: 
Klett-Cotta, 1982), 385. 
50 See Dieter Henrich, “Logical Form and Real Totality: The Authentic Conceptual Form of Hegel’s Concept of 
the State,” in Pippin, ed., Hegel on Ethics and Politics. 
51 G. W. F. Hegel, “Hauptideen von Hegels Vorlesung über Logik und Metaphysik [1801/1802],” in F. W. J 
Schelling and G. W. F. Hegel, Schellings und Hegels erste Absolute Metaphysik (1801–1802), ed. Ignaz Paul Vitalis 
Troxler, and Klaus Düsing (Köln: Dinter, 1988), 71. 
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serves as both its conditions and obstacles. Both sides for Hegel are infinite: the former in 
virtue of self-relation and the latter in the sense of the endlessness of particular situations, 
properties, and conditions that confront the identity. The indifference point refers to the 
situation before the act and any difficulties involved in it. Because identity and nonidentity 
generate an antinomy, a third standpoint is required to hold the two sides together without 
any kind of contradiction that natural understanding might face. The third standpoint belongs 
neither to the subjective side that makes identities nor to the side of the endless objective 
realm that created non-identities. It is the standpoint of “something determinate” (Bestimmtes). 
Through reconstruction, reason, according to Hegel, takes into account the conditionality of 
any identity, be it a transcendental ‘I,’ the person, the state, the work of art, the moral subject. 
Reason thus “demands the sublation . . . of the two infinites that oppose one another in the 
understanding, declares it as false, infinites that are separated only in their posited laws.” 
In the case of the person, Hegel claims that the contradiction between its finite and infinite 
aspects “may be borne or endured, but not resolved, by me, the harmony, the identity, of the 
two [the infinite and the finite], is only present in the rational” (GW 26, 3: 1113–14).52 It is 
only by starting from a whole differentiating itself internally, not from the parts adding 
themselves up to form the whole, that the unity of the two aspects of the person is possible. 
This unity, however, cannot be achieved consciously by the person itself. If the person is to 
be the bearer, but not the resolver, of the contradiction between its dual constitution, then its 
very genesis must fall outside of its own, self-standing unity. What in the final analysis 
constitutes the person is external to the person. The person owes its unity to something that 
does not lie within the person. This is true both systematically (the unity is “only present only 
                                                     
52 “Der Widerspruch wird zwar von mir getragen, aber nicht gelöst, die Harmonie, die Identität beider ist erst im 
Vernünftigen.”  
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in the rational”) and historically (the conditions for the rise of the person are concretely 
present). Hegel asserts the unity of both, a complex issue that I will turn to in the last part of 
this chapter after examining his account of the emergence of personality in the modern world.  
  
§ 3 THE GENESIS OF THE PERSON: HIRED LABOR 
On the historical nature of the emergence of the person Hegel remarks: 
The principle of the self-sufficient and inherently infinite personality of the individual, the 
principle of subjective freedom, which arose in an inward form in the Christian religion 
and in an external form . . . in the Roman world, is denied its right in that merely 
substantial form of the actual spirit [in Plato’s Republic]. This principle is historically 
later than the Greek world, and the philosophical reflection which can fathom these 
depths is likewise later than the substantial Idea of Greek philosophy. (PR: § 185, 223) 
 
In his preface to the second edition of Philosophy of Right in 1833, Hegel’s disciple, Gans, 
testifies that a most important merit of the master’s project is that in it, natural right is not 
“merely a beginning and a groundwork in a preceding science, but [that] a spillover and 
maturation into a following one is also given.”53 I take this to mean that for Hegel the figure 
                                                     
53 E. Ganz. “Vorwort zur 2. Ausgabe der Rechtsphilosophie (1833),” in Materialien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie, vol. 1, 
ed. Manfred Riedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975), 244. Modern theories of natural right during the 
eighteenth century, both on empiricist and rationalist-idealist sides, usually encounter the challenge of the point 
of departure and of the guiding principle in building up the other aspects of a political community out of that 
starting point. Categories such as natural state, social contract, natural right and law serve for Hegel as either 
abstract or downright fantastical and in any case arbitrary starting points to be done away with. The second and 
third parts of Hegel’s early treatise on natural right are devoted to a critique of theories of natural right. See Über 
die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie und sein Verhältnis zu den 
positiven Rechtswissenschaften, in: Jenaer Schriften 1801–1807. Werke II. (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1986), esp. 440–
441, 446–448, 452. For a commentary, see Rosenzweig, Hegel und der Staat 187–192. Cf. Horstmann, “Der 
geheime Kantianismus in Hegels Geschichtsphilosophie,” in Hegels Rechts Philosophie, esp. 56–58, 67–68, 71. On 
the distinction and relation between systematic and historical dimensions of Hegel’s philosophy of right, see 
Ludwig Siep, “Vernunftrechts und Rechtsgeschichte. Kontext und Konzept der Grundlinien im Blick auf die 
Vorrede,” in G. W. F Hegel: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997), 7–9, 13, 16–18. 
For a concise discussion of Hegel’s position vis-à-vis theories of natural right, see Dean Moyar, “The Political 
Theory of Kant, Fichte and Hegel,” in, The Routledge Companion to Nineteenth Philosophy, Dean Moyar (New York: 
Routledge, 2010). 
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of the person or free human being with rights is not an absolute, always-already taken-for-
granted point of departure, but the very emerging of the personal protagonist under specific 
historical conditions turns into a key concern of philosophy of right. Such a philosophy comes 
with a philosophy of history, suggests Gans. In the same vein, Rosenzweig’s 1921 tome on 
Hegel und der Staat works out a direct historical influence on Hegel’s thought of right from its 
very early stages. The first decisive encounter with the philosophical impact of world history, 
through the French Revolution, showed itself in the 1802 treatise On the Scientific Ways of 
Treating Natural Law, in which, according to Rosenzweig, the estate structure of the pre-
modern polis with its slaves–freemen division, ceded to a “universal mixture of estates.” This 
marks a crucial moment for the genesis of the figure of the person as the generic human 
being.54 
In fact, Hegel both declares the collapse of the traditional fixed estates of, say, aristocracy, 
clergy, and the warriors in modern society since the French Revolution and, at the same time, 
reconstructs new estates in the predominantly economic life of the bourgeois society through 
the category of labor. This makes for the closest thing to a theory of classes in Hegel, an 
essentially relational, fluid concept that rarely, if ever at all, occurs in Hegel.55 A glance at the 
development of these concepts in his thought will be illuminating.  
                                                     
54 Rosenzweig, Hegel und der Staat, 188. For a similar view on the decisive historical thinking in the early Jena 
period, see also Jean Hyppolite, Introduction à la philosopjhie de l’histoire de Hegel (Paris: Marcel Riviére et Cie, 1948), 
82, 52. An analogous reading of the objectification or reification in Hegel’s philosophy of right is offered in 
Marcuse’s Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (New York: Beacon, 1960), 195. For a thorough 
take on the place of history, philosophy of history, and the historical character of bourgeois society, see Manfred 
Riedel, Zwischen Tradition und Revolution, 59–64, 139–170, 203–223.  
55 Defining class (Klasse) in opposition to estates (Stände) is a tricky task. Commentators of Marx and Marxism 
have major difficulties in reaching a consensus over the characteristics of a class. It can be defined as the 
individuals’ position in the social production. The same can be said about the more traditional estates. Class is a 
more abstract concept. The material and legal conditions defining one’s class are much more indistinct and 
invisible that those defining one’s estate. The individuality of an individual belonging to a class is far more 
emphatic than in an estate. According to Weber, classes belong to the economic order, while estates to the social 
order. See Martin Groß, Klassen, Schichten, Mobilität: Eine Einführung (Tübingen: Springer, 2015), 27–28. If estate 
are more social, they are at once more naturally grown. See Deutsches Staats-Wörterbuch, J.G Bluntfchli and R. Brater 
(Stuttgart, 1860), 525. For a philological and philosophical take on the difference between estates and class, 
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Following the leads of Ritter and Lukács’s study of the young Hegel, Riedel points to the 
increasing, and among his peers unique, importance of the economic life of the modern society 
in Hegel’s thought early on in the Jena period (1801–1806).56 Though there is still no talk of 
“bourgeois society” in the 1803–04 and 1805–06 lecture outlines on the Realphilosophie,57 Hegel 
is already showing awareness of the necessity to take into account the political-economic reality 
of self-interested, needful, rights-seeking individuals in society. Two aspects of the person 
assert themselves in this respect as Hegel notes in the 1805–06 lecture outlines, “The same 
individual [Einzelne] cares about himself and his family, works, makes contracts, etc., and 
equally works also for the universal, has this as its goal. From that side he is called bourgeois, 
from this citoyen.”58 On the margins, according to the editor, Hegel uses the alternate terms of 
Spießbürger (urban middle-class dweller) for the former and Reichsbürger (the citizen of the 
Empire) for the latter, adding that “one is a much more formal Spießsbürger than the other.” If 
theories of natural right primarily deal with the person as citizen, the newly arisen, mainly 
British discipline of political economy, with whose study Hegel would increasingly occupy 
himself, deals with the person as self-interested bourgeois, or as the homo economicus. The 
big trial for the young Hegel was to reconcile these two aspects in such a manner that the 
particular interests desired by the bourgeois should not rule over the universal goals of the 
citizen. By paying attention to political economy and the key category of labor, with which he 
                                                     
especially in Marx, see Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. 
Patricia Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 29–30. 
56 According to Ritter, the person is the child of the bourgeois society: “Hegel was the very first thinker in 
Germany to grasp that the emerging civil society, with its ‘accumulation of wealth’ and the ‘dependency and 
distress of a class bound to labor,’ would establish itself, precisely through the property relations associated with 
it, by transforming all previous historical relations.” Joachim Ritter, “Person and Property in Hegel's Philosophy of 
Right [§§ 34–81],” in Pippin, ed., Hegel on Ethics and Politics, 107. 
57 Riedel criticizes Lukács for putting the term in the young Hegel’s mouth. Between Tradition and Revolution, 131. 
58 “Derselbe sorgt für sich und seine Familie, arbeitet, schließt Verträge usf. und ebenso arbeitet er auch für das 
Allgemeine, hat dieses zum Zwecke. Nach jener Seite heißt er bourgeois, nach dieser citozen.” “Jenaer 
Realphilosophie (1805/06),” in Frühe politische Systeme, ed. Gerhard Göhler (Frankfurt a M.: Ullstein, 1974), 266. 
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accounted for the nature of the society of the bourgeois, Hegel was already a big step ahead 
of the abstractness of the major theories of natural right. 59 
Hegel defines labor or work (Arbeit) thus, “The mediation whereby appropriate and 
particularized means are acquired and prepared for similarly particularized needs is work” (PR: § 
196, 231). 60 These particular needs belong to the concrete persons, and it is the means 
provided by labor that mediates their satisfaction, hence the simplified addendum to the 
definition: “It is by the sweat and labor of human beings that man obtains the means to satisfy 
his needs” (PR: § 196A, 232). This mediation through work does not leave the nature of the 
needs intact, and herein lies one key function of the category of labor for Hegel’s theory of 
the person: “The universal and objective aspect of work consists, however, in that [process 
of] abstraction which confers a specific character on means and needs and hence also on 
production, so giving rise to the division of labor” (PR: § 198, 232). The satisfaction of needs is 
a social activity in the sense that by seeking to meet my needs I do not merely meet my own 
needs because the means to do so are already multiplied, complex, thus requiring the concrete 
works of other individuals. The essential moment in this view of preparing the means for 
satisfying needs is abstraction. The insight that I as a person am supposed to gain in pursuing 
my needs demands that I view the labored means to my ends as separated, absolved, from my 
own ends and attached to an entire context of a multiplied, diversified, and differentiated 
system of means. This system is abstract to the extent that it remains indifferent to my needs 
solely and specifically. It is supposed to be there for all other persons as well.  
                                                     
59 On the “greatness” of the 1805–06 lecture outlines Riedel remakrs, “[T]hey free the social concept of modern 
natural law theory from the abstraction which had clung to it right up to Fichte. They achieve this by recalling it 
to the soil of political economy, or, to express it in a formula, by uniting Adam Smith and Rousseau.” Between 
Tradition and Revolution, 119. 
60 In a correspondence, Alex Horst drew my attention to the importance of the distinction between labor and 
work in Hannah Arendt. See Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 79–92, 118–125. 
Also, Marx in an footnote early on in Capital, discerns a fine distinctions between the labor and work in English 
(see C: 137, n. 16). 
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The positive outcome of this abstract system of needs and labored means reflects back on 
the relations between the needful persons, turning into “a determination of the mutual 
relations between individuals.” It is hence that Hegel takes the decisive step to infer the 
principle of the universality in bourgeois society from the reality of labor: “This universality, 
as the quality of being recognized, is the moment which makes isolated and abstract needs, means, 
and modes of satisfaction into concrete, i.e. social ones” (PR: § 192, 229). Indeed, he goes so far 
as to claim that even needs are abstract thus social, they are not my needs alone (PR: § 191A, 
229). Hegel is here implicitly working out a theory of socialized labor, borrowed from the 
Scottish and British political economists and absent from natural-right theories.61 
Can we draw the historical nature of labor in Hegel through this social, universal nature of 
the system of needs and means, thereby the historical genesis of the person? Labor in itself 
does not constitute any historical specificity. Even Marx, the epitome of a historical thinker, 
is aware that as a negative and productive relation of man to nature, labor appears in all 
societies across ages.62 For the category of labor to play a historically specific role, Hegel 
stresses the social division of labor, thereby assigning a political importance to it.63  
Because of the complex nature of satisfying needs in the modern society, the division of 
labor arises leading to a variety of estates (Stände) which Hegel defines as “particular systems of 
needs, with their corresponding means, varieties of work, modes of satisfaction, and 
theoretical and practical education” (PR: § 201, 234). The three estates of the modern society 
                                                     
61 On the importance of Hegel’s theory of labor and his construction of the modern social world, see Giorgio 
Cesarale, “Hegel’s Notion of Abstract Labor in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right,” in Hegel and Capitalism, ed. 
Andrew Buchwalter (New York: State University of New York Press, 2015), esp. 89.  
62 “Labor, then, as the creator of use-values, as useful labour, is a condition of human existence which is 
independent of all forms of society; it is an eternal natural necessity which mediates the metabolism between man 
and nature, and therefore human life itself.” C: 133. 
63 On Hegel’s conception of labor and economic life in its points of convergence and divergence with regard to 
the classical politics of Plato and Aristotle, see Karl-Heinz Ilting, “Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit der 
aristotelischen Politik,” in Hegel: Frühe politische Systeme, ed. Gerhard Göhler (Frankfurt a. M.: Ulstein, 1974), esp. 
776–774. 
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are that of agricultural workers or peasants, which is soil-bound and immediate in its relation 
to nature, the estate of trade and industry (Gewerbe), which is reflective or formal, and the 
universal estate of civil servants (PR: §§ 203, 204, 205, 235–237). In the Jena phase, we see 
two points of divergence from the tripartite system of the Philosophy of Right. First, Hegel 
distinguishes between the estate of industry (Gewerbe) and that of trade or commerce 
(Kaufmannsstand), which grow only to form one estate later on. The former consists of 
manufactures and craftsmanship, and the latter of merchants. If for the estate of industry, 
labor as a productive force is the central concern, in that of commerce: “The labor of the 
merchant is the pure exchange, neither natural nor artificial production and formation,” where 
the main concern is money as the most abstract yet material vehicle of exchange.64 The second 
point of divergence lies in the manner that Hegel separates the estate of universality, that is, 
the body of civil servants working for the state, from the three “lower” estates. No such 
separation is at work in the Philosophy of Right. Both points, I believe, indicate the increasing 
importance of economic life for the later Hegel.  
In both his Jena and Berlin phases, however, the second estate, that of the productive, 
industrial, manufacturing laborers, serves as the ground for leaving behind the immediacy of 
the soil and the agricultural mentality and stepping into the universal realm of freedom and 
relations of right. It is here that Hegel speaks of the bourgeois estate (Bürgerstand) or the estate 
of right (Rechtsstand).65 He writes: 
In the estate of trade and industry, the individual has to rely on himself, and this feeling 
of selfhood is initially connected with the demand for a condition in which right is 
upheld. The sense of freedom and order has therefore arisen mainly in towns. The 
first estate [the peasantry], on the other hand, has little need to think for itself: what it 
                                                     
64 Hegel, “Jenear Realphilosophie 1805–06,” in Hegel: Frühe politische Systeme, 274, 275. 
65 Hegel, “Jenear Realphilosophie,” 273, 272. 
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gains is an alien gift, a gift of nature . . . . The first estate is therefore more inclined to 
subservience, the second estate to freedom. (PR: § 204A, 237) 
 
It is important to note how Hegel reverts to the concept of freedom in tight relation to 
labor in respect of the bourgeois estate. Up until now in the Philosophy of Right, the primary 
expression for the freedom of the person has been property: “The person must give himself 
an external sphere of freedom in order to have being as Idea. . . . Not until he has property does 
the person exist as reason,” for it is in virtue of property as an external thing that the person 
finds a sphere distinct from its own will, within which it can see its freedom actually realized 
(see PR: § 41, 73). Property is a legal category as it is the possession of a thing protected by 
the law. In Kant’s eyes, the bourgeois society is primarily the legal sphere of persons in 
possession of things that become rightfully theirs as they have come together under the legal 
rule of the state.66 By setting in motion the economic category of labor as a constitutive aspect 
of freedom in bourgeois society, Hegel views this society as the sphere of persons and things. 
Besides property, labor is the other form of the externalization of the will. Labor as activity, 
glosses Ilting, “goes beyond the immediately given and present to realize the essential 
possibilities of the human being.”67 In this respect, labor is absent from Kant’s doctrine of 
right. In Riedel’s illuminating words: 
Hegel has grasped labour as the form of emancipation for modern society in which 
the individual is ‘formed’ to the freedom of legal personality. Labour’s ‘social character’ 
remains hidden both from classical politics (as a consequence of the fact that it ranks 
                                                     
66 Immanuel Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, ed. Hans Ebeling (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1990), Division I, Part II, § 8.  
67 Ilting, “Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit der aristotelischen Politik,” 773. For a discussion of the concept of 
externalization (Entäußerung) and a philosophical discussion of labor in Hegel’s early works, see Lukás, Der Junge 
Hegel: Über die Beziehungen von Dialektik und Ökonomie, vol. 2 (Frankfurt a. M.: 1973), 495–565; Translated by 
Rodney Livingstone as The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1975), 319–420.  
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moral action above production) and from modern natural law theory (as a 
consequence of its orientation to relations of will and contract).68  
 
But not all kinds of labor are “the form of emancipation for modern society” with regards 
to the rise of individuals as legal personalities. Only socialized wage labor, not unpaid slave 
labor, provides that condition. Hegel, only in passing, points to this issue, first in the Abstract 
Right section, and then invokes the historical specificity of person-generating labor by 
discussing the category of labor in the Civil Society section of Ethical Life.  
Hegel touches on the distinction between modern labor (“hired labor’) and slave labor in 
PR: §67. The core of the distinction brings up the category of temporality. While in hired labor 
I let others use my active capabilities and the products of my physical and mental skills “for a 
limited period” so that the totality and universality of my labor should remain intact and mine, 
slavery alienates “the whole of my time, as made concrete through work, and the totality of my 
production.” In this way, my entire personality becomes a property belonging to others.69 
Thus, only after having established the necessity of the person owning property and entering 
contract with other persons––both in terms of owning property and alienating one’s properties 
and products for limited use by others (see PR: § 65, 95)––Hegel could presuppose the 
existence of a mutually recognizable framework of laws in order for the category of labor in 
bourgeois society to acquire its full relevance. If we do not consider labor in this historically 
specific sense as I take Hegel to do, then the distinction between free labor as a modern 
phenomenon and the unfree, unpaid labor of slavery would fade away. This occurring, labor 
would fail to serve as a condition for “forming” individuals into persons, as Riedel noted, 
                                                     
68 Riedel, Between Tradition and Revolution, 122. 
69 The category of time in this sense, correlative with the concept of labor-power of a given society, would become 
key to Marx’s mature labor theory of value in the capitalist mode of production. See chapter one, § 3, of this 
dissertation.  
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because some would still remain laborers yet unfree because uncompensated and alienated 
from their own activity. Labor becomes such a condition provided only that all human beings 
should be free persons worthy of recognition for their labored contribution to the satisfying 
of social needs. It is through the laws of property and contract that the labor relations become 
externalized and posited as objectively valid. Ritter observes that modern society “raises 
freedom to a universal principle though that objectification [Versachlichung] of labor and every 
labor relation that ensures that skills and capabilities can be alienated as things or property 
only for a limited period. Modern society thus grants selfhood and its realization to the person 
intrinsically as personality.”70 
Modern hired labor emerges as a historically specific category, therefore, in correlation with 
a legal framework ensuring the limited use of the products of one’s labor, or simply, in 
correlation with right. To fully articulate the genesis of the person in Hegel, these two aspects, 
politico-economic and legal, should be brought together into one unified account. The 
necessity of this bringing together reveals itself when considering that for Hegel, mere 
historical givenness, labor relations in our present case, does not justify the rightfulness of that 
which is the case. The genesis of the person in modern society is the outcome of a set of 
world-historical conditions that are wanting in justification, especially when this set of 
conditions are not even consistent in their character and validity. With the rise of free labor, 
slavery remained both de facto and de jure in place in many corners of the (western) world. 
Even though by the 1790s slavery had been banned in Europe, the northeast territories of 
North America, and the French colonies, only decades after Hegel’s death had it effectively 
                                                     
70 Ritter, “Person and Property,” 115. 
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vanished from French colonies (1848) and been legally abolished in American South (1865).71 
 If the genesis of personality for Hegel, to use Ritter’s words, stems from “all the wealth of 
historically developed humanity,”72 then this genesis abounds in contingencies and uneven 
developments. Unlike what Ritter and Riedel seem to suggest, Hegel does not subscribe to the 
historical givenness of an institution on the sole grounds of its being the law of the land or 
enjoying an overwhelming historical reality. Hegel’s archenemy in this respect was Friedrich 
Carl von Savigny. Gierke testifies that the whole energy of modern German jurisprudence 
derives from the formulation by Savigny, “Is it now possible to understand the present time 
or actuality of an organic state other than through a connection with its past, i.e. in any other 
way but genetically?”73 Savigny developed a theory of positive law, or posited right, relying on 
an origin or source that was internal to the positedness of the law itself and not in any external 
source such as human will or reason.74  
Even though Hegel later in the Philosophy of Right notes that “In positive right, what is legal 
[gesetzmäßig] is therefore the source of cognition of what is right” (PR: § 212, 244), where he 
seems to be siding with the historicist school of the law, the more fundamental claim of the 
book states that, in the matters of right, “the human being must encounter his own reason; he 
                                                     
71 According to Alan Watson’s definition, “Slavery is an institution that operates on economic, moral, social, and 
political levels . . . Slavery is the most extreme form imaginable of exploitation of one human being by another, 
but the exploitation need not always proceed in one direction.” Roman Slave Law, 1. The idea of exploitation of 
one human being by another as, a “misfortune that could have happened to anyone” in Roman society, as a genus 
can, to use Hegel’s language, take various forms with most various legal technicalities and fundamental principles. 
For example, unlike its American version in the South, Roman slave law was not based on race (xvii). Among its 
latest forms we can count what is called “modern slavery” protected by local laws and institutions in places like 
Dubai or the United States (the recent case of the immigration deportation camps).  
72 Ritter, “Person and Property,” 116. 
73 ‘Ist es nun möglich, die Gegenwart eines Organischen Zustandes anders zu begreifen, als in Verbindung mit 
seiner Vergangenheit, d.h. anders als auf genetische Weise?” (emphasis added); qtd. in Otto Gierke, Die historische 
Rechtsschule und die Germanisten: Rede zur Gedächtnisfeier des Stifters der Berliner Universität König Friedrich Wilhelm III 
(Berlin: Gustav Schade, 1903), 7. 
74 On the concept of “immanent genesis,” see Toews, John E. “The Immanent Genesis and Transcendent Goal 
of Law: Savigny, Stahl, and The Ideology of the Christian German State.” The American Journal of Comparative Law, 
vol. 37, no. 1 (1989): 139–169.  
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must therefore consider the rationality of right, and this is the business of our science” (PR: 
Preface, 13A) Hegel immediately brings up the historical essence of this claim, “[T]he present-
day world has a more urgent need of such an investigation, for in olden times there was still 
respect and veneration for the existing law, whereas the culture [Bildung] of the present age has 
taken a new direction, and thought had adopted a leading role in the formation of values” (PR: 
Preface, 14A). It is thus the force of thought that can enable the subject of right to see through 
the apparent nexus of authority and positedness the substantial nexus of all determinations of 
freedom as a whole, or what is right in its actual existence.75 So, here thought itself acquires 
validity, it becomes culture, the order of the day, the currency of the present-day world, or at 
least in certain parts of western Europe since the French Revolution. 76 
In the rest of this chapter my task consists in showing the way by which Hegel brings 
together right and economy to resolve the personal antinomy, and he does so through his 
                                                     
75 Hegel notes in his lectures that “In the positive right, right is what is through or for the laws; in philosophical 
right, law is what right is, in it no law is the measure for the right” “Im positiven Recht ist Recht, was in den 
Gesetzen ist; im philosophischen Recht ist Gesetz, was Recht ist, in ihm ist kein Gesetz Maßstab für das Recht” 
(VNR 1818/19 § 8 A). When it comes to philosophy of right, as opposed to the positive science of right, the law 
does not serve as the (sole) source of recognition of right, even though the form of the law still offers one leg of 
its validity. Yet the content of the law cannot be taken for right just because it is posited in the form of a law. 
The clearest example of the relation between reasoning and reality of the posited laws is slavery. Then in the face 
of the reality of the legal institution of slavery, one can resort to the following simple syllogism: 
Minor Premise: Slavery is the law 
Major Premise: All laws are posited right 
Conclusion: Slavery is right  
 
This syllogism has a valid logical form, but the conclusion is obviously not true. I need not indicate a reference 
in the footnote to prove the falsity of the conclusion, but whence the self–evident character? The problematic 
nature of the syllogism relates to its major premise, that all laws are posited right. In Preface to PR, Hegel 
distinguishes between the laws of nature, which are “simply there and valid as they stand,” external and indifferent 
to us, and the laws of right, which though are equally simply there as posited and given to us, nevertheless in 
observing them “the spirit of reflection comes into play and their very diversity draws attention to the fact that 
they are not absolute” (PR: Preface, 13A). The laws are laid down before us but we do not stop short at their 
positedness and givenness. The human being “claims to have to have within himself the measure of what is 
right,” and, to use the language of Michael Kohlhaas, the human being has an “inner power” by virtue of which 
he or she can question the authority of the given, posited law. 
76 Thibaut, an important source of influence for Hegel’s philosophy of right, writes in a 1799 book on the logical 
interpretation of laws that if posited right was to be regarded and assessed only historically, without the 
intervention of reason, then “the certainty of right would thereby be undermined, and the universal scope of 
right rendered impossible” A.F. J. Thibaut, Theorie der logischen Auslegung des Römischen Rechts, 1799 (Altana: Johann 
Friedrich Hammerich, 1806), § 9, 27; see also 30–31.  
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theory of the state. I conclude by discussing the problem that stands in the way of reaching 
this resolution.  
 
§ 4 THE PERSONAL ANTINOMY AND ITS POLITICAL RESOLUTION  
In a passage from the 1824/25 lectures series, Hegel writes, “The finite person is the needful 
person, and the infinite one is the right” (GW 26, 3: 1341–42).77 The test of a philosophy of 
right consists in reconciling needs and right, the particular and the universal. The usefulness 
of this formulation is that the distinction between willing satisfaction of one’s needs and willing 
the universal right is reiterated in the form of distinguishing the finite and infinite aspects of 
the same phenomenon, the person. This helps us articulate the personal antinomy as a way of 
relating the formal structure of the person and its historical conditions of arising, which I laid 
down in terms of infinite self-relation and hired labor, respectively. The personal antinomy on 
account of its structural and genetic aspects, or its formal and real conditions, can be cast in 
this way:  
THESIS: The person is an unconditionally free human being that knows itself in 
separation from any social status and physical or psychological condition. It thus 
grasps itself as an independent subject of rights. 
 
ANTITHESIS: The person is a free human being only under the condition of the 
bourgeois society and hired labor. It knows itself by becoming a part of this society 
and thus grasps itself as a dependent subject of rights.  
 
This is an antinomy because both assertions are independently true yet in conflict with one 
another insofar as the condition for the possibility of the thesis, the labor relation, makes the 
                                                     
77 “Die endliche Person ist die bedürftige, die unendliche ist das Recht.” 
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antithesis impossible from the perspective of the person. To grasp this conflict, the antinomy 
itself should be viewed from two standpoints, the practical standpoint of the personal subject, 
who sees only the appearance or semblance, and the theoretical standpoint of the philosopher, 
who sees the essence. In a bid to unify both, Hegel presents the state as the resolution to the 
antinomy. I examine the antinomy from both standpoints. 
The contradiction between the two sides of the antinomy arises for, in bourgeois society, 
the needful person on its own does not afford insight into the universal realm of right by going 
beyond its own needs. The structure of the self-relating, independent, person excludes 
knowing oneself as structurally indebted to a realm beyond the ‘I.’ The concrete person in 
bourgeois society, “as a particular person, as a totality of needs and mixture of natural necessity 
and arbitrariness, is his own end” (PR: § 182, 220). This society is a place where the particular, 
the subjective, the personal as such has a right to exist. Particularity “in itself is boundless 
extravagance, and the forms of this extravagance are themselves boundless” (PR: § 185A, 223). 
Viewed sociologically, colorful needs, caprice, arbitrariness, selfish interests rule over civil 
society, and they are boundless in that there is no inherent condition preventing the persons 
from laying claim to the satisfaction of their needs, nor to the idiosyncrasy of those needs.78  
Hegel calls the bourgeois society the “world of appearance of the ethical” (PR: § 181, 219) and 
refers to the Encyclopedia (§§ 64ff) for his discussion on the relation between the essence, 
here the ethical substance, and its appearance. To the person that considers itself self-
                                                     
78 In respect of this individual arbitrariness, we can better understand Hegel’s recourse to the analogy of an 
disintegrated artwork in which the parts have gone their own way. Already during the Jena period, Hegel was 
well aware of the peculiarity of the modern, post-eighteenth-century society in which a beautiful whole is lost 
and the selfish singular individuals have claimed their absolute rights, “In the old times the beautiful public life 
was the custom [or the Sitte] of all, beauty [as] immediate unity of the universal and the singular, an artwork 
wherein no part severs itself from the whole but is this genial unity of self-knowing self and its representation. 
But, the singular individual who knows itself as absolute, this absolute being-in-itself, was not present.” Jenaer 
Realphilosophie II: Vorlesungen von 1805/06, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1932), 251. The 
person does not immediately take into account the existence of an organic whole of which it is a part. He or she 
is primarily concerned with their own existence. 
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sufficiently pursuing his or her interests––and this is a right that for Hegel the modern world 
grants to the particular person to “develop and express itself in all directions” (PR: § 184, 
221)––the universal, that is, the sphere in which all other subjects feel entitled to pursue their 
own interests and needs and deserve being regarded as persons, appears as a mere means. The 
person takes them as “links in the chain of this continuum” or nexus (Zusammenhang) of relations 
in bourgeois society, not seeing yet the substantiality of the nexus. In Marcuse’s words, “[T]he 
freedom of each individual was pitted in life-and-death competitive struggle against that of 
every other.”79 
Yet, from the perspective of the philosopher of right, bourgeois society is not just a means 
to the ends of the single person, but he or she “stands essentially in relation to other similar 
particulars, and their relation is such that each asserts itself and gains satisfaction through the 
others, and thus at the same time through the exclusive mediation of the form of universality” 
(PR: § 185A, 223). We already discussed the category of labor in Hegel. The actual function 
of this category for his philosophy of right, however, fully manifests itself here: it is to facilitate 
the relation between the particularity of the persons and the universality of right relations in 
bourgeois society. Being occupied in professions helps the persons gain insight into the social 
character both of their needs and of the means to their satisfaction: “By a dialectical 
movement, the particular is mediated by the universal so that each individual, in earning, 
producing, and enjoying on his own account, thereby earns and produces for the enjoyment 
of others” (PR: § 199, 233) The outcome of this interdependence of individuals through labor 
is the “universal and permanent resources,” a source of shared fruits of social labor. This 
makes for a fundamental assumption on Hegel’s part, namely, that labor does indeed help 
                                                     
79 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, 170. 
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modern individuals to see the vital urgency of collaboration for a collective enjoyment of the 
resources. From here Hegel takes short steps to arrive at the existence of the state.80  
This is how Hegel defines the state in its function as the resolver of the two contradictory 
aspects of the person:  
The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea––the ethical spirit as substantial 
will, manifest and clear to itself, which thinks and knows itself and implements 
what it knows in so far as it knows it. It has its immediate existence in custom 
and its mediate existence in the self-consciousness of the individual, in the 
individual’s knowledge and activity, just as self-consciousness, by virtue of its 
disposition, has its substantial freedom in the state as its essence, its end, and the 
product of its activity. (PR: § 257, 275)81 
 
The two standpoints noted above manifest themselves in this passage: The knowledge and 
activity of the individual, its self-consciousness, on the one hand, and on the other, the custom 
or ethical life, the source of what is posited as right. The individual is supposed to will the 
ethical in order to gain substantial freedom. This is to fulfil the condition of the unity of form 
and content in the matters of the free will. If the form belongs to the person, the content is 
                                                     
80 All Hegel’s lectures on philosophy of right between 1818 and 1825, as well as the Objective Spirit part of the 
Encyclopedia (1827 and 1830), essentially follow the same principle of organization of chapters as laid down in 
the PR. A schematic view of the structure of the book helps grasp the place of work in its path to the estate: 
Part One: Abstract Right 
Part Two: Morality 
Part Three: Ethical Life 
 Section 1: Family 
 Section 2: Civil Society 
A. The System of Needs [§§ 189–208] 
a. The Nature of needs and their Satisfaction  
b. The Nature of Work 
c. Resources  
B. The Administration of Justice  
C. The Police and the Corporation 
Section 3: The State 
81 “Der Staat ist die Wirklichkeit der sittlichen Idee––der sittliche Geist, als der offenbare, sich selbst deutliche, 
substantielle Wille, der sich denkt und weiß und das, was er weiß und insofern er es weiß, vollführt. An der Sitte 
hat er seine unmittelbare und an dem Selbsbevußtsein des Einzelnen, dem Wissen und Tätigkeit desselben, seine 
vermittelte Existenz, so wie dieses durch die Gesinnung in ihm, als seinem Wesen, Zweck und Produkte seiner 
Tätigkeit, seine substantielle Freiheit hat.” 
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provided by the actual relations of right materialized in the state. These two standpoints are 
unified here by stating that the latter, the ethical, is the end and the product of the former, the 
personal will.  
Hegel stresses that the state is only indirectly, mediately, present in the knowledge and 
activity of the individual. He or she still wills its own interests and pursues its own ends. The 
individual cannot be forced to will the universal, except through following the externally 
posited laws but not the ethical life itself, which would contradict the modern principle of 
infinitely free subjectivity so essential to Hegel’s position. The only thing that is present in the 
individual vis-à-vis the state is a Gesinnung or disposition. Through education, theoretical 
(thoughts and concerns) and practical (skills), the individual is to dispose or orient itself 
towards the state, to be concerned with the state. (See PR: § 187A, 226) 
This, however, is an insufficient justification of the state for it still follows the logic of civil 
society and the right to property. From the standpoint of the person, notes Hegel, “the 
individual . . . finds that, in fulfilling his duties as a citizen, he gains protection for his person 
and property, consideration for his particular welfare, satisfaction of his substantial essence, 
and the consciousness and self-awareness of being a member of a whole,” namely the state 
(PR: § 261, 285). The problem here is that the person still regards the whole as a means to his 
or her own ends, which justifies only the thesis of the antinomy: the person is independent 
and self-determining. The person does not reach the point of view of universal freedom for it 
does not see its true reason. We need a standpoint that breaks with the conception of freedom 
as owning property, satisfying needs, and pursuing private life plans by means of other persons 
and laws. 
The state must then separate itself from the aggregation of needy persons in civil society 
to form a higher standpoint: “If the state is confused with civil society and its determination 
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is equated with the security and protection of property and personal freedom, the interest of 
individuals as such becomes the ultimate end for which they are united” (PR § 258, 276). This 
means that bourgeois society on its own cannot reach a unity capable of realizing human 
freedom.82 If earlier, with regard to the estates, Hegel had said that the individual has real 
existence only when he or she is the member of the estates, here he maintains that “it is only 
through being a member of the state that the individual himself has objectivity, truth, and 
ethical life,” where he or she can “lead a universal life” (PR: § 258, 276) The antinomy of the 
self-determining, independent, infinitely free person that is at once wholly dependent and 
finite thus resolves itself in the unity of “objective freedom” and “subjective freedom.” 
Concretely, for Hegel, this unity consists in “self-determining action in accordance with laws 
and principles based on thought and hence universal” (ibid.)  
The necessity for the state to set itself apart from the society of laboring persons makes 
both for the originality of Hegel’s political thought and at once for one of its gravest problems. 
Hegel had remarked that the unity of the infinite and the finite in the constitution of the 
person, the harmony of both, is possible only in the rational, that is, the person on its own 
cannot arrive at it (See GW 26, 3: 1113–14). The standpoint of the rational, therefore, is not 
accessible to the individual. It requires deduction. The difficulty involved in the theory of the 
state best expresses itself here.  
Philosophy for Hegel, notes Marquard, is an “inquiry into mediation” 
(“Vermittlungsforschung”); its task is “to look into seemingly mere givens as such means, as 
mediation.”83 In this respect, the genetic conditions for the rise of the person––the bourgeois 
                                                     
82 On the need for the state to be separate from the logic of self-interest in civil society, see See Shlomo Avineri, 
Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 134. Cf. Karl Löwith, From Hegel 
to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-century Thought, trans. David E. Green (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1964), 236.  
83 Odo Marquard, Schwierigkeiten mit der Geschichtsphilosophie: Aufsätze (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973), 42.  
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society, hired labor, contract, estates, corporations, the administration of justice and finally the 
state––are neither abstract categories that “ought to” be realized, nor merely given historical 
circumstances taken on their face. They need to be justified and proven with regard to their 
necessity for the subject matter of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, namely, right as the realm of 
realized freedom in the modern world. According to Marquard, Hegel’s main critique of the 
transcendental philosophies of Fichte and Kant, whence the philosophical operation of 
deduction originally derives, pertains to their refusal “to link the universal ends, that is, the 
ends related to freedom, to the realization process of their mediation, and thereby to link the 
ought to reality.”84 As long as the means for realizing freedom is missing, any talk of freedom, 
universality, personality, right, would remain irrelevant, abstract, and ungrounded. A Hegelian 
philosophical deduction, therefore, is an attempt to prove that freedom is realizable under the 
condition of bourgeois society, but bourgeois society is no longer associated with economic 
life and relations of labor here. A higher standpoint is needed if the universal life must be held 
as a real possibility. It must be a philosophical standpoint. Hegel’s famous dictum, 
“[P]hilosophy . . . is its own time comprehended in thoughts” should be understood in this sense (PR: 
Preface, 21). 
Hegel’s reference to the decisive importance of deduction in philosophy occurs, in the 
transition from Part Two: Morality to Part Three: Ethical Life.85 Deduction is the philosophical 
proof of the truth of freedom as what is real and for which the actual conditions are available, 
the sum of which Hegel captures under “Ethical Life.” This life is no longer directly available 
to the individual. The individual sees only family and civil society, knowing only legal rights 
                                                     
84 Marquard, 44. On the same point, see Ritter notes that the Philosophy of Right “forgoes any attempt to provide 
an immediate deduction of the principles of law or right from ideas. Once freedom has itself become the concept 
of right, the task is to grasp the former no longer simply in its state of potentiality, but rather in its actualization.” 
“Person and Property,” 105. 
85 Cf. Marquard, Schwierigkeiten, 159–160, n. 24. 
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and moral duties. The state remains a realm far removed. In the first two parts of the book, 
Abstract Right and Morality, the free human being is viewed first as the legal person and then 
as the moral subject. The former solely concerns itself with one’s rights and primarily in the 
form of owning property. The latter through self-reflection becomes aware of this very right 
as the good. However, both are one-sided because both “constitute themselves as independent 
totalities” (PR: § 141, 185). Though both figures gain insight into others and develop a sense 
of relations between all persons or subjects, one through the legal recognition of contract and 
the other through conscience, they remain abstract, that is, separated from what grounds them 
and makes them possible. Instead of simply receiving the reality of bourgeois society as the 
realm of persons, needs, contracts, and products, Hegel points to the fact that such a realm 
already presupposes the existence of the state.86 If the passage on the definition of the state 
quoted earlier declares that the state as the realized ethical whole only has mediated existence 
in the persons, this occurs through the persons’ “particular satisfaction, activity, and mode of 
conduct” the point of departure and the result of which rest on the “substantial and universally 
valid basis” of the state (PR: § 258, 276). In other words, the state’s presence imposes itself 
only in the realm of practice, not in the direct self-consciousness of the persons as they remain 
concerned with their own self-satisfaction and life plans. The state as the resolution to the 
personal antinomy exists behind the back of the personal activity, as it were. To place the 
problem in a sharper light we should consider an even graver difficulty involved in Hegel’s 
conception of the sphere of bourgeois society that causes its resistance to any systematization. 
                                                     
86 Earlier in the book Hegel makes the following methodological remark on the place of bourgeois society vis-à-
vis the state: “Bourgeois society . . . intervenes between the family and the state, even if its full development 
occurs later than that of the state, . . . it presupposes the state, which it must have before it as a self-sufficient 
entity in order to subsist itself.” PR: § 182A, 220. 
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Interpreters of Hegel have taken notice of his sensitivity, exceptional among the generation 
of the German Idealists, to the phenomenon of poverty in bourgeois society. His reference to 
the rabble that has the “lowest level of subsistence” (PR: § 244, 266) testifies to that. Poverty 
can follow the person’s own failure to provide for themselves. Yet, there are other forces at 
work, too: “Not only arbitrariness, however, but also contingent physical factors and 
circumstances based on external conditions may reduce individuals to poverty. In this condition, 
they are left with the needs of civil society and yet . . . they are more or less deprived of all the 
advantages of society,” from skills and education to the administration of justice and even “the 
consolation of religion” (PR: § 241, 265). As a concentrated mass of the poor people,87 the 
rabble thus profoundly problematizes the transitions both from being a human to personality, 
and from the society of persons as bourgeois to the society of persons as citizens. The 
members of the rabble cannot become part of an estate, they form instead, as Ruda puts it, an 
un-estate––or a class without rights and duties in Wood’s words––thereby being rendered 
incapable of participating in the universal life of the state.88  
At the same time, however, Hegel shows a philosophical insensitivity to the phenomenon 
of the urban rabble. This follows from his insistence on the existence of a rationality in the 
realm of boundless needs where there is an understanding shared by the modern needful 
persons according to which the satisfying of the needs and ends of one person accords to 
those of others. The modern science of political economy for him addresses the “conciliatory 
effect” of this rationality (PR: § 189, 227). This axiomatic conviction on Hegel’s part qualifies 
                                                     
87 Allen Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 251; see 252–255, 284, 
290. 
88 See Frank Ruda, Hegel's Rabble: An Investigation Into Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. (London: Continuum, 2011); 
Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, 253. For a concise and illuminating take on the place of the rabble and the 
difficulties that it generates in Hegel’s philosophy of right, see Yitzhak Y. Melamed, “Leaving the Wound Visible: 
Hegel and Marx on the Rabble and the Problem of Poverty in Modern Society,” Iyyun: The Jerusalem 
Philosophical Quarterly / 50 עיון: רבעון פילוסופי (January 2001): 23–39. Published by: S. H. Bergman Center for 
Philosophical Studies.  
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him as a bourgeois thinker who believes that the private needs and capricious ends of 
bourgeois society somehow fall into place in the form of a “system of needs,” as was the case 
in his Jena phase. Even though he refrains from using the term “the system of needs” in his 
late works, the conviction remains with him in the form of the state. The key difference is that 
in the Jena phase the system of needs was first held to be one with the life of the people or 
nation (Volk) and then later with the existence of a constitution or governance, while in the 
Berlin phase this system finds its ground in the separated realm of the state.89 
A fundamental critical point made on Hegel’s theory of the state from a Marxist perspective 
relates precisely to such a conciliatory rationality in settling the conflicts of bourgeois society. 
Lukács calls it Hegel’s idealism in economics. The following 1859 statement by Marx quoted 
by Lukács sums up what is at stake here, “To observe society as one singular subject is to 
observe it moreover falsely; speculatively.”90 The only alternative to the existence of a single 
ideal subject organizing the bourgeois society into a system of needs would be to regard this 
society from the perspective of a clash between multiple real subjects, not to resolve the 
contradiction in thought or ideally.91 Speculative is an apt description of the state as the 
resolution to the antinomy. For Hegel, speculative is the opposite of dogmatic thinking. 
Whenever we have two opposed assertions, a dogmatic thinking declares that “one must be 
true, and the other false,” thus adhering to “one-sided determinations of the understanding 
                                                     
89 In the 1803–1804 lectures outlines Hegel speaks of the “spirit of the people” (“Volksgeist”) as the “absolutely 
universal element, the ether, . . . the absolute, simple, living, singular substance,” an constantly active substance 
that goes beyond the consciousness of the individuals. Frühe politische Systeme, 327–328. Later, in the 1805–1806 
lectures outlines, he refers to the existence of a governing (“Regierung”) that is the “absolute self and negativity 
of the individuals . . . the zenith of the whole.” 297. For a discussion of the difference between these lectures 
outlines and the rise of the concept of the state as a separate realm from the society, itself a new concept for 
Hegel, see Riedel, Between Tradition and Revolution, 124–125. On the Spinozist conception of the substance at work 
in Hegel’s early political thought, see Ilting, “Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit der aristotelischen Politik,” 775–
781.  
90 Georg Lukács, Der Junge Hegel, 567: Of course, more than a decade prior Marx had already raised the same 
objection with regard to the state as a unifying ideal subject viewed as existing above the processes of civil society. 
See “Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts,” MEW 1: 224–225. 
91 On Marx’s understanding of the speculative, see, MEW 1: 235.  
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whilst excluding their opposites.” (EG: § 32, § 32A). If the infinite or the finite, or self-relation 
and labor relations, constitute two determinations of personality, or, rather, if in the case of 
the state, being a separated realm and being entangled in bourgeois society fashion opposed 
determinations of the state, then a speculative standpoint in virtue of “being a totality” 
contains both determinations “that dogmatism holds to be fixed and true in a state of 
separation from one another.” If that is a speculative strategy, namely, to reach a standpoint 
from which the opposed determinations that the person encounters finds an ideal settling, 
then a certain Marxist streak of thought remains non-speculative, dogmatic, and finite for it 
refuses to resolve the oppositions between the determinations of its subject matter in thought 
alone.92  
The outcome of the Marxist critique is the non-speculative imperative that to understand 
the nature of modern society one must consider the nature of conflicts in the relations of labor 
and production and not in those of right as a realm transcendent to those relations. In this 
way, however, the figure of the person would lose all its relevance, surrendering its explanatory 
significance in the face of structural, impersonal forces dominating the social world beyond 
the will of the individual subjects. In virtue of its genetic determination, the person would thus 
relapse into its original meaning as a mask for economic relations and categories.93  
                                                     
92 Hegel writes, “Thinking is only finite insofar as it stays within restricted determinations, which it holds to be 
ultimate. Infinite or speculative thinking, on the contrary, makes determinations likewise, but, in determining, in 
limiting, it sublates this defect again. Infinity must not be interpreted as an abstract, ever-receding beyond.” EG, 
§ 27 A. On speculative thinking in Hegel, see Stephen Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity 
(West Lafayatte, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2006), 64, 93–98. 
On substituting the analysis of systems other than the Hegelian state in the subsequent developments of modern 
social theories, from Marx to Luhmann, see Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des 
Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998), 62–78. 
93 When discussing the Process of Exchange in capitalist mode of production, Marx writes of commodities in 
exchange and the place of the persons with regard to them, “In order that these objects may enter into relation 
with each other as commodities, their guardians must place themselves in relation to one another as persons 
whose will resides in those objects, and must behave in such a way that each does not appropriate the commodity 
of the other, and alienate his own, except through an act to which both parties consent. The guardians must 
therefore recognize each other as owners of private property. . . . Here the persons exist for one another merely 
as representatives and hence owners, of commodities.” C: 178–179.  
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Does this critique suggest that the theory of the state as a necessarily separate realm from 
society is a mere metaphysical extra to an otherwise plausible theory of bourgeois society 
dominated by economic self-interests? How are we to treat the abrupt jolt by which the 
transition from a presupposed set of historical conditions to the separate realm of the state as 
a pure concept takes place?  
Hegel’s desideratum for philosophical deduction, that it should infer the justification of a 
concept from the actual means or mediation of its realization, calls for reflecting on this 
relation between the rational and the historical. A sign of the difficulty faced by Hegel to move 
from the differentiated spheres of civil society to the universal realm of the state shows itself 
when he stresses that a philosophy of right has no interest in the “historical origin of the state 
in general,” nor in any particular state. He could not be more clear on the question of genesis: 
[W]hether it [the state] first arose out of patriarchal conditions, out of fear or trust, out 
of corporations etc., or how the basis of its rights has been understood and fixed in 
the consciousness as divine and positive right or contract, habit, etc. In relation to 
scientific cognition, which is our sole concern here, these are questions of appearance, 
consequently a matter for history. . . . The philosophical approach deals only with the 
internal aspect of all this, with the concept as thought.94 (PR: § 258, 276)  
 
The reservation on Hegel’s part would be plausible had he not already, in establishing right, 
taken his point of departure from a set of given historical conditions. As discussed the § 3 of 
                                                     
Marx also refers to individuals as “personifications of economic categories, the bearer of particular class-relations 
and interests.” This is true even for the capitalist himself as the personification of capital. Capital, 92. Adorno 
takes up this issue and Marx’s words in the Negative Dialektik in order to make the point that the modern society 
in virtue of the predominance of economic relations has absolved itself from the individual subjects, having 
turned them into its “mere executors.” GS 6: 299–300. The result is a universality that realizes itself above the 
“heads of the subjects.” 347.  
94 In this respect, Rozenzweig’s insight cuts to the heart of his project. where he speaks of a double countenance 
or Doppelantliz in the political philosophy of Hegel’s time as manifested in two main eighteenth-century sources 
of influence on Hegel: Montesquieu and Rousseau. The former had an empirical passion for the treasures of laws 
from various nations, while the latter was invested in an ideal of state. One was interested in experience, the other 
in concept: “To unify the double countenance, to transform the deviations of the two directions of view into a 
coming-together, became the work of the nineteenth century.” Hegel und der Staat, 25. 
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this chapter, Hegel took the point of departure of his discussion of personality from the 
objectified relations of property and hired labor in modern bourgeois society, in its most 
developed form available to Hegel since the French Revolution. But now, when it comes to 
the state as the true universal sphere, he makes a leap from the “stage of difference” of 
bourgeois society to the “Idea” of the state independent of that society, or of any other 
historical origins for that matter. Therefore, the personal standpoint and the philosophical 
standpoint fail to be brought together precisely because in the former the facticity through the 
relations of hired labor plays a decisive role while in the latter it is absent. 
The above passage clearly suggests that the state for Hegel holds a double stance: It is both 
caught up in the turmoil of historical situation and the contingent forces of bourgeois society 
and, at the same time, it is a subject that has managed to separate itself from that turmoil, 
emerging speculatively as a “deux ex machina” to resolve the clash of particularities of 
economically driven society.95 In his proposal to settle this problematic, Moyar gives much 
weight to “the historical rise of the reformed religious conscience that secures the subjective 
conditions for holding together the universal and particular purposes.”96 Through a systematic 
account of the place of conscience in Hegel’s ethics, Moyar attempts, in my view, to resolve 
the conflict of the needful dependent person and the infinite independent person, that is, the 
moment of particularity in the individual and its moment of universality primarily from the 
standpoint of subjectivity and subjective responsibility. In doing so, Moyar has an urgent task 
to carry out: refuting the view that Hegel’s state is detached from the society of the individuals 
                                                     
95 [I]n order to relax its grip, society requires a deus ex machina which binds necessity and chance together in a law. 
This law [Gesetz] which settles the social antagonisms and once again mediates the movement of the whole with 
itself and with the movement of the individuals is for Hegel The State.” Between Tradition and Revolution, 125.  
96 Dean Moyar, Hegel’s Conscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 184. 
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and yet that the individuals have a duty to the state if they are to succeed in fulfilling their own 
interests.97 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, such a view of the person-state relationship would 
defeat the very rationale for the place of the state in Hegel’s system. The state is not there 
merely to satisfy the needs of isolated individual. It is to secure the reconciliation of many 
particularities to the possibility of universal life. Moyar’s focus on such apparently quite non-
Hegelian concept as conscience serves to work out a plausible relation between the individuals 
and the state in a manner avoiding atomism. Doing so from “the side of the subject,”98 
however, tends to overlook the objective obstacles in the way of all individuals becoming 
persons and moral subjects with conscientious responsibility. We saw in the case of the rabble 
that the economic life of bourgeois society can pose serious threat to the realization of 
universal or concrete freedom.  
I believe that Hegel’s failure to offer a real resolution to the personal antinomy as we 
discussed above precisely points to his success in exposing the essential problematic of 
modern bourgeois society. If a real resolution is to be found, the two sides of the matter at 
hand, the particular and the universal, must be preserved in their full tension. Later theories 
of the bourgeois state in the Marxist tradition with categories such as the “relative autonomy 
of politics” give testimony to a problematic that Hegel’s speculative philosophy of right had 
clearly discerned.99 I conclude this chapter by proposing a reading of the double stance of the 
Hegelian state in respect of the personal antinomy and the stated goal of universal life. To do 
                                                     
97 See Moyar, 191–197, see also 81–110 on the detachment problem.  
98 Moyar, 193. 
99 I discuss this issue in chapter four. Apart from Marx’s own theory of the state in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, Lenin, Althusser, Polantzas, Gramsci, Lefort, Mouffe and Laclau and the entire streak of the so-called 
Post-Marxism have made efforts to do justice to the separateness of the state from, and its entanglement in, the 
capitalist society.  
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so I consider the place of world history in Hegel’s theory of the state, proposing to regard the 
formal structure of the state together with that of the person. 
 
THE STATE AND WORLD HISTORY 
Early on in the reception of Philosophy of Right, Hegel’s theory of the state had been criticized 
precisely on account of what Hegel takes to be its strong point according to the long passage 
on historical origins of the state quoted above. Arnold Ruge complains thus: 
To take the state as absolute and to disjoin it from history is not possible because every 
concept of the state and in general every determinate philosophy is itself an historical 
product; but it is also impossible to conceive of the state-constitution, i.e., the 
determinate state, as an eternal form because the determinate state is nothing other 
than the existence of the Spirit in which the latter realizes itself historically.”100 
 
 Why does Hegel need to disjoin––loslösen in Ruge’s choice of verb––the state from history, 
if he does it at all? One could show that Ruge both missed the point about the nature of 
Hegel’s idea of the state and yet was justified in his critique: Hegel’s state has to negate its 
historical genesis to claim its independent, universal individuality free from such and such set 
of circumstances, and yet it is bound up with world history in its relations to other states. The 
answer to the above question can be found in the structural affinity between the state and the 
person. In this regard, the three moments that Hegel isolates in the Idea of the state as the 
                                                     
100 “Den Staat absolut zu nehmen und aus der Geschichte loszulösen ist schon darum nicht möglich, weil jeder 
Begriff von ihm und überhaupt jede bestimmte Philosophie selbst ein geschichtliches Erzeugnis ist; aber es ist 
auch darum unmöglich, die Staatsverfassung, d. h. den bestimmten Staat, als eine ewige Form zu fassen, weil der 
bestimmte Staat nichts andres ist als die Existenz des Geistes, in welcher dieser sich geschichtlich verwirklicht.” 
“Der Hegelsche Rechtsphilosophie und die Politik unsrer Zeit. Erster Artikel (1842),” in Die Hegelsche Linke: 
Dokumente zu Philosophie und Politik im deutschen Vormärz, ed. Heinu and Ingrid Pepperle (Leipzig: Reclam, 1985), 
458; translated into English as “Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’ and the Politics of our Times,” in The Young 
Hegelians: An Anthology, ed. Lawrence S. Stepelevich (Cambridge: Cambrdige Unviersity Press, 1983). 
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concluding section of the last, third part of the book correspond to the three moments we 
identified in our discussion of Hegel’s view of the person: 
Section 3: The State 
 A. Constitutional Law: The state as a self-related organism  
 B. International Law: The relationship of the individual state to other states  
 C. World History: The state as the universal Idea, as a genus (see PR: § 259, 281) 
  
The A and B moments correspond, respectively, to the formal structure of the person, 
where the subject relates itself to itself unmediated by any conditions or qualification to grasp 
itself as the individual ‘I,’ and its genesis, where the relation between many individuals persons 
in the bourgeois society is organized through hired labor, property relations, and sharing the 
resources. As a concept, the state must have the moments of individuality and particularity. 
For Hegel, the state as a concept that is real and actual includes both moments of 
individuality (Individualität or Einzelnheit) and particularity (Besonderheit) so that it is not only one 
individual state (“states as such are independent from one another,” PR: § 259A, 282) but it is 
this or that, or such and such, specific state at once, a suchness that manifests itself in the 
differences between the laws, constitutions, modes of administration of forces and resources. 
This particularity makes for the immediate reality of the state as an organization or rather 
organism that relates itself to itself. Particularity belongs to history, notes Hegel, while 
individuality belongs to the idea of the state (ibid.). So far as the moment of individuality goes, 
both the state and the person as self-related unities are absolutely independent because 
separated or absolved from any condition interfering with their becoming a unity. The state 
has to separate itself from all concrete conditions and become abstract just as the person had 
to elevate itself above all particular physical, psychological, and social conditions in order to 
grasp itself as the independent ‘I.’ In a political remark on how in spite of all its deficiencies 
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there remains an affirmative aspect in the concrete life of any state, Hegel likens the latter to 
“the ugliest man, the criminal, the invalid, or the cripple” who is “still a living human being.” 
(PR: § 258A, 279). 
 Yet, once it has become such a unity, both the state and the person, viewed externally, turn 
into a specific unity beside other specific unities differently constituted. If previously the 
command of right declared, “Be a person and regard others as a person” (PR: § 36, 69), here 
the command addressed to the nations or peoples would be, Be a state and regard others as a 
state: “In its initial stage, a nation is not a state, and the transition of a family, tribe, kinship 
group, mass [of people], etc. to the condition of a state constitutes the formal realization of the 
Idea in general within it” (PR: § 349, 375). For Hegel, unlike the Romantics, the people (Volk) 
on its own does not constitute any political and thus ethical community. It first needs to 
formalize itself in the form of the state in order to acquire the status of a realized ethical life.101 
Personality was also the formal realization of human freedom, the resolution to the 
antinomy of being free yet embodied and embedded. This resolution could be offered in virtue 
of the existence of the relations of right protected and validated through the state. We saw 
that in order for the person to endure the conflict between its absolute independence and its 
actual dependence, the state must have already been in place as a realm separated from the 
contingencies of bourgeois society. Now the state itself undergoes the identical antinomian 
difficulty when considered in its relation to other states. Hegel writes:  
 “States function as particular entities in their mutual relations, the broadest view of 
these relations will encompass the ceaseless turmoil not just of external contingency, 
but also of passions, interests, ends, talents and virtues, violence, wrongdoing, and 
vices in their inner particularity. In this turmoil, the ethical whole itself––the 
independence of the state––is exposed to contingency.” (PR: § 340, 371) 
                                                     
101 Walter Jaeschke, Hegel-Handbuch: Leben, Werk, Schule (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2010), 390. 
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It is here that the C moment, World History, the last step in the Philosophy of Right asserts 
its right, which is “the highest” in the hierarchy of rights from that of the person to contract 
to the state. World history, or mundane history,102 as the stage of awe-inspiring turmoil must 
hold the highest right for there exists no standpoint other than that to adjudicate the tensions 
between equally self-standing unities of the particular states. World history has to be the world 
court of judgment. Yet, there is no norm or constitution available to this court under which 
to subsume particular cases of conflict; its sole norm is its deed alone. Here the concept of 
spirit for Hegel plays its most useful role. This will take us beyond the systemic scope of the 
objective spirit in Hegel and onto that of the absolute spirit, a direction that this chapter refuses 
to take.103 The key point to make here is that even the independence of the state as the reality 
of the ethical life is susceptible to the “contingency” of a realm over which the individual state 
has no control. The persons are immune against such a vociferous turmoil of history that 
directly besets the states and only indirectly the persons. They are supposed to enjoy the 
secured universality of the inner space of one state if they are to sustain their self-related, 
unconditionally free individuality.  
The distinction of inner- and outer space of the state can be useful for shedding light on a 
more plausible resolution to the personal antinomy, the interest in solving which was universal 
life. To set in motion this distinction, let us note the main theoretical concern behind Arnold 
Ruge’s critique of Hegel’s theory of the state, one shared by the so-called Left-Hegelian voices 
of Ruge’s generation in the pre-March period in Germany: politics. He opens his critique of 
                                                     
102 Livio Sichrollo, “La ‘Weltgeschichte’ (§§ 354–360) della Filosofia del dritto,” in Logica e storia in Hegel, ed. R. 
Racinaro and V. Vitiello (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1985), 42.  
103 For the ambiguity in the function of the concept of “world history” with regard to the state in Hegel, that is, 
world history as the realm of the spirit and world history as the process of making the state, see Jaeschke, Hegel-
Handbuch, 403.  
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Hegel thus, “Our time is political, our politics wants the freedom of this world. We no longer 
build on the church-state, but on the worldly state, and interest in the public essence of state 
freedom grows with every breath of the humanity.”104 “Politics” serves as a mark 
distinguishing Hegel’s generation from that of the 1840s. Indeed, there is scarcely any mention 
of politics in Hegel that rivals the usage that Ruge applied to it. Politik for Hegel denotes the 
theoretical science of the relation between the natural rights and the state.105 For Ruge, the 
term works differently, that is, strongly performatively. It indicates active participation in 
public (öffentlich) life on the one hand and passionate interest not only in history but in the lives 
of the foreign states. A characteristic of the new political age for Ruge is that people have 
become curious about what is going on in other European countries, finding those 
developments of importance and of resemblance to domestic German life.106 Moreover, he 
refers to an historical interest that is to define the politics of the future. This is a stance against 
what Ruge calls the metaphysical idea of the state in Hegel to be supplemented with the 
business of criticizing the historical forms of the state of freedom, which is again a political 
activity.107 Political sense for him equals a state-making pathos.108 through public, critical, 
historical engagement of the citizens, which is different from the political sentiment in Hegel 
as merely patriotism.109 
                                                     
104 “Unsre Zeit ist politisch, unsre Politik will die Freiheit dieser Welt. Wir bauen nicht mehr am Kirchenstaat, 
sondern an dem Weltstaat, und das Interesse an dem öffentlichen Wesen der Staatsfreiheit wächst mit jedem 
Atemzüge der Menschheit.” Arnold Ruge, “Der Hegelsche Rechtsphilosophie und die Politik unsrer Zeit. Erster 
Artikel,” 443. 
105 Some of the few instances of the appearance of political or politics in the Philosophy of Right include PR: § 257, 
275: politische Tugend (virtue); PR: § 267, 288: politische Gesinnung (disposition), politische[r] Staat; PR: § 268, 288, 
politische Gesinnung as patriotism; PR: § 337, 370: Politik, in a discussion of the clash between the state and morality; 
106 Ruge, 444. 
107 Ruge, 462–463. 
108 “staatenbildnerische Pathos,” Ruge, 470. 
109 For a concise discussion of Ruge’s views, see Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, 82–91. 
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The dual interest of politics for Ruge––in foreign countries and in history––clearly goes 
beyond the boundaries of the state within which alone Hegel treats of persons. Persons 
become political, therefore, when they participate in history in separation from the universality 
of the individual state. In other words, the presence of the person on the state of history is no 
longer strictly mediated by the state. It is interesting to note, as Lukács does, that the social 
and historical horizon of Hegel himself extended far beyond the development of Germany at 
the time and into the French political revolution and English industrial one.110  
The clamorous turmoil of contingencies in world history, which creates the states, and the 
tranquil universal life of the states, which sustain the persons, generate two worlds that as far 
as the life of the persons go remain separated from one another in Hegel’s system of right. It 
is this separation that renders Hegel’s resolution to the personal antinomy problematic. 
Bringing them together, I argued, involves a notion of politics as participation in history 
directed both at relations of right and at labor relations in bourgeois society. History, too, can 
educate persons for the sake of universal life. As Marx proclaims in his prime years, a critique 
of speculative philosophy of right of the kind that Hegel singularly put forward cannot fulfill 
itself in critique alone, but only in engaging with the problems presented by that philosophy 
the only solution to which would be praxis (see MEW 1: 385). 
 
 
                                                     
110 Lukács, Der Junge Hegel, 568. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE POLITICAL ANTINOMY AND ITS RESOLUTION IN MARX’S  
THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE 
 
 
Chapter Overview:  
§ 1 The Constituted Form: The Proclaimed Republic  
§ 2 The Constituent Content: The Presuppositions of the Republic  
§ 3 The Antinomy of Constituting: The Politics of Capital  
§ 4 The Resolution to Come  
 
Camille: Die Staatsform muß ein durchsichtiges Gewand 
sein, das sich dicht an den Leib des Volkes schmiegt. 
[The state form must be a transparent garment 
that densely nestles itself to the body of the people.] 
 
Georg Büchner, Dantons Tod (1835) 
 
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte provides a history of the formation, decline, and fall 
of the Second Republic in France, from its inauguration on 25 February 1848 to its collapse 
by the coup d’état of 2 December 1851.1 The making of the Republic was a long process of 
constituting its formal structure. According to Marx, the process proved ridden with political 
conflicts that I will show to have been conditioned by an antinomy pertaining to the capitalist 
mode of production. It was not until the mature phase of the wholly constituted parliamentary 
Republic and its necessary failure to resolve its conflicts that the antinomy revealed its full 
import. It blossomed, that is, when the Republic’s two structural powers, the legislative 
                                                     
1 The pamphlet briefly covers the months following the 2nd of December coupe d’état and the re-installment of 
universal suffrage, abolished in May, 1850. The second presidential election early in 1852 as well as the 
proclamation of the “Second Empire” in November of the same year are also mentioned.  
Throughout the chapter, whenever I quote I follow this format in referencing: B: [chapter].[English page 
number]/ German page number).  
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Assembly and the executive apparatus of the state, landed in a fatal opposition over the issue 
of revising the Constitution.  
The antinomy that arises in the Eighteenth Brumaire can be stated thus. Under the rule of 
capital it has been made possible for the first time in history to proclaim the republic as a 
political form that conforms to its social content, and yet under the rule of capital the form of 
the republic necessarily fails to conform to its content because capital enforces the rule of one 
class over all others. By political form, I understand the idea of a lawful government, one and 
indivisible, whose legitimate sovereignty rests on its ability to represent the many members of 
the people as persons entitled to free, decent life. By social content, I mean the configuration 
of different classes and persons that live under the Republic with their material interests and 
their rightful claims, in virtue of the political form, to participate in forming the body politic. 
Both form and content are equally necessary for sustaining the Republic as a legitimate body. 
The political form in the Republic was not the form of its content but the form fittest for the 
rule of capital. In my argument, it is the performative nature of politics as the participation of 
the people in determining their collective life that sustains the antinomian character of the 
republic in light of its historical genesis under the condition of the capitalist mode of 
production.  
 We have an antinomy here because there are two independently valid yet conflicting 
assertions on the Republic insofar as the conditions for the possibility of the political form, 
capital, come into conflict with the product of those conditions, that is, a political organization 
that claims to exist to benefit all, not some, of the people. Conditioned by this antinomy, the 
Republic. I take Marx to maintain, encounters conflicts in the course of its constitution that 
are of a political nature. It will be shown that the mode of presentation and manifestation of 
the antinomy in the Eighteenth Brumaire must be a political narrative, so that any resolution to 
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it will need to bring together the form-content analysis and the narrative of political 
development. It is the figure of the proletariat that will make possible this unification.  
In the four steps taken in this chapter, I will first consider the political form of the republic 
and its place for Marx before and after 1848 (§ 1). I will next examine Marx’s account of the 
social content of the Republic as conditioned by the historical development of the centralized 
state and the smallholding peasantry as moments of the capital development (§ 2). In a third 
step, the antinomy of the form and the content of the Republic will be formulated by 
examining the conditions of its rise and manifestation on the political scene (§ 3). Finally, I 
will look at the resolution that Marx proposes to the antinomy. The chapter concludes on a 
note about the double character of the proletariat (§ 4). 
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte counts among Marx’s most lucid, well-argued, and 
in some senses straightforward works composed at a turning point both in his own thought 
and in the course of European history. There is a multifaceted yet not so bulky body of 
literature on this work, stretching from Marxists such as Lenin, Poulantzas, and Karatani to 
historians such as White.2 My own contribution to the understanding of the Eighteenth Brumaire 
limits itself to two points. First, I interpret it as a work that succeeds in formulating an 
antinomy with regard to a concrete political experiment. Second, I demonstrate the presence 
                                                     
2 See Lenin’s chapter on “The State and Revolution. Experience of 1848–1851” in The State and Revolution. Essential 
Works of Lenin, ed. Henry M. Christman, (New York: Dover, 1987), 285–296; Nicos Poulantzas’s sporadic take 
in his Political Power and Social Classes, trans. ed. by Timothy O’Hagan (London: Verso, 1968) esp. 79–81, 234–252, 
310–312; Kojin Karatani’s insightful introduction to his collection of essays, History and Repetition, ed. by Seiji M. 
Lippit (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 1-29; Hayden White’s chapter on “Marx: the Philosophical 
Defense of History in Metonymical Mode” in his narratological study Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in 
Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975); For a thorough unpacking and 
almost exhaustive analysis of the Eighteenth Brumaire, see Brunkhorst’s commentary to the Studienbibliothek 
edition of Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007). In the same vein, from 
an emphatically political perspective, see Draper’s multi-volume Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution, 4 vols. (New 
York: Monthly Review, 1974–1990). See esp. vol. 1, 385–410 for a discussion of the Bonapartist model of the 
state in the first volume.  
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of an implicit aesthetic mode in Marx’s operation in the Eighteenth Brumaire, with which I revert, 
in the Conclusion to this dissertation, to the problem of art’s double character in Adorno. 
 
§ 1 THE CONSTITUTED FORM: THE PROCLAIMED REPUBLIC  
Marx’s earliest intellectual interventions bear the mark of his lifelong preoccupation with the 
question of form and content in modern political life.3 The fruits of his reflections on the topic 
ripened at two moments in the development of his politico-economic thought: in 1852 when 
he composed the Eighteenth Brumaire and in 1867 when he finished the first volume of his 
Capital. My aim in the first part of this chapter is to show the necessity and functioning for 
Marx of the form of politics in modern bourgeois society, first before the experience of the 
Second Republic, then in its wake.  
According to Marx’s tripartite way of dividing the life of the Republic, the first period, the 
Prologue, starts with the February revolution in Paris that overthrew the constitutional July 
Monarchy of Louis Philippe. It set up a provisional government (24th of February) and 
proclaimed France a republic (25th of February). The second period begins on 4 May 1848 
with the first session of the Constituent National Assembly tasked with drafting the 
Constitution and preparing the structure of the executive power. This makes for the 
                                                     
3 Marx first took up the question of form and content in political life early on in his two articles on Prussian laws 
of censorship and freedom of the press. His key argument revolves around the conflict arising from the 
incompatibility of form and content in these laws. The best way to grasp his position in this regard is through 
the way that he compares the censorship law with the press law. He writes, “The censorship law has only the form 
of a law. The press law is the real law” (MEW 1: 57). The latter is a law for the sake of freedom of journalists, 
therefore, it constitutes, in Marx’s Hegelian language, “the positive existence of freedom.” Here Marx shows his 
approval of the necessity and validity of laws for freedom. For him, laws “are the positive, bright, universal norms 
in which freedom has gained an impersonal, theoretical existences that is independent from the arbitrariness of 
the individual. A law book is the freedom Bible of a people” (MEW 1: 58). By contrast, however, the censorship 
law is a “police measure” to prevent freedom conceived of as a crime, as something “unfavorable” (“Mißliebig”). 
The relation between the law of the freedom of the press and the law of censorship is that “arbitrariness and 
freedom” (“Willkür und Freiheit”) or “formal law and real law” (“formelles Gesetz und wirkliches Gesetz,” 
MEW 1: 61).  
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Constituent period or the constituting of the Republic. It lasted until 28 May 1849 when the 
Legislative National Assembly first convened. The final, Constituted, period, the constitutional 
Republic, consisted in the life of this Assembly throughout its growing feud with Louis 
Bonaparte, the President of the Republic. It ended with the fall of the Assembly following the 
latter’s coup on 2 December 1851 (see B: I. 108/15). This periodization gives us the key 
elements of the abstract form, or the outline of the structure of the republic.4 On that basis, 
we can say that the Republic fully settled itself only after it had put in place these elements. 
The Republic was founded as late as over a year after the primal scene of the February 
revolution. When we speak of the settled or completed form of the Republic what we should 
have in mind is the parliamentary republic that began its work in early 1849. The first two 
periods then corresponded to the operative time of the constituting of the form of the 
Republic, that is, the time that it took for the Republic to settle as a political form. All the 
same, the Republic as a form was there the moment it was proclaimed in February. 
                                                     
4 The tripartite process of constitution brings out the relation between the diverse meanings of the term constitution 
that are vital to the modern political life. The multifaceted concept of constitution makes for the specificity of 
the modern notion of politics or politeia: 
 “What becomes decisive for the development of the modern era’s concept of constitution [Verfassung] is that of 
πολιτεία [politeia]. It designates, first, the participation of the individual in the polis by virtue of the right of the 
citizen; then the ensemble or community of the citizens who concretize themselves in the state, and further the 
order under which the citizens live in the state, as well as the form of governing [the exercise of rule 
‘Herschaftsausübung’]. Πολιτεία means at once ‘citizenship’ and ‘Constitution.’” “Verfassung (I.): Konstitution, 
Status, Lex fundamentalis.” Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, 
ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1990), 833.  
Moreover, we should note the function of constitution both as a text and as an act whereby it becomes the 
founding event, the subject of debate, the matter of conflict, the framework of act, and the form of politics. In 
accord with its rhetorical origin, the stasis or constitutio throughout the course of the Second Republic was the 
multifold phenomenon of constitution itself. According to A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms (Richard A. Landham. 
2nd ed, University of California Press, 1991), the term stasis or issue, with its Latin synonyms constitutio, status, “is 
the Greek term for the main point at issue in a legal argument. . . : who has done what, when, and how. Some 
theorists further narrow the definition to the starting point of a case––the circumstances that give rise to it––or 
to the first point raised by an opponent in a legal case” (170. See also the entry “Issue” 93–94). For a discussion 
of the social and political origins of stasis see, Carter, Michael. “Stasis and Kairos: Principles of Social Construction 
in Classical Rhetoric.” Rhetoric Review 7, no. 1 (1988): 97–112. JSTOR. For a useful discussion of the relation 
between stasis and the German term Sache, see Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon. ed. Barbara 
Cassin et al, trans. Emily Apter et al (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). s.v. “Sachverhalt.” 
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The concise statement of the claim underlying the republic as a political form can be found 
in the first article of the 1848 French Constitution composed months after the February 
prologue: “The sovereignty resides in the universality of French citizens. It is inalienable and 
imprescriptible. No individual, no faction of the people, can attribute to itself the exercise of 
sovereignty.”5 France as a nation consists of numerous individuals and many factions of the 
people, there are various groups, guilds, and classes. But France as a republic owes its sovereign 
unity and indivisibility to none of these elements alone. An 1850 French dictionary defines the 
république thus, “A state governed by many who draw or should draw their authority from the 
people themselves of which they are the representatives, the mandatories.” 6 Another French 
document of the period at issue, a general report on jurisprudent terms between 1791 and 
1850, notes that in its general, absolute sense, republic “is synonym with political corpus; it 
designates the moral and collective body generated by the association or union of all the 
members of a nation.”7  
The participants of the February days in France did not have the idea of revolution as such 
on their minds but only the idea of being part of the political scene. As Marx points out, “The 
February days originally aimed at an electoral reform, by which the circle of the politically 
privileged among the possessing class itself was to be widened and the exclusive domination 
of the finance aristocracy overthrown” (B: I. 109/16).8 Participation of the excluded part of 
                                                     
5 “La souveraineté réside dans l’universalité des citoyens français. Elle est inaliénable et imprescriptible. Aucun 
individu, aucune fraction de peuple ne peut s’en attribuer l’exercice.” La France de la Bourgeoisie, 1815–1850, ed. 
Philippe Sussel, Paris : Culture, art, loisirs, 1970, 198. 
6 “état gouverné par plusieurs qui tiennent ou doivent tenir leur autorité du people lui-même, dont ils sont les 
représentants, les mandataires.” Dictionaire Breton-Français de le Gondiec (Saint-Brieuc, 1850), 560. 
7 “République,” Répertoire Général contenant la jurisprudence de 1791 a 1850 . . . , vol. 11, ed. Achille Morin (Paris: A. 
Durand, 1850) 343. While the author notes that in its more restrained sense, meaning as a form of government, 
republic is not a novel, exclusively modern form, it has been always contested whether and to what extent modern 
republics, federalist or unitary, owes to its preceding Attic and Roman versions. One major point of departure in 
the modern republic from ancient forms, in any case, is the decisive role of the many, of “all members of a 
nation.” 
8 Within few days between February 22 to 24, the chant everyone shouted transformed itself from “Vive la 
Réform!” to “Vive la République!” The genesis of the new agenda can be tracked down in the way the morning 
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French society in political power made for the key idea of the early 1848 Revolution. Marx’s 
conception of the form of the Republic should be understood in relation to this notion of 
participation, just as the failure of this form in the course of its life related to the betrayal of 
that participation. What made possible the participation of all was universal suffrage: “The 
universal voting right, this is the banquette question of the new revolution.”9 As Karatani 
notes, “The events described in The Eighteenth Brumaire are unthinkable outside of the system 
of popular suffrage. Marx points out the existence of actual social classes in the background 
of such a representative system.”10 The major difficulty involving the claim of the republic as 
set forth in Article I lies with the division in its social content, the state of various groups and 
factions. The challenge before the form of the republic is thus: Can this form abstract and 
separate itself from any particular interest and reach the level of a universality in which every 
person-as-citizen could partake?  
Until the experience of the events in the Second Republic, Marx’s understanding of politics 
primarily consisted in a critical reception of bourgeois politics in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution of 1789–1792. Marx’s clearest early account of what he understands by politics in 
its bourgeois sense is to be found in his 1843 review of Bruno Bauer’s series of articles on 
Jewish emancipation in Germany. In “On the Jewish Question,” the state in its republican, 
that is, empty form is the necessary intermediary through which “man frees himself politically” 
                                                     
meeting of the Chambers of Deputies on the 24th of February led to the afternoon meeting at Hôtel de Ville 
where the provisional government was appointed. See “Résumé des événements qui ont causé la chute de la 
dynastie de juillet.” 24 Février & 15 Mai 1848 ou compte-rendu . . . (Paris : Barba-Garnot, 1848), 9. 
9 “Das allgemeine Stimmrecht, es ist die Bankettfrage der neuen Revolution.” MEW 7: 94. The metonymy of 
“banquet question” in this statement from The Class Struggle in France: 1848–1851 conforms to its content. In the 
months leading to the February revolution, the French reformers, from intellectuals and politicians to workers, 
would participate in banquettes to discuss politics over victuals and drinks. Each banquet revolved around one 
question or issue. The electoral reform, which served as the initial aim of the would-be February revolutionaries, 
counted among them.  
10 Karatani, History and Repetition, 7. 
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and “he does so indirectly” because through the state.11 “Political” in this context is treated as 
synonymous with the state.12 The republican state succeeds in its political liberation of 
individuals in virtue of its emptiness with regard to any particular determinations: 
The state abolishes distinctions of birth, rank, education, and occupation in its fashion when 
it declares them to be non-political distinction, when it proclaims that every member of 
the community equally participates in popular sovereignty without regard to these 
distinctions, and when it deals with all elements of the actual life of the nation from 
the standpoint of the state.13 
 
This politically liberated human being constitutes the opposite of the status-human being 
that Marx saw as animal life. This, however, does not, of course, mean that the political 
individual, legally thus formally equal to fellow individuals, is de facto emptied of any particular 
determinations. There are still professions, ranks, births, religions, and races. Individuals have 
concrete lives and multifaceted ways of subsistence. The human being is abstracted into what 
the young Marx calls its species-being (Gattungswesen). Yet, the individual substance of this 
species-being is left behind: the “egotistic life remains in civil [bourgeois] society outside the state, 
but as qualities of civil society.” The outcome of the state-mediated political liberation of 
individuals is a double life: “In the political community he regards himself as a communal being; but 
in civil society he is active as a private individual, treats other men as means, reduces himself to a 
means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers”14. The “alien powers” primarily refers to 
the property relations and makes for Marx’s ironic remark on the formality of bourgeois 
politics. Bauer argued that in order for the Jew to become a citizen he must shrug off his 
                                                     
11 Karl Marx, Selected Writings, ed. Lawrence H. Simon (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 7. 
12 The Grimm Brothers’ dictionary of German language makes explicit this association of politisch with the state. 
See Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, s.v. “Politisch,” accessed September 4, 2018, http://dwb.uni-
trier.de/de/die-digitale-version/online-version.  
13 Marx, Selected Writings, 8.  
14 Marx, 8–9. 
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religion, and Marx asks why relinquish only religion and not private property? “The difference 
between the religious man and the citizen is the difference between the shopkeeper and the 
citizen, between the day laborer and the citizen. . . . The contradiction between the religious 
and political man is the same as that between bourgeois and citoyen.”15 If religion is viewed as a 
particular content from which the state is to free itself and thus the citizen, then the property 
relation must be viewed as such, too, for it constitutes a part of the living individual in civil 
society.  
In the bourgeois form of political life, human beings, according to the young Marx, emerge 
as individuals in immediate relation to political society. “The bourgeois [Bürger] must waive his 
status [Stand] in bourgeois society, his private status [Privatstand], in order to arrive at political 
significance; because it is precisely this status that stands between the individual and the political 
status” (MEW 1: 282). This is a useful formulation on Marx’s early view on bourgeois abstract 
political form. The key term here is Stand, status or estate.16 Modern bourgeois society is one 
in which statuses or estates have vanished and given their place to individuals who come into 
more direct social relation with each other. The way Marx deploys the concept of Stand both 
conforms to and sharply deviates from the French republican tradition of an Abbé Siéyes. 
Estate was a more or less fixed social condition usually divided into that of the nobility, the 
military, and the rest of the people, the third of which was considered the productive and 
active political agent of the French Revolution: the bourgeois status. 
                                                     
15 Marx, ibid. 
16 An old political dictionary from Marx’s time notes that the “Estate signifies that title or interest which a man 
has in lands, tenements, hereditaments, or other property,” and adds that ”This is the legal signification of Estate, 
which . . . is not a piece of land or other property, but signifies the relationship of ownership between a land and 
property. The word was also used in former times to signify men’s station (status) or condition in life. It was also 
used, and is still sometimes use, to signify a class or order in a state.” Political Dictionary . . ., vol. 1, ed. Charles 
Knight (London: C. Knight and Co.: 1845), s.v. “Estate,” 857. 
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According to Siéyes’s famous formulation, the third estate was nothing under the ancien 
régime at the same time as it was everything thanks to its role in production, and now it wants 
to become something.17 For Marx, estates turn human beings into animals by equating them with 
their familial, professional, racial, in sum, material determinations (“The middle ages were the 
animal history of humankind”; MEW 1: 285). In this sense, from the perspective of bourgeois 
politics, to become something amounts to breaking with one’s always-already determined 
status in society and asserting oneself as individual. We are now in a better position to 
understand Marx’s claim that the private status of the bourgeois is to be shrugged off if the 
individual is to participate in political life and be considered an individual in the first place. 
And it is this very distinction that characterizes the political state of the modern bourgeois 
society. This, however, involves the duplicating of the individual in two modes of being with 
no prospect for unifying them. The same singular individual (“das einzelne Individuum,” 
MEW 1: 368, 38218) is regarded once as the citizen or citoyen under the sign of the political and 
then again as the bourgeois under the sign of the social. This is true even at the linguistic level 
of the difference between political and civil, a difference alien to the ancient world.19 
How this distinction between the bourgeois and the citizen is interpreted divorces Marx’s 
position from the kind of bourgeois republicanism of Abbé Siéyes. For all his affirmative view 
                                                     
17 Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, What is the Third Estate? in Political Writings, trans. Michael Sonenscher (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2003), 94. 
18 On all other occasions in the “On the Jewish Question” Marx uses the term Individuum.  
19 Civil society is the Latin translation of the Greek Aristotelian concept of political society or politike koinonia in 
that both refer to the city/polis as the public sphere of free and equal citizens in distinction to the household. 
See Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT: 1992), 84, 86–87. It 
was with the introduction of formal rights of persons that the linguistic distinction between civil and political, 
between material or social life and legal or formal life became significant. 
 “It is uncontroversial to argue that in the history of the concept of ‘civil society’ we can discern two distinct 
conceptualizations. In the classical conceptualizations, that stretches from Aristotle well into the eighteenth 
century, ‘civil society’ was used as a synonym for ‘political society’: civitas sive societas civilis sive res republica, ‘the city-
state or civil society or common wealth.’ But since the mid-eighteenth century, the term ‘civil society’ has been 
used to define a realm of social life that is (or ought to be) separate from the ‘state.’” Roland Axtmann, Liberal 
Democracy into the Twenty-First Century: Globalization, Integration, and the Nation-State (New York: Manchester 
University Press, 1996) 54. 
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of political emancipation, Marx regards the dichotomy of political/civil, form/material as a 
malaise. While it departs from the animal history of medieval humankind, writes Marx, 
“Modern time, civilization, commits the opposite mistake. It separates the objective essence 
[gegensändliche Wesen] of man as something merely external, material, from him. It does not take 
the content of man as his true reality” (MEW 1: 286). While the estate-society of the 
premodern world reduced human beings to their immediate, external determinations of rank, 
birth, profession, race, gender, the bourgeois society reduces them to their common 
denominator as dwellers of political society or the state. This is the first step on the fated way 
toward becoming bourgeois citizens who are legally or formally equal because in equal distance 
to the state, but socially and materially unequal.20 And it is here that, in the face of the political 
formalism of bourgeois society, the question of content emerges for Marx. Herein lie the seeds 
of his would-be radical critique of bourgeois politics in the Eighteenth Brumaire.  
The Eighteenth Brumaire rests on the following postulate that Marx had introduced years 
before, and which proved relevant only after the 1848 experience, “The form has no value if 
it is not the form of the content” (MEW 1: 146).21 Translated into the terms of modern political 
                                                     
20 Koselleck’s insight on the language used in the first comprehensive general Territorial Law for the Prussian 
States (1794) illustrates the prototypical figure of the bourgeois in a German nation-state not yet fully 
constitutionalized: 
 “In order terminologically to unify the social-right [sozialrechtilich] inequality and state-right 
[staatsrechtlich] equality, the Territorial Law resorts to general expressions such as ‘dweller’ [‘Einwöhner’] 
or ‘member’ [‘Mitglieder’] of the state, which are neutral with respect to the legal status of the estates 
[Stände] and indicate the bigger universality of a state-citizenship. . . . As member of the state one was 
the subject of the monarch, yet at the same time, depending on one’s estate, the possessor of specific 
rights and duties.” Reinhart Koselleck, Preussen Zwischen Reform und Revolution: Allgemeines Landrecht, 
Verwaltung und Soziale Bewegung von 1791 bis 1848 (Stuttgart: Klett, 1967), 96.  
 
Even though the Prussian Law book did not fully modernize or constitutionalize the German nation, it worked 
towards establishing a more direct, political, mediation between the individuals and the state different from the 
one provided by the old estate-system. The Prussian path to genuine constitutionalism was yet to go a very long 
way, but already in the reforms of 1806 and then 1848 did major political changes find their ways into Germany.  
21 “Die Form hat keinen Wert, wenn sie nicht die Form des Inhlats ist.” Marx makes this remark on the occasion 
of the Prussian wood theft laws on which he wrote an article in the Rheinische Zeitung. On the aesthetic nature of 
Marx’s postulate and its vital importance for his political thought Eagleton writes, “The emancipated society, for 
Marx as much as for the Rousseau from whom he has learnt here, is an aesthetic interfusion of form and content. 
An interfusion of form and content, in fact, may be taken as Marx’s aesthetic ideal.” Terry Eagleton, The Ideology 
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life, Marx asserts that “Democracy is content and form. The monarchy must only be form, but 
it falsifies the content” (MEW 1: 231). On the basis of the distinction between political society 
and civil society, one could say that for Marx political form is valid, or deserves being called 
form at all, when the political state constitutes itself from within the elements of society. 
Although monarchy makes up a unity claiming to stand in for the people living inside the 
boundaries of a geographical territory, its organizing principle, its source of authority and 
legitimacy, does not originate in the will of the members of the people. It derives from the 
divine power with which one person or family has been endowed. Otherwise, if the monarchy 
were to be authenticated through the will of the people, according to the defenders of 
monarchy, the outcome would be anarchy. “Where every man is his own monarch or 
governor,” writes Robert Filmer, the people with their councils, assemblies, bodies of 
representatives “will crumble away into the atoms of monarchy, which is the next degree to 
anarchy . . . a broken monarchy.”22 In other words, representative bodies of the people cannot 
by themselves arrive at the level of the unity that only the monarch can realize, precisely 
because the monarchical unity does not form itself out of the aggregation of assembly of the 
members. Monarchy legitimizes itself by holding that “kings, queens and other princes . . . are 
ordained of God, are to be obeyed and honoured of their subjects,” says a 1570 homily that 
was to be read in all churches in England.23 With the numerous members of the people taken 
as the source of power, the monarchy finds it impossible meaningfully to unify all the “atoms” 
and to authenticate the rule of one person over that unity. Filmer is clear on this point when, 
                                                     
of the Aesthetic (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 210. For Eagleton, too, the Eighteenth Brumaire is the key 
work probing this postulate. However, Eagleton limits himself to pointing to this aesthetic ideal without showing 
how it practically is at work in Marx’s pamphlet.  
22 Robert Filmer, “Observations upon Aristotle’s Politiques (1652),” in Divine Right and Democracy: An Anthology of 
Political Writing in Stuart England, ed. David Wootton (London: Penguin, 1986), 113.  
23 “A Homily against Disobedience and Wylful Rebellion (1570),” in Divine Right and Democracy, 96. 
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commenting on the Bible’s view of governing, he writes, “A true representation of the people 
to be made is as impossible as for the whole people to govern.”24  
Democracy, by contrast, ventures into this very unity based on multiplicity. Only 
democracy deserves to be called a valid form for only democracy does not shy away from 
seeking the organizing principle of its unity in its own diverse members, in representing the 
“atoms of monarchy.” The modern definition of the republic shows an awareness of the claim 
many individuals, as citizens, lay to political participation, as opposed to the rule by a particular 
family or dynasty or religious, racial, or economic group.25 It is a unique form of political 
government, which, unlike others, cannot derive its legitimacy from any other source.  
Over the formative decade of his political thought from 1842 to 1852, Marx uses two 
expressions to refer to a legitimate political form, or political form proper, that is in accord 
with its content: democratic republic and social republic. As regards the relation between the 
one and the many in the republican claim, two formulations by the younger Marx (in the 
context of his critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right) can help illustrate the issue. On the 
difference of democracy from other state forms Marx writes: 
All the rest of state formations are only a certain, determinate, particular state 
form. In democracy the formal principle is at once the material principle. Thus, it 
is democracy alone that is the true unity of the universal and the particular. 
(MEW 1: 231)26 
 
                                                     
24 Filmer, 111. 
25 Ever since Jean Bodin’s famous definition of the republic as the rightful government of many households with 
things in common, this form has been characterized in the French tradition by a previously unthinkable mélange 
of sovereign power and the law with the many ‘plusieurs.’ According to Bodin, the republic is “un droict 
gouuernement de plusieurs menages et de ce qui leur est commun, auec puissance souueraine” ‘a rightful 
government of many households [of families] and of what is common to them, with sovereign power.’ Qtd in 
Lioyd, A. Howell. Jean Bodin.”The Pre-Eminent Man of France”: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 129. Still far from the modern form of politics, the “many” for Bodin refers to privileged, powerful 
groups, the households, not many individuals or the people at large.  
26 “Alle übrigen Staatsbildungen sind eine gewisse, bestimmte, besondere Staatsform. In der Demokratie ist das formelle 
Prinzip zugleich das materielle Prinzip. Sie ist daher erst die wahre Einheit des Allgemeinen und Besondern.” 
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In democracy, the abstract state has ceased to be the dominant moment. The 
conflict between monarchy and republic is itself still one within the abstract 
state. The political republic is democracy within the abstract state form. The 
abstract state-form of democracy is therefore the republic; but here it ceases 
to be merely the political constitution. (MEW 1: 233)27 
 
Two moves occur in these passages. One move designates the republic as a form distinct from 
other state formations and the other calls this distinct form democracy to the extent that the 
republic as a political constitution takes account of the question of its content. Thus, one is an 
abstracting or separating move and the other a concretizing one. In the first move, democracy 
and republic are treated as synonymous inasmuch as both differentiate themselves from all 
other forms of governing, such as constitutional monarchy, aristocracy, tyranny. Monarchies 
tend to associate themselves with family names like the Bourbons in France, the Romanovs 
in Russia, the Pahlavis in Iran. Republics cannot boast such affiliations; they take the name of 
a country, nation, region as the most general indicators of a territorial sovereign unity. 
Otherwise, they would contradict their claim to be a government represented by all the people 
and not by some groups among the people. The republic can empty itself of any kind of 
property in the form of family lineage, religious or divine affiliation, racial or brute power 
relations. It is abstract in the sense that it separates the condition for participating in body 
politic from any properties such as defined by religion, rank, and birth. For Marx, democracy 
is a state form that has no determinateness of its own, does not distinguish itself through a 
definite content, so that one cannot refer to it “in distinction to the other content” (“im 
Unterschied zu dem andern Inhalt”), which is to say, it is determined only by what is inside it 
                                                     
27 “In der Demokratie hat der abstrakte Staat aufgehört, das herrschende Moment zu sein. Der Streit zwischen 
Monarchie und Republik ist selbst noch ein Streit innerhalb des abstrakten Staats. Die politische Republik ist die 
Demokratie innerhalb der abstrakten Staatsform. Die abstrakte Staatsform der Demokratie ist daher die Republik; 
sie hört hier aber auf, die nur politische Verfassung zu sein.” 
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(MEW 1: 233). To use modern linguistic terms, it is the abstract system of langue whose 
content is the infinitely various particular utterances, while other state formations tend to 
dictate particular utterances as the main patterns for speaking.  
In the second move that takes place in the above quoted passages, this abstracted and 
emptied out state form, which has only the notion of the people as such to resort to, is to 
become aware of what it contains in the fullness of its diversity. It is to come to grips with the 
internal differentiations of the people as its source of sovereign legitimacy. By emptied out 
state form, I do not mean that democracy is free of social division of groups and classes, 
modes of production and concrete political conflicts. Emptiness refers to the claim of 
democracy to leave open the space of power and representation to all in spite of concrete 
distinctions. So, if the first move emphasizes the abstract moment in the republic by which 
the body politic separates itself from, and lets go of this or that property as condition of 
participation, the second move precisely stresses the need for the republic to concretize itself 
in respect of differences among the people. In monarchy or aristocracy only certain individuals 
or groups qualify to participate in the governing. The republic calls for the participation of all, 
negating the estrangement of monarchy from the life of the people (“Volksleben”; MEW 1: 
233). If no particular element can lay claim to sovereignty, then how is the republic determined 
as a form, what must it contain if it is not to be an empty form hovering over society? It must 
be democratic. A republic becomes democratic when it finds a way to equate the political 
society with the popular or civil society.28  
The mystery of democracy seems thereby solved. Even so, all Marx has in fact achieved in 
this early phase of his thought, through criticizing Hegel’s theory of the state, is that the state 
                                                     
28 For a discussion of Marx’s early conception of the state, see Helmut Reichelt, “Karl Marx u ̈ber den Staat. Zum 
Verha ̈ltnis von Staat und Gesellschaft im Marxschen Fru ̈hwerk,” in Der Staat der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft: Zum 
Staatsverständnis von Karl Marx, ed. Joachim Hirsch et al (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008). 
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not simply be an idea, a unitary lofty subject, ruling over the society as the sphere of particular 
elements. Rather, it is a real manifold subject constituting itself from within the differentiated 
civil or bourgeois society.29 Marx subsequently both remained on this track and drastically 
changed his direction. Five years from 1843, the prospect for a democratic republic in the 
sense outlined above presented itself to Marx and his generation. How does a democratic 
republic as the unity of the political and the social manifest itself in practice? When we look at 
the 1848 revolution, it takes the form of a proclamation by representatives of various groups 
of the people who have taken to the streets. The republic had been proclaimed on 25 February 
on the balcony of the Hôtel de Ville through a simple verbal, not written, statement: “La 
République est proclamée” (“the Republic is proclaimed”). This was done by Lamartine, a 
member of the Provisional Government appointed by the people the day before. In the first 
official proclamation of the Provisional Government on the 24th of February, it reads that 
“The Provisional Government wants a republic, through ratification by the people, who will 
immediately be consulted.”30  
It was not clear how such a consultation was to be done in the absence of an assembly or 
any means of communicating except through word of mouth and the presence on the streets. 
Yet, this is not to be regarded as a sociological question of how the revolutionaries or the 
members of the Provisional Government could possibly have the Republic ratified by all the 
members of French nation. Rather, it is a question of the presence of some members of the 
people promising the universal, inclusive, space of political participation for all. This promise 
                                                     
29 According to Marx, Hegel’s state as realized Idea of ethical life is to be developed and understood, not as a 
subject sustaining the organic whole of society in its many spheres (family, bourgeois society, corporations, 
individual persons), but as a subject developed out of the distinctions within society itself. See MEW 1: 210. 
30 ‘Le Gouvernement proviso ire veut la république, sauf ratification par le peuple, qui sera immédiatement 
consulté.” Actes officiels du Gouvernement provisoir . . . les 22, 23 et février 1848, 2. The issue of ratification was reflected 
in the debates of the first session of the National Assembly on 4 May 1848. See “Séance de jeudi 4 mai 1848.” 
Compte rendu des séances de l’Assemblée nationale, vol. 1, 14–18.  
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takes the form of an operative act, which can be successful or unsuccessful, not a statemental 
description that could be true or false.31 Marx writes of the revolutionary February in 1848, 
immediately after the proclamation of the republic, “No one and nothing dared to claim the 
right to persist and to act” (translation modified). The main act consisted in the very making 
possible of political presence, as Marx promptly adds, “All the elements that had prepared or 
determined the revolution, the dynastic opposition, the republican bourgeoisie, the 
democratic-republican petty bourgeoisie and the Social-Democratic workers, provisionally 
found their place in the February government” (B: I. 109/16).32 A space is opened up, though in 
a transient manner, in which various groups in French society claim to be players, having a 
voice, and yet no single group or individual qualifies to totalize its own claim or voice over 
others. Marx occasionally refers to this early moment as that of fraternity or universal 
brotherhood (B: VI. 180/111). The February scene temporarily captured the unity of political 
society and civil society.33  
The double move sketched above in the context of Marx’s definition of the democratic 
republic aims at establishing the republic as an autonomous form or a form of self-
determination. Self-determination or autonomy here should be understood in a double sense, 
                                                     
31 See J. L. Austin, “Performative Utterances,” in Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 
220–239. As for the act of proclaiming, Austin classifies it under the “exercitives”: 
 “An exercitive is the giving of a decision in favour of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it. It 
is a decision that something is to be so, as distinct from a judgment that it is so: it is advocacy that it should be 
so, as opposed to an estimate that it is so, it is an award as opposed to an assessment; it is a sentence as opposed 
to a verdict.” J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà, 2nd ed (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 155.  
32 “Niemand und Nichts wagte das Rechts des Bestehens und der wirklichen That für sich in Anspruch zu 
nehmen. Alle Elemente, die die Revolution vorbereitet oder bestimmt hatten, dynastische Opposition, 
republikanische Bourgeoisie, demokratisch-republikanisches Kleinbürgerthum, sozial-demokratisches 
Arbeiterthum fanden provisorische ihren Platz in der Februar-Regierung.” 
33 See the recent work by Judith Butler, Notes Towards a Performative Theory of Assembly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2015), putting forward the thesis that “[A]cting in concert can be an embodied form, calling 
into question the inchoate and powerful dimension of reigning notions of the political . . . The Gathering signifies 
in excess of what is said, and that mode of signification is a concerted bodily enactment, a plural form of 
performativity.” 9, 8.  
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negative and positive. Negatively, because the republic claims to be free of the determining 
force of particular interests, special groups of people, and divine right. Positively autonomous 
because, in virtue of proclaiming the opening up of a universal space of power, the republic 
claims to represent all the people, meeting their concrete demands and interests, from voting 
rights and right to labor to enjoying the public goods.34 Though present as a promise in the 
February act of proclamation, it was the positive dimension of the autonomous form of the 
proclaimed republic that, as I will show in the next part, proved problematic. 
Any felicitous performative, that is, doing things either by saying words or by bodily 
presence, requires a set of conditions. The conditions include history, agents, correct and 
complete act, intention, and fulfilling the promise in the future. According to Austin, there 
must be an accepted conventional procedure, the appropriate persons must invoke the 
procedure, all participants must perform the procedure correctly and completely, there must 
be the relevant intention to do so, and they “must actually so conduct themselves 
subsequently.”35 In our case, we encounter the previous proclamation of the Republic in 1792, 
the presence of the February revolutionaries on the scene, the act of proclaiming the Republic. 
These make up the first four conditions. As regards the last two conditions, having the right 
intention to promise and fulfilling that promise, there was no way to verify them in the 
February event. But these two, unlike the first four, do not make up the conditions for the 
                                                     
34 The same double movement in Marx’s critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is at work in his account of political 
vs. human emancipation in “On the Jewish Question.” What follows the upward, abstracting move that frees 
human beings from particular determinations, elevating them into the political society, is a downward, 
concretizing move. This second move aims at the real content of the politically thus formally emancipated human 
being. The goal of the double movement is to reconcile political society with civil society. It is for this reason 
that Marx asserts, “Democracy is content and form. The monarchy must only be form, but it falsifies the content.” 
MEW 1: 231. 
35 See Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 14–15. Regard for the conditions for performatives tends to be absent 
from widespread discussion of performativity in very diverse fields of agency. Butler turns to the question of the 
conditions for performative agency with the concept of precarity as defining living in contemporary Neoliberal 
society. Butler, Assembly, 45, 65, 66–98, 118, 124, 131, 177.  
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success of the act in the moment of its enactment. The February revolutionaries might have 
proclaimed the Republic in bad faith or could or would not have decided fully to follow 
through its implications. In other words, they might have abused the act that had successfully 
been executed.36 The intention and fulfilment augment the political performative by adding a 
procedural, temporal dimension to it, extending its relevance and scope to the future.37 In light 
of the fact that the Second Republic collapsed in the course of nearly four years, one could 
ask whether it was the agents and their abusive mode of acting that botched the Republic or 
whether there were structural obstacles that turned the proclamation into a miscarriage.  
In The Class Struggles in France: 1848 to 1850, about two years before the end of the Second 
Republic and the composition of the Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx wrote, “The bourgeoisie has no 
king: the true form of bourgeois rule is the republic.” 38 The rule of one class over other classes 
would not qualify for the “universality of French citizens” as claimed in Article I of the 
Constitution unless we conceive of this universality solely as legal equality of all regardless of 
their social and class status. It seems that, so far as it leaves intact property relations, bourgeois 
politics falsifies the content just as monarchy did. For Marx, this signaled the contradiction in 
the form of monarchy. In the case of bourgeois democracy, the contradiction takes the form 
of an antinomy. The antinomy arose because the real conditions that underlay the 
proclamation of the republic as an autonomous and valid form came into conflict with the 
essential claim of that form, whereas both remain necessary for sustaining the republic as a 
                                                     
36 Austin clearly distinguishes between the first four and the last two conditions. While the absence of any of the 
first four conditions would end up in “misfire,” that is, an unsuccessful or infelicitous performative, the absence 
of any of the last two would lead to an abuse of the act that is achieved. See Austin, 16.  
37 For a concise programmatic reconstruction of the concept of the political as a procedure, in a manner not 
entirely alien to Austin’s ways, see Alain Badiou, Metaplitics, trans. Jason Barker (London: Verso, 2012), chap. 10: 
“Politics as Truth-Procedure,” 141–152. 
38 “Die Bourgeoisie hat keinen König, die wahre Form ihrer Herrschaft ist die Republik.” Karl Marx, Surveys from 
Exile, vol. 2 of Political Writings, ed. David Fernbach (New York: Vintage,1974), 68; MEW 7: 40. 
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legitimate body. These were summed up by Marx under the capitalist mode of production in 
its different moments. 
 
§ 2 THE CONSTITUENT CONTENT: THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE 
REPUBLIC  
In his short and compact essay called “Society” Adorno makes a passing remark on the nature 
and place of conflict in 1848 that directly speaks to Marx’s position in the Eighteenth Brumaire. 
Of the time around 1848 Adorno writes that “the relation of classes manifested itself as a 
conflict between the society-immanent group, the bourgeoisie, and the proletariat finding itself 
halfway outside it” (GS 8: 17).39 This conflict in the aftermath of 1848 differed from the 
struggle between the nascent bourgeois society and the monarchical rule in 1789. The 
distinction between the two kinds of conflict is operative throughout the Eighteenth Brumaire. 
For Marx, the first or old French Revolution set up “modern bourgeois society,” created the 
conditions for “free competition . . . parceled landed property . . . and unchained industrial 
productive forces” (B: I. 104). It was a bourgeois revolution against the old aristocratic and 
feudal forces in French society with their reign over big landed properties.40 But, as the early 
developments after the 1848 Revolution revealed, at issue was no longer the question of 
“republic or monarchy” but that “here bourgeois republic signifies the unlimited despotism of 
                                                     
39 “[Das] Klassenverhältnis sich als Konflikt zwischen der gesellschaftsimmanenten Gruppe, der bürgerlichen, 
und der halb draußen befindlichen, dem Proletariat manifestierte. . . .”  
40 Marx’s characterization of the French Revolution as a bourgeois revolution against feudal relations has seen a 
heated controversy specially since the 1950s. For a summary of some of the major objections and a defence of 
Marx’s position, see Richardo Duchesne, “The French Revolution as a Bourgeois Revolution: A Critique of the 
Revisionists,” Science & Society 54, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 288–320. This issue of Science & Society is devoted to “The 
French Revolution and Marxism” (guest editor: Bernard H. Moss). For an extensively researched study on the 
category of “bourgoeis revulution,” from the English Revolution to 1848, and from before the rise of Marxism 
to the twentieth-century revisiniost positions, see Neil Davidson, How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions? 
(Chicaco: Haymarket, 2012). See esp. 332–485 on revisionism. 
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one class over other classes” (B: I. 111). In the aftermath of 1848, the goal that the 1789 
revolutionaries had sought, the republic and the overthrowing of the monarchy, had been 
achieved, yet the conflicts had not ceased but were internalized in the republic between its 
major actors. Such a republic-immanent, or society-immanent, conflict ran its course up to the 
end of the Second Republic when a false or indeed farcical resolution was given to it by the 
figure of Louis Bonaparte.41 
If the view of the Republic during the revolutionary prologue can be called naïve on 
account of the autonomy and the break with the previous forms of government that the 
revolutionaries were convinced it had to offer, the other view on the form of the Republic as 
the rule of one class over all others can be described as ironic. The Republic claims that it 
represents the universality of the French citizens whereas in fact it presents the best form for 
the rule of capital by representing only one class of the people. Here Marx adopts a historical 
standpoint on the presuppositions of the rise of the Republic and thus turns to the 
determination of the Republic through its constituent social content. The protagonist of 
Marx’s historical narrative is the smallholding peasant. The making of this class was 
accompanied by the evermore centralized state power since the French Revolution and, more 
                                                     
41 The “time around 1848” is significant for Adorno for although what came afterwards managed to resolve the 
conflict, it did so by integrating all social forces of resistance into what Lenin would call an ever-perfected state 
machine (289) and Adorno would call a totally administered world (GS 10. 2: 506, 772, 797). The context of this 
remark is a discussion of the process of socialization (in Herbert Spencer). Adorno goes on to state that in stark 
contrast to this period when there still remains an active conflict, modern society managed to integrate all 
individuals and groups without allowing any differentiation within itself. By differentiation he means the capacity 
of individuals to know themselves as subjects. The medium of this socializing integration without differentiation 
according to Adorno is a process that Marx had not yet fully articulated by the time he wrote the Eighteenth 
Brumaire but only a few decades later in Capital: the “valorizing law of capital” and the compulsion of the market 
to have all the consumers to adapt themselves to its demands (C: 18). If the body of Marxist tradition, from Lenin 
to Poulantzas, stresses the importance of the state with its repressive apparatuses in the workings of post-1852 
bourgeois society, Adorno, like Althusser, tends to highlight what the latter calls the ideological apparatuses of 
the state: from schools and churches to communication venues and manifestations of culture industry. See Louis 
Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review, 2001), 85–127, 
esp. 101–103. Adorno’s relation to the Eighteenth Brumaire is rarely noted. For a take on the importance of the 
conclusions of Marx’s work and the period in question for Adorno’s thought see Larsen’s Modernism and Hegemony: 
A Materialist Critique of Aesthetic Agencies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 9–11.  
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structurally, by the development of the capitalist mode of production. Before turning to the 
role of this protagonist in the life of the Republic, I should make a note on the significance of 
the social content of the Republic both for Marx and the February revolutionaries.  
The Marx of 1850 had ceased to use the term “democratic republic” approvingly. His name 
for a republic that was not merely the form of the bourgeois rule was now social republic 
(“soziale Republik”). Social republic promised the unity of the political form of the republic 
and its social content. It was an ideal advocated by the socialists and the workers. In Marx’s 
words with regard to the prologue period, “Every party construed it [the Republic] in its own 
way. Having secured it arms in hand, the proletariat impressed its stamp upon it and 
proclaimed it to be a social republic” (B: II. 109/16).42 A socialist pamphleteer of the time 
concisely articulates what is at stake in this idea:  
The social republic attacks property first and foremost. How could it respect 
it? Society says, with justice and reason: unity of the law for all, equality of 
rights for all; but diversity, inequality of fact [or what is the case], in partitioning 
of the goods. The social republic responds: the same sum of goods to be 
apportioned to all; equality in rights, equality in fact.43  
 
The two aspects of the social republic are designated in the passage by the legal equality and 
factual equality or equality in receiving the goods produced in society. From the standpoint of 
the (best) advocates of the social republic, or the socialists, only the unity of both forms of 
                                                     
42 “Jede Partei deutete sie in ihrem Sinn. Von dem Proletariat, die Waffen in der Hand ertrotzt, prägte es ihr 
seinen Stempel auf und proklamirte sie als soziale Republik. So wurde der allgemeine Inhalt der modernen 
Revolution angedeutet . . .” 
43 “La République sociale attaque d’abord la propriété. Comment pourrait-elle la respecter? La société dit, avec 
la justice et la raison: unité de lois pour tous, égalité de droits pour tous ; mais diversité, inégalité de fait, dans la 
répartition des biens. La République sociale répond: la même somme de biens appartient à tout; égalité dans le 
droit, égalité dans le fait.” M. J. Langlais, La République sociale. Lettres a un électeur de la Sarthe. European pamphlets, 
vol. 22 (Paris : Sablé, 1850), 26.  
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equality, legal and factual, could satisfy the desideratum of social republic.44 This distinction 
echoes that of the young Marx’s between the political state or the abstract form of the republic, 
and the civil society. If the unity of both for him amounted to democracy or democratic 
republic, now, instead of democratic, Marx tends to use the adjective social. As Draper puts 
it, social republic “means carrying through the revolution from its merely political phase. This 
is what gives it an antibourgeois bite,” for a social revolution would have to come to terms 
with the question of factual equality and distribution of the fruits of labor.45 According to the 
pamphleteer, what stands in the way of this legal-factual unity, or universal-particular unity in 
Marx’s early terminology, is property. A republic bereft of this unity was dubbed a bourgeois 
or democratic (or bourgeois-democratic) republic.46  
                                                     
44 Equality of all citizens before the law makes for a principle of the republic. The first proclamation of the 
Provisional Government, stating that the government wants a republic to be ratified by the people, points to the 
trinity of liberty, equality, and fraternity as principles underlying the republic. See Actes officiels, 2.  
45 Draper, Marx’s Theory of Revolution, vol. 2, 205. For an example of labor demands set forth by the workers in 
the aftermath of the 1848 Revolution, see the statement published in the first issue of the Journal des travailleurs 
founded by the workers’ delegation to the Government Commission for Workers known as the Luxembourg 
Commission. Jacques Rancière and Alain Faure, La parole ouvrière: 1830–1851 (Paris: La Fabrique, 2007), 298–
301. The statement demands the right to work, the right to association, the termination of the word and idea of 
exploitation, the right to enjoy the products of labor. 
46 To get a sense of the conflict inherent in this issue, it should be noted that even a politician and thinker of the 
caliber of Tocqueville did not hold the view that the two kinds of equality, the bourgeois-democratic and the 
socialist, were reconcilable. At one of the meetings of the National Assembly in 1848 around the place of the 
right to work in the Constitution, as he speaks of the affinity between democracy and socialism in their emphasis 
on equality, he urges his audience to remark the “difference: democracy wants equality in liberty, and socialism 
wants equality in gene and in servitude” ‘différence: la démocratie veut l’égalité dans la liberté, et le socialisme 
veut dans la géne et dans la servitude.’ Œuvres, Papiers et Correspondances, vol. 3 (Paris: Gallimard, 1951), 179. See 
also the discourse on socialism (189–190). Even so, Tocqueville was well aware of the key bone of contention in 
the period of the Second Republic and its difference from previous political conflicts in France. By drawing upon 
one of his earlier speeches, in 1847, he writes, “The time will come when the country will find itself once again 
divided between two great parties. The French Revolution which abolished all privileges and destroyed all 
exclusive rights, has allowed one to remain, that is property.” The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville, trans. 
Alexander Teixeira de Mattos (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1979), 10. On a similar note, August Blanqui, the 
voice of radical, Jacobin republicanism and the proletarian socialism, declares in a pamphlet (26 February 1848), 
“We are no longer in ’93! We are in 1848! The tricolor drapery is not the drapery of the Republic; it is that of 
Louis Philippe and of the monarchy.” Texts choisis, ed. V. P. Volgin (Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1971), 110. In other 
words, the political struggle for establishing the republic, as in 1792–94, is not enough. The struggle is also social 
and among the forces that are already within the framework of the republic as a political form. But the republic 
as a mere political form, as merely a system of formal equality, has no other content but monarchy in the shape 
that it took under Louis Phillipe. A concise account of the relation and tension between the radical bourgeois 
struggle for political representation and the socialists struggle for social revolution, see Shlomo Avineri, Karl 
Marx: Social and Political Thought of Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 212–214.  
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This was widely in keeping with his and Engels’ view in the Manifesto of the Communist Party 
two years prior, just before the 1848 Revolution. They wrote, “the bourgeoisie has at last, since 
the establishment of modern industry and of the world market, conquered for itself, in the 
modern representative state, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern state is but 
a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.”47 The defining 
feature of the Manifesto and Class Struggle views of the representative state is their tendency to 
conceive of the bourgeoisie as a more or less unified ruling class that has the state as an 
instrument at its disposal.48 Both elements of this view, the class unity of the bourgeoisie and 
the state as an instrument for bourgeois rule, would change two years later in the 1852 
Eighteenth Brumaire, where, according to Lenin, Marx was to take “a tremendous step forward” 
from the “extremely abstract manner” and the “most general terms” of the Manifesto.49 Not 
only would the factious struggles emerge within the French big bourgeoisie, and between this 
bloc and the bourgeois masses in society, the state as the executive power of the Republic 
would rise as a powerful, independent force. This situation fully emerged only when the 
Republic was in its mature form. Before the Eighteenth Brumaire there was no report of any 
inevitable conflict of this sort in Marx’s works.50 
 
                                                     
47 Karl Marx, The Revolutions of 1848, vol. 1 of Political Writings, ed. David Fernbach (London: Verso, 2010), 59. 
48 Apart from the experience of the first half of the Second Republic, up to 1850, when he refers to the 
representative state, Marx must have had three cases in view: The First Republic in France from 1792 to 1799, 
when it was struck down by Napoleon’s coup d’état on 18th of the revolutionary month of Brumaire, especially 
the less radical, more liberal-bourgeois period after the Jacobin Terror: 1794–11799; the parliamentary monarchy 
in the Great Britain, and the newly founded federalist Republic in the United States. For a discussion of the 
bourgeois class state, See Richard N. Hunt, The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, vol 2: Classical Marxism 1850–1895 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974), 64–99. 
49 V. I. Lenin, The State and Revolution, 289. 
50 The introduction of social differentiations in the form of class division poses a number of problems with regard 
to any Marxist theory of form and the state form. As Hall draws attention, the application of the “determinations” 
placed by “objective conditions over the political resolutions” became increasingly unrelenting and widespread 
in Marx. Stuart Hall, “The ‘Political’ and the ‘Economic’ in Marx’s Theory of Classes,” in Class and Class Structure, 
ed. Alan Hunt (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1977), 40.  
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Marx’s account of the lineage of the conflict between the social content of the Republic and 
its political form goes beyond the case of the Second Republic. In his view, the Republic during 
1848–1851 inherited the double historical situation of an ongoing state-building and social 
fragmentation. The social forces, the army of laborers, artisans, smallholders, as well as the 
hordes of the property-less, the rabble and the lumpenproletariat did not find their proper 
expression in the parliamentary Republic. The failure of the form of the parliamentary 
Republic would show itself in the allegiance between its excluded social content, represented 
by the enormous population of the smallholding peasants, and the executive power of the 
state. As Marx writes of the collusion of the peasants with the Bonapartist state later in the life 
of the Republic, “The political influence of the small-holding peasants, therefore, finds its final 
expression in the executive power subordinating society to itself” (B: VII. 188). His famous 
characterization of this class as a sack of potatoes rests on the claim that the isolated peasants 
could not form a meaningful social unity translatable into political form proper. Marx 
characterizes the smallholding peasants thus: 
The smallholding peasants [Parzellenbauern] form a vast mass, the members of which 
live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one 
another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing 
them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is increased by France's bad means of 
communication and by the poverty of the peasants. Their field of production, the 
smallholding, admits of no division of labour in its cultivation, no application of 
science and, therefore, no diversity of development, no variety of talent, no wealth of 
social relationships. Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it itself 
directly produces the major part of its consumption and thus acquires its means of life 
more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society. A smallholding, 
a peasant and his family; alongside them another smallholding, another peasant and 
another family. A few score of these make up a village, and a few score of villages 
make up a department. In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by 
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simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack 
of potatoes. (B: VII. 187/119) 
 
In light of this vast population that, thanks to their position in the capitalist mode of 
production, are incapable of forming a unity that could rise above particular interests, the real 
trial of social republic as the modern political form par excellence fully appears. The logic of 
parcellation runs counter to the logic of making political wholes capable of resisting 
disintegration. The smallholding peasants’ little shares of the previously massive portions of 
the land were indebted to the land reforms carried out by the first French Revolution. On the 
one hand, this class formed itself following the fragmentation of the land in the countryside 
in the wake of the overthrowing of the landed aristocracy; on the other hand, however, it 
“supplemented free competition and the beginning of big industry in the town” (B: VII. 
190/122). The isolated peasants, which despite their communal life never really formed a class 
according to Marx, helped the nascent, accumulating capital extract profits from partitioned 
lands not previously possible on a large and productive scale. Accompanying the peasantry as 
a class in its historical becoming was the rise of the centralized state.  
Marx writes of the emergence of an all-powerful state power in France in the wake of its 
first Revolution: 
This executive power with its enormous bureaucratic and military organisation, with 
its extensive and artificial state machinery, with a host of officials numbering half a 
million, besides an army of another half million, this appalling parasitic body, which 
enmeshes the body of French society like a net and chokes all its pores, sprang up in 
the days of the absolute monarchy, with the decay of the feudal system, which it helped 
to hasten. The seignorial privileges of the landowners and towns became transformed 
into so many attributes of the state power, the feudal dignitaries into paid officials and 
the motley pattern of conflicting medieval plenary powers into the regulated plan of a 
state authority whose work is divided and centralised as in a factory. The first French 
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Revolution, with its task of breaking all separate local, territorial, urban and provincial 
powers in order to create the civil unity of the nation, was bound to develop what the 
absolute monarchy had begun: the centralisation, but at the same time the extent, the 
attributes and the agents of governmental power. Napoleon perfected this state 
machinery. (B: VII. 185/116–117). 
 
Breaking the old feudal relations of production and administration set in motion the social 
forces and opened up the scene for accumulating a power that was increasingly becoming 
concentrated. This new “civil unity of the nation” with its paid officials, however, went hand 
in hand with a new form of fragmentation of the nation: division of work among the 
functionaries of the state. Hinting at the connivance of the state machinery and capitalist 
production, Marx’s metaphor for this division is factory: “a state authority whose work is 
divided and centralised as in a factory.”51 If a fragmented society and fragmented landed 
property became the suitable stuff for governing, then the smallholding peasants as a class 
could potentially become the proper ally of the state power.52  
This relation between smallholding peasants and the nascent bourgeois rule in France 
ceased to be as harmonious during the Second Republic as it was under Napoleon the first, 
                                                     
51 A few years before Marx had laid out his theory of the increasing independence and self-organization of the 
state with regard to the bourgeois society as the latter broke away from the traditional forms of cooperation. The 
following passage from The German Ideology (co-authored with Engels) offers a clear account:  
“The bourgeoisie, because it is a class, no longer a estate [Stand], has been forced to organize itself nationally, no 
longer merely locally, and to give its average interests a universal form. Through the emancipation of private 
property from the commonwealth [Gemeinwesen] has the state become a particular existence next to and outside 
of the bourgeois society; it is, however, nothing further than the form of organization that the bourgeois, both 
externally and internally, give themselves by necessity in order mutually to guarantee their property and their 
interests. The independence of the state nowadays emerge in those countries where the estates have not fully 
developed themselves into classes, where the estates dispelled in the advanced countries still play a role and there 
exists a mixture, and in which, therefore, no part of the population can gain rule over the rest. This is, namely, 
the case in Germany.” MEW 3: 62. 
52 In a very useful interpretation, Negt and Mohl take the smallholding peasant, this “hidden secrets of patriotist 
state spectacle,” as the “elementary form” of the Bonapartist state in the same way that Marx later in Capital I 
would take commodity as the elementary form of the wealth of capitalists societies. Oskar Negt and Ernst-
Theodor Mohl, “Marx und Engels: der unaufgehobene Widerspruch von Theorie und Praxis,” in Pipers Handbuch 
der Politischer Ideen, vol. 4 (Munich: Piper, 1985), 486. 
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according to Marx. He points out the ramifications of the existence of an ever-powerful state, 
allied with capital, and the impoverishment and misery that it had generated both in the 
countryside and the town (see B: VII. 191/123–124). For this reason, Marx holds, the 
omnipotence of the state power did become a problem with the rise of the economically 
frustrated, indebted smallholding class that stepped into the political scene on 10 December 
1848, when Bonaparte was elected as the president of the Republic. The peasantry, thus, had 
their revenge against the bourgeois republic by electing Louis Bonaparte.53 
With Marx’s account of the smallholding peasants as a key moment in the social content 
of the Republic we get a clear sense of the robust difficulty involved in the republican 
experiment: justifying its political form by fully representing what it contains. This content 
turned out to be essentially fragmented and incapable of taking form. Essential because of the 
very structure of the peasant class preceding the formation of the Republic. The peasantry’s 
relation to the state through taxation and to the capitalist production through parceled lands 
providing raw materials for rising industries, “this enslavement by capital” (VII: 190), made it 
                                                     
53 His full account of this rise is given in Class Struggle (The Eighteenth Brumaire refers the reader to that account, 
B: II. 119/29). That the peasants all together voted for Louis Bonaparte and not the republican candidate 
Cavaignac––the former general in charge of crushing the June 1848 insurrection and the visible face of bourgeois 
republicanism––owed to their frustration with the post-February taxation. To settle its budget deficit after the 
Revolution, the Provisional Government had already started imposing a new tax on the peasantry, 45 centimes 
in the franc, on a number of goods. To pay its debts and grant credits to its bourgeois rentiers, bankers, 
industrialists, the state sacrificed the peasantry, according to Marx. Compare these two passages by Marx from 
1850 and 1852 as regards the role of the peasantry: 
While the revolution of 1789 began by relieving the peasant of his feudal burdens, the revolution of 1848, the 
revolution of 1848 introduced itself to the rural population by levying a new tax, in order not to endanger capital 
and in order to keep the machinery of state running.” Surveys from Exile, 51. 
[10 December 1848] was a reaction of the peasants, who had had to pay the costs of the February revolution, against 
the remaining classes of the nation, a reaction of the country against the town. B: II. 119/29–30. 
These programmatic statements on the contribution of two French Revolutions both to the rise of modern 
bourgeois state and at the same time to the internal, social threats to that state remain highly abstract. Marx offers 
his historical account both here and in the last, interpretive chapter of the Eighteenth Brumaire. This is a meaningful 
decision in terms of the mode of presentation of his case. Meaningful because of the dual contribution of the 
peasantry: the one time in electing Bonaparte and the second time in supporting his later moves up to the coupe 
d’état. 
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a massive class in the French society of the mid-nineteenth century that rendered the social 
content of the Republic inherently contradictory.  
The making and features of the peasantry as laid down by Marx may appear as a contingent 
historical development specific to France since the late eighteenth century. The making and 
role of this class in Great Britain, Holland, Germany, Japan, and other countries is bound to 
display striking differences. Yet, the variety in developments should not conceal the presence 
of an underlying development that shows common formal features wherever capital sets foot. 
According to Capital, the smallholding peasantry in itself was not the sign of a full-fledged 
capitalist production; it proved, however, a moment of its arising in the form of fully socialized 
industrial production in which the majority of the population emerged as wage laborers. 
Capital was to extend its rule over agriculture, subsuming all forms of products and all forms 
of labor, but first by expropriating “a part of the agricultural population”: “Formerly, the 
peasant family produced means of subsistence and raw materials, which they themselves for 
the most part consumed.” With the development of capitalist production, “These raw 
materials and means of subsistence have now become commodities; the large-scale farmer 
sells them, he finds his market in the manufactures.” The role of the smallholding peasants 
was to provide “raw materials” (C: 910–911).54 This process was set in motion in Britain in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth century, while in France it started in the late eighteenth century.55 
 Viewed from this structural perspective, fragmentation of society, the land rents, the 
money form and, most of all, the rise of the wage labor create both the presuppositions and 
                                                     
54 The smallholding peasantry, or the agrarian relations of class and landed property s such, as a key moment of 
the rise of capitalist mode of production in Europe is not free of controversy in the political economy literature. 
See The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, ed. T. H. Aston and 
C. H. E. Philton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).  
55 Marx’s account of the historical process of accumulation of capital mainly looks at this development in England 
and Northern Ireland. See C: Part Eight, 873–943. 
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the results of the emergence of capital, according to Marx. In the third part of this chapter I 
proceed to consider the antinomy of the Republic, its relation to the capital form, and the 
specific manifestation of the antinomy in the political life of the Second Republic.  
 
§ 3 THE ANTINOMY OF THE REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF CAPITAL  
On the account of the preceding sections, we are in a position to formulate the antinomy of 
the republic in the following terms: 
THESIS: The Republic proclaims itself as a self-determining body politic that 
represents all the people.  
 
ANTITHESIS: The Republic is determined by capital and thus represents the rule of 
one class over all the people.  
 
We have an antinomy here because the same phenomenon, the French republic, can be 
viewed from the standpoints of two opposed yet equally valid determinations. From the thetic 
standpoint, the Republic is treated as an already constituted structure that stands in itself in 
virtue of its being proclaimed by the February revolutionary agents. Of an essentially political 
nature, this standpoint regards the existence of the Republic in its own terms from the moment 
it was called into being by a performative act, hence as determined through form alone. France 
constitutes itself as a republic, and neither in the oral proclamation from the balcony of Hôtel 
de Ville in Paris nor in the written text of the Constitution months later is there any recourse 
to the conditions for the arising of the Republic except the will of the people in France. The 
political form of the Republic owes its validity to the presence of the conditions for the success 
of the proclamation act. The Republic appears in the eyes of the revolutionary agents as a 
break with previous forms of body politic, especially monarchy, separating itself from other 
 243 
principles of organizing such as family, religion, money, birth, race. In Marx’s words, “The 
February revolution was a surprise attack, a taking of the old society unawares, and the people 
proclaimed this unexpected coup de main as a deed of historic importance, ushering in the new 
epoch” (B: I. 106).  
The other standpoint, which offers the antithetical determination and is of a more 
theoretical and not necessarily political nature, looks at the historical presuppositions of the 
arising of the Republic, viewing it in its determination through the content of forces that 
delimit the boundaries of the Republic as a form. It turns to the conditions prior to the rise of 
the republic and those in which the republic currently finds itself situated as a result of those 
conditions: wage labor, parceled landed property, smallholding peasantry, the laws of private 
property, the rule of exchange value. In this respect, the Republic cannot lay claim to 
autonomy because those conditions, which Marx recapitulates with the concept of the capital 
form, contradict the self-determination of the Republic. Capital emerges as a force generating 
a social content that is inherently contradictory and incapable of forming itself as a harmonious 
unity of all classes in the fashion that the Republic promised to realize. The core problematic 
of the Eighteenth Brumaire, I believe, can be found in the way in which these two standpoints 
relate to each other. The Republic confronts us with an antinomy because both views on it 
necessarily hold true yet come into conflict theoretically and practically. In the case of the 
autonomy of art in chapter one we encountered the identical structural problematic. That is, 
the work of art separates itself from its genesis to gain its autonomy, and yet this separation is 
historically determined by capitalist society.  
If it generates inherently contradictory social content, then why does capital, as a present 
force at the time of the making of the Republic––and then consequently the Republic itself–
–need to be considered as a historical phenomenon, that is, diachronically? Would a 
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synchronic consideration of capital not suffice to account for the conflictual content of the 
political form of the Republic? I justify a diachronic view in two respects. In order for capital 
to serve as a condition of possibility for the Republic, it must precede the latter. As yet not in 
possession of a fully worked out analysis of the form of capital in general and in separation 
from its historical emergence, Marx himself in the Eighteenth Brumaire refers to the history of 
the capital formation before the Second Republic, tracing it down to the late-eighteenth-
century French developments (the rise of smallholding peasants, wage labor, property laws, 
centralization of the state, taxation). But what is the relevance of this historical, diachronic 
view in respect of capital as a condition of impossibility for the Republic? To answer, we 
should note that the very relation between the synchronic and the diachronic will turn into a 
key methodological question not only in the later Marx but also in subsequent Marxist thought.  
The relation between an existing structure and its historical genetic presuppositions would 
grow into a key problematic of method as Marx proceeded after 1852 to his investigation of 
the capitalist mode of production. Comparing the two ways that this problematic appears in 
the Eighteenth Brumaire and in Marx’s later works, despite their striking differences, will prove 
useful for the argument that I am proposing here. In what follows, I do not intend to suggest 
that the form-content relation in the Republic is the same as the form-content relation in 
capital. The comparison, at least in this chapter, solely serves to work out a conceptual tool 
for grasping Marx’s operation in the Eighteenth Brumaire from the perspective of his later 
analysis of capital. As regards the pamphlet on its own terms, Marx merely refers to “capital” 
without going into any theoretical reflections on its specific formation, its historical 
presupposition, and all the methodological considerations that such an inquiry would yet prove 
to call for.  
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The result of more than two decades of preoccupation with British and French political 
economies since the 1840s, the problematic in Marx’s post-1852 studies asks: To understand 
the capitalist mode of production, should we study the historical development of previous 
forms leading up to the arising of the capital, with presuppositions such as the money form, 
land rent, and wage labor, or should we examine the formal structure of capital in its already 
realized, most advanced form through abstract economic categories? Should our point of 
departure, that is, be the becoming or genesis (“Werden,” “Entstehen”) of the capital or its 
existence (“Dasein”)? (See MEW 42: 372). Marx’s key innovation in critical political economy 
during the late 1850s and early 1860s was the methodological insight that the “presuppositions, 
which originally appeared as conditions of its [that is, capital’s] becoming – and hence could 
not spring from its action as capital – now appear as results of its own realization, reality, as 
posited by it – not as conditions of its arising, but as results of its presence.”56 Thus, instead of starting 
with the general concept of production and tracing down its variegated shapes across ages to 
arrive at its present form, as was the Grundrisse’s primary strategy, in Capital Marx starts his 
investigation with the elementary unit of wealth as it appears in capitalist societies, that is, 
commodity.57  
                                                     
56 “Diese Voraussetzungen, die ursprünglich als Bedingungen seines Werdens erschienen – und daher noch nicht 
von seiner Aktion als Kapital entspringen konnten – erscheinen jetzt als Resultate seiner eignen Verwirklichung, 
Wirklichkeit, als gesetzt von ihm – nicht als Bedingungen seines entstehens, sondern als Resultate seines Daseins.” Karl Marx, 
Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin / NLR, 1973); 
MEW 42: 372. 
57 Since the 1960s and especially in German scholarship, close attention has been paid to the problematic of 
history and structure in Marx’s analysis of capital. Ingo Elbe, “Soziale Form und Geschichte: Der Gegenstand 
des Kapital aus der Perspektive neuerer Marx-Lektüren.” DZPhil, no. 58 (2010): 221–240, esp. 224. Underlying 
this account is the following work by Helmut Reichelt, Zur logischen Struktur des Kampitalbegriffs bei Karl Marx 
(Freiburg: ça ira, 2006), esp. 139–150 on the relation between the logical and the historical in Marx’s analysis of 
the capital. See also Michael Heinrich, Wie das Marxsche “Kapital” Lesen? Leseanleitung und Kommentar zum Anfang des 
“Kapital,” vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Schmetterling, 2009), 40–41. In the same vein, for an early, illuminating account of 
the relation between the logical and the historical, see Alfred Schmidt, History and Structure: An Essay on Hegelian-
Marxist and Structuralist Theories of History, trans. Jeffrey Herf (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), esp. 31–37. For 
a multifaceted collective discussion on a number of issues in Grundrisse in its relation to Capital, see In Marx’s 
Laboratory: Critical Interpretations of the Grundrisse, ed. Riccardo Bellofiore et al (Leiden: Brill, 2013).  
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Two essential formal features of the capitalist mode of production for the mature Marx are 
these: all products take the form of commodity, and labor power itself becomes a commodity 
to be sold on the market. The former feature can be taken as the sufficient condition of the 
rise of capital and the latter at its necessary condition. The production of commodities, which 
presupposes a level of development of the division of labor within society, writes Marx, “is 
common to many economic formations of society, with the most diverse historical 
characteristics” (C: 273). Thus, a further condition is needed specifically, and not generally, to 
determinate the rise of capital proper: “It arises only when the owner of the means of 
production and subsistence finds the free worker available, on the market, as the seller of his 
own labour-power. And this one historical pre-condition comprises a world’s history. Capital, 
therefore, announces from the outset a new epoch in the process of social production” (C: 
274). As a highly productive force, however, once arisen on the ground of commodity 
production and wage labor “capitalist production now establishes itself as a mode of production 
sui generis and brings into being a new mode of material production” (C: 1035). 
The establishment of capitalist production as a mode of existence sui generis grants it the 
status of a form, that is, a unity of elements organized by an internal principle. It becomes 
autonomous in that it transforms its relation to its conditions of arising, it comes into being 
like a living body by separating its ties to the womb. In this respect, Marx speaks of the birth 
of an organic system:  
While in the completed bourgeois system every economic relation presupposes every 
other in its bourgeois economic form, and everything posited is thus also a 
presupposition, this is the case with every organic system. This organic system itself, 
as a totality, has its presuppositions, and its development to its totality consists 
precisely in subordinating all elements of society to itself, or in creating out of it the 
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organs which it still lacks. This is historically how it becomes a totality. The process of 
becoming this totality forms a moment of its process, of its development.58 
 
An organic system, such as capital is for Marx, is an autonomous system insofar as, though 
it remains a historical phenomenon, it appears and functions as an organization that presents 
itself as ahistorical. While once the wage labor and the money were conditions for the arising 
of capital as a valorizing force, after capital fully settled itself in Europe wage labor and money 
became subsumed under capital as its products such that to know them properly would involve 
grasping the capital form. So, knowing the historical emergence of capital does not seem 
necessary to realize why it generates contradictory content, and yet it is not the case that the 
question of historical emergence fades away; it only becomes absorbed in the formal analysis 
of the synchronic structure of a fully settled capital. 
If we accept Marx’s later insight into the capital form, then it can also prove consequential, 
retrospectively, for understanding his operation in the Eighteenth Brumaire. As a threshold to 
the works of the mature Marx, the Eighteenth Brumaire, on my interpretation, prefigures the 
above problematic. The Republic as form behaves in a similar fashion, especially from the 
perspective of the revolutionary agents proclaiming and defending it. While the Republic has 
historical presuppositions, at the time of its proclamation and constitution it asserts itself as 
already presupposed. However, unlike Marx’s later analysis of the capital form, in the form of 
                                                     
58 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, 278. “Es ist zu bedenken, daß die neuen Productivkräfte und Productionsverhältnisse 
sich nicht aus Nichts entwickeln, noch aus der Luft, noch aus dem Schooß der sich selbst setzenden Idee; sondern 
innerhalb und gegensätzlich gegen vorhandene Entwicklung der Production und überlieferte, traditionelle 
Eigenthumsverhältnisse. Wenn im vollendeten bürgerlichen System, jedes ökonomische Verhältniß das andre in 
der bürgerlich-ökonomischen Form voraussetzt und so jedes Gesetze zugleich Voraussetzung ist, so ist das mit 
jedem organischen System der Fall. Dieß organische System selbst als Totalität hat seine Voraussetzungen und 
seine Entwicklung zur Totalität besteht eben [darin], alle Elemente der Gesellschaft sich unterzuordnen, oder die 
ihm noch fehlenden Organe aus ihr heraus zu schaffen. Es wird so historisch zur Totalität. Das Werden zu dieser 
Totalität bildet ein Moment seines Prozesses, seiner Entwicklung.” “Grundrisse,” in Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe 
(MEGA), II/1.1 (Berlin: Dietz, 1998f), 1, 201.  
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the Republic the problematic of existence and genesis retains its double character throughout 
the analysis because of the unity of opposed determinations contained in the Republic: it is 
both self-determined as an organic system and at once determined by capital. That is, naively 
the Republic is autonomous for the agents, while, ironically, for Marx, the Republic is the 
fittest form for the joint rule of the competing fractions of French big bourgeoisie.59 Because 
Marx’s double standpoint in the Eighteenth Brumaire does not reduce one determination of the 
Republic to the other, the antinomy of political form as self-determination and social content 
as determination through capital persists. The naïveté of the actors does not rule out the 
validity or success of their act. Accusing Marx of being interested merely in the economic 
conflicts in civils society with no regard for democratic procedures or in politics as a separate 
sphere rests on wobbly premises.60 In the case of the capital form, however, there exists no 
antinomy for Marx.  
In light of this view of the Republic as an antinomic unity of opposed determinations, any 
interpretation of the Eighteenth Brumaire needs to show how (1) this antinomian unity is made 
possible and why it falls apart, and how (2) the antinomy manifests itself in the concrete life 
of the Republic. I take Marx to hold in the Eighteenth Brumaire that the capacity to bring about 
                                                     
59 With regard to later development in the Republic Marx writes, “After having founded a republic for the 
bourgeoisie, driven the revolutionary proletariat out of the field and reduced the democratic petty bourgeoisie to 
silence for the time being, they [bourgeois republicans] are themselves thrust aside by the mass of the bourgeoisie, 
which justly impounds this republic as its property. This bourgeois mass was, however, royalist. One section of it, 
the big landowners, had ruled during the Restoration and was accordingly Legitimist. The other, the finance 
aristocracy and big industrialists, had ruled during the July monarchy and was consequently Orleanist. The high 
dignitaries of the army, the university, the church, the bar, the Academy and of the press were to be found on 
either side, though in various proportions. Here, in the bourgeois republic, which bore neither the name Bourbon 
[the house ruling during the Restoration] nor the name Orleans, but the name Capital, they found the form of state 
in which they could rule conjointly.” B: II. 120/30. 
60 I would refer in particular to the French historian François Furet’s revisionist critique of Marx. When discussing 
Marx’s interpretation of the 1848, December, election of Bonaparte for president with the help of the peasantry 
and the lumpenproletariat, which, for Marx prefigured the Bonaparitst assault on the bourgeois Republic, Furet 
writes, “Marx never extensively analyzes the impact of democratic procedures on the political sphere, quite simply 
because it does not interest him, obsessed as he never ceased to be with the reduction of the political sphere to 
the opposing interests in civil society.” François Furet, Marx and the French Revolution, trans. Deborah Kan Furet 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 88. 
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such a complex and contradictory form of the political as is the case in the Republic belongs 
to the peculiar nature of the capital form whose structure he by 1852 was not yet in a position 
to articulate. It has not been my intention here to argue that the republic as a unity of opposed 
determinations is structurally or actually identical with that of the capital in Marx’s later 
account. Whether or not such a line of argumentation can be pursued, it simply does not fit 
into the scope of the present chapter. I contend instead that the antinomy of the Republic 
does have a bearing on the form of capital in its relation both to social life and its political 
expression. In other words, capital does enforce its own politics.61 I will next show that the 
key to grasping the Eighteenth Brumaire is to recognize that the antinomy of the Republic is 
presented as manifesting itself politically, that is, in the form of inevitable conflicts and 
dilemmas that the actors encounter on the political scene.  
In the absence of a mature analysis of the form of capital, political narrative was the main 
mode of presentation that Marx had at his disposal––fittest for his subject matter, the 
bourgeois politics––when it came to the question of an historically determined antinomy 
arising from the nature of capitalist mode of production. Political narrative, however, was not 
merely a makeshift for economic analysis. Rather, there is a necessary relation for Marx 
between the political life and the capital form. Doing justice to Marx’s operation in the 
Eighteenth Brumaire calls for grasping this relation.62 
                                                     
61 For a thorough discussion of the political content of different stages of capitalist development and different 
levels of abstraction in analyzing the form of capital, from simple circulation and the money form to the general 
logic of self-producing capital, in Marx, see Patrick Murray, Marx’s Theory of Scientific Knowledge (Atlantic Highlands, 
NJ: Humanities Press International: 1988), 195–207. 
62 Insofar as the relation between political development and capitalist mode of production may be taken as the 
relation of a stage of particular events and acts on the one hand and, on the other, the underlying structure of 
universal forces, social explanations have encountered a number of tricky problems: Should one start with the 
structure or with its concrete manifestations? Is the political thoroughly determined by the economic or does 
that form an autonomous sphere of its own? For a thorough discussion of the problematic of holism vs. 
individualism in Marxist tradition, especially in Althusser and Poulantzas, see Susan James, The Content of Social 
Explanation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). See esp. the chapter “The Framework Applied: 
Poulantzas,” 118–146.  
 250 
 Social class struggle, for which the Eighteenth Brumaire offers a dramatic scene, is at the 
same time political struggle. As Marx notes in 1847, “The political power is the official 
expression of the class contrast within the bourgeois society. . . . There is no political 
movement that would not simultaneously also be a social movement.” In fact, as we saw him 
arguing in his early writings such as “On the Jewish Question,” Marx seems to be holding that 
it is only in bourgeois society that the social differentiates itself from the political, “Where 
there are no classes and no class contrast, the social evolutions will cease to be political revolutions.” 63 
If the political conflicts as empirically recounted in the Eighteenth Brumaire do not arise and are 
not taken into account, the antinomy will prove to be an irrelevant abstract concept. But, 
equally, the conflicts arise because the political form in capitalist society cannot become the 
form of its content, hence failing to claim its autonomy. While the antinomy stems from the 
conflict between the two necessary sides of the Republic, that is, political form and social 
content, the way that the antinomy appears takes the shape of politics. Indeed, the solution 
that practically was given to the antinomy at the cost of the collapse of the Republic, in Marx’s 
narrative, was of a political nature: the Bonapartist centralized state.64 
 
In rough accord with the tripartite periodization of the Republic, Marx detects three distinct 
shapes that the form of the Republic took following two transformations along the course of 
                                                     
63 “die politische Gewalt der offizielle Ausdruck des Klassengegensatzes innerhalb der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft 
ist. . . . Es gibt keine politische Bewegung, die nicht gleichzeitig auch eine gesellschaftliche wäre. Nur bei einer 
Ordnung der Dinge, wo es keine Klassen und keinen Klassengegensatz gibt, werden die gesellschaftlichen Evolutionen 
aufhören, politische Revolutionen zu sein.” Das Elend der Philosophie, in MEW 4: 182. 
64 The Republic collapsed when it lost its unity and, as Marx repeatedly put, disintegrated into its components 
parts. On three different occasions in his analysis of the events Marx writes: 
“The Party of Order was a combination of heterogeneous social substances. The question of revision generated 
a political temperature at which the product again decomposed into its original constituents.” B: VI. 164/86. 
“The attempt at a royalist fusion of Orleanists with Legitimists had thus not only failed; it had destroyed their 
parliamentary fusion, their common republican form, and had broken up the Party of Order into its original 
component parts.” B: VI. 167/93. 
“The National Assembly had become incapable of transacting business. Its atomised constituents were no longer held 
together by any force of cohesion; it had drawn its last breath; it was dead.” B: VI. 178/108. 
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its constitution: the social republic, the democratic republic, and the parliamentary republic 
(B: VII. 181–182/111–112). In this development, two turning points can be singled out for 
their relevance to the question of how the antinomy manifested itself: the 1848 June 
insurrection and the call for the revision of the Constitution in 1851. Marx calls the former 
the “most colossal event in the history of European civil wars” in which one class was 
confronted by all other classes and out of which one class emerged as triumphant (B: I. 
110/18). What we are going to witness is the way that, as a result of the exclusion first of the 
socialists and then of the pure republicans from the scene, one element of the Republic, the 
state power, subjugated the other element, the legislature, backed up mainly by the 
smallholding peasantry.  
The advocates of the bourgeois-democratic republic, meaning those forces that would only 
stress the mere political form of the Republic as a system of universal suffrage and democratic 
representation, bear different names in Marx’s language: tricolor republicans, pure republicans, 
political republicans, formalist republicans (see B: II. 21, VII: 111). It was this class of 
republicans that ruled over the Second Republic between June and December of 1848. Their 
rule was made possible by excluding the proletarian forces during the June Days. On the path 
leading to the civil war of June and the collapse of the social republic there occurred the event 
of the 15th of May in the National Assembly. The month of May saw the National Assembly’s 
efforts to install the Republic by establishing its executive as well as legislative powers. An 
Executive Commission had been appointed to replace the Provisional Government. A group 
of people, mainly members of the Paris radical left clubs, among them representatives, such 
as Barbés and Blanc, “violated the Assembly,” as a representative present said.65 Though it 
                                                     
65 As Maurice Agulhon notes, “It also seems likely that, beyond the Poland issue, which was regarded as 
exemplary and symbolic, the demonstration was intended to express opposition to the retrograde tendency of 
the policies of May and support for a return to the aspirations of February.” The Republican Experiment, 1848–
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imposed itself upon the Assembly and made its voice heard, the whole badly organized 
invasion was a failure. The result was that “the extreme left lost its leaders” in the assembly 
and the main achievements of the February revolution as a quasi-socialist prologue started 
fading away. The National Workshops, a loose adaptation of Loui Blanc’s social workshops 
to guarantee work and livelihood for the masses of French laborers, were abolished, and along 
with it the Government Commission for Workers (the Luxembourg Commission) was 
dissolved.66  
This initial exclusion of the proletarian and socialist forces from the political scene signaled 
the tensions in the social base of the Republic. What established itself afterwards was the 
second period of the Republic during which the pure bourgeois republicans took over the 
executive power and legislature. What matters to us at this point is the significance of the 
“reaction” from within the largest stratum of French society to the specific form of the 
Republic as constituted by pure bourgeois republicans. In the absence of the proletarian forces 
throughout the constituent period, the peasantry, once liberated from the yoke of the feudal 
lords thanks to the first French Revolution, found itself under the yoke of republican taxation 
by a deeply indebted state. The election of this new, unexpected figure, Louis Bonaparte, was 
“met with great approval in the army. . . among the big bourgeoisie, who hailed Bonaparte as 
a bridge to the monarchy, and among the proletarians and petty bourgeois, who hailed him as 
a scourge for Cavaignac.” Various groups hailed him for various, even contradictory, reasons. 
                                                     
1852. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 52. 
66 As Marx notes in 1850, the right to work shrank into the right to resistance in the Constitution (see Surveys from 
Exile, 69). Moreover, a number of socialist leaders, from Barbés to Albert, Blanqui, Raspail were arrested on the 
same day (See Agulhon’s glossing over the event, in The Republican Experiment, 52–54). The republican newspaper 
Le National wrote in its 16 May issue, “One part of the populace, giving rein to most noble sentiments, associated 
itself with a demonstration in support of Poland. Under the cover of the demonstration a plot was being mounted 
against the assembly, against the whole nation, whose life, essence, thought, and energy is expressed by the 
assembly, in fact against the Republic itself. The sovereignty of the people itself has been attached in this attack 
upon its representatives.” Qtd. in Price, Roger. 1848 in France (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975), 98. 
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The outcome, however, as Marx stresses, was the union of the state and capital by the 
mediation of taxation in the interest of the bourgeois creditors of the state. Thus, the 
republicans excluded the socialists, now they are to be excluded by the royalists. The first 
repetition of the exclusion in the life of the Republic occurred during January 1849 only a 
month after the Republic had elected its President.67 With the Constituent Assembly forcibly 
dissolved and the bourgeois Republicans practically excluded, the Republic did not terminate 
itself. It only started its complete form with a President, a council of ministers, magistrates, 
and a Legislative Assembly. The course of its constitution was increasingly running counter to 
its constituent content. 
The parliamentary Republic founded itself in early 1849 upon two exclusions of social 
forces during the early months of the constituent and constituted periods: the proletariat in 
June 1848 and the pure republicans in January 1849. The post-February battle between the 
progressive forces of various grades (the socialists, the pure republicans, the petty bourgeois 
social-democratic) and the relatively reactionary forces of different agendas (the republicans, 
the royalists) over their claim to represent the totality of the Republic would reach a decisive 
point. In the absence of other political rivals, the scene was set for the final life-and-death 
battle in the Republic: between the royalists of the Party of Order in the Legislative Assembly 
and the person of Bonaparte in the executive. It came about over the revision question.  
                                                     
67 The case in point was a foreign policy decision by the new state. This was about French intervention in the 
affairs of the newly founded revolutionary Republic in Rome. While the Constitution forbade the executive power 
to indulge in any unilateral involvement abroad, Bonaparte’s council of ministers “resolved on the expedition to 
Rome, which, it was agreed, should be undertaken behind the back of the National Assembly.” The royalist 
factions of the Party of Order in the Assembly and the head of the ministry Odilon Barrot wanted the Assembly 
to dissolve itself, “suggesting that its dissolution was necessary for the restoration of credit, for the consolidation 
of order, for putting an end to the indefinite provisional arrangements and for establishing a definite state of 
affairs” (B: II. 121). The royalist and Bonapartist forces brought the conflict to the French public and arranged 
rallies against the Assembly. With the help of the National Guard, the republican Assembly was forced to dissolve 
itself.  
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Note that the Party of Order was a coalition of two major factions of the big bourgeoisie: 
the big landed property represented by the legitimists of House of Bourbon and the finance 
aristocracy and big industry represented by House of Orleans. As long as these two groups 
could unify themselves in their social rule, their political differences were merely a semblance. 
To clarify this point, Marx uses the conceptual pairs of political expression and material 
interests. Previously, according to Marx, the legitimists of the Restoration period (1815–1830) 
with their “lords of the soil” and “priests and lackeys,” enjoyed the political expression of 
monarchy. The Orleanists of the July monarchy, on the other hand, with their scores of 
“lawyers, professors and smooth-tongued orators,” had constitutional monarchy as their 
political expression68: “What kept the two factions apart, therefore, was not any so-called 
principles, it was their material conditions of existence, two different kinds of property, it was 
the old contrast between town and country, the rivalry between capital and landed property” 
(B: II. 127–128/40). In the same vein, what kept the two factions untied was a set of conditions 
under which capital and landed property could reconcile with one another, the political 
expression of which was the parliamentary Republic. This would mean securing a double rule: 
social as well as political. 
Enjoying the majority rule in the Assembly was not sufficient to achieve socio-political 
unity. Two preconditions needed to be met: socially, the organs were required to rule over the 
lands, to acquire taxes, to guarantee production, and to preserve order. Politically, the 
executive or administrative power of the state was needed to ensure an indivisible and unified 
power. Of the essential relation between political and material interests and the challenge 
facing the bourgeois rule in uniting these two necessary aspects of its social being Marx writes: 
                                                     
68 Tocqueville makes a clear case for the rise of the “middle classes” and the rule of the property under the reign 
of Louis Philippe during the July Monarchy. See Recollections, 2.  
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But it is precisely with the maintenance of that extensive state machine in its 
numerous ramifications that the material interests of the French bourgeoisie are 
interwoven in the closest fashion. Here it finds posts for its surplus population 
and makes up in the form of state salaries for what it cannot pocket in the 
form of profit, interest, rents and honorariums. On the other hand, its political 
interests compelled it to increase daily the repressive measures and therefore the 
resources and the personnel of the state power, while at the same time it had 
to wage an uninterrupted war against public opinion and mistrustfully mutilate, 
cripple, the independent organs of the social movement, where it did not 
succeed in amputating them entirely.” (B: IV. 139/54) 
 
The series of exclusions of social forces over the first two years of the Second Republic were 
instances of crippling the political expression of other classes, correlative to the increasing 
power of the state machinery to rule over civil society. This arrangement would have worked 
towards benefiting the Party of Order in the Assembly if only it had successfully secured its 
alliance with the administrative power of the state. Now with the increasing independence of 
Bonaparte against the Party of Order, the preconditions started to work against the latter. If 
the factious unity-in-the-republic of the French big bourgeoisie with their varying material 
interests––the finance, industry, and trade of the Orleanists and the landed property of the 
legitimists––had been made possible thanks to the centralized state apparatus, if they had stuck 
too confidently to the form of the parliamentary Republic as the fittest form for their 
unification, losing state power would only equal losing their unity. The occasion came about 
when the revision of the Constitution was put on the agenda in the Assembly. The point of 
revision was the four-year eligibility of the presidential candidate specified in Article 45 of the 
Constitution.69 
                                                     
69 In an 1851 pamphlet titled “Revision of the Constitution” allegedly written by himself, Bonaparte argues at 
length why he believes the government in France needs to end “the bondage of ministerial power to parliamentary 
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The Bonapartists in the Assembly were for the revision and the minority republicans, of 
course, against it as they saw in it the end of the Republic. A revision required three quarters 
of the entire votes, and because of the republican vote, the issue was constitutionally doomed. 
What was the position of the royalists of the Party of Order? Should they pursue a revision, 
jeopardize the Republic, and thereby concede to the continued and extra- and even anti-
parliamentary authority of the state power headed by Bonaparte? Or should they side with the 
minority republicans, reject the revision, and put themselves in the perilous way of a Bonaparte 
imminently resorting to brute force? But most of all, the latter way would open the gates of 
the Republic, in the upcoming 1852 presidential elections, to “revolutionary anarchy, with a 
President who had lost his authority, with a parliament which for a long time had not possessed 
it and with a people that meant to reconquer it (see B: VI. 164/89). Since they were wanting 
in a social base, unlike Bonaparte’s army of lumpenproletariat and peasantry, they saw the light 
of an autarchic Bonaparte at one end of the tunnel of revision and that of the revolutionary 
people at the other end. 
A successfully bourgeois rule requires both political expression and social rule. The political 
rule should both be the expression of social groups and permeate them. Just as happened 
before in the course of the Republic, the parliamentary bourgeoisie decided that “in order to 
preserve its social power intact, its political power must be broken” (B: IV. 143). However, it 
was wrong on both accounts: the political form had already become fragile and the social 
forces had already sided with Bonaparte. This was the irony or the curse of the bourgeoisie in 
                                                     
combinations and cliques, neglect and dissection towards the central and moving power, a gradual weakening 
and fall of authority and of government.” Napoleon, The Political and Historical Works of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte . 
. . (New York: H. Fertig, 1972), 307. The entire pamphlet is an affront against the parliamentary regime and at 
the same time a defense of, not a return to monarchy, but the presence of a central power as the “distinctive 
characteristic of political progress in France” and unity under the law (294). While he laments the fact of political 
fragmentation of French society into numerous departments for electoral purposes, the concrete desire behind 
the pamphlet’s bid to revise the 1848 Constitution relates to “the impossibility of the country interposing its 
voice in its own affairs for a period of four years” (emphasis added; 292). 
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the face of the repeated pattern of permanent counterrevolution.70 Such a dilemma arose 
precisely because of the resistance of the structure or the political form itself: it was the 
Constitution that resisted any attempt at an easy revision by containing a mechanism for 
revision. Thus, when the Assembly majority ultimately decided that a group of representatives 
from the two factions of the Party of Order should indeed move that the Constitution be 
revised, Marx writes, “the majority of parliament declared against the Constitution, but this 
Constitution itself declared for the minority and that its vote was binding” (B: VI. 168/94–
95).71 The structure of the constitutional Republic resisted its dissolution as a result of the 
revision thanks to the article in the Constitution requiring a certain majority to enforce any 
revision. The agents facilitated the dissolution of the form anyway; they thus acted 
unconstitutionally. The revision, that is, could be done only at the expense of betraying the 
structure of the Republic by the ruling agents in the parliament.  
But the dissolution of the form of the Republic would mean the undoing of the unity of 
the rival factions of the big bourgeoisie, the legitimists and the Orleanists, the landed property 
and the trade and industry. Since they were the majority in the Assembly, their decline would 
give way to the full power of the executive. Moreover, since neither the proletariat nor any 
other class was ready to stand up for the Republic, it would remain only for Louis Bonaparte 
to arise as the victorious figure in the situation, as turned out to be the case within less than 
year in his coup d’état of 2 December 1851. In light of the outcome of the solution that the 
                                                     
70 While they do not use the term antinomy, commentators have deployed other terms to indicate the conflictual 
state in which the French bourgeoisie found itself. By stressing the bourgeoisie’s relation to the state power it 
helped create, Hunt calls the outcome of its state-building an “ironic result”: “the executive power triumphs, nota 
bene, as a force ‘hostile’ to the bourgeoisie, even though the bourgeoisie had contributed heavily to the triumph.” 
Hunt, The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 51. In a similar vein, Draper writes, “The bourgeoisie . . . was incapable 
of opposing this development [of the state becoming independent of society and of the bourgeois parliamentary 
rule]; its contradiction was that it was simultaneously disarmed and defended by one and the same process, cured 
and castrated by the same operation.” Theory of Revolution, vol.1, 396. 
71 “Die Majorität des Parlaments erklärte sich so gegen die Verfassung, aber diese Verfassung selbst erklärte sich 
für die Minorität, und ihren Beschluß für bindend.” 
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Party of Order opted for in the face of the antinomy, that is to say, the downfall of its political 
form as well as the loss of its social rule, the support of the army and the bourgeois mass and 
other classes, we can now see the phenomenon of Louis Bonaparte himself as the inevitable 
outcome of the unresolved conflict.72  
The decline of the Republic can be seen as its failure to hold together its constituent 
elements and thus justify its form as the form of its content. This was a failure to generate a 
unity in which the political form could go beyond the particularity of the interests of the 
participants in order to represent the universality of all the people. Our investigation will not 
be complete without considering the resolution to the antinomy 
 
                                                     
72 In a letter to Marx on the day after the coup d’état Engels points out the new situation as “the terrifying 
perspective of lack of opposition” (“schreckliche Perspektive der Gegensatzlosigkeit”; Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, 
III. 4: 260). A better translation for Gegensatzlosigkeit would be the lack of any contrast or contradiction. While 
Engels and Marx both wondered why there was no real opposition against Bonaparte on the part of the proletariat 
(a week or so later Engels wrote an article explaining the reasons; see Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, I: 11), the 
expression could also be read as Bonaparte having put an end to the contrast that had beset the forces of the 
Republic and thereby resolved the antinomy. In this respect, Gramsci’s formulation of the phenomenon of 
Bonapartism or as he put it Caesarism is very useful and the closest one to the format of the antinomy: 
 “Caesarism can be said to express a situation in which the forces in conflict balance each other in a catastrophic 
manner; that is to say, they balance each other in such a way that a continuation of the conflict can only terminate 
in their reciprocal destruction. When the progressive force A struggles with the reactionary force B, not only may 
A defeat B or B defeat A, but it may happen that neither A nor B defeats the other––that they bleed each other 
mutually and then a third force C intervenes from outside, subjugating what is left of Both A and B.” Antonio 
Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. Quintin Hoare, and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith 
(New York: International Publishers, 1971), 219. 
He then goes on to indicate various examples of the intervening C with varying degrees of being progressive or 
reactionary: Napoleon I, Napoleon III, Bismarck, and the rise of Fascism in Italy and Germany. In our case, 
however, it is not easy to neatly tell apart and distinguish the natures of the A and B forces in terms of 
progressiveness. While the royalist Party of Order used the form of the parliamentary republic, this was to secure 
the interests of finance, landed property, and big industry and to do so they had to exclude the republican, 
proletarian, and social-democratic forces. They were thus reactionary forces. On the other hand, while the 
progressive forces, in particular the socialist proletariat, their occasional alliances with the peasantry in as the 
social base of Bonaparte, and early on with the bourgeoisie as well, at times jeopardized or polluted their 
progressive character. It is probably for this reason that Marx, throughout the Eighteenth Brumaire, widely took 
account of various coalitions, factions, and groups in both A and B forces.   
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§ 4 THE RESOLUTION TO COME 
Marx’s proposal for resolving the antinomy can be viewed as an attempt to bring together the 
two levels of analysis that I offered in the previous sections of this chapter: the philosophical 
analysis of the antinomic form-content relation in the Republic (in §§ 1 and 2) and the political-
empirical analysis of the manifestation of the antinomy (in § 3). From the standpoint of the 
Eighteenth Brumaire, the composition of which Marx started only weeks after the coup of 
December 2, 1851, the fall of the French Republic was inevitable not because of the particular 
decisions that the actors made on the occasion of, say, the revision of the Constitution, but 
because of the nature of the political form as conditioned by the rule of capital. In this sense, 
no matter what the actors did, their deeds were doomed. This is critical to any consideration 
of a resolution to the antinomy. For unpacking this view on the inevitability of the antinomy 
and collapse of the bourgeois republic in Marx, a closer look at the mode of exposition in the 
Eighteenth Brumaire with regard to its different temporalities will prove useful.  
The Eighteenth Brumaire performs on three temporal modalities: the temporality of political 
acts in the present tense, the temporality of capital in the past or rather in the perfect tense, 
and the temporality of the resolution in the future tense. The first two modalities correspond 
to the two standpoints of the Eighteenth Brumaire, synchronic and diachronic, both with regard 
to the form of the republic as such and the structure of capital as such, and with regard to the 
particular political development of the Republic and the specific development of capital in 
France with the rise of the smallholding peasants, landed property, and the centralized state. 
The third temporality relates to the resolution, in which the two standpoints are to be unified. 
Now, because the predominant mode of narrative in the Eighteenth Brumaire is political, we 
should be careful not to draw sharp lines between the narrative temporalities on one hand and, 
on the other, between them and discursive or theoretical standpoints. The political narrative, 
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which treats both of the form of the Republic and of the concrete development of events 
within that form, is also dominant in Marx’s attempt to offer a resolution to the antinomy. I 
clarify this point as I proceed to examine the resolution.  
 In the first temporality, the book offers a chronicle of events spanning in a linear mode 
from the late 1848 through the early 1852. Here, the deeds of the actors act upon one another 
in a chain of causality with specific effects leading up to the end. It also offers a retrospective 
narrative in light of the final downfall of the Republic in which all previous stages and acts 
appear predetermined, inevitability leading up to the end result. For instance, the function of 
the 15th of May, 1848, insurrection by the Parisian proletariat, an early turning point in the 
developments to come, is cast in these terms: 
In vain the Paris proletariat, which immediately grasped the character of this 
National Assembly, attempted on May 15, a few days after it met, forcibly to 
negate its existence, to dissolve it, to disintegrate again into its constituent parts 
the organic form in which the proletariat was threatened by the reacting spirit 
of the nation (B: I. 110/17).73  
 
The “organic form” did not fall apart but continued its life. Its final disintegration, as Marx 
knew the end of the story, came about thanks to, not the proletarians, but the Bonapartist 
state backed up by the peasants and lumpenproletariat. Yet, this early decisive exclusion of the 
proletariat and their ideal of a social republic was to cast its long shadow over the subsequent 
developments, acting as a demand whose repression by the ruling classes cost them the 
Republic. The last chapter of the work contains the following remark: “On the threshold of 
the February revolution, the social republic appeared as a phrase, as a prophecy. In the June days 
                                                     
73 “Vergebens versuchte das Pariser Proletariat, das den Charakter dieser Nationalversammlung sofort begriff,  
wenige Tage nach ihrem Zusammentritt, am 15. Mai, ihre Existenz gewaltsam wegzuläugnen, sie aufzulösen, die 
organische Gestalt, worin der reagirende Geist der Nation es bedrohte, wieder in ihre einzelnen Bestandtheile zu 
zerstreuen.” 
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of 1848, it was drowned in the blood of the Paris proletariat, but it haunts the subsequent acts 
of the drama like a ghost” (B: VII. 181/111). 
The second temporality follows a logic that goes beyond the causal nexus of concrete 
events during the period at stake. Here, the narrative tells the story, not of an act enclosed in 
a period, but of a set of conditions historically and logically preceding the period. Historically, 
because Marx’s account of the rise of the centralized state and the smallholding peasants trace 
these to the late eighteenth century. Logically, because his evolving concept of the capital 
form, as a force accompanying the forming of the state and conditioning the making of the 
smallholders, is not bound to the specific and contingent conditions of France. Representative 
of this second mode of narrative is what Marx says of the Republic in the early third period 
when both the socialist and pure-republican forces had been widely ousted from the scene of 
the drama, “Here, in the bourgeois republic, which bore neither the name Bourbon [the house 
ruling during the Restoration] nor the name Orleans, but the name Capital, they found the form 
of state in which they could rule conjointly” (B: II. 120/30). The core claim in this mode is that 
the Republic owed its form to the capitalist mode of production and thus was the political 
expression of the rule of one class over all others. 
Michel Henry’s words speak to the two temporalities in Marx’s work in these terms: 
In examining the revolutionary process in France during the years 1846–1851 [sic], 
Marx divides it in two times, the primary time, which has just ended under his eyes, 
which belongs to the past, which ends with the coup d’état of December 2, and the 
secondary time that is the process of self-realizing, whose description is at the same 
time a prophecy and which Marx justly interprets as the constructing of a secret finality 
beneath an apparent counter-finality.74 
 
                                                     
74 Michel Henry, Marx: Une philosophie de la réalité, vol. 1 (Paris : Gallimard, 1976), 166–167. 
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The manifest counter-finality or counter-purposiveness for Henry refers to what guided the 
major actors in the Republic in their decisions to preserve themselves both against the social 
forces from below and the Bonapartist statist forces from above, up to the constitutional 
revision affaire. The secret or latent finality, on the other hand, refers to the insight that all 
those deeds, as we saw, only accelerated the opposite of what they aimed to negate: the 
strengthening of the state over the parliament and society. The Bonapartist coup was the ripe 
fruit of this latent finality. In other words, standing at the close of the period at issue but 
starting with the February days in 1848, Marx is recounting a forward-moving series of political 
acts and events at the same time as he is narrating the predestined outcome of those acts and 
events from the perspective of the capital. The counter-finality is the irony teasing the naïve 
purposiveness of the agents insofar as they were the agents of the autonomous form of 
political life. Marx’s operation in the Eighteenth Brumaire, however, does not stop here. There 
is a third temporality with which he can anticipate a resolution to the antinomy.  
If Marx had stuck to these two temporalities, he would have had to endorse a pure blind 
historical determinism whose necessity would be impossible to decipher. Without a necessity, 
there would have been no antinomy to begin with. The antinomy arose precisely because both 
the form and the content of modern political life for Marx equally held true yet came into 
conflict with one another under the condition of capital. Of the affirmative importance of the 
bourgeois form created by the February revolution in relation to the collapse of the Republic, 
Marx writes:  
Under Louis Philippe the privileged part of the bourgeoisie concealed its rule beneath 
the crown; in the parliamentary republic the rule of the bourgeoisie––after it had 
united all its elements and made its empire the empire of its class––revealed itself. So 
the revolution had first created the form in which the rule of the bourgeois class 
received its broadest, most general and ultimate expression and could therefore also 
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be overthrown, without being able to rise again. Only now was the sentence executed 
that was passed in February upon the Orleanist bourgeoisie, i.e. the most viable faction 
of the French bourgeoisie. (B: VII. 183/114) 75 
 
The first part of this passage from the last chapter of the Eighteenth Brumaire does not tell us 
anything we do not already know from the preceding chapters of the work; the parliamentary 
Republic proved to be the revelation of bourgeois rule in which the competing factions of the 
big bourgeoisie reached consensus and ruled conjointly. The parliamentary Republic, that is, 
became the fittest form for the bourgeois rule thanks to the February revolution. What the 
passage in its second part adds to this insight, however, is a claim that is neither chronological 
nor structural-historical, but philosophical and prophetic. It states that it was necessary for a 
fully bourgeois, thus abstract and illegitimate, political form to emerge and to run its course to 
its downfall. “Now a crushing blow was struck,” by the Bonapartist forces, at the entire body 
of the bourgeois political as well as social rule: “at its parliament, its legal courts, its commercial 
courts, its provincial representations, its notary’s office, its university, its tribune and its 
tribunals, its press and its literature. . . .” 
This crushing of the bourgeois rule was accomplished not by progressive, proletarian 
forces, but by reactionary, imperialist Bonapartist forces in collusion with smallholding 
peasants and urban property-less masses; the same social content that the bourgeois classes 
had curbed in the interest of the abstract political form of the parliamentary republic suitable 
for unifying various fractions of the bourgeoisie. As Marx puts it in a series of rhetorical 
                                                     
75 “Unter Louis Philippe verbarg der bevorzugte Theil der Bourgeoisie seine Herrschaft unter der Krone; in der 
parlamentarischen Republik zeigte die Herrschaft der Bourgeoisie nachdem sie alle ihre Elemente vereint und ihr 
Reich zum Reiche ihrer Klasse erweitert hatte, nacht ihr Haupt. So mußte die Revolution selbst erst die Form 
schaffen, worin die Herrschaft der Bourgeoisklasse ihren weitesten, allgemeinsten und letzten Ausdruck 
gewinnen, also nun auch gestürzt werden konnte, ohne wieder aufstehn zu können. Erst jetzt wurde das im 
Februar erlassene Urtheil an der orleanistischen Bourgeoisie, d. h. an der lebensfähigsten Fraktion der 
französischen Bourgeoisie vollsteckt.” 
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inversions, “The French bourgeoisie balked at the power of the working proletariat; it has 
brought the lumpenproletariat to power. . . . The Bourgeoisie apotheosised the sword; the 
sword rules it. It destroyed the revolutionary press; its own press has been destroyed . . .” (B: 
VII. 183/112). Though the crushing was not the work of the proletariat, it served, for Marx, 
as the necessary precondition for a proletarian revolution to come. Years ago Marx had 
concluded his self-defense before the Prussian court on the same note, “Perhaps the victory 
of the revolution is possible only after the completed counterrevolution” (MEW 6: 257).76  
The counterrevolution in our case is the Bonapartist coup d’état. It proved a solution to 
the antinomy of the parliamentary Republic, but it was not the true resolution to the antinomy 
for Marx: “Instead of society having conquered a new content for itself, it seems that the state 
only returned to its oldest form, to the shamelessly simple domination of the sabre and the 
cowl” (B: I. 106/13).77 Here Marx expressively defends the bourgeois form of politics as 
opposed to the shameless rule of brute force even if the latter crushed the bourgeois rule. The 
resolution to the bourgeois antinomy is not an all-powerful state machinery. At issue for him 
is rescuing the abstract form of modern politics, which has broken with the old forms of rule, 
by conquering its own actual content. The modality of the future in the Eighteenth Brumaire is 
conditioned by this very historical-philosophical principle of the necessity of the emerging and 
perishing of, to use the language of Marx’s prime years, the “mere political formalism of 
bourgeois society” (MEW 1: 277).78 It is in this sense that the early famous passage in the 
pamphlet should be understood:  
The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its poetry from the past, 
but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped off all 
                                                     
76 “Vielleicht ist der Sieg der Revolution erst möglich nach vollendeter Konterrevolution.” 
77 “Statt daß die Gesellschaft selbst sich einen neuen Inhalt erobert hätte, scheint nur der Staat zu seiner ältesten 
Form zurückgekehrt, zur unverschämt einfachen Herrschaft von Säbel und von Kutte.“ 
78 “bloßen politischen Formalismus der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft.” 
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superstition about the past. Earlier revolutions required recollections of past world 
history in order to dull themselves to their own content. In order to arrive at its own 
content, the revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead. 
There the words went beyond the content; here the content goes beyond the words. 
(B: I. 106/12)79  
 
The call to the content is a call to make the abstract form of the Republic, inherited from 
the eighteenth centuries’ revolutions, become conscious of its constituents, yet this self-
consciousness is not possible under the historically given conditions of bourgeois society, that 
is, under the condition of capitalist production. Capital, the full analysis of which Marx was 
yet to undertake, is that which stymies the legitimacy and autonomy of the political form as 
the form of its content. However, it was owing to the triumph of capital following the February 
revolution and the repressing of the June insurrection, as we saw above, that the form of the 
republic with its claim to universal representation could assert itself. The Eighteenth Brumaire is 
not sufficiently articulate on this double role of capital in contributing both to the political 
form and the social content of bourgeois society at the same time as it prevents the unity of 
both. Yet it was only after the failure of the republican revolutions of those four years in 
Europe, especially in his own Germany, that Marx fully resumed his political-economic studies 
during his long exile in London, which came to fruition in the Capital project. To understand 
the modality of the future in Marx, under the sign of which the failure of the republic transpires 
as a necessary and welcomed event, we need to find a way to reconcile the two temporalities 
in Marx. To do so, and in proposing the Eighteenth Brumaire’s resolution to the antinomy of the 
                                                     
79 “Die soziale Revolution des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts kann ihre Poesie nicht aus der Vergangenheit schöpfen, 
sondern nur aus der Zukunft. Sie kann nicht mit sich selbst beginnen, bevor sie allen Aberglauben an die 
Vergangenheit abgestreift hat. Die früheren Revolutionen bedurften der weltgeschichtlichen Rückerinnerungen, 
um sich über ihren eigenen Inhalt zu betäuben. Die Revolution des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts muß die Todten 
ihre Todten begraben lassen, um bei ihrem eignen Inhalt anzukommen. Dort ging die Phrase über den Inhalt, 
hier geht der Inhalt geht über die Phrase hinaus.” 
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republic, I conclude this chapter on a note about the prominent Marxian figure that turned 
out sidetracked in the development of the nearly four years at stake here: the proletariat. 
The antinomy that we investigated had entangled the bourgeois rule in the face of the 
desiderata of its own form of politics, which it failed to meet, giving way to most reactionary 
monarchic and imperialist forces. This form had a double character. On the one hand, it was 
autonomous according to its central claim to represent all the people and thus legitimize itself 
by virtue of its content alone. On the other hand, however, it was a social fact, the product of 
forces that preceded its revolutionary coming on the stage in the February days. Its main 
challenge, therefore, was to assert its autonomy within the coercive historical conditions of its 
genesis. A true synthesis of the double narrative necessary for grasping the fate of the Second 
Republic must take into account both the capital form and its real produced content, the army 
of wage laborers. But this army itself needs to emerge as a class that is aware of its own position 
in modern society. The becoming of such a class, ironically, requires the ripening of the social-
political conditions against which it is to fight, that is, the conditions of bourgeois rule. Thus, 
the resolution to the antinomy can be found in the following remarks by Marx with regard to 
the third period of the Republic in which even the pure republicans along with the socialists 
had been excluded:  
As long as the rule of the bourgeois class had not been organised completely, as long 
as it had not acquired its pure political expression, the antagonism of the other classes, 
likewise, could not appear in its pure form, and where it did appear could not take the 
dangerous turn that [ suddenly puts into question the property, the religion, the family, 
and the order] transforms every struggle against the state power into a struggle against 
capital. (B: IV. 142/60)80 
                                                     
80 “So lange die Herrschaft der Bourgeoisklasse sich nicht vollständig organisirt, nicht ihren reinen politischen 
Ausdruck gewonnen hatte, konnte auch der Gegensatz der andern Klassen nicht rein hervortreten, und wo er 
hervortrat, nicht die gefährliche Wendung nehmen, die sofort das Eigenthum, die Religion, die Familie, die 
Ordnung in Frage stellt, jeden Kampf gegen die Staatsgewalt in einen Kampf gegen das Kapital verwandelt.” 
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The two modalities of Marx’s narrative in the Eighteenth Brumaire find their unity in the 
above claim. This states that the political anti-state struggle, such as the one against the July 
Monarchy leading to the Second Republic or the June Insurrection against the established 
government, becomes at once an anti-capital struggle provided only that the rule of capital has 
found its pure expression in politics. Marx’s best example of the discrepancy between these 
two struggles, that is, a political struggle devoid of class struggle, is the position of the social-
democratic Montage party in 1849. This party became a coalition of the peasants and some 
socialist workers. “The peculiar character of Social-Democracy is epitomised in the fact that 
democratic-republican institutions are demanded as a means, not of superseding two extremes, 
capital and wage labour, but of weakening their antagonism and transforming it into harmony” 
(B: III. 130). The social democrats, according to Marx, accept the general framework of the 
bourgeois republic and fight for political representation within it, thus avoiding the class 
struggle that permeates the social content of that framework. On account of Marx’s passage 
quoted above, one could then maintain that the predominance of a social-democratic political 
struggle, of the petty-bourgeois kind that was the case in the Second Republic according to 
Marx, already implies that the rule of the bourgeois class has not found its pure political 
expression such that any struggle against the state would be at the same time one against 
capital.  
The political agent to come, therefore, leads a politics that is simultaneously the conscious 
reflection of class struggle within the bourgeois society, coming to terms with the conflicts in 
the social content of the political life. It is such an agency that can unite the empirical narrative 
                                                     
Note: the clause “das Eigenthum . . . stellt” belongs to a later version of the book, which is missing in the English 
translation used above. I have added it in brackets.  
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of political events with the transcendent account of the historically conditioned formal 
structure of the capitalist mode of production. The resolution to the antinomy of the republic 
will be provided by the practice of a self-conscious class that knows that “There is no political 
movement that would not simultaneously also be a social movement” (MEW 4: 182). 
Now, inasmuch as the prospect for a genuine, not Bonapartist-smallholding, resolution to 
the antinomy is at issue, the same risk of antinomy in which the bourgeois republicans found 
themselves entangled besets the proletariat. After all, as Marx submits in the longer passage 
quoted above, the ripening of the bourgeois rule must coincide with the ripening of its class 
enemy, the proletariat. Is it not the very presence of such a class that already signifies that the 
capital has found its pure political expression? Or is it the other way around? There is not 
much of an answer to this circular problematic in the Eighteenth Brumaire. The proletariat, 
therefore, acquires an ambiguous status in the pamphlet. In the concluding remarks of his 
lecture on the Eighteenth Brumaire, Claude Lefort describes the double character of this “strange 
being” succinctly:  
At once purely social, purely historical, and, as it were, outside society and history—a 
class which ceases to be one, since the dissolution of all classes takes place within it, 
and the only class which can act in a way which is free from the poetry of the past; a 
strange being who fulfils the destiny of humanity, but abolishes all tradition—an heir 
without a heritage. Should we say that it is the destroyer of the social imaginary or the 
last product of Marx's imagination?81  
 
If the last word of Lefort’s lecture happens to be “imagination,” then it is not out of order to 
stress the aesthetic dimension of Marx’s operation in the Eighteenth Brumaire. After all, it is in 
aesthetics, as I have tried to argue in this dissertation, that the double character, social and 
                                                     
81 Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism, ed. John Thompson 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 180. 
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autonomous, of any attempt at self-determination within a coercive nexus of determining 
relations most consistently manifests itself. And yet, the resolution to this bewildering conflict 




The four chapters of this dissertation have investigated the problem of autonomous form 
under specific historical conditions in the domains of aesthetics, literature, politics, and history. 
I have submitted two related theses. The first thesis states that autonomous form is inevitably 
antinomic, and the second thesis underlines that it is antinomic only under the conditions of 
capitalist society. In short, the antinomy is historical. I presented a model of performative 
antinomy in which a formal act of self-relation faces difficulties from its real conditions of 
possibility—both of these aspects are valid and demand resolution. A performative antinomy 
must be of a historical nature if it is to take into account the relation of opposition between 
an internally successful act and its external conditions. 
I cast the antinomy problem in the modality of the aesthetic in chapter one, while the three 
other chapters conformed to it in working out their respective problems in regards to the 
literary work, the person and the state, and the republic. The awareness of the conflict and the 
proclivity to resolve it constituted the defining mark of the four primary texts that I examined. 
A conclusion for such a study proceeding under the sign of structural parallelism must note 
the relationship between the aesthetic modality and other spheres with their specificities. 
Instead of stressing their likenesses, this is the place to highlight their differences. 
In chapter one I aimed to show that the relationship of the aesthetic act to its own context 
becomes a direct issue both for the act itself and for the observer of the act. If the aesthetic 
act fails to turn that relationship into an issue, it falls back into the fetish-commodity form 
and, more generally, into the form of functionality as such. In this case, the aesthetic act of the 
artwork would lose its claim to autonomy as freedom from any function imposed on it from 
an outside force. Avoiding this generates both a remarkable consciousness of the act’s 
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conditioning as well as a commitment to resolve the ensuing conflict. Without this 
commitment, the autonomous aesthetic act ends up as pure fetish, a mere semblance, as the 
sign of false consciousness. 
In this context, saying that autonomous form “is conscious” of its conditions does not 
necessarily need to be taken in a figurative sense only. In my readings of Adorno’s proposed 
resolution to aesthetic antinomy, Hegel’s view of the infinite self-relation in the embodied 
subject as person, and Marx’s conception of the proletariat as a force that is neither entirely 
social nor entirely autonomous, I did take it literally in order to leave room for metaphysical 
resolutions to the arising antinomies. However, there is no rule against a metaphysical or 
theological account, no matter how minimally conceived or pianissimo played, of the force 
that supposedly holds together the elements of the form by binding them to a law distinct 
from natural causation, social functions, or historical circumstances.1 However the resolution 
may be imagined, one thing remains certain: although the aesthetic can figure a resolution or, 
for that matter, may even be able to show in an Aristotelian or Platonic fashion, how forms 
as such work in the world, how they emerge out of disparate materials and govern unities and 
arbitrate conflicts –– the aesthetic nevertheless falls short of actually resolving the antinomy 
of form. For it belongs to the realm of semblances with no power to change things or the 
conditions of possibility or impossibility. Unless, again, we go for the alternative, and mobilize 
aesthetics in a high metaphysical key by, say, conceiving of nature, history, and life as aesthetic 
phenomena in which forms come into being and perish by virtue of an objective force whose 
source of causality remains obscure to us. This, however, would mean that instead of facing 
                                                     
1 The impossibility of ruling out a metaphysical account in dealing with the matters of autonomy and rationality 
in the modern world, see Hent de Vries, Minimal Theologies: Critiques of Secular Reason in Adorno and Levinas, 151–
164. 
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the predicament of the aesthetic mode of thinking and acting, we would be raising it to an 
absolute standpoint ostensibly freed of the conflicts of other formal acts.  
As I attempted to illustrate, none of the four figures whose works I examined here would 
have settled for such an account. For Adorno, Kleist, Hegel, and Marx, the autonomy claims 
of their subject matter of the specific texts explored here must face the crucible of their real 
conditions of existence, of the world of law-bound appearances, unyielding obstacles, and 
inevitable antagonisms. The resolutions that the autonomous forms offer to defend their 
identities must, for their part, justify themselves and live with the consequences of their 
specific formations. Thus, Kleist’s Michael Kohlhaas must show that it is aware of the tension 
between its forensic and fantastic modes of narrative and further legitimize its specific way of 
recomposing itself in response to that conflict. The human subject as a person capable of 
saying “I am myself, free, and entitled to rights” must, or even ought to, endure the resistance 
imposed on that utterance by physical, psychological, social, and historical conditions that 
make the utterance possible. And finally, the 1848 revolutionaries could not naïvely proclaim 
that the republic was a political form claiming to represent all people while closing their eyes 
to the antagonistic nature of all that their act presupposed. Keeping the eyes open, however, 
does not necessarily amount to cynicism or resignation in the face of historical hurdles. 
Revolutionary acts must suffer through not only their miscarriages but the reasons for 
miscarrying, and must thus learn the lesson that the revolutionary act must reappropriate and 
take possession of its very conditions.  
Each of the four cases in question attempts to reconstruct its original claim to autonomy 
after that claim was confronted with its real conditions. My particular account of the four 
reconstructions may not be the only path ahead. But there must be a path for reconstruction, 
at any rate, if the act is to be legitimate and in accord with its concept. In chapter three I 
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reproduced Hegel’s 1801/1802 schema (see Figure 2) that describes how philosophies that 
rely on a subject-object dichotomy become entangled in antinomies by failing to locate a 
ground to bring together the opposed determinations of their constructs. Hegel’s goal––which 
turned into the program of his system as such––was to show that the antinomies between a 
self-related, self-identical structural form, such as the ‘I,’ and the resistant world of objective, 
non-identical obstacles arise because philosophy fails to heed the actual conditions for its 
systematic efforts. Thus, philosophy becomes abstract and not determinate. I have argued that 
while Hegel’s plea to seek conditionality in the constitution of the person in bourgeois society 
was indeed a breakthrough in modern practical philosophy, his own effort to reconcile the 
systematic aspect of personality and its historical arising produced more antinomies. This 
occurred for Hegel did not go far enough in analyzing the concrete conditions of bourgeois 
society as the birthplace of persons, and instead opted for a third standpoint anchored in world 
history and its spirit. The third Hegelian standpoint involved a double commitment: to the 
Absolute and to “objective totality.” The other three texts that I examined here are marked by 
deviations from Hegel’s solution that nevertheless stick to its core problematic: how to think 
the infinite self-relation and its finite conditionality at one and the same time. I further argued 
that it was in Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire that seeking concrete conditions with regard to the 
autonomous form of the republic was fully carried out.   
Even so, Hegel’s schema is useful both for imagining the relation of autonomous form and 
its conditioning in each case and for the relationship between all four cases from a global 
perspective. Accordingly, I propose a similar schema (Figure 3) regarding the dissertation’s 
thesis as a whole. Adorno’s aesthetic theory posits the problematic of autonomous form and 
its historical conditions. When we look at the three concrete cases of self-relation in Kleist, 
Hegel, and Marx—that is, Michael Kohlhaas, a modern person, and the Second Republic, 
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respectively—we find that though they are structurally analogous, ontologically they are very 
different phenomena: one is a text, one is a human being, and the other an abstract entity 
composed of human beings, texts, things, and institutions. Thus, Marx offers the largest case 
by considering the most general or structural set of conditions underlying a self-relating entity, 
the republic. The dominant mode of narrative in the latter case, as I have shown, was political. 
The proclamation of the modern republic was the expression of the claim of politics in the 












And yet, the historical framework that makes such a revolutionary act of proclaiming 
possible, the rule of capital, proved to be the conditions of impossibility of what was 
proclaimed, the political form of the republic. The same conditions played a crucial role in the 
other cases I investigated. For Marx, I argued that revolutionizing the conditions of possibility 
of the truly political form itself would take a political form. Thus, the same conflict between a 























Its Conditions   
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and a speculative or right resolution in Hegel, but a political or real resolution in Marx. The 
conflict, however, whose resolution turned out to be political was originally posed in the 
aesthetic mode. Therefore, the aesthetic problem of the autonomous act under the specific 
historical conditions of bourgeois society can fully manifest itself only in a political mode in 
which the relation of an act and its conditions most concretely reveals itself.  
A renewed engagement with antinomies in thinking structures and their social facticity may 
help us shed light on the wider geography of, in Kant’s’ language, the dialectical battlefields 
where rival accounts of double aspects of any matter at hand continue to fight each other. The 
second half of the twentieth century and the early years of the present century have seen 
several attempts to recapture that terrain. One could think of New Marx Readings in political 
economy, Speculative Realism, New Materialisms, and studies of Anthropocene in philosophy 
and historical sociology, different tenets of revisiting Hegel in practical philosophy, and Freud 
and Lacan in psychoanalysis, but also new interpretations of theology as structuring modern 
politics and ethics. A key concern of some of these efforts is their shared lines of flight from 
relativism, individualism, and finitude engendered by rethinking the notions of the infinite, the 
structural and historical totality, and truth. In particular, I think of Alain Badiou’s project of 
presenting philosophy as a reflection on truth through rigorously taking into account the 
conditions of producing truths in art, science, psychoanalysis, and politics.2  
To conclude, this dissertation hopes to contribute to philosophical aesthetics and, more 
generally, to understanding some of the key problems in philosophy, political thought, and 
literature, which I believe first revealed their full import in modern Germany thought, through 
a single insight. That is, an inquiry into conditions –– economic, social, and historical –– not 
                                                     
2 His most recent work, a forthcoming sequel to Being and Event (London: Bloomsbury, 2013, originally published 
in French in 1988), is L’immanence des vérités (Paris: Fayard, set to be published in September 2018).  
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only does not undo what is perceived as the autonomy of formal disciplines in humanities, it 
can very well confirm the necessity of this autonomy. This, however, demands that we traverse 
our fantasies about that autonomy by looking into the eyes of the objective forces that infiltrate 
it to its most ideal extremes. Aesthetics proposes a model of free, self-ruled praxis, but the act 
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